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is not to extend knowledge by confirming what 
we already know, that the world is a place of dom-
ination and oppression? What if we asked theory 
instead, to help us see openings, to provide a space 
of freedom and possibility?«
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2008). Diverse economies: perfor-
mative practices for ›other worlds‹. Progress in Human 
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‘Questioning the meaningfulness of continuous material growth should 
become an integral part of spatial sciences and planning.’
Christian Schulz, Martina Hülz, Bastian Lange, Benedikt Schmid
About this book
The idea for this book arose from the collaboration of the editors and a num-
ber of the contributors in the working group ‘Post-Growth Economies’1 of the 
Academy for Territorial Development in the Leibniz Association (Akademie 
für Raumentwicklung in der Leibniz-Gemeinschaf t, ARL2). The working group 
involved more than a dozen geographers, economists and spatial and land-
scape planners from Germany, Switzerland and Luxembourg. From mid-
2017 to mid-2020, the group members met every six months at workshops in 
different locations and systematically tackled the topic of post-growth econ-
omies from the perspective of the spatial and planning sciences. 
Exchanges with post-growth actors on the ground were always an inte-
gral part of the workshops and a source of inspiration for further work. In 
addition to this book, the working group has been involved in various other 
activities. Members of the group were instrumental in preparing the 2019 
ARL annual congress on ‘Post-growth and Transformation’ in Kassel. In addi-
tion, they contributed to the conception and content of an issue of the jour-
nal politische ökologie entitled ‘Möglichkeitsräume. Raumplanung im Zeichen des 
Postwachstums’ (‘Spaces of opportunities. Spatial Planning and Post-growth’; 
also see https://www.arl-net.de/de/postwachstum, 28.02.2020).
All the chapters in this book are direct translations from the German orig-
inal (Lange et al. 2020) and authorised by the respective authors. The intro-
duction has been updated for an international audience. As the original work 
was sent to the publisher in early 2020, the implications of the Covid-19 pan-
1  Goals, activities and membership of the ARL working group ‘Post-Growth Economies’: 
https://www.arl-net.de/de/projekte/postwachstumsökonomien (28.02.2020)
2  The ARL – Academy for Spatial Research and Planning, Leibniz Forum for Spatial Sciences, 
adopted a new name at the beginning of 2021: ARL – Academy for Territorial Development 
in the Leibniz Association. This new name has not been used in the articles of this volume.
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demic had not yet been addressed. The revised introduction includes obser-
vations on the pandemic from a post-growth perspective.
The editors would like to thank all contributors and interviewees for their 
commitment and participation. Special thanks go to the ARL, the Univer-
sity of Luxembourg and the University of Leipzig for its financial support 
and to the staff of the ARL Headquarters for their all-round support of the 
working group and this publication. We would also like to thank the team at 
transcript for including us in the series Social and Cultural Geography and 
for their consistently professional support and encouragement of the project. 
We hope that this publication will inspire as many people as possible and look 
forward to further discussions, comments and reactions.
Berlin/Hannover/Freiburg/Luxembourg, May 2021
Bastian Lange – Martina Hülz – Benedikt Schmid – Christian Schulz
Illustrations
The cover design and the pages separating the main parts of the book are 
based on a graphic recording of the 2019 ARL Congress in Kassel, 
designed by Katrina Günther of ‘Thinking Visual’, Berlin. 
The quotations on the rear sides of the dividing pages are taken from a video 
project with compiled interview sequences, produced in the run-up to 
the 2019 ARL Congress. Viola Schulze Dieckhoff and Joyce Gosemann 
drew the portrait sketches of the individuals quoted.
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Conceptual and thematic cornerstones of this book
Christian Schulz, Bastian Lange, Martina Hülz, Benedikt Schmid
Post-growth: Context and current debates
In the last ten to fifteen years, there has been a rapid increase in the impor-
tance of debates held under the headings of degrowth or post-growth, con-
sidering the consequences of systemic growth imperatives and possible 
alternatives to dominant economic practices. 
The enhanced significance of such discussions is linked, first, to the 
so-called ‘economic and financial crisis’ of 2007/2008, which revealed the 
culmination (Jorberg, 2010) of global crises (the financial, climate, migration, 
hunger and biodiversity crises) and their mutual interdependencies. 
Second, the growth of social inequality, both globally and between and 
within regions and cities, and the intensified deregulation and financiali-
sation of the economy, e. g. in the property sector, has led to broad media 
coverage of their causal interrelationships. 
Third, new social movements such as Extinction Rebellion, Fridays 
for Future and associated groups have recently managed to establish a 
socio-ecological framework for their climate policy demands, the effective-
ness of which seems to be only temporarily overshadowed by the Covid-19 
pandemic, as demonstrated by current campaigns for the German 2021 fed-
eral elections. Indeed, the pandemic is seen as having the potential to accel-
erate post-growth policy approaches, for instance in the context of regional 
resilience, shortened supply chains and security of supply (further discus-
sion of this below).
In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 ‘economic and financial crisis’, a num-
ber of growth-critical approaches were taken up by international organisa-
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tions that had not previously addressed the issue of growth limits. Exam-
ples include the European Commission and their strategy paper ‘GDP and 
beyond’ (European Commission, 2009) and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development with their ‘Better Life Index’ (OECD, 2011). 
These organisations thus started to engage with conventional measurements 
of economic development and prosperity. 
Subsequently, both organisations attempted to link growth management 
and sustainability goals: the EU in its ‘Strategy 2020’, using the concept of 
‘Sustainable Growth’ (European Commission, 2010), and the OECD, who 
adopted the principle of ‘Green Growth’ (OECD, 2014, 2009). The concept of 
the ‘Green Economy’ propagated by the United Nations (UNEP, 2011) has a 
similar focus. Indeed, among the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
which are currently subject to much discussion, SDG 8 calls for the promo-
tion of ‘sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and pro-
ductive employment and decent work for all’. This is to be achieved through 
explicit adherence to GDP growth targets1 and a development policy that 
focuses on technology, efficiency and diversification2. The aim is that eco-
nomic growth and environmental degradation should be decoupled by 20303. 
Similarly, the 2019 ‘Green Deal’ called for by the new EU Commission also 
discusses a ‘new growth strategy’ based on a ‘modern, resource-efficient and 
competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases 
in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use’ (Euro-
pean Commission, 2019, 2).
None of these approaches fundamentally question the material growth 
logic of the dominant economic system. However, they do see it as causing 
negative social and ecological externalities and, in order to minimise these 
externalities, are thus in favour of the ecological modernisation of the cur-
rent production system. Technology is intended to improve efficiency in the 
1  Target 1: ‘Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances 
and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least 
developed countries’
2   Target 2: ‘Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, techno-
logical upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and la-
bour-intensive sectors’
3   Target 4: ‘Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efficiency in consumption 
and production and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degra-
dation’
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production and use of goods (e. g. smart homes) and, coupled with greater 
recycling of resources (e.  g. the circular economy), is expected to support 
sustainability and open up new possibilities for economic development and 
diversification in the field of environmental technology or eco-technology.
However, it is already apparent that such technology-based moderni-
sation approaches are insufficient to address the prevalent ecological and 
social problems. Indeed, the one-sided focus on improving resource effi-
ciency through technological progress encourages us to assume that current 
patterns of consumption and behaviour can be maintained in the long term. 
In this context, Kenis and Lievens (2016, 221) speak of the ‘royal road to sav-
ing capitalism’. Three important points of criticism can be identified here. 
First, it has not yet proved possible to decouple economic growth from 
resource consumption, either globally or at a national level. Thus, despite all 
the efforts to improve efficiency in the 2000s and 2010s, resource consump-
tion has continued to rise with economic output (Giljum & Lutter, 2015). At 
best, it is possible to recognise a degree of relative decoupling whereby eco-
nomic output has risen somewhat faster than resource requirements. How-
ever, in absolute terms, consumption of materials and energy has continued 
to grow steadily (Jackson, 2009, Haberl et al., 2020, Paech, 2010). 
Second, this lack of decoupling can only be partially attributed to demo-
graphic trends (e.  g. global population growth) and socio-economic devel-
opments (the emergence of a high-consumption ‘middle class’ in emerging 
economies). It is also due to the fact that improved efficiency is associated 
with financial savings (e. g. reduced heating costs), which then lead to addi-
tional purchases (e.  g. energy-intensive electrical equipment) or activities 
(e. g. increased air travel). In terms of resource ecology, this is counterpro-
ductive and produces a ‘rebound effect’ (also known as the ‘Jevons paradox’; 
W.S. Jevons, 1865). In view of recent increases in material intensity in certain 
industries, there has even been talk of ‘recoupling’ (Hickel & Kallis, 2019).
Third, ‘smart’ technologies and the ‘Internet of Things’ are viewed with 
increasing scepticism (Kerschner et al., 2018), not only in terms of data pro-
tection or the potential vulnerability of such technologies (‘critical’ infra-
structures), but also from a resource perspective. The introduction of high-
tech solutions, e.  g. in building technology, always involves new materials 
and energy requirements, which in some cases outweigh the desired effi-
ciency gains or even lead to new environmental and resource problems (as 
with the example of rare earths).
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Post-growth as an emancipatory critique of growth promises 
In addition to asking whether economic growth can be decoupled from 
resource consumption, feminist and postcolonial critiques problematise 
growth, measured as gross domestic product (GDP), as a political econ-
omy objective in itself. GDP fails to capture significant and fundamental 
elements of social relations – such as private care work, household labour, 
free exchange and production for personal use. Focusing economic policy 
on growth therefore provides an incentive to repress such social relations 
in favour of formal markets. This not only limits what is recognised as work 
and the economy (Gibson-Graham & Dombroski, 2020), but also leads to the 
undermining and destabilisation of traditional communities and economic 
activities under the pretext of (economic) progress (Kothari et al., 2019).
Discussions about the limits of economic growth and resulting pros-
perity and satisfaction are conducted primarily by those who have already 
achieved a certain level of material prosperity, a position from which it is 
hardly possible to achieve happiness and fulfilment through further mate-
rial growth. It is therefore extremely important to problematise global rela-
tions of exploitation (Brand & Wissen, 2021), questions of responsibility and 
distributive justice, for instance in relation to the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions.
Justified doubts about the technology and market focus of approaches 
favoured by the political sphere have fed a vibrant post-growth debate that 
is seeking options for fundamental change (see the overview in Schmelzer 
& Vetter, 2019). This discussion presents the idea of sufficiency as a counter-
point to one-sided, strongly growth-oriented efficiency approaches (Schnei-
dewind & Zahrnt, 2014). However, more recent debates (Kerschner et al., 
2018, Pansera et al., 2019, Lange and Santarius, 2020) also include consider-
ation of whether and how technological developments (under the keywords 
of ‘digitalisation’ and ‘automation’) can be positively managed in social and 
ecological terms.
Post-growth researchers discuss not only what and how we consume 
but also the ways in which we organise production, how much time we 
devote to paid work, and how we measure the importance of non-market 
and non-GDP-relevant economic activities (home care, neighbourhood help 
and voluntary work). Behind this is the larger issue of the purpose and focus 
of our economic system (profit maximisation versus a focus on the com-
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mon good) and the attempt to overcome material growth imperatives – for 
example in the sense of the décroissance/degrowth approach (Latouche, 2006, 
Kallis, 2018) or the search for ‘prosperity without growth’ (Jackson, 2009, 
Lange, 2018).
Post-growth in spatial and planning sciences
Against the backdrop of the lively debates on post-growth approaches that 
are currently being conducted primarily in civil society forums and organi-
sations, spatial and planning sciences are also beginning to pay attention to 
the topic (Zademach & Hillebrand, 2013, Krueger et al., 2017, Schmid, 2019, 
Schulz & Bailey, 2014, Lamker & Schulze Dieckhoff, 2019, Demaria et al., 
2019, Lange, 2017). In some cases this involves drawing on approaches which 
are not explicitly post-growth but are critical of capitalism, such as the con-
cept of diverse economies (Gibson-Graham, 2008). 
It seems surprising that spatial sciences and planning have not become 
involved in the debate sooner. After all, it is some time since the spatial sci-
ences pointed out the limits to growth and there has been extensive research 
and many publications on the negative consequences of global resource con-
sumption from within the discipline. In turn, spatial planning has tradition-
ally addressed the scarcity of land, landscapes, habitats and resources and is 
concerned with channelling or limiting land consumption.
However, most prevailing concepts, models and theoretical approaches 
in the spatial sciences continue to draw on an unquestioned growth para-
digm. For example, common indicators and models in regional develop-
ment are based on the assumption that quantitative growth (e. g. of labour 
markets, population, company turnover and infrastructure investment) is 
the most important driver of any positive development. The negative exter-
nalities of this development paradigm – such as environmental and health 
impacts – are problematised and efforts are made to reduce and manage 
such impacts, but there is generally little fundamental questioning of the 
purpose and desirability of continuous growth. 
Paradoxically, this also applies to recent research on shrinking cities and 
on demographic change in rural areas. Here the focus tends to be on the 
problems and possible ways of returning to growth paths rather than on the 
opportunities presented by change. 
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To ensure there is no misunderstanding here: post-growth is not synon-
ymous with shrinkage (e. g. of the population) or recession (e. g. of economic 
output). Rather, it is about abandoning the illusory notion that technological 
innovations and improved efficiency can ensure the long-term global growth 
of current production systems and consumption patterns, thereby improv-
ing living conditions for all. 
Furthermore, post-growth does not mean that material growth should 
no longer be possible. Most post-growth approaches rather assume that 
spatial differentiation is necessary (e.  g. pro-poor growth in economically 
disadvantaged regions). In essence, it is about adjusting understandings 
of growth and re-evaluating it, examining the long-term meaningfulness 
of certain developments and, if necessary, looking for possible alternatives 
within free social conditions. Meaningfulness refers here not only to the 
environment but also to individual and social needs, i.e. a focus on the com-
mon good rather than individual economic profitability. 
In this context, a broader understanding of ‘economy’ is also relevant. 
This includes not only formally constituted enterprises operating according 
to market principles, but also forms of the social and solidarity economy, pri-
vate pursuits (e. g. home care) and community activities (e. g. neighbourhood 
help, swap shops). This is by no means to say that all forms of human activ-
ity should be assessed and quantified according to market logics. Rather, 
authors like Seidl and Zahrnt (2019) argue that the creation of social prosper-
ity should be recognised as being just as valuable as GDP-relevant activities 
(see the article by Brückner in this volume).
The spatial sciences, with their established interest in sustainability 
issues, are particularly called upon to critically engage with the current 
debates on green growth, the circular economy, smart cities and the shar-
ing economy. At the same time, more systematic engagement with alterna-
tive forms of economic activity is urgently needed in order to understand 
such approaches, some of which remain ephemeral while others are clearly 
gaining in relevance (e. g. Community Supported Agriculture). This will then 
allow their transformative potential to be evaluated.
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Concepts for a geographical perspective on post-growth 
processes
Common spatial concepts such as scale, network, territory and place, along 
with other terms such as terrain, landscape and border, have a long tradition 
in spatial science research. The former are cited by various authors as fun-
damental concepts of space, as they each stand for different logics of how 
space is produced in social practice and can be examined (Jessop, Brenner 
& Jones, 2008). The way in which space and spatial relations may be socially 
produced (Lefebvre) and grasped is also of great importance for transforma-
tion research (see the article by Schmid in this volume). 
A recurring topic in many of the empirical articles in this volume is, for 
example, the question of the scaling of civil society initiatives. This ref lects 
the central importance of issues of scaling in current debates on post-growth 
(Buch-Hansen, 2018). However, understandings of scaling vary considerably 
and include range, relevance, professionalisation or institutionalisation. 
Attempts to overcome structural distinctions between the local and global 
(Marston, Jones & Woodward, 2005, Massey, 2005) play a role here, as does 
distinguishing between bottom-up and top-down strategies of social change 
(Gallo-Cruz, 2017). 
Inspired by non-hierarchical, rhizomatic and horizontal ontologies – 
as proposed, for example, by practice theory or actor-network approaches 
– change is increasingly imagined and conceived as the shifting of diverse 
practices in more than human contexts (Joutsenvirta, 2016, Lange & Bürkner, 
2018, Rodríguez-Giralt, Marrero-Guillamón & Milstein, 2018, Schmid & 
Smith, 2020). 
Similarly, governance and planning-related contributions raise ques-
tions about the reference areas, spaces of action and territoriality of post-
growth processes (see the article by Bürkner/Lange in this volume). While 
spatial science approaches repeatedly point out the constructed nature of 
territorial entities (Agnew, 1994, Cox, 2003), administrative and planning 
territories are usually presented as one way (among several) of describing 
‘reality’ for transformative policies. 
With the help of more recent urban research approaches in urban geog-
raphy and cultural studies, it is possible to identify subject-oriented and 
scale-critical perspectives as an extension of transition theory approaches. 
The subjectively configured spatial frame of reference of actors and its rele-
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vance for actors’ roles, functions and expectations in post-growth processes 
are examined more closely by Smith, Voß and Grin (2010) and Coenen, Ben-
neworth and Truffer (2012) as transition geographies (see the articles by 
Lamker/Schulze Dieckhoff and Kettner/Mössner in this volume).
At the same time, debates on digitalisation have detected the increasing 
dissolution of spatial boundaries. However, it is easy to overlook the fact that 
social practice is bound to specific places and materialities even in the digital 
age. The multifaceted spatial relations and translocal linkages of online and 
off line communities therefore require approaches that capture spatial inter-
connections and links to places of social practice. 
Developments around open workshops (Lange, 2017) and the maker 
movement (Davies, 2017) are a case in point (see the article by Kurzeja/Thiele/
Klagge in this volume). While supra-regional organisations (such as the Ver-
bund Of fener Werkstätten [Association of Open Workshops]) and online plat-
forms play an important role in the diffusion of open workshops, the actual 
places themselves are charged with specific meanings, shaped by commu-
nities and temporary, so that they cannot easily be expanded or replicated 
(scaled). Thus, interaction between different forms of space – e.  g. scale, 
place and network – is also an important prerequisite for understanding 
transformation processes and potentials (Schmid, 2020). 
Concrete examples of post-growth economic activities, consumption, 
planning and construction can thus neither be considered in isolation from 
superordinate levels of action and policy nor detached from their relational 
connections to other practices and actors, be they regional or more exten-
sive. It is this interplay of levels, scopes and relationships that creates new 
geographies of post-growth. We refer here to geographies in the plural in 
order to include not only the structural and thematic diversity of geographi-
cal articulations of post-growth, but also the current dynamics and volatility 
of emergent patterns. Considering and ref lecting upon these developments 
provides both opportunities and challenges and requires the constant ques-
tioning of established models and explanatory approaches. It is to be hoped 
that the present and future findings of spatial post-growth research will 
soon be ref lected in textbooks and policy recommendations. This book aims 
to make a contribution here (Oekom, 2020, ARL, 2021a, 2021b). 
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Challenges for the spatial sciences 
From a spatial science perspective, many of the post-growth phenomena are 
clearly highly relevant and require intensive scientific monitoring so that we 
can learn from the early phases of the initiatives and draw conclusions for 
future projects and policy advice (see below).
While, for example, alternative energy concepts (Klagge & Meister, 2018) 
and aspects of communal urban farming (Rosol, 2018) have already received 
great attention, the empirical study of other approaches oriented towards 
post-growth is still in its infancy. The following topics serve as examples.
Land
Land ownership and land policy are not new topics for the spatial sciences or 
spatial planning (see Hertweck, 2020). However, current debates on rising 
property prices and housing shortages are bringing the issue of land owner-
ship back into the spotlight (Difu & vhw, 2017). There are a number of links 
here to the post-growth debate such as the commodification of public land, 
the question of re-municipalising formerly privatised property (e. g. for pub-
lic welfare housing) and – closely related to this – the issue of democratic 
participation in decision-making about the socially desirable use of land 
(Hesse, 2018).
Housing
Concerns about a lack of control over settlement development in times of pro-
gressive privatisation and financialisation are closely linked to the question 
of what kinds of growth are desired (e. g. what kind of housing for whom). In 
addition to social factors and design aspects (including sustainable build-
ing standards), this also involves ways of enabling and promoting types of 
housing that offer space for post-growth lifestyles and modes of production 
(Jarvis, 2017, Nelson & Schneider, 2019). One option is, for example, to com-
bine (comparatively) small private living spaces with spaces for communal 
use (office spaces, workshops, play and sports areas and gardens). Also of 
relevance are collective forms of planning, investment and housing provi-
sion (e. g. cooperatives) (see the article by Wohlgemuth/Pütz in this volume).
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Work
Aspects of settlement design are in turn closely linked to the development of 
new forms of urban production. In addition to urban farming, this includes 
open workshops and makerspaces (Lange & Bürkner, 2018), forms of com-
munal or temporary office use (co-working spaces – increasingly in combi-
nation with childcare, housing and catering services) and a variety of other 
types of cooperative and shared functions. 
As well as the issue of new places of work, the post-growth debate also 
raises the far more fundamental question of the role of work (Grenzdörffer, 
2021, McKinnon, 2020, Seidl & Zahrnt, 2019). This is, first, about the general 
importance of work for social well-being, with a particular focus on improv-
ing (formal) recognition of care work, which has mostly gone unpaid and 
unnoticed by economic statistics. Second, discussion focuses on how the 
temporal balance between gainful employment and other forms of socially 
and personally important activities can be changed on an individual basis – 
not least in order to facilitate more resource-efficient lifestyles with time for 
gardening, handicrafts/repairing, food preparation, etc.
Sharing
Not every form of the sharing economy is per se post-growth-oriented or 
more sustainable than conventional forms of use. On the contrary, a whole 
range of commercial services run under this label only involve sharing on 
a superficial level or in part, e. g. large car sharing providers or the online 
accommodation marketplace Airbnb. Such services are increasingly subject 
to critical scrutiny (Belk, 2017, Martin, 2016). However, sharing practices 
that focus on conserving resources and the community – so-called ‘trans-
formative sharing’ – provide important impulses for post-growth economies 
(Schmid, 2020).
Agriculture
Alongside the focus on changing consumption patterns and a return to 
regional food production, new forms of active or passive participation are 
also particularly important, for example contributing financial resources 
or labour in the context of community supported agriculture (CSA). Social 
science research is interested not only in the ecological aspects of land con-
version and spatial patterns of changed supply relationships, but also in the 
socio-economic questions of cohesion, participation and co-production. 
Post-growth geographies 25
Rural areas
CSA initiatives are not only found in the environs of urban agglomerations 
but are increasingly shaping rural areas as well. Here, too, the focus is on 
adaptability, security of supply and social cohesion. In addition to farm-
ing, there are a wide variety of growth-critical approaches in rural areas 
(e. g. neighbourhood shops, co-working spaces, swap shops, local currencies, 
energy cooperatives) that are often brought together under the umbrella of 
Transition Town initiatives.
Transdisciplinary perspectives on post-growth
All of the thematic areas discussed above involve new forms of social rela-
tions and specific forms of organisation. The latter often go beyond conven-
tional understandings of private-sector enterprises or public institutions 
and include diverse types of hybrid organisations. These include constel-
lations of economic, public and civil society actors, such as those that have 
emerged in fair trade initiatives or in the decentralised production of renew-
able energies (Dufays & Huybrechts, 2016). Social enterprises or ‘(eco-)social 
enterprises’ (Defourny, 2014, Johanisova & Franková, 2017) are examples of 
hybrid organisations that combine economic, social and ecological concerns 
in very different ways. So far, they have only received marginal attention 
from the spatial sciences (e. g. economic geography). 
Post-growth can be taken into account more or less explicitly at all levels 
of planning. Especially in urban planning and architecture, there are numer-
ous examples of approaches that are creating design and infrastructural 
conditions intended to promote or enable post-growth activities (see the 
articles by Kettner/Mössner and Lamker/Schulze Dieckhoff in this volume). 
Including particular design features in residential and commercial build-
ings or public areas can proactively create spaces for sharing (e. g. co-work-
ing, community gardens) and necessary infrastructures (e.  g. workshops, 
car/bike sharing). In this context, reference should also be made to the idea 
labs of the ARL’s Post-Growth Society Initiative (Initiative Postwachstums-
gesellschaf t), which experimentally engage with approaches to post-growth 
planning (Schulze Diekhoff & Lamker, 2017).
Last but not least, we should also consider the question of how intensively 
the spatial sciences want to participate in these political and social debates. 
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There is a large gap between, on the one hand, a position of defensive obser-
vation, which addresses post-growth phenomena primarily from empirical 
or conceptual interest, and, on the other hand, an explicitly activist role with 
socially engaged researchers who see themselves as part of a movement (Par-
ticipatory Action Research, see Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007). 
It seems clear that examining the topics presented here from a spatial 
science perspective is relevant and necessary. This edited volume provides 
examples that demonstrate how the spatial sciences can continue to serve 
as descriptive and analytical research disciplines and also develop a role as 
a body for action and implementation in planning practice. In both cases, 
far-reaching imperatives for action emerge in the context of a post-growth 
analysis of society. 
A valuable contribution could also be made to the increasingly dynamic 
debate on fundamental economies (Foundational Economy Collective, 2018). 
Starting from a critique of the neo-liberal state’s withdrawal from public ser-
vices and welfare, the concept has identified a set of foundational infrastruc-
tures and services that is considered indispensable for societal well-being 
(public utilities, education, health services and care). The authors argue that 
these services and infrastructures should be distributed and accessible to 
all members of a society with the same high-quality standards and reliabil-
ity. They should be counted as citizen rights and not subject to privatisation, 
speculation or profit-oriented market dynamics. Rather, they should become 
(or remain) public services financed by the state and decided upon in dem-
ocratic, transparent and inclusive decision-making processes that serve the 
common good (Nygaard & Hansen, 2021). This pledge resonates with recent 
geographical contributions to the role of infrastructures in the socio-ecolog-
ical transition (Moss & Marvin, 2016, Becker, Naumann & Moss, 2016).
Post-growth in times of pandemic
Both the importance of foundational infrastructures and services for societal 
well-being and their vulnerability in a growth-based market economy have 
become very clear in the recent months which have been greatly inf luenced 
by Covid-19. In lieu of a detailed analysis, many of which have been offered 
by scholars across the social sciences (see for example the Special Issue ‘The 
Geography of the COVID‐19 Pandemic’ of the Tijdschrift voor Economische 
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en Sociale Geografie, KNAG, 2020), we want to highlight a number of obser-
vations that are particularly important from a post-growth perspective. 
The pandemic has impressively demonstrated the vulnerability of eco-
nomic relations that depend on highly distributed global value chains and 
the continuous intensification of market exchange. Even in the absence of 
real demand – as mass events, holiday travel and many indoor and outdoor 
leisure activities had to be put on hold – the economy needed to be kept 
going at all costs. This led to balancing the health of ‘the economy’ against 
the health of people (e. g. by failing to significantly restrict contacts in offices 
and factories or by subsidising the automobile industry instead of investing 
in better public transportation). Higher demands in other areas, in partic-
ular the hospital, medical and healthcare sector, in turn, led to the overload 
and breakdown of basic services which had been streamlined towards mar-
ket efficiency. Key workers, who were most affected by the pandemic and at 
the same time crucial for the maintenance of basic supply, received symbolic 
appreciation (clapping for care workers) but neither monetary nor profes-
sional improvement of their structural position. 
States, meanwhile, mobilised impressive financial, administrative and 
discursive resources and implemented a wide range of measures – ranging 
from comprehensive restrictions on public and private life to massive vacci-
nation programmes. This raises the question of whether this astonishingly 
rapid execution of power could not be transferred to more diffuse but no less 
dangerous crises, such as climate change or species extinction? From a post-
growth perspective, there needs to be (finally) recognition of the scientifi-
cally proven urgency of ecological crises, leading to a decisive redirection of 
political and economic processes. At the same time, the forces of inertia have 
been amply demonstrated in the massive subsidies awarded to carbon-in-
tensive industries such as airlines and the automobile sector. In the face of 
intensifying climate crises, many states have squandered a unique opportu-
nity to ‘build back better’.
In sum, Covid-19 has deepened existing fault lines and socio-ecological 
challenges, but also made them more visible. Alternative discourses and 
practices that emancipatory groups and movements were already imple-
menting before the pandemic have acquired new meanings and dynamism. 
Amidst attempts to get back to ‘normal’, the viability and urgency of alterna-
tive forms of economic activity and notions of prosperity have gained trac-
tion in social debates. New practices that address social and ecological chal-
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lenges have emerged at a speed that would have been unimaginable without 
the rupture caused by Covid-19. These range from neighbourhood initiatives 
with a wide variety of people offering help to others, especially those in ‘risk 
groups’, to pop-up bike lanes in large cities that would otherwise have taken 
years to implement. 
The pandemic has intensified structural issues but also given impe-
tus to certain discussions, some of which have long been part of the post-
growth debate. These include the measurement of prosperity by GDP, the 
growth-oriented incentives of tax and interest rate policy, the limits of mar-
kets as an allocation mechanism, the (re)evaluation of waged labour and non-
waged labour, and the purposes of business activities. Covid-19 has magni-
fied both the structural inequalities within and across regions and countries, 
and the severe limitations of existing instruments and approaches intended 
to address them. Post-growth research therefore has to (continue to) develop 
alternative visions and discourses that address the roots of socio-environ-
mental crises – of which the current pandemic is but one dimension.
Objectives of the publication
Against this backdrop, the key concern of this book is to provide answers to 
the following questions:
1. How does a spatial perspective contribute to an understanding of post-
growth economies? 
2. In which relations of place, network connections and positionings do 
practices and processes of the post-growth economy become visible?
3. How can established terms and concepts of spatial and planning sciences 
be fruitfully operationalised for post-growth research? 
4. How do the possibilities and problems of institutionalising and scaling 
post-growth organisations and practices appear from a spatial science 
perspective? 
5. Which consequences and design options emerge for spatial and urban 
planning?
6. Which explanations of social change that include a spatial perspective 
prove analytically helpful and applicable to practice?
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These questions can only be answered through critical consideration of the 
established terms and concepts of the spatial and planning sciences. This 
includes identifying the latent inf luences of growth-oriented regional and 
spatial analysis and, if necessary, providing modified heuristics. 
For example, our analytical understanding of regional development pro-
cesses is generally inextricably linked to conventional methods of measuring 
or evaluating them. Despite long-standing and manifold criticism of the use 
of purely quantitative monetary indicators (e.  g. GDP, productivity, direct 
investment, expenditure on research and development), these indicators 
continue to dominate scientific analysis and political debates. Alternative 
approaches to assessing sustainability, life satisfaction and the extent of 
social cohesion/solidarity already exist. However, these approaches – not 
least because of their greater complexity – have so far been confined to the 
margins of academia.
Our prevailing understanding of innovation is similarly one-sided or 
narrow. Although the concept of social innovation has found its way into spa-
tial science research in recent years (Avelino et al., 2017), most work remains 
linked to a more technical-organisational understanding of innovation. The 
focus tends to be primarily on researching the spatial effects of incremental 
improvements in production processes (e.  g. efficiency increases through 
new manufacturing processes, the optimisation of logistical processes) 
rather than on the consequences of disruptive innovations or inventions, 
such as the so-called Internet of Things. However, an expanded spatially sit-
uated understanding of innovation would allow us to additionally capture 
societal change and related innovations in the areas of, for example, political 
participation, local communities, models of working hours, lifestyles and 
consumption patterns (see Lange/Bürkner and Tschumi/Winiger/Wirth et 
al. in this volume). 
Furthermore, not only do the spatial sciences mostly use a narrow con-
cept of the economy, they also take a traditional view of enterprises as cen-
tral actors. As a rule, enterprises are understood as formally constituted 
organisations that are subject to the rules of the market and pursue targets 
related to monetary profitability. Public enterprises (e. g. municipal utilities) 
or social and solidarity enterprises (e. g. cooperatives and non-profit organ-
isations) are also primarily seen from the perspective of market logic. This 
understanding of enterprises leaves little room for hybrid or temporary con-
stellations of actors, public welfare-oriented initiatives and other heterodox 
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ways of organising everyday economic activity, developments to which the 
post-growth debate attaches particular importance.
Structure of the edited volume
The book is structured around the key questions listed above and the asso-
ciated disciplinary and interdisciplinary strands of discussion. The ques-
tions are addressed in four thematic sections (I-IV) in which the individual 
articles are grouped. On the one hand, these articles ref lect the breadth of 
current debates in academia and practice and, on the other hand, highlight 
conceptual and factual problems that have been somewhat neglected in dis-
cussion to date.
In the first thematic section ‘Spaces of Perspective’, the articles explore 
how a spatial perspective can contribute to understandings of post-growth. 
What are the relations of place, network connections and positionings in 
which practices and processes of the post-growth economy become visible? 
What spatial strategies and social innovations underlie such post-growth 
economic practices and processes? 
Section II presents ‘Spaces of Possibility’ and discusses how actors in the 
field of the post-growth economy assess their environmental, spatial and 
place relations. How do they deal with the expectations of transition and 
transformation directed towards them? Which concrete practices, concepts 
and visions create new geographies of post-growth?
The third thematic section ‘Spaces of Conf lict’ addresses selected fields of 
tension, considering, for example, the global dimension or the North-South 
dimension of socio-ecological transformation and the role of the financial 
sector.
Finally, thematic Section IV is dedicated to ‘Spaces of Design’ and consid-
ers questions such as: What are the consequences for spatial and settlement 
planning? What impulses, topics and methodologies should be incorporated 
in training and teaching? What action is required from spatial development 
policy? What options does civil society have for intervention and co-design?
The four thematic sections are accompanied by practical examples, inter-
views and case studies. The intention is to present the specific stories, prac-
tices, processes and perceptions of activists and actors directly in their own 
words. This polyvocality thus includes practitioners as defining promoters 
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of post-growth geographies – even if they rarely use the term post-growth, 
their practices nevertheless display concrete links to the movement. 
The book aims to provide conceptual stimuli and arouse curiosity about a 
new thematic field. Rather than presenting conclusive answers, the objective 
is to trace and synthesise the diversity and potentials of post-growth geo-
graphies. Open questions are also identified and hence goals for continued 
debate are derived. A further emphasis is on questioning familiar ways of 
thinking and working and initiating new thematic collaborations across 
disciplines. The concluding interview on the potential role of art and cre-
ative experimentation in post-growth spatial development exemplifies this 
approach. We encourage an open and dynamic process between activist and 
academic discussions on post-growth. Spatial sciences and planning should 
contribute here by developing a geographical perspective on post-growth 
processes, taking a differentiated view of the spatial dimensions of societal, 
socio-economic and ecological change dynamics. This is particularly called 
for in the context of current debates on the socio-economic and ecological 
consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic.
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I. Spaces of Perspective
‘Is there really a lack of conceptual ideas for alternative development models 
that are not based on material growth indicators? Or is it only a question of 
not daring to act?’
Frank Gwildis
Using socio-spatial concepts of situatedness 
to explain work processes in the context   
of post-growth economies
Hans-Joachim Bürkner, Bastian Lange
1. (Post)capitalist understandings of work 
1.1 Questions and objectives
Geographical discussions about the possible forms and effects of nascent 
post-growth economies have thus far strangely excluded the category ‘work’. 
Economic geography in particular has paid little attention to concrete forms 
of work and their inf luence on production structures, networks and spatial 
constructs. This seems particularly strange given that work, as a central 
component of economic processes, should be an immediate focus of the dis-
cipline. It is therefore necessary to develop a perspective on post-growth that 
places the category ‘work’ and its particular socio-spatial implications at the 
centre of consideration.  
Of especial relevance here are social innovations that penetrate eco-
nomic fields in somewhat unpredictable ways. This extends considerably 
beyond the horizons of economic analyses. Such analyses have usually linked 
work directly with economic processes and structures, which in turn have 
been devised as subordinated to the basic logic of capitalist economic activ-
ity. This has remained accepted practice even when considering marginal 
areas of economics, irritating as they often are for economists. For exam-
ple, although in recent years concepts of economic innovation have been 
discussed in terms of their receptiveness for further social impulses, the 
fundamental growth postulates of the current global economic system have 
remained unaffected by this. Viewed from this perspective, ‘user innovation’ 
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or ‘open innovation’, with which ingenious enterprises use external knowl-
edge and tap into low-cost resources, serves the continued pursuit of growth 
and unconditional profit maximisation (see Brinks 2019).
The problem of adequately describing changed work processes is thus 
more complicated than it may initially appear, since it involves nothing less 
than breaking up the traditional concepts of ‘production’, ‘consumption’ and 
‘market’ as fixed points of convergence for capitalist economic activities. New 
forms of work, which have developed outside formal economic structures, 
have an experimental and often emancipatory character that requires atten-
tion to be paid to f lexible arrangements and links between social practice, 
the economy and spatial development. What is needed here is an intensive 
examination of the diverse meanings and social consequences of the co-evo-
lution of technological and social innovations (Blättel-Mink 2010). 
Technological innovations reach far into social activities and transform 
almost all social spheres but are relatively easy to investigate, as they are 
close to traditional disciplinary concerns and require only a slightly different 
focus. In comparison, the analysis of social innovations, and their relevance 
for economic and technological innovation, is more difficult. They are highly 
dependent on context, so that the focus must clearly be on analysing social 
forms of practice (Howaldt/Schwarz 2010a: 30 ff., 66). 
This chapter aims to provide some food for thought on tackling these 
tasks from the perspective of spatial socio-economic research. In light of the 
limited role played by social innovations in the theories of economic geog-
raphy to date, we make this field the starting point of our considerations. 
We introduce the term ‘situated social innovation’ to refer to the linking of 
innovation processes to social communities and specific social constructs 
of space (Section 6).  At the same time, we show that in the course of the 
quasi-natural and uncontrolled development of an everyday culture of post-
growth (Hagen/Rückert-John 2016), work processes are also being redefined, 
and are in turn accompanied by changed situational constructs of space.
1.2  Structure of the discussion
Due to the comprehensive embedding of social innovations in social forms 
of practice, we adopt a context-oriented view on work. It not only focuses on 
original, new kinds of work processes, but also on mixed transitional forms 
located between classic gainful employment and ‘atypical’ work not subject 
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to the pressure of profit. Accordingly, we pay particular attention to hybrid 
work practices, which can be recognised in the transitional area between 
hobbies, voluntary work, self-organised or freelance work and formalised 
gainful employment and its variants (part-time, full-time). These heteroge-
neous forms of work and their practices often do not follow a clear devel-
opment logic. They emerge more or less contingently and unplanned in situ, 
i.  e. in places where complex, multidimensional social practice is located. 
From the perspective of spatial science, the task is thus to capture their par-
ticular situatedness. We assume that work is always situated, i.  e. embed-
ded in certain spatial-social contexts that give it particular characteristics. 
Situatedness and concrete characteristics must therefore be established as 
central objects of the analysis of post-growth economies. Last but not least, 
this requires a change in approaches to spatial relations by the geographical 
sub-disciplines, especially economic geography. 
2. Transformation of work:  
cornerstones and forms of practice
2.1 ‘New work’?
In current descriptions of societal futures, numerous concepts of work are 
being brought into position. On the one hand, there are the promises of a 
digitalised world of work, which should optimise existing industrial and 
technological structures. This primarily involves more f lexibility and effi-
ciency in the design of work processes, increased performance, the easy 
organisation of multilocal production and services, and technical omnipo-
tentiality (Apt/Bovenschulte/Hartmann et al. 2016). Such notions are related 
to the first waves of digitalisation that swept through the core areas of 
industry and drove robotisation and automation within enterprises, known 
as ‘Industry 4.0’. They also address more recent processes of digitalisation 
which appear as new forms of the internet-based platform and gig economy 
and as crowdworking, and penetrate deep into the organisation of individu-
alised wage labour and pseudo self-employment outside of enterprises. 
On the other hand, in accordance with the credo of ‘new work’ (Berg-
mann 2019 [1988]), alternative concepts of work are developing that are 
based on changed social premises. Thus in more recent post-growth debates, 
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work is addressed in strikingly anti-technical and reductionist terms with 
an emphasis on self-sufficiency. It follows that work in the future should be 
freely chosen, socially embedded, community-oriented and people-centred, 
with independently scheduled working hours and a positive energy balance 
(Schmelzer/Vetter 2019; Chatterton/Pusey 2019). 
Such ideas are inf luenced by the conviction that new arrangements of 
economic activities should relate to what is humanly desirable. The eman-
cipatory project of post-growth economies not only criticises the materi-
ally and ecologically disastrous resource consumption of growth-oriented 
industrial production, it also calls for new, self-determined work processes. 
Critiques of economic growth imperatives therefore include consideration 
of the dominant working conditions in both the global South and the global 
North. Accordingly, discriminatory and exploitative work is increasingly 
organised digitally. It is thus the ‘ground troops for globalisation’ (Busche 
2001, translated from German) who are primarily burdened with the social 
costs of technological change. Micro jobs, a lack of legal protection and the 
strategic exploitation of differences in prosperity weaken the position of 
those who in any case have little say in the purpose and organisation of work. 
2.2 The emancipatory critique of dominant working conditions
As an emancipatory counterproposal, the post-growth debate bases the 
concept of work on the postulate of structural autonomy. The definition of 
work no longer focuses on profit and economic gain but rather takes hetero-
geneous forms and contexts of work into equal consideration. Liberation 
from the dictates of profit presupposes the existence of multiple counter-po-
sitions: they must be anti-consumerist, anti-neoliberal and anti-hegemonic 
and draw orientation from an appropriate pyramid of needs (Seidl/Zahrnt 
2019, 924). At the same time, new technologies are seen as a way of achieving 
this liberation. Digitally organised access to resources, tools and knowledge 
seems to provide important bottom-up options for action. Another count-
er-position to the autonomy postulate propagates the transition to a socie-
tal state of post-work (Chatterton/Pusey 2019; Pitts/Dinerstein 2017). This is 
based on calls for the general abolition of industrial work, the safeguarding 
of livelihoods through a minimum income and the structural decoupling of 
work and the economy. 
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Such postulates abandon well-known social theory and risk theoretical 
paradoxes. Thus, on the one hand, the debate considers work as the abstract 
negation of a neoliberally distorted concept of work, which leads to calls 
to overcome capitalist principles of production. On the other hand, work 
– drawing on the evolutionary perspective of ‘new work’ – is elevated to a 
utopian instrument of liberation that does not necessarily have to free itself 
from the conventional rationality of the system. This makes the emancipa-
tion project of post-growth less and less clearly definable. Furthermore, the 
theoretical definition of ‘work’ and its functions for post-growth economies 
also runs the risk of getting caught in a maelstrom of speculation, eclecti-
cism and epistemological arbitrariness. For contemporary social and spatial 
science, the focus is therefore primarily on understanding the way in which 
social practice is moving away from the affirmative and eclectic expec-
tations of innovation and growth of the past. At the same time, the paths 
leading to alternative work processes must be empirically and theoretically 
reconstructed and their emancipatory substance analysed. It is, however, not 
enough to merely observe the practical consequences of political-normative 
demands on individuals (‘Change your lifestyle!’). The onus is rather on tak-
ing the intrinsic logics and autonomy postulates of the workers themselves 
seriously. It is thus indispensable to obtain and develop reliable analytical 
approaches to the concrete starting points, characteristic features and social 
contexts of heterogeneous forms of work.
2.3 Work processes in post-growth spaces
In the 2010s, new phenotypes of work attracted increasing public attention. 
Work processes that are carried out in makerspaces, real labs, fab labs, open 
workshops and co-working spaces do not fit into the descriptive categories 
of economics and business studies. They can no longer be clearly assigned to 
traditional entrepreneurial or wage-dependent forms of work (in the sense 
of labour) (Krueger/Schulz/Gibbs 2017), nor can they be simply described by 
the attribute ‘new’ (as used in the term ‘new work’ in descriptions of post-in-
dustrial change undertaken by the social sciences; Bergmann 2019[1988]). It 
is also insufficient to view them it as an ‘atypical’ residual category of f lexi-
bilised industrial work (see Schiek/Apitzsch 2013), since this largely ignores 
their social contexts. Similarly, labelling such forms of work as unpaid, vol-
untary and personally motivated and classifying them under the heading 
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‘amateur economy’ misses the point, as this implies an ex-ante contrast to the 
category of a ‘professional economy’ with paid employment (see Sekulova/
Kallis/Rodríguez-Labajos, 2013: 4). In fact, however, recent work processes 
of this kind are mostly situated in heterogeneous social practice contexts – 
located between hobbies, the f lexible everyday appropriation of digital tech-
nologies, digitally based prototypical small-scale production, early forms of 
start-ups, and expanding economies of sharing and making (Carr/Gibson 
2015; Chatterton/Pusey 2019).
2.4 The hybridisation of work
The ‘new’ open forms of work are de-standardised and autonomously organ-
ised. They are based on taking on manual tasks and handicrafts, freshly 
acquired digital expertise and informal elements of practice that were 
often previously viewed as unproductive or reproductive. As they cannot be 
understood as deviating from a specific standard but involve rather individ-
ual and collective explorations and experiments, they are not described here 
as ‘atypical’. 
Such ‘open work’ can be linked to gainful employment, but often exists 
independently of it. It is clearly a hybrid phenomenon with links to both 
the social and the economic. A key characteristic is the strong orientation 
of workers towards social communities and peer groups (Simons/Petschow/
Peuckert 2016). They prioritise social motives and independent, non-hier-
archical work contexts over organisations and their requirements. Actors 
largely develop their interests and abilities independently and enter into 
open communication with like-minded people. They negotiate the exchange 
of knowledge, materials and ideas. They tolerate different competences 
and the emergence of small organisational elites that set up and manage 
the various working environments. This community practice leads to the 
transformation of what were originally do-it-yourself attitudes into a kind 
of do-it-together attitude (Smith/Fressoli/Abrol et al. 2017). Collective dis-
covery and practice create meaning and special social and symbolic rewards 
quite apart from the concrete results of the work. 
The recent socio-economic hybridisation of work poses considerable con-
ceptual problems for politics and spatial sciences. In areas characterised by 
the diffusion of forms of work that cannot be clearly located in economic 
terms, the social and economic fields involved are increasingly diffuse and 
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changeable. Thus, for example, the collective search for new mobility infra-
structures has become highly ambivalent. As the case of the ridesharing pro-
vider Uber shows, social goals (i. e. sharing with no profit) are undermined 
by the quasi-employment of drivers, while the economic side of such work 
develops outside of state security systems and fails to comply with minimum 
social standards (Rogers 2017). It is very hard to adequately categorise such 
phenomena; nevertheless, they have expanded the range of ‘diverse’ and 
pluralistic understandings of work beyond an income-oriented economic 
understanding (Gibson-Graham 2008; North 2016; White/Williams 2016). 
It is therefore unsurprising that conventional ideas about the emergence 
of economic spatial constructs can no longer be viewed with conviction. We 
need only to refer here to the stagnating political discussions concerning 
regional innovation clusters, which in the past always assumed an extremely 
specialised and highly qualified workforce would be available within dynamic 
enterprises. Other innovative work contexts have only recently been consid-
ered relevant for development, e. g. in connection with ‘open innovation’, the 
appropriation of external innovation potential by commercial enterprises 
(Beise-Zee 2014). This draws the attention of the wider professional public 
to temporary clusters and also to changing aggregations of business-related 
communication processes.
3. Formal economies and work typologies
3.1 The spatial transformation of work
A similar fixation on formal economies and work typologies has been evident 
in the economic and social science debate on the transformation of economic 
spaces. Since the 1990s, economic geography in particular has adopted a 
more or less linear logic of space with reference to economic activity, one in 
which the spatial proximity or distance of economic actors to one another 
functions as an important causal and interpretative variable (Coenen/Raven/
Verbong 2010). Only since about 2005 has the discussion increasingly rec-
ognised that digitalisation, virtualisation, globalisation, new production 
technologies and ‘atypical’ forms of work have led to the proliferation of 
possible relations of proximity and distance (Reichwald/Piller 2006; Ibert 
2010; Ibert/Hautala/Jauhiainen 2015; Butzin/Meyer 2020). Not only has the 
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new complexity of these relationships been noted, but doubts have also been 
expressed about whether such relations have general significance for spatial 
development. Proximity is now rather understood as processual, ref lexive 
and often temporary. It is viewed as a phenomenon of practice with variable 
effects that is difficult to reliably address ex ante (Eckhardt 2019). Digitalisa-
tion and the emergence of online platform economies are thus creating new 
hybrid forms of work and an unexpected diversification of spatial relations 
(Autio/Nambisan/Thomas et al. 2018; Brettel/Friederichsen/Keller et al. 2014; 
Carr/Gibson 2015; Ravenelle 2017). This is also leading to new socio-spatial 
inequalities, asynchronous development and different degrees of political 
anticipation. 
3.2 Multiplicity of spatial relations:  
a challenge for economic geography 
Unexpectedly and often initially unnoticed, multiple relationships between 
actors and attributable spatialities have emerged – between the co-presence 
of actors at physically localised workplaces, focused communication in pro-
tected global data channels, the open interaction of heterogeneous actors in 
online social networks, activities on topic-related internet platforms, blogs 
and forums, and finally the temporary arrangement of projects and events 
within and outside organisations and social communities. 
While inquiring into the nature of these relationships, the focus must 
also be on how the localisation processes of new forms of production and 
consumption can be conceived without – as so often in the past – imme-
diately deriving or suggesting that physical spatiality has any kind of pri-
macy simply because of the mere existence of a physical place of work (e. g. 
in a concrete urban neighbourhood). Although physical places should still 
be approached as a ‘hard’ condition of social and economic activities, they 
are nevertheless linked to other diverse conceptual, symbolic and material 
contexts (Butzin/Meier 2020). Their social and economic meanings must 
first be attentively ascertained before the theoretical relevance of a physi-
cal place can be asserted. All too often in the past, spatial research gave in 
to the temptations of appealing political catchwords: it adopted labels that 
were previously established by politicians and economic actors. The ‘creative 
urban neighbourhoods’ of the 2000s are only one well-known example of 
this uncritical adoption of crude spatial abstractions (see Merkel 2008). In 
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this respect, spatial physicality is always to be understood as a phenomenon 
integrated in multiple disciplinary discourses and the ongoing interdisci-
plinary negotiation of spatial imaginaries (Watkins 2015). 
4. Variants of post-capitalist forms of work
Although different crafts, e. g. screen printing, woodworking, digital print-
ing, fabric processing, metalworking and software creation, may each rep-
resent a starting point for exploration, they have one feature in common: the 
individual design dimensions and forms of processing only emerge in the 
course of a collaborative process of discovery. The focus of everyday practice 
is on the gradually emerging ‘product’ development options and their modi-
fication, and on the practice of independently developed processing routines. 
It is not only local working communities that define themselves in this way, 
but also small social movements that propagate a transition from discovery 
to competent work and processing. In the USA, the actors involved often 
refer to themselves as ‘ProAms’ (Professional Amateurs) or regard them-
selves as part of a larger craftsmanship movement that focuses on rediscov-
ering manual skills and crafting qualities in amateur, often urban, everyday 
realities (Sennett 2008). 
4.1 Crafters, tinkerers, makers
To take the discussion a step further, this sort of community focus, which is 
clearly revealed in everyday practices of self-empowerment, self-organisa-
tion and self-direction, can be related to more fundamental post-capitalist 
and post-growth economic values (Baier/Hansing/Müller et al. 2016). Many 
actors understand their work as part of a countermovement to the growth 
ideology of currently dominant variants of capitalism, offering a contrast 
with an increased focus on discovery and the processual configuration of 
alternative forms of production, work and life. This is not always obvious. 
Thus, for instance, those involved in the newly popular maker-movement sel-
dom tend to use blatant post-growth or degrowth rhetoric. 
Nevertheless, the participants have a community-based and practical 
self-image with an unmistakable focus on exploring alternatives to the ubiq-
uitous routines of generating growth. Here, the everyday routines of eco-
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nomic activity already involve repairing, maintaining, prolonging usage, 
sharing and exchanging without the use of money. These practices are 
directed towards social needs and the principle of sufficiency.
4.2  Universalists and prosumers
Furthermore, types of actors have emerged who see themselves as new uni-
versalists: as prosumers who take the development, production and distri-
bution of products into their own hands or directly inf luence the production 
of goods by other actors (Hellmann 2010). These include creative freelanc-
ers engaged in translocal networking projects, spontaneous value creation 
and experimental discovery processes in mobile workspaces (co-working 
spaces, home offices, cafes etc.) (Bender 2013); niche actors engaged in DIY 
production and repair; and participants in a subculture of informally organ-
ised sharing – both in the local neighbourhood and across the globe as inter-
net-based exchange systems and issue-oriented communities. 
All these actors have not only tried out new things and often developed 
experimental forms of work, they have also formally reversed the sup-
ply-oriented logic of capitalist economies. Demand, which is largely socially 
defined, is the focus of the new activities and makes it possible to develop 
f lexible starting points for new value creation processes. These processes are 
then no longer subordinated to universal competitive economic logic. The 
relevant socio-economic fields are often social communities with their par-
ticular collective values and needs rather than ‘the market’ with its monetary 
exchange mechanisms.
4.3 Post-growth work
The conceptualisation of post-growth work must therefore take into account 
that the focus is always on hybrid forms of work. Working within such social 
communities means assigning a subordinate position to profit and income 
generation in the individual and collective hierarchy of values. The social 
and economic purposes and objectives of work exist side by side. There are 
not necessarily any links between them, nor do they always compete with 
one another. Work need not be separated from processes of self-discovery 
and the associated self-positioning of actors in a group or a community of 
practitioners. At the same time, practices of do-it-together bring actors 
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into locally interwoven but readily comprehensible contexts of communica-
tion, distribution and consumption. Compared to dependent wage labour, 
the new workers enjoy a high degree of autonomy and self-empowerment. 
This predestines them for social roles that in a capitalist economy are only 
granted to individual entrepreneurs, for example as agents of the ‘trial and 
error’ principle, of social innovation and of the creative invention of products 
and processes. 
It is no coincidence that associations with Joseph Schumpeter’s ideal 
type of creative entrepreneur spring to mind. However, this association 
cannot be pursued too far, because Schumpeter’s entrepreneur must always 
avert economic ruin and, in the interest of growth, must channel creativity 
towards destroying the old and inventing the new, instead of using creativity 
for non-profit purposes like a social entrepreneur (Löff ler 2013). There is of 
course another story here, in that even social entrepreneurs are required to 
submit to competitive pressures and market conditions. However, in pro-
tected realms of work, community-oriented workers can at least temporarily 
combine ‘free and creative’ making with the powerful environmental condi-
tions of ‘competition’ and ‘market survival’. 
As promising as this perspective may be for further conceptualisation, 
the preconditions of actor constitutions must nevertheless be fundamentally 
addressed. More specifically, attention must be paid to the particular forms 
and logics of social innovations that enable active creators to inf luence the 
form and setting of their work. The aim is to determine more precisely the 
innovative content of the action focus on communities, alternative networks, 
social or economic niches and non-economic rationalities, and to trace its 
effects on forms of work and the attributable spatial constructs. 
5. Social innovations as drivers of new forms of work and 
attributable spatial constructs
5.1 The embedding and practices of social innovations
Recent interdisciplinary approaches to the topic of social innovation ques-
tion many of the sweeping assumptions about the direct sectoral effects of 
inventing and disseminating new goods or economic procedures. They draw 
attention to the fact that innovations need to be accepted by society and are 
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therefore always socially mediated. This mediation can occur within indus-
tries, social communities, milieus or similar sub-fields of society. Economic 
innovations in the narrower sense are thus always linked to social innova-
tions that involve a change in the purposes, uses, effects and socio-spatial 
ranges (i. e. scales) of goods and services (Howaldt/Schwarz 2010b). 
Moreover, the fixed temporal sequencing of technical innovations (first 
the invention, then the actual innovation in the form of dissemination, 
acceptance and the discursive labelling of new or changed goods and tech-
nologies) is replaced by variable temporal relations. Socially initiated or 
mediated ‘inventions’ can occur at the same time as their implementation 
– i. e. in the actual execution of social practices. Thanks to their anchoring 
in practice, they do not necessarily need to be labelled as innovations before 
they are disseminated. In this respect, it seems that a variable co-evolution 
of technical and social innovations can be assumed, which leaves great scope 
for both the success and the failure of experiments. 
The shift from a technicistic worldview focusing on the mastery of nature 
by technology to a mindset focusing on resource conservation and sustain-
ability can be viewed as a macro-social innovation that affects the ‘subordi-
nate’ spheres of society as well as the individual subjects. Exogenous, uni-
versal innovations of this kind require individuals and small collectives to 
creatively adapt to set development models, while endogenous innovations 
follow their own intrinsic logic to a greater extent. They invite further exper-
imentation – in the sense of open-ended trial and error – and are less pre-
dictable (Brandsen/Evers/Cattacin et al. 2016: 310).
5.2 Post-growth economies as social innovations?
New ways of thinking, norms and moral standards have so far tended to 
be regarded as exogenous innovations. Such classifications have quickly 
become established in the rather fundamental debates held on post-growth 
and post-capitalism. However, at the grassroots level the concerns of the 
philosophical-ideological protagonists of the post-growth transformation 
(e. g. Paech 2012; Mason/Gebauer 2016) are often perceived as strange and 
somewhat detached from reality. The norms and values they formulate are 
received by the practitioners but must always be compared with their own 
factual everyday experience. Such exogenous innovations easily reach their 
limitations. 
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Degrowth and post-growth are then often no longer the main things but 
are rather almost side-effects of collective success in an open workshop or 
a 3-D printing lab. Problematic endogenous-exogenous couplings can thus 
be identified for every sub-area of society (e.  g. a socio-economic field). It 
becomes difficult to bring together the local dynamics of change in forms 
of work, modes of production and consumption habits on the one hand and 
overarching ideological, economic and cultural changes on the other hand. 
As a result, the co-evolution and co-existence of different reference systems 
(grassroots practice as opposed to ideological superstructure) are more likely 
than convincing mediation and integration. 
Social innovations and their couplings thus require the opening of con-
ceptual approaches beyond the demand for new and better social theory (for 
instance in the sense of Howaldt/Schwarz 2010a). As Jaeger-Erben, John and 
Rückert-John (2017) have pointed out, a social theory approaches its sub-
ject matter with a logic of subsumption that inevitably leads to the misin-
terpretation of experiments, demands for freedom in the use of products 
and activities, seemingly independent testing and other social practices. It 
attributes actors with an intentionality that they perhaps do not possess, or 
not in the way assumed. The promise of a better future generally associated 
with the term ‘social innovation’ (Jaeger-Erben/John/Rückert-John 2017: 246) 
immediately leads to demands for this future to be politically controlled. 
However, this ignores the experimental character of innovations and the 
right of experimenters to freedom of scope and freedom from the external 
exploitation of what they have just discovered or found – not to mention 
their right to fail. 
5.3 From the social niche to the entrepreneurial world?
Applied to the phenomenon of new forms of work, this means that not every-
thing that society as a whole regards as a social innovation has to be one. It 
may rather be a case of attempting to tame norm-defying actors within a 
given set of power relations. To return to our current case: when makers and 
users of open workshops use their tinkering and experimentation to develop 
potential (or actual) business ideas with a public-good focus and to become 
(socially) entrepreneurial, this is often seen as a successful social innova-
tion, since it represents economic upscaling out of a niche, which is in turn 
associated with economic innovations (Schmid 2019; Lange/Domann/Häfele 
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2016). However, what is seldom taken into account is that this can lead to 
the annexing of the lifeworld ‘below’ by outsiders, covertly denying that the 
social innovation is justified and advocating instead for ‘correct’ (i. e. insti-
tutionalised) paths of innovation. 
Conceptual, symbolic and material expropriations of innovators may 
be undertaken by political institutions (economic development policy), sci-
entific institutions (including economic geographers who claim that this 
upscaling is unexpectedly useful for urban and regional development) and 
economic actors (e. g. niche competitors who cannot draw on a specific inno-
vation in a current debate). Others who may be involved in expropriation 
emerge in situ (in cities mostly in the form of city marketing with a focus 
on urban creativity) and under the inf luence of prominent elites (e. g. media 
leaders).
Social innovators are thus confronted with the necessity of defending 
from takeover the painstakingly defined socio-technical domains (e. g. dig-
ital competence), corresponding social spaces and especially the curating 
communities. This can be temporarily achieved by retreating into less acces-
sible subcultures and exclusive practices. However, such a retreat is increas-
ingly at odds with the post-capitalist demand for publicly accessible knowl-
edge bases, procedures and blueprints (see the papers in Baier/Hansing/
Müller et al. 2016). DIY (do it yourself) and DIT (do it together) technologies, 
the insistence on free access to public domains and the re(establishment) of 
technically advanced products fit for everyday use are all only possible in the 
public sphere. However, this public accessibility renders innovators vulnera-
ble and easy to marginalise by institutionally established actors.  
6. Cornerstones of the ‘situated social innovations’ 
perspective
In practice, makerspaces, open workshops and co-working spaces are open 
spaces. They encourage the actors involved to experiment within the com-
munity, to embark on self-discovery, to communicate openly with peers and 
to further develop a supportive community. Looking over each other’s shoul-
ders when exploring new things, sharing knowledge and also tolerating the 
temporary knowledge advantages of others may seem risky to many people 
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who have been socialised in a neoliberal, competitive society, but it is also 
very enticing (Simons/Petschow/Peuckert 2016: 20 ff.).
Social spaces that emerge in the form of local communities at a specific 
location (e.  g. meeting place, workshop) result from attempts to make tar-
geted use of the work-specific materiality of crafts, tools, working spaces 
and visible labelling, as in the example of the ‘Makerspace Rhein-Neckar’1. 
At the same time, they symbolically and materially safeguard what has been 
achieved, enable the dissemination of new working practices and bring 
together interested parties in a visible place. The socio-material elements of 
these places emerge in part through the working techniques and practices, 
but they also result from erratic searching and chance encounters. As open-
source spaces, it remains possible to change them collectively and to simul-
taneously shape them individually. 
This variability and the open-endedness of design is an expression of a 
process that we call ‘situated social innovation’. New forms of work are sit-
uated when they relate to a social community that encourages individuals 
in their experimentation (cf. Rogowska-Stangret 2018) and protects them 
against appropriation from outside (for use in an established model or a 
political role, for example to showcase seemingly vibrant or diverse urban 
development). The collective adoption of attitudes and practices of experi-
mentation is the real social innovation. It is always temporary and can be 
superseded or its importance relativised by the next community initiative. 
The approach focuses on social forms of practice in the context of work, espe-
cially those that draw on diverse, internet-based communication and every-
day technological adaptation processes.
Due to the processuality and open-ended variability of social practices, 
the actors involved each develop temporary and context-related spatial con-
structs. These constructs are also fundamentally situated because in prac-
tice the actors each work in a concrete but changeable place, be this a social 
place (community, organisation, meeting place), a physical workplace (office, 
workshop, desktop) or an identifiable virtual communication node (virtual 
network, IP address). 
Situatedness is made up not only of communalisation processes and 
their material safeguards in the form of physical spatial components; it 
also takes place through openings into virtual spaces, as exemplified by the 
1  See https://www.makerspace-rheinneckar.de/ (21.02.2020)
Hans-Joachim Bürkner, Bastian Lange54
maker movement. Makers, tinkerers and sharers have long since integrated 
the world of the internet, social networks and blog-based interaction with 
important makers into their own communication practice. The impulses 
for new fields of experimentation, community action and fairs (e.  g. the 
emblematic Maker Fairs) originate largely from the USA and the first com-
munities that popularised the maker idea (see the description by the US 
makerspace-guru Dale Dougherty2). 
Here, individual users worldwide can still receive concrete support and 
advice. The situating is realised by selectively using virtual means to bring 
the relevant global communities and their members to a specific local point. 
Seen from the perspective of the local actors, the emerging spatial construct 
also extends variably into virtual spaces, driven by interest or curiosity. The 
continuous changing of this oscillating spatial construct, its expansion and 
contraction in line with the collective nurturing (curation) of the experimen-
tal (as a modus operandi), represents an important peculiarity and at the 
same time a central condition for the further development of the respective 
communities and their forms of practice.
In this sense, the task here is not to carefully observe the Marxian ‘state 
of the productive forces’, but rather the state and the continuous change of 
the ‘experimental forces’. Important drivers, the directions of movement and 
the effects of experimental activities must be reconstructed empirically and 
theoretically. Jaeger-Erben/John/Rückert-John (2017) have already advocated 
the utilisation of a theory of social change rather than more static social the-
ory. The extent to which such a theory already includes entrenched assump-
tions about social structures, relations and processes that stand in the way 
of the unconditional reconstruction of open experimentation has yet to be 
demonstrated in the concrete reconstruction of a specific case. 
A spatial science that is primarily interested in Euclidean distances or 
even in the observation of structurally determined social distances will find 
few opportunities for engagement here. Only if structure-fixated thinking is 
abandoned in favour of variable, multidimensional and ref lexive processes 
of spatial construction (beyond the geographical fix) will more satisfactory 
explanations emerge in the foreseeable future.
Even where it has already been recognised that social proximity does not 
necessarily correlate with physical proximity (e.  g. in research on co-pres-
2  https://makezine.com/author/dalepd/ (21.02.2020)
Using socio-spatial concepts of situatedness to explain work processes 55
ence and co-location, see Grabher/Melchior/Schiemer et al. 2018), it could be 
deceptive to hope that minimal course correction will suffice. The case of a 
makerspace will remain obscure if it is approached with harboured hopes 
of discovering physical correlates of the social or economic. The actors are 
then viewed as demonstrating apparently familiar patterns of ‘innovation 
through physical proximity’, although in reality the virtual spaces of refer-
ence to similar communities of enthusiasts are much more relevant for shap-
ing their everyday work. Hence it is necessary to make a conscious decision 
to embark on a reconstruction of multidimensional spatial oscillations to get 
closer to the phenomenon.
7. The ‘spaces of work’ perspective and post-growth 
questions: an initial résumé
A decisive move towards work-related forms of practice allows economic 
determinisms in the descriptions and explanations of more or less fixed 
‘spaces of economic activity’ to recede from the centre of attention. The 
focus then shifts to the social penetration of economic processes and activ-
ities. The diversity of forms of work is associated with the multiple ways in 
which actors deal with their social and material environment – including 
the apparent rejection of commercial exploitation when testing new tech-
nologies, the profit-free provision of products and services for a community, 
and even the transition of small-scale work and production concepts into 
entrepreneurial livelihoods and formalised employment relationships. This 
diversity and polymorphism of forms of work is linked to a fundamentally 
open socio-materiality of the constructs of place and space. New spaces 
stretch across temporary virtual places and spheres of communication on 
the one hand and physical places of co-present work on the other. This open-
ness means that the constructs of space are f luid and cannot be conceived as 
static spatial structures or as a systematically generated spatial fix – in the 
sense of a spatial manifestation of social or economic processes. 
In particular, ideas for products, services and work processes emerge 
from everyday post-growth practices and are communicated to actors 
through virtual, multilateral channels, but it is seldom that these ideas are 
clearly traceable to their places of origin. They are thus rarely localisable. 
Under these conditions, it is fairly clear that there is no such thing as ‘the’ 
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location of ‘the’ post-growth innovation. Analogously, it must be assumed 
that we are dealing with spaces that are multi-dimensionally constituted, 
i. e. simultaneously virtualised, globalised and localised. They arise from sit-
uated innovation processes that also initiate translocal forms of post-growth. 
This must be addressed in detail by a modified analytical reconstruction of 
the diverse, processual constructions of space in the context of new post-
growth forms of work.
Cited literature
Apt, W., Bovenschulte, M., Hartmann, E. A., & Wischmann, St. (2016). 
Foresight-Studie ‘Digitale Arbeitswelt’. Research Report of the Bunde-
sministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 463. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/
handle/document/47039 (2016, June 14).
Autio, E., Nambisan, S., Thomas, L. D. W., & Wright, M. (2018). Digital affor-
dances, spatial affordances, and the genesis of entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 12(1), 72–95.
Baier, A., Hansing, T., Müller, C., & Werner, K. (Eds.) (2016). Die Welt reparie-
ren: Open Source und Selbermachen als postkapitalistische Praxis. transcript.
Beise-Zee, M. (2014). Regionale Innovationscluster und internationale 
Netzwerkkompetenz. In C. Schultz, & K. Hölzle (Eds.), Motoren der Inno-
vation. Zukunf tsperspektiven der Innovationsforschung. Springer, 295310.
Bender, D. (2013). Mobile Arbeitsplätze als kreative Räume: Coworking 
Spaces, Cafés und andere urbane Arbeitsorte. transcript. 
Bergmann, F. (2019). New work new culture: Work we want and a culture that 
strengthens us (Original word published 1988). transcript.
Blättel-Mink, B. (2010). Innovation und Kultur am Beispiel von Crowdsourc-
ing. Herausforderung für die Innovationsforschung. In J. Howaldt, & H. 
Jacobsen (Eds.), Soziale Innovation. Auf dem Weg zu einem postindustriellen 
Innovationsparadigma. Wiesbaden, 127–142.
Brandsen, T., Evers, A., Cattacin, S., & Zimmer, A. (2016). The good, the bad 
and the ugly in social innovation. In T. Brandsen, S. Cattacin, A. Evers, 
& A. Zimmer (Eds.), Social innovations in the urban context. Springer, 303–
310.
Brettel, M., Friederichsen, N., Keller, M., & Rosenberg, M. (2014). How vir-
tualization, decentralization and network building change the manu-
Using socio-spatial concepts of situatedness to explain work processes 57
facturing landscape: An industry 4.0 perspective. International Journal of 
Mechanical, Aerospace, Industrial and Mechatronics Engineering, 8(1), 37–44.
Brinks, V. (2019). ‘And since I knew about the possibilities there …’: The role 
of open creative labs in user innovation processes. Tijdschrif t voor econo-
mische en sociale geografie 110(4), 381–394.
Busche, A. (2001, July 17). Bodentruppen für die Globalisierung. taz, die tag-
eszeitung. https://taz.de/Bodentruppen-fuer-die-Globalisierung/!1161619/.
Butzin, A., & Meyer, K. (2020). Urbane Produktion und temporäre räumliche 
Nähe in Produktionsprozessen. Raumforschung Und Raumordnung Spatial 
Research and Planning, 78(1), 5–20.
Carr, Ch., & Gibson, Ch. (2015). Geographies of making: Rethinking mate-
rials and skills for volatile futures. Progress in Human Geography, 40(3), 
297–315.
Chatterton, P., & Pusey, A. (2019). Beyond capitalist enclosure, commodifica-
tion and alienation: Postcapitalist praxis as commons, social production 
and useful doing. Progress in Human Geography. (2019, January 8).
Coenen, L., Raven, R., & Verbong, G. (2010). Local niche experimentation in 
energy transitions: a theoretical and empirical exploration of proximity 
advantages and disadvantages. Technology in Society, 32(4), 295–302.
Eckhardt, F. (2019). Technologie und Virtualität. In F. Kessl, & Ch. Reutlinger 
(Eds.), Handbuch Sozialraum. Grundlagen für den Bildungs- und Sozialbere-
ich. 2nd edition. Springer, 243–258.
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2008). Diverse economies: performative practices for 
‘other worlds’. Progress in Human Geography, 32(5), 613–632.
Grabher, G., Melchior, A., Schiemer, B., Schüßler, E., & Sydow, J. (2018). 
From being there to being aware: Confronting geographical and socio-
logical imaginations of copresence. Environment and Planning A: Economy 
and Space, 50(1), 245–255.
Hagen, K., & Rückert-John, J. (2016). Teilen, tauschen, leihen – tragfähige 
Modelle zukünftigen Wirtschaftens? Editorial. Vierteljahrshef te zur 
Wirtschaf tsforschung, 85(2), 5–12.
Hellmann, K.-U. (2010). Prosumer Revisited: Zur Aktualität einer Debatte. 
Eine Einführung. In B. Blättel-Mink, & K.-U. Hellmann (Eds.), Prosumer 
Revisited. Zur Aktualität einer Debatte. Springer, 13–48.
Howaldt, J., & Schwarz, M. (2010a). »Soziale Innovation« im Fokus: Skizze eines 
gesellschaf tstheoretisch inspirierten Forschungskonzepts. transcript. 
Hans-Joachim Bürkner, Bastian Lange58
Howaldt, J., & Schwarz, M.(2010b). Soziale Innovation – Konzepte, For-
schungsfelder und -perspektiven. In J. Howaldt, & H. Jacobsen (Eds.), 
Soziale Innovation. Auf dem Weg zu einem postindustriellen Innovationspar-
adigma. Springer, 87–108.
Ibert, O. (2010). Relational distance. Sociocultural and time-spatial tensions 
in innovation practices. Environment and Planning, A(42), 187–204. 
Ibert, O., Hautala, J., & Jauhiainen, J. S. (2015). From cluster to process: New 
economic geographic perspectives on practices of knowledge creation. 
Geoforum, 65, 323–327.
Jaeger-Erben, M., John, R., & Rückert-John, J. (2017). Soziale Innovation: Ver-
heißung oder Verführung? GAIA - Ecological Perspectives for Science and 
Society, 26(3), 245–248. 
Krueger, R., Schulz, Ch., & Gibbs, D. C. (2017). Institutionalizing alternative 
economic spaces? An interpretivist perspective on diverse economies. 
Progress in Human Geography, 42(4), 569–589. 
Lange, B., Domann, V., & Häfele, V. (2016): Wertschöpfung in offenen Werk-
stätten. Eine empirische Erhebung kollaborativer Praktiken in Deutsch-
land. IÖW publication series, 213/16.
Löff ler, M. (2013). Der Schumpeterianische Unternehmer als fragwürdiges 
Vorbild für Social Entrepreneurs. Kurswechsel, 2/2013, 16–27.
Mason, P., & Gebauer, S. (2016). Postkapitalismus. Grundrisse einer kommenden 
Ökonomie. Suhrkamp.
Merkel, J. (2008). Kreativquartiere. Urbane Milieus zwischen Inspiration und 
Prekarität. Springer.
North, P. (2016). The business of the Anthropocene? Substantivist and diverse 
economies perspectives on SME engagement in local low carbon transi-
tions. Progress of Human Geography, 40(4), 437-454.
Paech, N. (2012). Befreiung vom Überf luss. Auf dem Weg in die Postwachs-
tumsökonomie. oekom verlag.
Pitts, F. H., & Dinerstein, A. C. (2017). Postcapitalism, basic income and 
the end of work: A critique and alternative. Bath Papers in Interna-
tional Development and Wellbeing 55.https://www.econstor.eu/bit-
stream/10419/180927/1/100921179X.pdf (2020, January 1).
Ravenelle, A. J. (2017). Sharing economy workers: selling, not sharing. Cam-
bridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 10(2), 281–295.
Using socio-spatial concepts of situatedness to explain work processes 59
Reichwald, R., & Piller, F. (2006). Interaktive Wertschöpfung. Open Inno-
vation, Individualisierung und neue Formen der Arbeitsteilung. Gabler 
Verlag.
Rogers, B. (2017). The social costs of Uber. University of Chicago Law Review 
Online, 82(1), 85–102.
Rogowska-Stangret, M. (2018). Situated Knowledges. New Materialism: 
Almanac. https://newmaterialism.eu/almanac/s/situated-knowledges.
html (2019, July 21).
Schiek, D., & Apitzsch, B. (2013). Doing Work. Atypische Arbeit in der Film- 
und der Automobilbranche im Vergleich. Berliner Journal Für Soziologie, 
23(2), 181–204. 
Schmelzer, M., & Vetter, A. (2019). Degrowth/Postwachstum zur Einführung. 
Junius Verlag.
Schmid, B. (2019). Degrowth and postcapitalism: Transformative geogra-
phies beyond accumulation and growth. Geography Compass, 13(11), 49.
Seidl, I., & Zahrnt, A. (2019). Neugewichtung von Erwerbsarbeit und Tätig-
sein für eine Postwachstumsgesellschaft. Ökologisches Wirtschaften 
- Fachzeitschrift, 33(1), 17. 
Sekulova, F., Kallis, G., Rodríguez-Labajos, B. Schneider, F. (2013). Degrowth: 
from theory to practice. Journal of Cleaner Production, 38, 1–6.
Sennett, R. (2008). The craf tsman. 2nd edition. Penguin Books Ltd.
Simons, A., Petschow, U., & Peuckert, J. (2016). Of fene Werkstätten – nach-
haltig innovativ? Potenziale gemeinsamen Arbeitens und Produzierens in der 
gesellschaf tlichen Transformation.  IÖW publication series 212/16.
Smith, A., Fressoli, M., Abrol, D., Arond, E., & Ely, A. (2017). Grassroots inno-
vation movements. Taylor and Francis.
Watkins, J. (2015). Spatial imaginaries research in geography: Synergies, ten-
sions, and new directions. Geography Compass, 9(9), 508–522. 
White, R., & Williams, C. (2016). Beyond capitalocentricism: are non-capital-
ist work practices ‘alternatives’? Area, 48(3), 325–331.





It becomes increasingly obvious that there is a disjuncture between the 
socio-economic developments that lead to increasing destabilisation and 
exploitation of ecological and social systems on the one hand and scien-
tific concerns about these developments on the other hand. Research into 
possible forms of socio-ecological transformation is gaining corresponding 
significance in the social and spatial sciences. Aside from criticising social 
conditions, researchers and practitioners are exploring a range of alterna-
tive development options. Research into economic and political alternatives 
(Fuller/Jonas/Lee 2016; Leyshon/Lee/Williamet et al. 2003) comprises a series 
of complementary but also diverging concepts and research strands such as 
post-growth (Demaria/Kallis/Bakker 2019; Schmelzer/Vetter 2019), post-cap-
italism (Chatterton/Pusey 2019; Gibson-Graham 2006), commons (Helfrich/
Bollier 2019), radical democracy (Barnett 2017), post-development (Kothari/
Salleh/Escobar et al. 2019) and the solidarity economy (Exner/Kratzwald 
2012; North/Cato 2017). All these approaches criticize political, economic 
and cultural practices that are based on increasingly severe encroachments 
in social and ecological systems and leading to the highly unequal destabili-
sation of communities and ecosystems.
Despite sound scientific knowledge about the consequences and effects 
of the prevailing lines of development and their contradictions, alterna-
tive concepts have received little attention, never mind implementation by 
(higher levels of) policy, planning or economic decision-making (Gills/Mor-
gan 2019). Disillusioned by reforms ‘from above’, various forms of practice 
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have emerged that address these deficiencies ‘from the bottom up’ (Chat-
terton 2019; Schmelzer/Vetter 2019). These alternative projects and organ-
isations include civil society initiatives as well as socio-ecological enter-
prises and protest movements – which can be characterised by different 
approaches, strategies and objectives. 
Transformation – profound changes in the form and structure of 
socio-ecological relations – meanwhile is a fundamentally spatial process. 
Social change occurs in concrete locations, is embedded in immediate and 
more far-f lung networks of relations and challenges existing boundaries. 
Some publications have highlighted the significance of space in processes 
of transformation (including: Bouzarovski/Haarstad 2018; Chatterton 2016; 
Chatterton/Pickerill 2010; Coenen et al. 2012; Hansen/Coenen 2015; Lon-
ghurst 2015; Raven et al. 2012; Smith et al. 2010; Vandeventer et al. 2019). 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of genuine geographical concepts in the theo-
risation of transformation and transition. Hansen and Coenen (2015: 105), 
for instance, argue that most studies on the spatiality of transformation 
draw on existing transition literature and seldom venture beyond the addi-
tion of ‘spatial sensitivity’. There is little research, according to Hansen und 
Coenen, that develops genuinely spatial perspectives to address questions of 
socio-ecological transformation.
This article tackles precisely this research gap. It endeavours to develop 
a decidedly spatial perspective for the investigation of transformation pro-
cesses. Two key questions provide a focus here: 
1. Which spatial concepts can be used to think about transformation?
2. What strategies for socio-ecological transformation can be derived from 
a spatial perspective?
In order to address these questions, the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 outlines the essentials of a post-growth transformation. On the basis 
of an overview of the concept of transformation and the post-growth dis-
course, this section considers different transformation strategies. It draws 
on the typology proposed by Erik Olin Wright (2010), which distinguishes 
between symbiotic, interstitial and ruptural strategies. Section 3 addresses 
the spatiality of transformation using the spatial concepts of territory, net-
work, place and scale. Each of these concepts provides a specific perspective 
on transformation processes. Subsequently, section 4 links the spatial and 
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Transformation refers to fundamental changes in the form and structure of 
socio-ecological relations. At first, thereby, the term transformation does 
not indicate a specific direction in which these changes lead, nor which 
forces cause them. Transformation, therefore, can be specified along two 
lines. First, it must be determined whether transformation is viewed as a 
process that is to be actively shaped or as a change that emerges from largely 
undetermined forces (passive). In the latter, passive, sense, transformation 
describes diverse and interwoven social and biophysical processes of change 
like globalisation and climate change. Here the focus is primarily on deter-
mining which changes are occurring and how societies and communities can 
respond to them (adaptation and resilience). Considering transformation in 
a more active sense, meanwhile, foregrounds the individuals, organisations 
and institutions that affect change, or attempt to do so, for example in the 
context of social movements. 
Second, the directionality of transformation must be determined. Trans-
formation does not necessarily lead to more justice and sustainability. It is 
therefore particularly important that a critical perspective specifies which 
changes should be encouraged or prevented. As the direction of socio-eco-
logical transformation should not be decided by a few while leaving out oth-
ers, transformation research faces the challenge of using ecological, social 
and ethical principles for guidance while ensuring inclusive negotiation 
processes between different perspectives. The post-growth debate navigates 
this field of tension by combining collective decision-making and manage-




Post-growth brings together a range of theoretical and practical approaches 
that question the position of economic growth as the primary guiding prin-
ciple of human societies. In doing so, post-growth perspectives call for a 
ref lexive reorientation of economic, political and social institutions to enable 
temporally and spatially just, sustainable and dignified lives. Post-growth 
tackles the growth imperative of capitalist economies and takes seriously the 
notion that there are material and social limits to growth (Georgescu-Roe-
gen 1977; Meadows/Randers/Meadows 2004; Rockström/Steffen/Noone et 
al. 2009). To date, there has been no sign of an (absolute) decoupling of eco-
nomic growth from resource consumption, as postulated by green economy 
approaches – an option that appears increasingly unlikely (Fatheuer/Fuhr/
Unmüßig 2015; Georgescu-Roegen 1977; Jackson 2017; Kenis/Lievens 2015; 
Paech 2013). 
Regardless of whether further growth is possible, it stands to question 
how far it is even desirable.1 Post-growth approaches point out the fact that 
prosperity cannot be reduced to market relations and therefore cannot be 
captured by the growth of economic indicators (Hayden/Wilson 2017; Rosa 
2016; Rosa/Henning 2018). At the same time, growth and acceleration – when 
seen as an end in themselves – increasingly lead to conditions of physical and 
psychological exhaustion (ranging from dissatisfaction to burnout) (Fisher 
2009), which are exacerbated by the continued fixation on growth. In con-
trast, post-growth posits satisfaction, frugality, moderation and leisure as 
basic positive qualities (Kallis 2019). 
Various strands can be identified within the post-growth debate (for 
categorisations see van den Bergh 2011; Eversberg/Schmelzer 2018; Koepp/
1  Post-growth acknowledges that in certain contexts a further increase in material prosper-
ity is required (especially in the Global South but also for socio-economically disadvan-
taged population groups in the Global North). However, it is becoming clear that this is, 
first, rather a question of wealth redistribution than a further  increase  in economic out-
put. And that, second, an economy based on growth actually creates poverty (structural 
adjustment measures, volatility of the markets for food and raw materials due to finan-
cialisation, the break-up of traditional economic and social relations, focus on exports…). 
These and other issues are also discussed under keywords like ‘imperial mode of living’ (of 
the Global North) (Brand/Wissen, 2017), ‘postdevelopment’ (Kothari/Salleh/Escobar et al. 
2019) and alternative visions of the good life (Gudynas 2011).
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Schunke/Köhler et al. 2015) which adopt very different positions vis-à-vis 
existing institutions and which follow different visions and strategies of 
transformation. What they have in common is, however, that they all shift 
away from economism towards social and ecological justice (Latouche 2009; 
Martínez-Alier/Pascual/Vivien et al. 2010). Schmelzer and Vetter (2019) dis-
tinguish between three central objectives of post-growth.
Global ecological justice: first, lifestyles in the capitalist centres depend on 
the ‘shaping of social conditions and natural conditions elsewhere’ (Brand/
Wissen 2017: 43). This ‘imperial mode of living’ (ibid.) is based on externalisa-
tion and ‘cheapening’ (Patel/Moore 2018: 22) and is neither generalisable (as 
it depends on an exploitable outside) nor just (as this exploitation creates and 
sustains asymmetric power relations) nor sustainable (as it destroys its own 
ecological and social foundations). Post-growth, therefore, does not aim 
simply for a shrinkage of the economy, but rather for a fundamental restruc-
turing of economic relations to enable a just and sustainable way of life for all. 
Good life: a second objective is basic material and social well-being that 
can in actual fact (and not just formally) be attained by all people. The ‘good 
life’ can only be defined via democratic and self-determined processes of 
negotiation and requires a re-politicisation of economic relations (Gib-
son-Graham 2006; Gibson-Graham/Cameron/Healy 2013). Fundamentally, 
this involves a radical redistribution of resources and wealth, the provision 
of accessible and comprehensive basic services and a renegotiation of eco-
nomic objectives (Schmelzer/Vetter 2019).
Growth independence: these changes require, thirdly, that economic insti-
tutions and infrastructures become growth-independent. Economic struc-
tures, social institutions and even the subjects of capitalist societies are fun-
damentally oriented towards growth and can therefore only be ‘dynamically 
stabilised’ (Rosa/Dörre/Lessenich 2017). In other words, institutions, infra-
structures and subjectivities can only be maintained in their prevailing con-
stitution by continued growth. Within current institutional orders, reces-
sions and stagnation, but also frugality, leisure and contemplation,2 lead to 
crises. Post-growth aims for not less than the fundamental restructuring of 
economic, social, political and cultural relations consonant with social jus-




In addition to in-depth analysis and critique of existing conditions and the 
formulation of possible alternatives, transformation research also requires a 
transformation theory that encapsulates how fundamental changes to social 
conditions can occur and be actively shaped. In an inf luential piece of work, 
Erik Olin Wright (2010) distinguishes between three transformation strate-
gies: symbiotic, interstitial and ruptural (see Figure 1).
Symbiotic strategies, first, aim to strengthen emancipatory transfor-
mation processes within existing power structures by striving to achieve 
synergies between socio-ecological aspects and the objectives of dominant 
interest groups. Symbiotic strategies pursue a largely reformist policy and 
attempt to fundamentally change socio-ecological conditions in cooperation 
with existing institutions.
Interstitial strategies, second, are based on producing alternatives in 
in-between spaces of the incumbent order. Instead of cooperation with 
politically and economically inf luential actors, interstitial activities, proj-
ects and organisations remain largely outside (and often under the radar) of 
capitalist institutions. Compromises are replaced by the (anarchist-inspired) 
principle of prefiguration – the anticipation of desired relations in the here 
and now (Loick 2017). 
Ruptural strategies, third, focus on revolutionary notions of transfor-
mation and try to attain change through direct confrontation, protest and 
resistance. In contrast to the gradual approach of symbiotic and interstitial 
strategies, ruptural strategies aim to build an organised counterforce to 
achieve abrupt and comprehensive changes. The primary orientation of rup-
tural strategists is antagonistic, breaking with existing conditions first and 
creating alternatives second.
Wright himself sees the best prospect for advancing fundamental 
socio-ecological change in the countries of the Global North in a strategic ori-
entation ‘mainly organized around the interplay of interstitial and symbiotic 
strategies, with perhaps periodic episodes involving elements of ruptural 
strategy’ (Hahnel/Wright 2016: 103). A bottom-up emancipatory transforma-
tion, Wright argues, needs not only to make use of the various strategies but 
must also coordinate them with one another. 
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Figure 1: Strategic dimensions of transformation
Source: the author
The actors of a post-growth transformation thus face the challenge of devel-
oping and implementing context-specific transformative strategies and 
of combining and harmonising different strategic orientations. I suggest 
that this can be supported by a resolutely spatial analysis of transformation 
processes. The following section specifies the spatialities of transformation 
using different concepts of space, before section 4 returns to the discussion 
of transformation strategies, further sharpening their focus through the 
addition of a spatial perspective.
3. The spatiality of transformation
This section discusses transformation processes in the light of different 
forms of socio-spatial relations (see Figure 2). In their much-quoted article 
Theorizing Sociospatial Relations, Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) distinguish 
between four concepts of space: territory, network, place and scale. Each of 
these concepts embodies: 
 its own logic and perspectives on the way in which space is produced in social 
practice … Place operates primarily with and through proximity, embed-
dedness  and  local  dif ferentiation.  Networks  are  constituted  by  interde-
pendences and connectivity, while scale indicates hierarchies and vertical 





subdivisions, inclusions and exclusions (Schmid/Reda/Kraehnk et al. 2019: 93 
f., translated from German).
It is important to note that the discussion about socio-spatial dimensions 
is not exhausted by these four concepts. Nonetheless, they are particularly 
significant in geographical research and debate (Belina 2013). This section 
addresses key aspects of these four forms of spatiality and links them to the 
multifaceted transformation processes.
Figure 2: Spatial dimensions of transformation
Source: the author
Place
Places are constituted by spatial encounters and interactions between bod-
ies, artefacts, things, meanings and practices. They are meaningful locations 
in which historical paths of development meet, integrate, stabilise or trans-
form. Place should not be understood as a spatially separate and self-con-
tained unit, but as a locality with materialities, practices and meanings that 
always exist in relation to other places.
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In light of the complex interactions between a place and ‘elsewhere’ it is 
easy to overlook the fact that this ‘elsewhere’ is also grounded in concrete 
places. Doreen Massey (2008), for instance, uses the City of London in her 
famous demonstration of how ‘the global’ is produced locally. Existing con-
ditions as well as the potential for changing them do not lie in an abstract, 
placeless global sphere but start in specific places. 
Just as far-reaching economic and political dynamics emerge from 
practices that are spatially and materially anchored, so too is the potential 
of emancipatory transformation interwoven in place-bounded contexts. 
Transformation, in this sense, does not occur in an a-spatial ‘vacuum’ but 
in concrete places. Longhurst (2015: 184), for example, underlines the sig-
nificance of ‘alternative milieus’ as local concentrations of institutions and 
networks that promote alternative practices, experiments and new ideas. 
Authors who emphasise the importance of proximity also speak of ‘informal 
local institutions’ as central moments of transformative practice (Coenen 
et al. 2012; Hansen/Coenen 2015; Späth/Rohracher 2012) and point out how 
norms, values, trust, social networks and cooperation constitute alternative 
forms of economic activity and decision making. Many transformation ini-
tiatives, such as the Transition Town movement, therefore focus especially 
on the scales of neighbourhoods and municipalities, without being reducible 
to them (see below).
Network
A place-specific perspective is important for understanding the various con-
stellations of values, communities and technologies from which transfor-
mative practices emerge. However, it is equally vital to capture the people, 
ideas and techniques that pass through the various places and create links 
between them. Through interactions between individuals, organisations 
and artefacts, horizontal relations emerge which can be comprehended as 
networked spatialities. Networks therefore are constituted by ‘the horizon-
tal links of entities and spaces created through their interactions’ (Schmid/
Reda/Kraehnk et al. 2019: 106, translated from German).
In transformation research, the horizontal spatiality of networks is a 
recurring figure of thought, particularly in approaches inspired by feminism 
and anarchism (Gibson-Graham 2006; Springer 2014; Chatterton/Pickerill 
2010). Numerous projects and organisations are considered – such as food 
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networks (Rosol 2018), housing projects (Chatterton 2016; Metzger 2017), 
repair initiatives (Baier/Hansing/Müller et al. 2016), neighbourhood initia-
tives (Gibson-Graham 2006) and social-ecological enterprises (Johanisova/
Fraňková 2017) – all of which are based on horizontal economic and political 
relations. Beyond individual projects, the possibility of building far-reach-
ing networks is particularly relevant and has inspired many transformation 
narratives (Chatterton 2016; Habermann 2009; Mason 2016; Meretz 2014). 
Although individual projects are usually strongly embedded in place-re-
lated contexts, their activities and impacts are by no means limited to the 
local. Places, as discussed above, should not be understood as independent 
and self-contained units but are linked to one another in diverse ways. Fair 
trade and sustainable production, for example, can improve living con-
ditions and environmental conditions elsewhere (or rather initially simply 
reduce the negative impacts on other places). The places, people and com-
munities involved in transformative practice are themselves linked with 
one another via umbrella organisations, urban networks, conferences and 
other cooperative formats and are thus involved in an exchange of ideas, 
values and technologies. The aforementioned Transition Town movement, 
for instance, comprises and links well over 1000 initiatives in more than 40 
countries (Grossmann/Creamer, 2016).
Ultimately, the relationality of social conditions also affects large social 
phenomena like statehood or capitalist markets (Schatzki 2016a). Critical 
geographers challenge representations that portray states and markets as 
apparently coherent macrogeographical systems. These representations 
abstract from the multifaceted practices, processes and bodies that produce 
statehood or capitalist markets while differently positioned in their power 
structures (Gibson-Graham 2006; Marston/Jones/Woodward 2005; Springer 
2014). Considering the concrete relations that produce social (macro-) phe-
nomena at the same time reveals possibilities to break down existing institu-
tions and to replace them with more emancipatory alternatives (Chatterton 
2016). 
Territory 
Territories are another important form of social spatiality that are relevant in 
transformation processes. Territories are generally understood as bounded 
segments of space. Like places and networks, neither the boundaries nor the 
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territories themselves are givens, but are rather the products of social prac-
tice. Geographers therefore particularly emphasise processes of territoriali-
sation (Belina 2013; Painter 2010). 
Territories are relevant for transformation processes, both in their pro-
duction and in their effects. Administrative entities generally constitute a 
‘reality’ for transformative practice that cannot be simply ignored. Indeed, 
violating laws and regulations can have forcible consequences, as in cases 
of civil disobedience (Braune 2017). Local, regional, national and supra-
national legislation can promote, hinder or prevent sustainable and post-
growth oriented practice. Simultaneously, actors can tactically resort to dif-
ferent administrative territories and scales to navigate political parameters, 
acquire funding and disseminate alternative practices. In doing so, they 
negotiate and transform the territorial dimension of society.
Scale
Scale refers to the vertical differentiation of social conditions. Traditionally, 
scale is related to different levels – from local to regional to national and 
on up to global – which, however, as will be shown, is conceptually prob-
lematic. Nonetheless, scale is of key significance for transformation research 
(Schmid 2019). Firstly, because the debate about scale is fundamental to an 
understanding of the possibilities and limitations of transformative practice. 
Second, because transformation inevitably includes forms of diffusion, dis-
semination and institutionalisation that are often discussed in a superficial 
manner. I brief ly consider both these aspects in the following. 
The debate about horizontal and vertical forms of spatiality is char-
acterised by many misunderstandings – particularly by the conf lation of 
ontological arguments and those concerned with existing social power rela-
tions (Moore 2008). Relational perspectives on space show that the a pri-
ori structuring of social relations in different scaler levels (local, regional, 
national, global) is not tenable (Jones/Woodward/Marston 2007; Marston/
Jones/Woodward 2005). While horizontal perspectives are characterised by 
an inherent emancipatory moment, it is nonetheless important not to lose 
sight of the power relations that structure and limit the spaces and scope 
for action (Schmid/Smith 2020). This means that a critical scalar perspective 
requires both a spatial ontology that is not based on the presupposition of 
distinct structural levels, while at the same time recognising the socio-ma-
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terial conditions that enable or constrain (transformative) practice. Vertical 
differentiations then become visible not as predefined givens but rather as 
social products. 
Nevertheless, different positions are adopted vis-à-vis the opportunities 
and limitations of transformative practice. A ‘politics of hope’ emphasises 
the opportunities made visible by a ‘f lat ontology’ (Schatzki 2016b). More 
sceptical approaches, in contrast, highlight the inf luence of institutional 
arrangements that – although socially produced –, still condition trans-
formative practice, which is inevitably embedded in the context of existing 
social relations (Buch-Hansen 2018; Joutsenvirta 2016).
Notwithstanding different positionings in relation to the possibili-
ties and constraints of transformative practice, scale itself is fundamen-
tal to concepts of transformation. Upscaling, polycentric shifts, diffusion, 
expansion and dissemination express different views about how changes 
unfold. A critical understanding of scale suggests that simple notions of 
scaling socio-ecological innovations and niche experiments are insufficient. 
Instead, the linking of scalar and network spatialities allows an understand-
ing of transformation to emerge that grasps social change as an emergent, 
non-linear, polycentric and complex process.
4. Spatial strategies for a post-growth transformation
Place, network, territory and scale capture the multi-layered spatialities of 
transformation. Although different socio-spatial dimensions overlap and 
condition one another, an analytical separation – as presented in Section 3 
– sharpens the focus of the transformation strategies discussed in Section 
2. This fourth section attempts a synthesis by developing spatial strategies 
for post-growth transformation. Three social fields are considered which 
are central for a socio-ecological transformation: the economy, politics and 
community. Although these deliberations remain incomplete and in no 
way exclude alternative readings, they are intended to encourage debate on 
transformation strategies to focus more closely on space.
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Networked interstitial strategies for an economic transformation
The complexity and opacity of globalised economic relations represent a 
great challenge to socio-ecological transformation. Subjects, organisations 
and places that are very differently positioned in terms of resources, deci-
sion-making power and agency are brought into complex relations of depen-
dency and exploitation by (peri-)capitalist value chains (Tsing 2015). These 
relationships remain largely invisible under the surface of formal economies.
In this context, symbiotic strategies may be very limited in scope as they 
themselves build on the existing non-transparent value chains. Symbiotic 
strategies are based on compromises and cooperation and must navigate 
a narrow line between the subversion of and reintegration in incumbent 
social relations. Social enterprises, for example, are themselves situated in 
economic relationships that actually force the continuation of exploitative 
conditions through competition.
Ruptural strategies, on the other hand, lack a centre against which to 
direct their resistance (important exceptions here are clearly localisable prac-
tices such as lignite mining in Germany and the protests against it organised 
by the resistance movement ‘Ende Gelände’). However, targeting the complex 
of transnational enterprises and (supranational) legislation as a whole seems 
inconceivable without a broad (revolutionary) movement (which does not 
currently exist in the capitalist centres). 
In contrast, interstitial strategies aim to establish transformative net-
works to replace exploitative and unsustainable economic relations. Intersti-
tial strategies react to the complexity of extractive value chains by building 
fairer and – wherever possible – more local alternatives. They are based on 
the possibility of creating potentially autonomous ‘circuits of cooperation’ 
(Hardt/Negri 2017: 145) and thus on finding a decentralised answer to the 
structural irresponsibility of capitalist and peri-capitalist value chains. 
In order to have a transformative effect, interstitial processes should not, 
however, remain limited to the production and maintenance of niches and 
in-between spaces. Criticism (some justified and some based on misunder-
standings) has been directed towards the focus of many interstitial projects 
on their immediate context (Srnicek/Williams 2016). Explicitly thinking of 
interstitial strategies in terms of networked spatialities reveals the potential 
of alternative circuits of value for economic transformations. The network-
ing of alternative practices introduces the prospect of cooperative networks 
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that gradually replace exploitative relations until they encompass entire 
fields of economic activity (Mason 2016).
Networked interstitial strategies for economic transformation, however, 
are often complicated and blocked by political parameters that focus on eco-
nomic growth and thus prioritise profit over the common good – not to men-
tion the fact that state structures in general are fundamentally dependent 
on growth-based politics. A simultaneous intervention in formal politics is 
therefore necessary. Interstitial strategies, thereby, match badly with the 
territorial organisation of political institutions, requiring the consideration 
of other spatial strategies.
Confronting territorially organised power
Territorially organised power jars with the networked character of dispersed 
and multiple economic exchange relations and dependencies. While polit-
ical power is not only exercised territorially, legislative processes and their 
legal implementation generally play out in spatially bordered entities and 
have a fundamental role in the reproduction of existing social relations. The 
territoriality of political power formally precludes the option of interstitial 
spaces in which alternative forms of bureaucracy, administration and legis-
lation could be tested and implemented. Grey zones of regulation and taxa-
tion, of course, provide important scope for counterhegemonic groups and 
socio-ecological organisations. However, the possibilities for extending and 
generalising alternative political and regulative mechanisms – in line with 
interstitial ideas related to economic practice – seem to be very limited. 
Symbiotic strategies are one option for changing political parameters to 
ensure close attention is paid to social and ecological issues in regulation. 
In order to have a transformative effect, however, symbiotic strategies must 
‘interact to point beyond the capitalist, growth-oriented mode of production 
and defend and extend spaces where it can be overcome’ (Schmelzer/Vetter 
2019: 27, translated from German). In the current political sphere with its 
mostly reactive orientation, however, majorities supporting radical change 
are rarely found. The question thus arises as to whether and to what extent 
symbiotic strategies can lead on to overcome growth-based economic and 
social relations. Or are the changes possible in the context of these strategies 
so limited in their transformative effect that they ultimately contribute to 
the stabilisation of existing conditions?
Spatial strategies for a post-growth transformation 75
Another option is provided by ruptural strategies. Although ruptural 
strategies are unable to locate an identifiable centre for confrontation in the 
context of the decentralised interactions described in Section 3, focusing on 
territorial power allows such a centre to become visible. Territories do not 
simply exist; they must rather be continuously produced and enforced. This 
work of reproduction reveals the centres from which the regulative, con-
trolling and enforcing exercise of territorial power emanates – e. g. the gov-
ernment district of a capital city or the seat of an important financial insti-
tute. This opens options for place-based action and confrontation aiming to 
change the (territorially organised) political conditions.
Post-growth coalitions – the place-relatedness of symbiotic strategies
Ruptural strategies have a crucial disadvantage however: they have a divi-
sive effect, distinguishing between ‘us’ – those who put up resistance and 
denounce injustices – and ‘them’ – who must be held accountable. This 
can lead to aggressive accusations, social disintegration and entrenched 
positions and even trigger counter movements based on a shared identity 
of being ‘accused’. The antagonistic orientation of ruptural strategies can 
therefore lead to the reproduction and deepening of opposition rather than 
to solidarity and the joint tackling of socio-ecological wrongs. The abstract 
nature of territorial power and its distance from the populace may well 
require the exercising of ruptural strategies, but this type of strategy seems 
less appropriate for specific place-related problem solving.
Symbiotic strategies, on the other hand, are challenged by the fact that 
coalitions operating with and through the existing institutional landscape 
require a great deal of ref lexivity, knowledge and trust to have transforma-
tive effects despite the compromises they have to make. Place, thereby, offers 
a possible strategic entry point for symbiotic transformative practice. While 
determinist and romanticised images of proximity and the local should be 
avoided, direct contacts, trust, personal relations and mutual knowledge 
are important resources for ref lexive and emancipatory cooperation. On 
that basis, the selective perpetuation of unsustainable and unjust conditions 
caused by compromise can be assessed collectively and transparently. 
Places where transformative practices are concentrated – alternative 
milieus (Longhurst 2015) – can act as central sources of further impulses 
and changes. This may involve specific establishments like a neighbourhood 
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office or an open workshop (Smith 2019), but also includes beneficial (for a 
socio-ecological transformation) relationships between different actors 
from the sphere of politics and civil society (Barnes 2015). In this way, places 
also offer a shared frame of reference that promotes the forging of trans-
versal coalitions. Post-growth discourses discuss the fundamental need for 
intact and liveable socio-ecological conditions that are not limited to specific 
political groups. Places offer experimental spaces for prefigurative practices 
and immediate experiences, which can then in turn have a positive effect on 
the transformative potential of these places.
5. Conclusion
Post-growth demands fundamental social-ecological transformation away 
from political, economic and cultural practice that leads to an increasing 
destabilisation and exploitation of ecological and social systems. The insti-
tutional restructuring implied by post-growth is so far-reaching that it 
challenges both our notions of what is feasible and encounters a great deal 
of resistance from people who feel afraid or want to maintain their privi-
leges. As a consequence, it is insufficient to formulate convincing alterna-
tives. What is required, furthermore, is a strategic orientation to push for a 
social-ecological transformation.
The typology drawn up by Erik Olin Wright with symbiotic, interstitial 
and ruptural transformation strategies offers a framework for the system-
atic investigation and organisation of different transformative practices. 
Compromise-based, interstitial and antagonistic approaches, thereby, must 
be scrutinised in terms of their social and spatial manifestations and inter-
actions. By combining these strategic approaches with different spatial con-
cepts, particularly robust socio-spatial post-growth strategies can be identi-
fied (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Socio-spatial post-growth strategies
Source: the author
An economic transformation primarily requires a long-term focus on inter-
stitial strategies aimed at creating alternative circuits of value. In the context 
of ‘structural irresponsibility’, ruptural strategies find it difficult to identify 
an economic centre against which resistance can be directed. Symbiotic 
strategies, in contrast, are themselves subjected to economic constraints and 
often appropriated.
Interstitial strategies, however, quickly reach their limits when faced 
with growth-oriented framework conditions and are less suited to confront 
political institutions. Ruptural strategies, on the other hand, can find a ‘tar-
get’ in the centres from which territorial power is exercised. Such an antag-
onistic approach may, however, be problematic, as it generates opposition 
where more solidary ways of living are envisioned. Particularly in contexts 
where proximity and trust can be established, symbiotic strategies in their 




















The interplay of the various strategies discussed here supports Wright’s 
assessment that a fundamental (emancipatory) restructuring of social con-
ditions requires a combination of symbiotic, interstitial and ruptural strat-
egies. A robust spatial perspective clarifies which roles can be assigned to 
the different strategic orientations in the context of a post-growth transfor-
mation. The elaboration of these three socio-spatial strategies is intended to 
encourage different socio-ecological developments, organisations, actors 
and practices to be considered in relation to one another. In concrete terms 
this involves focusing on the fact that while social movements, alternative 
economic organisations and socio-ecological initiatives demonstrate very 
different strategic orientations, there is also significant convergence in their 
objectives. Spatial strategies for post-growth transformation can provide an 
analytical framework for the better understanding and systematic organisa-
tion of these struggles.
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Reducing working hours in small enterprises 
as a post-growth practice?
Hubert Eichmann
In 2018 the online marketing company ‘eMagnetix’ in Upper Austria switched 
to a 30-hour week, while continuing to pay its 22 employees the same full-
time wage. The CEO, Klaus Hochreiner, justifies the reduction of working 
hours by citing advantages for three parties. Thanks to the increased free 
time, the employees are more even-tempered, more satisfied and more pro-
ductive. Output is improved, which then benefits the employer and, espe-
cially, the customers (Hausensteiner 2019). The entrepreneur Lasse Rhein-
gans has gone a step further with his IT agency in Bielefeld, Germany. In 
2017, he and his 15 employees introduced a five-hour day, or 25-hour week, 
while continuing with full-pay, initially as an experiment. They claim to be 
the first company in Germany to take such a step (Hausensteiner 2019).1 
How do the increasing number of enterprises that are reducing work-
ing hours without reducing pay fit into post-growth or degrowth discourses 
calling for the abandonment of economic growth (e.g. Kallis/Kalush/Flynn et 
al. 2013; Knight/Rosa/Schor 2013; Nässén/Larsson 2015)? Are concrete exam-
ples of reduced working hours evidence that post-growth positions are not 
just theoretical, largely macro-economic models, but are rather increasingly 
disseminated in the realities of the business world (Gebauer 2018; Schmid 
2018)? Or is it only justified to speak of post-growth in this context if there 
is a move away from commercial objectives like profit, productivity or size 
(volume of employment) – and correspondingly from growth? Does it even 
make sense to apply post-growth concepts to the business level? Or is this a 
pointless undertaking? Even given the need for economic shrinkage on the 
1  Also see: https://www.zeit.de/zeit-spezial/2018/01/25-stunden-woche-lasse-rheingans-
agentur-bielefeld/komplettansicht (28.01.2020)
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macro-scale, in future not all businesses will need to be persuaded to shrink 
no matter what their field of activities or structural organisation. On the 
contrary, from a post-growth perspective, it may be better to promote busi-
nesses that excel in terms of conserving resources or focusing on the com-
mon good (Sommer 2018; Wiefek/Heinitz 2018), as far as possible in combi-
nation with employee-friendly or even democratically constituted working 
conditions. In brief: does it make sense to speak of post-growth on the meso-
level of the enterprise or would it be more appropriate to restrict attention to 
concepts like the ‘transformative company’ (Pfriem/Antoni-Komar/Lauter-
mann 2015; Antoni-Komar/Kropp/Paech et al. 2019), because this approach is 
more conceptually open to diverse desirable paths?2 
One of those arguing in favour of the latter approach is Bernd Sommer, 
who wishes to avoid misunderstandings by emphasising that the transi-
tion to a society which is not dependent on growth does not require every 
company to shrink or not to grow: ‘On the contrary, in the context of such 
structural transformation it can be the case that certain industries and 
enterprises grow or multiply while others disappear. What is crucial is just 
that in the long-term the continued existence of individual enterprises and 
the stability of societies overall do not depend on endlessly sustained growth’ 
(Sommer 2018: 20).
Representative of relevant findings are those of a research project on 
growth-neutral enterprises and post-growth pioneers by Jana Gebauer 
and Julian Sagebiel, in the course of which a broad survey of about ca. 700 
SME in Germany was also carried out. The enterprises were asked about 
their growth orientation and it emerged that the majority, circa 60 %, had 
either no (34 %) or only limited (25 %) growth ambitions (Gebauer/Sagebiel 
2015; Gebauer 2019). This will not surprise people who are themselves active 
in or research the world of small and micro enterprises and thereby tend to 
encounter growth aversion rather than growth ambitions. The criticism of 
business management principles like maximisation of profits, productivity 
and turnover is misguided, at least when it is applied generally without tak-
ing into consideration the fact that large companies usually (can or must) 
act quite differently from small ones. On the other hand, just because small 
2  With ‘impact dimensions’ like self-empowerment, collaborative empowerment, self-suf-
ficiency, economic self-limitation, deceleration, regionalisation/localisation, renaturation 
(Pfriem/Antoni-Komar/Lautermann 2015).
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companies are not focused on growth does not mean that it is possible to 
assume a transformation is at work.
Reductions in working hours of one-person enterprises (OPEs) 
with or without a transformative agenda
This paper draws on material gathered in qualitative interviews in small and 
micro enterprises from the creative industry in Vienna, especially from the 
graphics and internet business. The image of freelancers working long and 
unlimited hours around the clock automatically springs to mind. However, 
this notion needs to be overhauled, if only because the lack of supervisory 
instances means that autonomous working rhythms are more heterogeneous 
(see Bührmann/Hansen 2012; Muckenhuber 2014). Furthermore, individual 
strategies can or must be adapted more quickly, e.g. because the self-em-
ployed are not subject to working time regulations or because adaptation is 
necessary when there is a drop in orders. Examples of reduced or shorter 
working hours (in relation to daily, weekly, seasonal or other rhythms) 
include part-time self-employment, for instance because of childcare duties;3 
a reduction in the time invested due to increases in efficiency (or, on the 
other hand, a lack of orders); and e.g. the realisation of a long-cherished wish 
to slow down after many years of professional life. Socio-ecological goals or 
collectively managed constellations with distinct company democracy also 
often correspond to preferences for reducing working hours. 
Nonetheless, organisations that reduce working hours as the result of an 
explicitly transformative approach, for instance as part of an overall strategy 
to conserve resources or a democratic charter, probably remain something of 
a niche phenomenon. On the other hand, it is argued here that many one-per-
son enterprises or micro enterprises follow a risk-averse ‘no growth’ path or 
tend to strive to reduce their own input, e.g. measured in working hours. 
This occurs, however, in diverse ways, without an ecological imperative of 
action or the motivation of a post-growth principle. Rather, in the middle of 
their professional lives (when many career goals and advancement ambitions 
have been realised or abandoned), actors socialised in micro enterprises rec-
3   20 % of male and 45 % of  female OPEs and 8 % of male and 18 % of  female  ‘employers’ 
(i.e. entrepreneurs with employees) work part-time in Austria (Statistik Austria 2016: 91 f f.)
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ognise that (further) growth would involve a great deal of effort. They there-
fore focus on stabilising their economic prospects, for instance aiming to 
work less but without a reduction in income.
The following sections use empirical cases drawn from two research proj-
ects as a basis for discussion of working time practices that involve fewer 
working hours than the full-time jobs of non-self-employed persons. The first 
section presents no-growth paths that lead to a reduction in working hours 
where the actors involved do not suggest that their course of action is moti-
vated by socio-ecological or other related factors. The examples are drawn 
from interview-based research conducted in 2016 with 14 self-employed per-
sons. Working hours were a side issue here and interviewees were therefore 
not selected according to the number of hours they worked. It is nonetheless 
interesting that about half of those interviewed categorised themselves as 
working less than full time (four women, three men; a total of seven men and 
seven women were interviewed). The subsequent section presents the results 
of a company case study from 2019 which was conducted in the course of an 
investigation into alternative business models. This example demonstrates a 
transformative approach where a group of people with a history of working 
as OPEs formed an occupational association aimed at professionalising and 
reducing their hours of paid work.
Redcing working hours without a transformative agenda
Of the 14 self-employed persons from the design and internet verticals who 
were interviewed in 2016, only two are employers in a literal sense, i.e. they 
employ staff in their own businesses. The others are legally ‘independent 
self-employed’ and most do not define themselves as having an explicit 
focus on expansion. Becoming an employer is thought to be extremely risky 
because of the associated costs. Nevertheless, it is usually important for 
freelancers to avoid a go-it-alone existence, because this means that only a 
very small range of services can be offered and also, for instance, makes it 
difficult to bridge long absences resulting from illness or holidays. The modus 
operandi for those who do not work in a joint company with a partner (thus 
for almost all of those interviewed) is therefore a sustainable network of col-
leagues active in the same professional field, or at least in complementary 
lines of business. Little seems to remain of grand artistic ambitions after 
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a professional career in the project world, or only in the form of subsidi-
ary projects that are not intended for the market. Such ambitions are out-
weighed by an eye for the necessities: providing professional services, sus-
taining cost-income ratios, ensuring capacity utilisation and maintaining 
market reputation – all while preserving a balance between creative work 
and (the moderately popular) commercial management. 
The survey analysis revealed the heterogeneous nature of working time 
strategies among self-employed individuals from the Viennese creative 
industry. Looking first at those who estimated that they worked more than 
an average of 40 hours a week (about half of those interviewed), few proved 
to be true ‘workhorses’. Long working hours were explained by particularly 
intensive phases of work, e.g. filming sessions for filmmakers which often 
include idle periods, but also by artistic lifestyles with some of the creatives 
rejecting the notion of a divide between the spheres of paid and unpaid work. 
The interviewees who suggested that they did not work more than 40 hours 
a week on average over the year can be divided into two groups. Firstly, suc-
cessful and somewhat older self-employed individuals, who are now slowing 
down and improving their quality of life after a work-intensive past of mixed 
success. The motto here is that professional success is no longer everything, 
the next generation should rather be the ones to hold the front line. 
For example, after the bankruptcy of his company in the financial crisis 
of 2008/2009, the owner of an internet agency changed his field of business 
and today works as a self-employed photographer. The bankruptcy did not 
leave him untouched: as well as losing his assets he now has a significantly 
lower income. At the same time, he recognises advantages in his present pro-
fessional situation as he suffers from much less stress than when he man-
aged his company with 20 employees.
‘I: If you now sum up, the years 2005 and 2015: income, working hours and 
satisfaction with what you do … 
M: Less, less, exorbitantly more.
I: So in terms of expenditure of time sort of reasonable? 
M: It is reasonable. Naturally, there are phases where a lot is going on.’ (Pho-
tographer, aged 50)
Somewhat different reasons for restricting working hours to not more than 
40 hours are given by the second group of younger self-employed persons 
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who have many years of working life in front of them but nonetheless do 
not want to dedicate their lives just to paid work. Their argument for work-
ing shorter hours is based largely on the fact that they began their working 
lives as employees and only entered self-employment later. The professional 
socialisation of this group occurred through providing more or less creative 
services in the world of advertising agencies. In many sequences of dialogue, 
such biographies serve as an apparent paradox to desired working hours and 
practices: several of the interviewees chose to switch to self-employment 
because they realised that they did not want to end up as workaholics in the 
agency rat race. They hoped that being self-employed would allow them more 
sovereignty over daily and weekly working hours. At the same time, start-
ing with a job as an employee provided experience about standard working 
hours and their meaningfulness. In contrast, limiting working hours is often 
of minor importance for those who start their working lives in self-employ-
ment and do not know anything else.
Rather than unlimited self-exploitation, in the course of gathering pro-
fessional experience many people become concerned not with maximising 
output but rather with achieving a sustainable balance between external 
demands and their own resources. A frequently mentioned objective is to 
achieve as stable an income as possible while continuing to establish a mar-
ket position with limited inputs of work(ing time). In some cases, restricting 
the working hours invested in profane creative services is also intended to 
free resources for their own artistic interests. It should be noted that those 
interviewed from the younger group (i.e. aged +/- 40) with shorter working 
hours tend not to be among the low earners in this sample, on the contrary a 
number of them are commercially well established. 
One example of this is an entrepreneur who for five years has filmed 
advertising slots for the PR department of a large company, for instance 
for jubilees or regular quarterly reports. This major customer is profitable 
enough for the commercial filmmaker to earn a good income – while not 
working more than an annual average of 15 to 20 hours a week. He seems 
to spend the time thus gained on his own interests. For instance, in the year 
before the interview he used the network that he had developed in his pre-
vious job with a film production company to gain an assistant’s job on the 
Austrian location of an international blockbuster action film. Being part of 
this high-end production was a great learning experience for him. He rea-
Reducing working hours in small enterprises as a post-growth practice? 91
lises that he would have to reorganise his whole strategy if he lost his major 
customer.
‘I: If you average it all out, working very intensively for a few weeks a year and 
then often less: approximately how many working hours a week do you have?
L: Well, perhaps 20 hours, if you spread it all out and add everything in. I mean, 
other things always come up too... In the last year I’ve really worked a lot. If I 
now look at the hours again… actually, I would rather say 15 hours a week, so 
on average. If I leave out the last year.’ (Commercial filmmaker, aged 42)
In comparison we consider a graphic designer who set up her own company 
with a colleague about five years before the interview, after working for years 
in a large advertising agency. The young company was able to quickly gain a 
good reputation despite the difficult market – in part through ex-colleagues 
who had moved to the PR departments of advertising purchasers. Now that 
her partner has left the business, the interviewee works as an OPE and coor-
dinates a considerable network of freelancers with whom she can tackle rel-
atively large projects. As the acquisition and care of customers has become 
her core competence, she maintains a central position in the network and 
earns correspondingly well. She has reduced the amount of creative work she 
undertakes in favour of project management and outsources a great deal to 
the freelancers. 
‘I: Do you actually plan to expand?
Z: No, it’s better to do less and demand more for it. So generally I always want 
to do less than I’m doing. And I think that after ten years you can say, yes, peo-
ple come to me for a certain reason. Because they think it’s good…
[…]
I: How about your working times, overall, if you count hours in the week: 
more or less than 40 hours?
Z: Well certainly not more, I can’t imagine that. […] No, the aim is simple: bet-
ter paid hours.
I: Yes, okay. But better paid hours may mean that I work the same amount 
and earn more or I earn the same amount and then have less work. 
Z: No, I work less because I … because it’s so well paid, I can much better 
afford  someone  else  to  do  the  work  …  so  that  I  can  have  it  pretty  cushy.’ 
(Graphic designer, aged 38)
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Founding an association and reducing working hours  
as a transformative approach
So, what is different about certain organisations that justifies labelling them 
‘transformative’? I analyse this using the example of a company that is also 
in the internet industry, which facilitates comparison. This case is part of a 
series of case studies scrutinising diverse ‘alternative’ organisational mod-
els, ranging from co-operatives to fab labs to the peer-to-peer economy and 
barter exchanges.
The company in question is a fusion of (so far) five one-person enterprises 
(three men and two women aged between 35 and 60). The individuals con-
cerned have known each other for a long time through various networks and 
project constellations but only decided a year ago to legally amalgamate as 
a joint graphics agency, not in the usual legal form of a limited company but 
as a co-operative. In addition to fulfilling their desire for greater interaction 
and community, the decision to form an association was motivated, firstly, 
by the fact that this allows the entrepreneurs to hold employment contracts 
(with unemployment insurance benefits). None of the five founding mem-
bers escapes the need to find customers, but the revenue is now generated in 
the name of the co-operative, is administered by the co-operative and is then 
paid to the members according to their employment contracts or working 
hours. In the initial years, profits are reinvested, e.g. in office infrastructure. 
It should be mentioned that the five members of this co-operative do not all 
contribute their entire turnover to the new association, several continue to 
serve some of their existing customers on a self-employed basis. The associa-
tion approach is clearly intended to reduce individual business risk. Further-
more, personal liability is limited to a reasonable sum, namely double the 
amount of the individual investment of circa 2000 euros. As entrepreneurs 
but simultaneously also neo-employees, there is also the option of drawing 
unemployment benefit if necessary. 
Secondly, the foundation of the co-operative was motivated by a wish for 
solidarity. For instance, those involved hoped for more democracy than is 
generally found in a joint-stock company, because in the articles of associ-
ation it was agreed that each member should have one vote rather than the 
number of votes being governed by the amount of an individual’s invest-
ment. There is undoubtedly a transformative aspect to this resolution, which 
should also help to encourage moderate corporate growth. Contrary to post-
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growth or shrinkage paradigms, the co-operative is interested in recruit-
ing new members, up to 10-12 in the medium term, in order to extend and 
safeguard the portfolio. Self-employed acquaintances with complementary 
competences are therefore offered an opportunity to join the association and 
thus a chance of escaping the typical insecurity of freelancers.
‘I: Why a co-operative actually?
G: Actually it is, for me at least, the greater amount of solidarity. And a dif fer-
ent focus now, not so much profit optimisation, which is of course rather the 
case in a limited company. […] Till now, we’ve had a year, it has gone very well. 
Also we went  into this affair on an equal footing, that’s already a dif ferent 
understanding.’ (Graphic designer, aged 49)
Thirdly, during the interviews several members of the co-operative made 
clear that they were particularly concerned with restricting their working 
hours, initially through professional cooperation or project organisation. 
The desire for more (working-time) efficiency in everyday procedures is nat-
urally not in itself a transformative approach, for instance in socio-ecological 
terms. However, the additional reasons given are of interest. The focus is not 
primarily on reducing the number of weekly working hours – for instance, 
by introducing a binding 30-hour week or something similar, like in other 
enterprises. That would apparently be relatively difficult for those inter-
viewed during this case study. After the years they have spent organising 
their own working rhythms, it requires a great deal of effort to even discover 
how many hours a week they work on average (strictly speaking vs. broadly 
speaking, etc.). The desire to reduce working hours seems more connected to 
two specific objectives.
Firstly, the aim is to have more time for creative work, volunteering or 
alternative pursuits other than their primary professional activities. Four 
of the five interviewees mentioned diverse non-commercial activities that 
require a relevant amount of time (1x artistic activity, 2x volunteer work, 
1x academic thesis). Those involved do not want to give up such pursuits. 
Indeed, the intention is that the association should facilitate their non-pro-
fessional interests by stabilising business operations and the understanding 
that professional commitments should generally not exceed a 40-hour week.
Secondly, the topic of reducing working hours ref lects a desire to take 
longer breaks but with a right to return to work ensured by membership of 
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the association. As ‘habitualised’ self-employed service providers, several of 
the interviewees are all too aware of the problem of being absent for a longer 
period of time without running the risk of losing customers (e.g. longer hol-
idays abroad), not to mention extended periods of recuperation from illness 
or burnout conditions. Hence there was a desire to leave the self-employ-
ment-past behind and finally enjoy the chance of a break – safeguarded by 
the vehicle of participation in the co-operative. 
‘B: And the next thing is that there is also a wish to be replaceable. That it is 
positive if you are replaceable, because then you get breaks for other busi-
ness and generally.
I: Have I understood it properly: I can finally be away for longer and then have 
no problem coming back?
B: That is a really strong argument for me, namely also that the culture is that 
it is not just okay but rather that it is even to a degree welcomed. I know that 
from other  organisations,  that  it  is  often  extremely  problematic  if  people 
want to back off even just a bit, take leave or educational leave or do volun-
tary work or something like that.’ (Graphic designer, aged 44)
Conclusion
In discourses on post-growth economies, arguments focus on whether and 
to what extent entire economies can be brought to pursue a no-growth path, 
particularly for ecological reasons. Discussion considers the policy agendas 
that should be established – and why it is difficult to identify significant 
transformation movements on the enterprise level, apart from pioneers in 
rather narrowly defined sustainability niches or in diverse non-profit worlds. 
In contrast, this paper argues that a significant proportion of one-person 
enterprises already implicitly follow a no-growth path and thus actually 
want to reduce their input, e.g. measured in working hours, rather than 
expand. This manifests itself in diverse ways and is likely to be far removed 
from post-growth imperatives. 
Using interviews with self-employed creatives in Vienna, it has been 
demonstrated that many actors develop aspirations that result in the stabi-
lisation of their own output. Their working hours then vary with peaks and 
troughs in capacity utilisation but average less than 40 hours a week. Many 
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actors perceive the limits of their own resources by the time they are in the 
middle third of their professional biographies. In light of these limits, it is 
then about achieving a reasonable balance between input and output. In line 
with this aim, many entrepreneurs tend to proactively restrict and reduce 
their working hours. And of course, there are numerous pioneering compa-
nies from which much can be learnt.
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Lessons from Practice

The emancipatory project of degrowth
An interview with Andrea Vetter and Matthias Schmelzer, conducted by Meret 
Batke, Mai Anh Ha and Bastian Lange
Andrea Vetter writes, researches, talks and organises for socio-ecological change; 
primarily for the ‘Haus des Wandels’ (‘House of Transformation’) in eastern Bran-
denburg, for the ‘Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie’ (‘Laboratory for new economic 
ideas’) in Leipzig and for the journal ‘Oya: enkeltauglich leben’  (‘Oya:  grandchil-
dren-compatible living’). She teaches ‘Transformation Design’ at University of 
Fine Arts in Braunschweig. 
Matthias Schmelzer works with ‘Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie’ on social utopias, 
alternative economics and degrowth and is a research assistant at the University 
of Jena. He is actively involved in the climate justice movement.
In debates on post-growth and degrowth, how do you dissociate yourselves from 
right-wing spatial semantics?
Matthias Schmelzer: One of the main thrusts of the postgrowth or degrowth 
discussion – in our German book on this concept we use both terms almost 
synonymously – is to confront the neoliberal, authoritarian and fossil glo-
balisation with a vision of a more small-scale economic system that focuses 
on needs and care. This has certain superficial similarities with right-wing 
spatial semantics or imaginings, so that those on the right have at times 
taken up ‘post-growth’ as a keyword. In particular, the far-right faction of 
the AfD [Alternative für Deutschland – Alternative for Germany] expresses 
views that refer to a small-scale approach, and several years ago they used 
the term ‘post-growth economy’. 
From an emancipatory, left-wing perspective, the possibility of appropri-
ation is of course problematic for critical debate and for a vision of a region-
alised and de-globalised economy. That’s why in our view the basic motiva-
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tion and focus for emancipatory post-growth and degrowth policies should 
always be the prospect of global justice, which goes hand in hand with a call 
for open borders. Open primarily in relation to the free movement of people, 
not necessarily also of goods, services and capital – it may very well be rea-
sonable to discuss certain restrictions there. For instance, implementing a 
post-growth economy in a globalised world economy will certainly involve 
controlling f lows of capital in the transition period. 
In discussing alternatives to borders, the degrowth debate uses the term 
‘open re-localisation’ to clearly distinguish this from culturally closed ‘biore-
gions’. A central part of degrowth practices, and one that is still insufficiently 
implemented, is for instance practical solidarity with refugees who have 
been deprived of their rights to freedom of movement. 
Is that a kind of internal decolonisation or de-imperialisation that every individual 
should practise?
Matthias Schmelzer: In the degrowth debate the focus is on economic cate-
gories such as GDP that we have internalised and on questioning our West-
ern vision of what makes a good life. Serge Latouche, one of the early pio-
neers of degrowth, proposed terming this a ‘decolonisation of the imaginary’, 
but there is also criticism of the use of this notion. In essence this criticism 
says that ‘colonisation’ and ‘decolonisation’ are terms that were coined to 
apply to very specific historical and social contexts and today their main 
function is to address racism and the consequences of colonisation. When 
these terms are transferred to another field such as economics, then their 
critical potential is taken and appropriated for something else. Nonetheless, 
the fundamental idea of questioning and freeing ourselves from entrenched 
imaginaries about hierarchical society and capitalist economies is central to 
the degrowth discussion.
Are there practical examples for this fundamental idea of degrowth?
Andrea Vetter: A change of perspective is needed to learn to really see the 
world in which I live. One example is the omnipresent smartphone. If I look 
closely at the phone in my pocket, what materials it is made of, which factory 
it was manufactured in, what infrastructures are necessary for it to work, 
then I learn to see what relationships are concealed beneath its shiny black 
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surface – namely exploitative relationships that spread around the whole 
globe. All the global, growth-driven, exploitative relations are contained in 
the materiality of the quite everyday things that we surround ourselves with 
– whether in the concrete of our houses, in the plastic and microelectronics of 
our devices or in the fossil fuels that transport us and keep us warm. Sharp-
ening this view of the world helps me to discern the world in which I find 
myself and then to engage collectively with others to change these exploit-
ative relationships. 
Do processes like the planned phase-out of coal represent an opportunity?
Andrea Vetter: Yes, that could really be the case – for instance in the Lausitz 
region, a big lignite mining area in East Germany, there’s a plan to invest 17 
billion euros in the so-called structural transformation by the 2030s. This 
money could be used to initiate a socio-ecological model region, if there was 
a lot more cooperation with local civil society actors. Instead though, the 
road network is being upgraded and tax breaks are offered in an attempt to 
attract industry. I think it’s fatal to try to move forward into the next 20 years 
with yesterday’s concepts – with the same imperial ways of life and economic 
approaches that have led to ecological and social destruction. After 1990 and 
the end of the GDR, people in the Lausitz region already experienced one 
structural transformation, a brutal process. Now they deserve better than 
the foul promises of the same ‘blossoming landscapes’ that have not come 
true in the last 30 years.
What are the core topics and core processes of an emancipatory degrowth economy, 
also in relation to spatial references used by the political right? 
Matthias Schmelzer: The right-wing and racist approach to space involves 
strengthening closed, bio-ethnic regions. Degrowth is about the opposite, 
namely global justice, for the sake of which globalisation processes must be 
driven back in several fields – like so-called free trade. This somewhat com-
plicated line of argument means that it is not always easy for the degrowth 
discussion to gain a foothold in left-wing emancipatory debates. There’s a 
lot of scepticism because historically speaking, most concepts that focused 
on regionalisation and criticism of industrialism were reactionary or against 
global justice.
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It is especially important to talk about socio-ecological transformation, 
to stop people being afraid of the future and of changes. This needs to occur 
on a very concrete basis, which is why socio-political demands play such a 
great role in the degrowth discussion. Ecological and social issues must be 
very closely linked together. 
In nearly all proposals of the degrowth and post-growth debate, demands 
for a radical redistribution of income and wealth are central – concepts that 
focus on a universal basic income or concepts involving radical cuts in aver-
age working hours and periods of employment. These are suggestions that 
could actually be tried out experimentally in model regions like the Lausitz, 
where transformations to phase out coal dependency are necessary. In 
these experimental regions, society as a whole must take on responsibility 
and ensure funding to make this sort of approach possible. Current politics, 
however, is not moving in the direction of transformations or a fundamental 
rethinking of economic and social priorities.
Is it understandable that people, for instance in the Lausitz region, are afraid of a 
third – ecological – transformation?
Matthias Schmelzer: The so-called ‘reforms’ or ‘transformations’ of recent 
decades have not improved the lives of most people. Fears or concerns are 
therefore understandable, as transformations usually bring something bad 
for people. But it is difficult to sympathise with an attitude that scapegoats 
people who are discriminated against, have fewer resources and less access 
to power. That is what is happening at the moment, because in the widest 
sense migrants and people of colour are being made the scapegoats. There 
are numerous investigations that show that there is no obvious rational con-
nection between problems in the rural areas of eastern Germany and the 
immigration policy of recent decades. Nonetheless, many people believe this 
is the case and see concepts like homeland (Heimat) and right-wing national-
ist politics as a solution. It is important to set clear boundaries against such 
racist attitudes. And it is important to make clear that the economic policy 
of the AfD is not one that will benefit ‘ordinary people’ – on the contrary. 
Nonetheless, in the current political situation it is an important challenge to 
convincingly convey the message that the pending socio-ecological transfor-
mation is one that really does provide a good life for all. 
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Andrea Vetter: I think it’s also important here not to take a universalising 
approach and pretend all the rural regions of eastern Germany are the same. 
If you really go to a specific village and talk to the people you see that the 
conditions are different in each village. One village faces demolition to 
make way for a lignite mine – of course the residents there are pleased if 
coal is phased out quickly and their village is saved. In another village nearby 
some of the men work in mining and are worried about losing their jobs. In a 
third village the residents are resigned because the solar-panel factory there 
closed several years ago, due to renewable energy legislation that destroyed 
large parts of renewables industry in East Germany, which by the way had a 
similar number of employees to the lignite industry. 
The difference is though that one industry has a powerful lobby behind it 
and the other doesn’t. This means that media and politics tend to exaggerate 
phenomena and discourses that actually have little to do with the real life 
and perceptions of local people. 
What do manifestations of right-wing spatial semantics look like in transformation 
regions in East Germany?
Andrea Vetter: In many East German municipalities a lot of people over the 
age of 60 actually tend to vote for the left, for historical reasons. In the elec-
tion in Thuringia for example, it was primarily people between 30 and 45 who 
voted for right-wing parties like the AfD. This has its roots in the political 
vacuum of the 1990s when GDR state institutions suddenly disappeared 
and with them a lot of local cultural institutions where young people were 
socialised. Right-wing extremists from West Germany deliberately targeted 
the East at this time, doing ‘missionary work’ there. So it was not simply the 
case that ‘the people’ in the countryside suddenly discovered their racism, 
but rather that this was targeted and promoted by right-wing extremists and 
activists. 
But it is also important to look specifically at good examples and options. 
There are many engaged actors locally who have for decades countered 
right-wing narratives with youth work and education, and especially in the 
so-called structurally disadvantaged regions there are also many spatial 
pioneers who are experimenting with creative, emancipatory and ecologi-
cal lifestyles. I think there are certainly links to post-growth discussions in 
rural post-socialist areas – with these new actors who enter into abandoned 
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spaces but also with the experiences and knowledge of the older generations, 
whose everyday lives still include subsistence production, repairing things 
and being frugal with resources. It is indeed possible to link this local subsis-
tence orientation with sustainable, feminist and anti-racist contexts instead 
of letting the right-wing propagandists do their work. But this needs politi-
cal long-term work on a local level. 
Matthias Schmelzer: Realistically speaking, it is also understandable that 
degrowth concepts strike more of a note in urban contexts, as degrowth is 
also about the deprivileging of people who profit particularly strongly from 
the imperial mode of living. Those who live in cities are also those who par-
ticipate most strongly in the imperial mode of living, who f ly most and who 
consume more than average, as high incomes strongly correlate with ecolog-
ical footprints. That is also why it is important to set the discourse straight. 
The main problems of the imperial mode of living, of externalisation societies 
and for the climate catastrophe are not the car drivers in rural East Germany, 
and not the miners, but rather the growth-oriented, profit-driven economic 
system that primarily benefits an urban, globally oriented elite. 
Is it possible to learn to live a post-growth life?
Matthias Schmelzer: The pending transformation process is an unbeliev-
ably multifaceted, complex and long-term project. If we work for an eco-
logical, social and democratic economy, then it’s important to understand 
how various transformation strategies complement each other. We need 
spaces where alternatives can be tried out on a small scale and new post-
growth practices and imaginaries can be learned. In the same way we also 
need far-reaching reforms in institutions and infrastructures. And we need 
strong social movements that fight for counter-hegemony. That is especially 
important because what the present-day political parties propose in their 
party programmes is, in our view, completely insufficient for a future-proof 
society and economy. That’s why we start with strengthening social move-
ments, driving civil society discourse and so shifting the space of what is 
imaginable and possible. 
Andrea Vetter: For years, the ‘Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie’ has been involved 
in organising many conferences, but we also deliberately take the degrowth 
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summer schools out to places, e.g. as climate camps. Temporary places like 
climate camps are heterotopias where new routines can be established and 
counter-hegemonic solidaric modes of living can be tested out. For one week, 
these heterotopias create a strong resonance between hundreds or thou-
sands of people who practise energy sufficiency and democratic self-organi-
sation – be it in using and caring for compost toilets, building solar turbines 
or organising shared childcare. 
Experiences in workshops, camps, conferences or practical workcamps 
like this are an important part of transformative learning. Our target groups 
are often mostly young, highly educated people who haven’t decided yet 
what work they want to do or where they want to live. If, early on in their 
professional careers, a lot of these people get impulses encouraging them 
to approach their lifepaths quite differently and not to seek the well-trod-
den paths, then that makes a big difference. If people decide to work for a 
socio-ecological transformation there are a lot of jobs to do: establishing 
new institutions, networks and cooperatives, as well as changing existing 
institutions from the inside. As a social anthropologist and transformation 
designer, I’ve witnessed over and over again the importance of such tempo-
rary heterotopias for making a profound change in people’s lives.
What transformation strategies are required to work towards a post-growth soci-
ety?
Andrea Vetter: The ‘Laboratory for New Economic Ideas’ works together with 
various social movements that have different target groups, e.g. with the 
network ‘Care Revolution’, which includes 80 smaller groups based in Ger-
man-speaking countries concerned with the topic of care work –both paid 
and unpaid care-givers like nurses, parents or sex workers, and also care-re-
ceivers, who for instance employ assistants. 
The idea is to deepen a discourse in wider society around care work. The 
people who are involved in ‘Care Revolution’ recognise the need for a society 
beyond growth but argue from a different perspective than the ecological 
one. We emphasise the links between the social and ecological crises and 
believe it is important to tackle both together. This means including the eco-
logical question in the question of care work and the transformation of the 
economy and also the other way round – if from an ecological perspective 
we need a very different economy then we must put care work at the heart of 
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this different economy. We work with actors who are starting from different 
places and we draw up and support strategies about how the various issues 
can be more closely interlinked. 
What challenges emerge?
Andrea Vetter: We need institutional, fundamental reforms that extend the 
scope of action for existing nowtopias and movements. Every time a nowto-
pia project starts in a concrete location, it becomes obvious that the existing 
laws, subsidies and legal forms are generally aimed at profit-oriented and 
large actors and work against socio-ecological pioneers. We need funda-
mental institutional reforms to change the parameters of the economic sys-
tem – top-down, if you like – and simultaneously bottom-up strategies to 
create local ways of living characterised by more solidarity; they inspire and 
learn from one another. To achieve this, we need a counter-hegemony that 
involves interventions in the public sphere of the media and education, but 
also includes practices like civil disobedience and forms of radical protest. 
This is all happening at once and requires appreciation and respect for one 
another. No individual can tackle all the fields of social change at the same 
time, but together we can take further steps. 
Degrowth 
A kind of pragmatic utopian thinking,  
re-politicising humanistic debates
An interview with Dr Helen Jarvis, conducted by Christian Schulz
Helen Jarvis is Professor in Social Geography at Newcastle Uni versity, UK. Helen’s 
research focuses, among other things, on the compatibility of family and work, 
on the significance of public spaces and on the ‘social archi tecture’ of new collab-
orative living arrangements. She is also concerned with the role of civic engage-
ment in sustainable urban development. 
https://www.ncl.ac.uk/gps/staff/profile/helenjarvis.html#background 
What do degrowth approaches mean for your own research?
Helen Jarvis: I very much embrace degrowth thinking as a social geographer, 
so for me it is all about the relevance of geography as a scholar-activist. I 
probably don’t think of myself as employing a fully-f ledged participatory 
action research. My degrowth understanding is closely aligned with a kind 
of pragmatic utopian thinking. So, my collaboration with external partners 
and a broad based alliance of community organisations, really of bottom-up 
civil society is probably messier and more about agitating action than it is 
participatory action research. Indeed, a lot of what I’m doing is not really 
research at all, it’s more about working within civil society. But going back 
to what I understand as the relevance of degrowth for geography and myself 
as a social geographer: for me it’s about re-politicising humanistic debates 
concerning where and how we live with each other on the earth. It starts 
with questions that geography has always worked with in terms of urban 
development, urban planning, liveability, but it is saying that the question 
‘where and how we live’ is not adequately managed through the current lens 
of urban planning. We must completely reimagine those relationships.
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What can we contribute to ‘spatialise’ the degrowth debate?
Helen Jarvis: For me, the spatial geography of degrowth is about the scale 
of living and the scale of civil society alliance and activism. So degrowth 
is not just an economic concept and the counter-hegemonic narrative that 
degrowth contributes to, it is more about opening a scale of action both in 
scholarship, a scale of action that is much more about activism and social 
change and transformation, but also a scale of activism. My focus, geograph-
ically, is on that meso-scale, so it’s not about the individual consumer citizen, 
the individual making choices about how and where they live, but rather 
the meso-scale of thinking and acting differently. I think re-politicising the 
urban politics and spatial justice debates allows for – it’s not really using the 
language of degrowth, but I see it as entirely compatible – this idea of con-
viviality, the political sense of conviviality. What is public space for? It’s for 
this renewed idea of a civil society. There’s also a sense of a space that’s free 
from private interests and market interests and the state and is reworking 
conditions of possibility. It’s socio-spatial.
To what extent are our textbook models and theoretical and conceptual underpin-
nings challenged by degrowth thinking?
Helen Jarvis: I think that social geography has a similar problem, perhaps, to 
economic geography, certainly in the textbooks, in that there is a tendency I 
think to slip between this preoccupation with identity politics and the indi-
vidual and a cultural social geography of identity and a sense of ‘where is 
the radical critique?’. Maybe that’s not really the way to express it, I suppose 
I don’t see a lot of the degrowth discourse or degrowth as a counter-hege-
monic narrative entering social geography. And I also have always been a 
little bit frustrated by this disconnect between, for instance, issues around 
the housing crisis and the social justice side of that, and precarious employ-
ment and the corrosion of working life and the social justice implications of 
that, and bigger debates around nature and environmental sustainability. 
So, degrowth discourse, for me, as many advocates talk about it, this kind 
of missile concept, this bombshell, a symbolic term, it’s an opportunity to 
say there isn’t a kind of meta-theory that’s going to make solutions between 
social and economic justice align together. But this bombshell concept does 
allow us to recognise the interdependence, the mosaic of things like housing, 
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employment, and social everyday realities, such as feelings of isolation or 
inclusion and the conventional hyper-privatised neighbourhood.
This goes back, in terms of my journey, to the work I did years ago now, 
2001–2005. I was working closely around work-life balance, I wrote the book 
Work/Life City Limits in 2005, and I didn’t use the word degrowth, but look-
ing back it was entirely about engaging with the ideas of degrowth. I talked 
about practical limits to growth, and it was bound up in this meso-scale of 
home-work family nexus, and I felt it was critically important to revive this 
idea of human-environment connections but not in the way that actor-net-
work theory was more than representational: it was instead about everyday 
pragmatism. Where are the limits to the possibilities for people to act inten-
tionally, to consciously follow the grain of a moral limits to growth, to do 
what they feel is right for their ethic of care? In current parlance this would 
be in the context of climate emergency. So, as far as the early inspiration of 
degrowth, I was motivated by the work of Anders Hayden: he wrote this book 
called ‘Sharing the work, sparing the planet’, and he was talking there about 
working hours reduction – as one part of a virtuous circle of reducing over- 
and excessive consumption and waste. And what was useful about this was 
that it offered a simple way into degrowth, but what I also liked was that it 
very easily linked that nexus of ‘where and how we live’ in relation to housing, 
transport and commuting, the everyday decisions of getting children to and 
from school, whether we walk and cycle, whether we can walk or cycle, the 
relationship of space and time. He conceptualised, in a compelling way, all 
that most vicious or virtuous connectedness that either locks us into a very 
unsustainable and exploitative relationship with others and the planet or 
allows us to step out of that lock-in effect.
So, the notion of scale seems to play a major role in your work?
Helen Jarvis: I wouldn’t want you to take away from this discussion that I 
privilege the local. Obviously, the work I do around collaborative housing 
and cohousing is about a scale of belonging and intentional practice. This 
scale is necessarily limited in size. Cohousing schemes tend to view this opti-
mal scale as around 25 households while the intentional ‘we thinking’ prac-
tised in an eco-village would be around 150 people. Both examples describe 
an intimate scale of belonging and collaboration. At the same time, it would 
be wrong to extract these intentional scales from their wider ecology. This 
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multi-scale thinking resonates with what Ivan Illich conjured up really nicely 
in the notion of a ‘commune of communes’ whereby you could say that the 
scale of belonging is nested within multiple scales that are ‘scaled out’ rather 
than ‘scaled up’: not one large scale of region, but a region made up of scaled-
out intimate scales of belonging. A good example of that would be the current 
social movements of lasting change around the school climate change strike 
(I was at one on Friday), and Extinction Rebellion. These all operate through 
a process of social affinity groups. The language of an affinity group, or the 
scale of an affinity group, is aligned with face-to-face alliances whereby peo-
ple can build relationships of trust and seek common ground. For example, 
I’m involved with Citizens UK which is broad-based community organising, 
a bit like the Barrack Obama model of community organising, and this is 
on a person to person scale of listening to what the problems are and then 
acting collectively on achievable, meaningful change. This way it’s helpful to 
think of scale rather than territory because these are spatial scales that are 
necessarily interpersonal and context dependent, so the local isn’t just a scale 
of belonging, it’s of the earth, or the terroir. Slow-food and slow-cities move-
ments also show this, as well as Extinction Rebellion. When it works with an 
indigenous local knowledge, it’s about what gives meaning and purpose to 
environmental action, in and of, a place. So, I don’t want to sound like I’m 
wanting the best of all worlds here, but I don’t think it should be a debate of 
‘is the local or is the region the most relevant geographic spatial lens?’. For 
me, as a social geographer, it’s about the interpersonal and the empowered 
ability to act as changemaker.
How do you convey the notion of degrowth in your teaching?
Helen Jarvis: Well, I think there is a problem with language, and in my 
undergraduate teaching, I tend not to use the term degrowth. It’s not very 
easily understood. It doesn’t translate very well; it becomes quite abstract. 
Again, I tend to draw upon the language of civic activism, and on alliances 
and co-operation and on the ability to unlock the capacity to act. I draw a 
distinction between individuals acting on their own lifestyle habits as being 
quite disadvantaged, and I demonstrate alternative forms of groupwork and 
group dynamics. To help overcome the language barriers, I introduce sce-
narios and examples of inspirational degrowth activists and scholars into 
my teaching. I have a set of cards that tell the stories of urban food growers 
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and people who have organised local sharing economies. These provide a real 
name, a face and a story, to offer a joined-up belief in degrowth practice. It 
is difficult for students to relate to degrowth when it is presented in a theo-
retical and abstract way and that has caused quite a lot of misunderstanding. 
Degrowth theory is widely considered either to be very fuzzy or very ideolog-
ical, so to cut through that I go to the level of introducing my own perspec-
tive. I say ‘I’m a single parent, it’s crazy how I have to manage a house and all 
aspects of a private life, and working full-time’, and all these things ‘I’m one 
person’, and then I say ‘when I’ve gone to stay in Christiania, or a cohousing 
project, it has been possible to live collaboratively, in a more tribal way, with 
others, to raise children together and to organise our housing solutions and 
work collectively’. So, I introduce a lot of myself as a practical way of cutting 
through that fuzzy, ideological understanding of degrowth. And that says 
that I acknowledge having reached a point in my life as a parent, and I’m 
thinking here of the climate emergency, where I must act – we must act. In 
that respect the methods of teaching are about hope and the real potential 
we must harness to make a difference collectively, rather than as individual 
consumers.
I’m taking a group of students in the spring to Copenhagen, for an 
annual field trip. I usually take them to a housing cooperative or cohousing 
scheme, as well as to the former squatters’ settlement of Christiania, where 
I’ve done some research before. But I’m also going to be meeting up with 
some anthropology scholars at Copenhagen University who have been mak-
ing comparisons between the kind of environmental sensibility and mind-
set that most Copenhageners are encouraged to practice, recycling in their 
households, and travelling by bicycle etc., versus more intentional ways of 
reducing energy use through sharing, in cohousing but also in eco-commu-
nities. This is interesting because it shows us what we can achieve collectively 
that we can’t manage individually. And it’s not just about the scale, it’s about 
the social learning that takes place, we retain privacy but when we live a little 
more consciously with others and make decisions that have a bigger impact 
on others, I think it pushes us to degrow, to step off the treadmill of work 
and consumption.
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If you were given an unconditional degrowth research grant allowing you to hire a 
postdoc for two years, what would be the topical focus of your project?
Helen Jarvis: I am very interested – and this is going to sound more esoteric, 
when you are given the opportunity to ref lect and research in more depth, 
it does come down to more a burning curiosity – I’m very interested in this 
sense of intentionality: we are all torn between contradictions to do the right 
thing but also to live in the now, and I think there’s something about work-
ing in a group, collaboratively, which is incredibly difficult. I know this from 
all the endless committee meetings I sit on to try and make change happen. 
So, I am motivated to explore this socio-cultural but also psychological and 
socio-technical infrastructure of intentionality: what really will facilitate 
and unlock collaboration? How do we scale out a new ‘normal’ of being inten-
tional in a way that stimulates this virtuous cycle of being intentional for 
people and the planet? It could be that I would explore this through a move-
ment such as Extinction Rebellion, because within that movement, there’s 
been a real tension between anarchy, where people pursue their own action, 
the example here was that there was some direct action of jumping on trains 
and public transport which seemed to completely contradict the idea that 
public transport is a good thing for the environment. So, my ideal research 
would harness the power of groups and collaboration, allowing that to go in 
myriad different directions. I’m interested in this tension between harness-
ing the power of collaboration and citizen action, civic action, but also this 
idea of what soft infrastructure would propel ‘we-thinking’ and intentional 
behaviour, intentional practice, to reach beneficial results for the planet, for 
the people of the planet.
I have a longer-term goal to write a book, and there’s a suggested working 
title: ‘Being intentional for people and planet’. It would be an anthology of 
my work on various apparently quite radical eco-communities in different 
places. What do we learn from them about different capacities to change and 
to work collaboratively?
II. Spaces of Possibility
‘We need places for experimentation where the new options provided by 
post-growth societies become tangible.’
Uwe Schneidewind
Growth independence through social innovations?  
An analysis of potential growth effects of social 
innovations in a Swiss mountain region
Pascal Tschumi, Andrea Winiger, Samuel Wirth, Heike Mayer, Irmi Seidl
Social innovations are being increasingly discussed as solutions to the 
diverse challenges faced by rural, peripheral areas. However, the economic 
growth effects of social innovations are unclear. One of the open questions 
is whether social innovations trigger new growth in regions or contribute to 
growth independence. This paper seeks to fill this research gap. To this end, 
an inventory of social innovations in the Swiss mountain region of the Ber-
nese Oberland has been compiled and the potential growth effects (economic 
growth stimulation and economic growth independence) of the social inno-
vations were investigated using specially developed indicators. Ideal types 
of social innovations with particularly marked potential growth effects are 
presented as the results of the investigation.
The analysis of social innovations and their growth effects is undertaken 
in the context of the social, economic and ecological challenges facing Swiss 
mountain regions. Out-migration is quite high in Swiss Alpine regions, 
amounting to about 11% of the population between 1981 and 2010 (Bundes-
amt für Raumentwicklung, 2012). The consequence is an aging population. 
In the course of the Euro crisis that began in 2010 the Swiss franc increased 
in value so that revenue from European visitors sank noticeably (Müller-
Jentsch, 2017). Furthermore, scarcity of building land for new infrastructure 
and buildings is increasing (Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung, 2017). In 
addition, the maintenance of basic services is threatened, especially in the 
health sector (Cerny/Rosemann/Tandjung et al., 2016). Last but not least, the 
mountain regions are particularly strongly affected by the numerous conse-
quences of climate change (Schmucki/Marty/Fierz et al., 2017).
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Swiss regional policy aims to promote entrepreneurship and innova-
tion with the help of regionally initiated projects and thus to counter the 
economic challenges (Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft, 2017). This pol-
icy takes an export-based approach, assuming that economic growth in a 
region is triggered by key sectors that serve external demand. However, this 
growth-oriented approach has its limitations. Not every region has a leading 
export sector or the potential to develop one, not least because Swiss moun-
tain regions are socio-economically heterogeneous (Mayer/Rime/Meili et al., 
2018). Furthermore, the probability of the revenue generated circulating in 
these regions sinks as the mobility of people and goods in the Alpine area 
increases (Segessemann/Crevoisier, 2016). The Swiss regional policy of the 
late 2010s accordingly lacked ‘situationally adaptable (also non-economic) 
perspectives’ (Peter/Rink/Forster et al., 2016: 6, translated from German). 
This is the background against which social innovations are recom-
mended as a solution to problems in peripheral and rural areas. Firstly, social 
innovations are proposed by representatives of EU organisations as a means 
of increasing economic growth in such areas (European Commission, 2017; 
Nicholls/Edmiston, 2018). Secondly, researchers like Dax and Fischer (2018: 
297) and Dewald and Rother (2019) argue that future regional development 
approaches should extend beyond strategies that target growth to address 
local participation and social innovation. Social innovations could help 
regions to solve their problems (Bock, 2016; Neumeier, 2012), for instance by 
successfully implementing knowledge from outside the region (Noack/Fed-
erwisch, 2019). Post-growth authors emphasis the potential of social inno-
vation initiatives to contribute to a (more) growth-independent society and 
economy and thus to (more) growth-independent regions (Elsen, 2014; Seidl/
Zahrnt, 2022). Much discussed examples include local currencies, commu-
nity housing projects or repair initiatives (Burkhart/Schmelzer/Treu, 2020; 
Habermann, 2009).
This brief insight into the academic discourses shows that social inno-
vations are attributed with various impacts on regional growth. However, 
research on these impacts is not particularly advanced (Pelka/Terstriep, 
2016: 13; Secco/Pisani/Da Re et al., 2019: 10) and the extent to which social 
innovations can stimulate regional growth or contribute towards growth 
independence remains unclear. This is the point which this chapter seeks to 
address. The research question on which it is based is: What are the potential 
economic growth effects of social innovations in the Bernese Oberland? 
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The Bernese Oberland is a mountainous area that lies north of the Swiss 
high Alpine region and has about 200,000 inhabitants in an area of circa 
2,900 km2. With around four million overnight stays a year, the tourism 
industry accounts for over 35% of gross domestic product (GDP) for many 
places (Rütter/Rütter-Fischbacher, 2016). International tourism has a long 
tradition here and has always followed a growth-oriented strategy (Ebneter/
Liechti, 2019; von Rütte, 2007). The economic structure, the culture and pub-
lic and private stakeholders are correspondingly inf luenced by the dominant 
role of tourism (Haisch, 2017: 221 f.). Developments within the region are by 
no means homogeneous. Tourist centres like the Jungfrau region and the 
municipalities of Grindelwald and Lauterbrunnen and their surroundings 
are characterised by high and slightly growing volumes of overnight stays 
(with annual overnight stays amounting to almost one million) (Bundesamt 
für Statistik, 2018a). In Grindelwald the population is also growing slowly 
(2010 to 2016). This contrasts with the far east of the region where the num-
ber of overnight stays in the municipalities Meiringen and Hasliberg fell 
from 2013 to 2018 (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2018a). With the exception of the 
central municipality Meiringen, the population in the far east is declining 
(Bundesamt für Statistik, 2018b).
Social innovations and growth (in)dependence
Social innovations are the goal of many political programmes (Grimm/Fox/
Baines et al., 2013) and the focus of newly founded research centres (e.g. 
Stanford Center for Social Innovation or Young Foundation). However, the 
definitions and understandings of social innovations in the literature are 
most diverse. This may be because the various disciplines – transformation 
research, sociology, regional sciences or economics – conduct research on 
social innovations using their own definitions (Edwards-Schachter/Wallace, 
2017). Meta-analyses of social innovations confirm the different research 
streams (Ayob/Teasdale/Fagan, 2016; Edwards-Schachter/Wallace, 2017; 
van der Have/Rubalcaba, 2016). One important strand of research expects 
social innovations to have positive effects on society. In particular authors 
who focus on local development are well-known for this research, especially 
Moulaert and Mulgan. They view social innovations as solutions for social 
problems and as impulses for empowerment and for changes in social rela-
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tions (Moulaert/MacCallum/Hiller, 2013; Mulgan/Tucker/Ali et al., 2007). 
Another strand of research revolves around the work of Franz, Hochgerner 
and Howaldt (2012) and adopts a sociological and more neutral perspective 
to the effects of social innovations, focusing primarily on changed social 
practices and relations. Mumford (2002) sees social innovations as provid-
ing new ideas about how social relations and social organisation could be 
structured to achieve a common goal. The creative process of generating and 
implementing innovation is the focus here, also within businesses. Overall, 
it can be noted that some definitions focus more on the innovation process 
while others concentrate on the results or effects of the innovation. This 
paper uses a definition that integrates the different orientations and draws 
on the bibliometric analysis by Ayob, Teasdale and Fagan (2016). The defini-
tion is as follows:
A social innovation consists of new forms of cooperation of individuals or 
organisations that lead to new ideas, of which the implementation is at least 
considered. In regional development, such innovations can have a positive 
impact on society, improve the quality of life and/or change social or power 
relations.
This definition allows for a rather broad understanding of social inno-
vations and an open approach to the phenomenon under investigation. It is 
suitable for application to the Swiss mountain region with its multifaceted 
socio-economic structures, as social innovations do not only emerge in con-
nection with the problems or challenges of this rural area but are also devel-
oped in response to economic growth opportunities. 
The basic precondition for our definition of a social innovation – a new 
form of cooperation – is based on a sociological understanding that con-
ceives of ‘new’ as extraordinary for the geographical area of investigation. 
For a social innovation, it is crucial that this new cooperation leads to a new 
idea, the implementation of which is at least considered (Ayob/Teasdale/
Fagan, 2016). Furthermore, the definition includes two characteristics that 
describe the effect of a social innovation: first, a positive effect for society; 
second, the transformation of social relations and power relations.
In order to examine the link between social innovations and growth, rel-
evant concepts of growth are clarified in the following. Enterprise growth 
refers to both growth in volumes of sales, production and orders and also 
growth in the financial profitability of an enterprise (turnover, profit, cash-
f low, return on investment). We understand enterprises as organisations 
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that pursue business practices, i.e. they create and exploit ‘deliverables to 
cover third-party requirements with due regard to economic efficiency’ 
(Lück, 1990, translated from German). This includes ‘classical’ companies but 
also associations, foundations and cooperatives. Regional growth primar-
ily refers to the growth of regional gross domestic product, i.e. the total of 
regional value added. Growth independence is not understood as the oppo-
site of growth, namely shrinking. We rather adopt the meaning established 
in the post-growth literature (see Schmelzer/Vetter, 2019: 158 f.; 171): the 
ability of a society including its economy and its institutions to continue to 
fulfil its functions but no longer to be existentially dependent on economic 
growth (Seidl/Zahrnt, 2010; Seidl/Zahrnt, 2022). Basic social and economic 
functions include safeguarding livelihoods, participation in society for all, 
basic infrastructure and healthcare.
Methodology
There is currently no comprehensive overview of social innovations in moun-
tain regions and existing inventories (for the Alpine region) are neither sys-
tematic nor do they extend beyond case studies (see SIMRA, 2018). Our com-
prehensive inventory of social innovations in the Bernese Oberland helps 
to close this gap. It utilises a database of innovative projects, organisations, 
offerings or initiatives that were planned or carried out in the Bernese Ober-
land between 1997 and 2018. To compile the inventory1, various databases 
from regional development programmes2 and innovation prizes3 were iden-
tified and merged. An online survey of the municipal secretaries (the senior 
administrative officers) of all 76 municipalities of the Bernese Oberland was 
also conducted in order to identify other local projects and initiatives.4 In 
addition, a systematic online search and newspaper review5 was conducted 
1  The inventory is publicly accessible on the website www.sozinno.unibe.ch 
2  New Regional Policy (Neue Regionalpolitik, NRP); Innovation, Cooperation and Knowledge 
Development in Tourism (Innovation, Zusammenarbeit und Wissensaufbau im Tourismus, In-
notour); Regional Conference East Oberland  (Regionalkonferenz Oberland-Ost, RKOO); So-
cial Innovation in Marginalised Rural Areas (SIMRA); the association ‘vorwärtsbeo’. 
3  Milestone, Prix Montagna, Swiss Mountain Award, Bernese Innovation Prize, PrixWINtutti
4  The survey was able to identify 26 potential social innovations. 
5  Five regional newspapers were examined. 
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between January and June 2019. Overall, it was possible to identify 979 poten-
tial social innovations.
With the help of an analysis matrix consisting of 23 evaluation criteria6, 
we identified the social innovations that corresponded to the definition 
above. The goal of the social innovation was assessed in order to determine if 
it fulfilled the two additional characteristics. A total of 68 social innovations 
were identified, 32 of which aim to achieve positive effects for society and 
six of which aim to change social relations and/or power relations. To iden-
tify the social innovations, all projects and initiatives in the database were 
independently evaluated by two researchers. The intercoder reliability of the 
analysis is 90%.
In a subsequent step, the social innovations that had been identified were 
assessed in terms of their potential growth effects using theory-based indi-
cators. The set of indicators that we developed for this analysis is based on 
the literature on drivers of enterprise growth (Gebauer/Lange/Posse, 2017; 
Mewes/Gebauer, 2015; Posse, 2015; Richters/Siemoneit, 2019) and on strat-
egies of non-growing enterprises (Liesen/Dietsche/Gebauer, 2013; Posse, 
2015). The aim was to derive indicators from these business strategies that 
could be applied to the region and to economic actors. This involved iden-
tifying the mechanisms of the growth or non-growth strategies of enter-
prises. From these mechanisms, it was possible to derive 39 indicators which 
point to growth stimulating or growth independence effects. Hence, the 
indicators capture two different growth effects: first, the effects that stim-
ulate economic growth in regions or enterprises (henceforth called growth 
stimulation effects); second, effects that make these regions or enterprises 
more growth independent (henceforth called growth independence effects). 
In order to analyse the potential effects of the 68 social innovations in our 
inventory, we assessed which indicators could potentially apply to which 
social innovation. To this end we gathered additional information on the 
emergence, implementation or goal of the social innovations through online 
research. The evaluation was independently carried out by two researchers 
with an intercoder reliability of 88%.
6  The analysis was based on criteria for the following categories: Cooperation / Novelty / Idea / 
Bernese Oberland / Improvements in quality of life / Changes in social relations / Changes in 
power relations.
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Growth effects
The following table displays the indicators and their growth effects as devel-
oped from the literature analysis.
Table 1: Indicators of growth independence and growth ef fects / Sources: primarily 
Gebauer/Lange/Posse, 2017; Paech, 2012a; Posse, 2015
No� Indicator Growth effects
U1 Regional sales 
structures
Less price competition; some degree of guaranteed 




Less price competition; guaranteed market for manufactu-
red products; promotion of small businesses (U8)
U3 Economic actors in 
close contact
Reduced price competition; adaptation to consumer needs; 
some degree of guaranteed market; building of trust with 




Absence of the growth dynamic of capitalist market rela-
tions; greater self-sufficiency
U5 Reduction in hours of 
paid work
Decline in consumption and reduction of capitalist market 
dynamics
U6 Low debt capital and 
interest 
Less pressure to generate returns to pay interest/dividends; 
less outside control by external investors 
U7 Low capital intensity 
in production
Less pressure to generate returns to pay interest/dividends; 
less outside control by external investors
U8 Small or medium-si-
zed enterprise
Less striving for growth, no negative scale effects (ad-
ministrative costs etc�), improved crisis resistance and less 
dependence on market dynamics
U9 Communication in 
favour of limiting 
consumption and 
production 
Limiting growth in line with consumer demand
U10 Communication of 
social and ecological 
indicators 
Focus on entrepreneurial success through various enter-
prise goals 
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No� Indicator Growth effects
U11 Niche markets Less price competition; some degree of guaranteed market
U12 Long useful life  Limiting growth caused by consumer demand
U13 Craft skills for main-
tenance and repair
Limiting growth through consumer demand; de-commer-
cialisation (U4)
U14 Prosumers Adaptation to consumer needs; limiting growth through 




Broader understanding of entrepreneurial success than just 
growth; small and medium-sized businesses (U8)
U16 Substitution of pro-
ducts by services
Less economies of scale in providing services than pro-
ducts, i�e� less growth dynamics 
U17 Product sales (fair 
prices, purchase 
guarantees, no bulk 
discounts)
Less price competition; reduced cost pressure, reduced 
incentives for economies of scale
U18 Low advertising 
expenditure
Limit on growth caused by consumer demand
U19 Short value chain Limit on the number of enterprises involved that are stri-
ving for growth; production volume aligned with demand
U20 Regional value chain Less price competition; involvement of smaller enterpri-
ses; guaranteed demand; production volume aligned with 
demand; possibly favourable external financing.
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Table 2: Indicators of growth stimulation and growth ef fects / Sources: primarily 
Gebauer/Lange/Posse, 2017; Paech, 2012a; Posse, 2015
No� Indicator Growth effects
S1 Bulk discounts 
when purchasing
Incentives for more consumption or production
S2 Remuneration of 
management ac-
cording to growth 
figures and market 
value
Strategic and operative growth focus
S3 Higher proportion 
of fixed costs in 
production 
Incentive to increase production to realise economies of scale 
S4 Higher leverage Great pressure to generate returns to pay interest/dividends; 
more outside control by external investors
S5 Planned obsole-
scence 











Increased production due to increased productivity of innovati-
ons; new demands due to new products (features)
S8 Volatile capacity 
expansion 
Increased need for outside investment; long-term pressure to 
grow




Great pressure to generate returns to pay interest/dividends; 
development of products with scaling potential; high levels of 
outside control by external investors
S10 High capital inten-
sity of production
Great pressure to generate returns to pay interest/dividends; 
maximisation of economies of scale; high levels of outside 
control by external investors
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No� Indicator Growth effects










Promotion of product sales by enterprises increased demand 
and consumption
S13 Legal form public 
limited company
Great pressure to generate returns to pay dividends/improve 
the share price; heteronomy by external investors 
S14 Economic actors 
with loose con-
tacts 
Limited adaptation of products to consumer needs and 
therefore more consumption; price competition; marketing 
strategies like planned obsolescence and measures to promote 
consumption 
S15 Entrepreneurial 
goal of economic 
growth and profit 
maximisation
Focus on the growth goals of the enterprise
S16 High advertising 
expenditure
Promotion of growth dynamics through consumer demand 
(needs); maximisation of economies of scale
S17 Spatially dispersed 
value chain (high 
spatial distance / 
increase in spatial 
distance)
Enterprises focused uniformly on growth and profit; increased 
competition; exploitation of economies of scale and extension 
of markets; little adaptation of production volumes to demand 
(potential for overproduction)
S18 Long value chains Numerous companies involved with a drive for growth; 
increased competition; exploitation of economies of scale and 
extension of markets; production volumes not adapted to de-
mand (potential for overproduction); low levels of trust between 
actors and thus increased need for capital and interest due to 
more insecure loans
S19 Great competitive 
pressure 
Growth strategies like price and quantity competition; 
maximisation of economies of scale; strategies to increase 
productivity; active marketing
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The following section presents by way of example the mechanisms that lead 
to growth independence and from which – amongst others – the two ideal 
types of social innovation can be derived. A low level of debt capital (U6) 
means there is less pressure to make profits in order to pay interest (Bin-
swanger, 2009). An absence of outside investors is thus associated with 
lower profit expectations, better options for control by the management and 
greater transparency (Posse, 2015). A short value chain with few actors (U19) 
means that there are fewer debt financed enterprises involved who need to 
make profits (Paech, 2012b). Regional value chains have a similar effect (U20) 
(Gebauer/Lange/Posse, 2017; Gebauer, 2018; Paech, 2012b; Posse, 2015). They 
make it more likely that a strong bond develops between producers, con-
sumers and investors. Product prices then become less important because 
consumers have a closer relationship with the producers. The latter therefore 
experience less pricing pressure (Posse, 2015). The involvement of consum-
ers in production (U14) helps to align the product with consumer needs. This 
allows production resources to be more efficiently adjusted to actual prod-
uct needs (Leismann/Schmitt/Rohn et al., 2012). The relations between the 
actors involved are also strengthened (Bakker/Loske/Sherhorn, 1999; Schor, 
2010). Furthermore, guaranteed sales (U17) reduce pricing pressure for pro-
ducers all along the value chain as a fixed price is agreed in advance (Gebauer, 
2018; Gebauer/Lange/Posse, 2017). In addition, low capital intensity of pro-
duction (U7) reduces dependence on outside investment because less invest-
ment in capital (in machinery etc.) is necessary (Paech, 2012b).
The indicators numbered S1 to S19 listed in the Table 2 describe the growth 
stimulation effects. These effects are, for instance, generated through the 
creation of consumer needs and emotions in advertising (S16) (Gebauer, 
2018; Gebauer/Lange/Posse, 2017). A physically and spatially dispersed value 
chain (S17) can reduce trust between actors and thus increase the pressure to 
generate returns (Paech, 2012b). For instance, less trust means that a higher 
collateral is required for lending transactions; this takes the form of higher 
interest payments which need to be generated with profits (Paech, 2012b). 
Furthermore, production innovations are viewed as growth-inducing if the 
production of ever more new products is linked to capital investments (S7) 
(Paech, 2012a). Products for status consumption (S6) are primarily devel-
oped for saturated markets in order to generate more demand (Paech, 2012b; 
Posse, 2015).
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Social innovations and their potential growth effects
Many different actors participated in the 68 social innovations that were 
identified. Most frequently involved are enterprises and private individu-
als (both 20%) and, in addition, state organisations, tourism organisations, 
associations, research institutes and foundations. One-third of the social 
innovations are located in the primary and secondary economic sectors, two-
thirds in the tertiary sector. Social innovations are present in diverse fields 
like tourism, mobility, agriculture, health and education. They emerged both 
in remote shrinking areas and in economically growing central municipali-
ties in the Bernese Oberland. 
One aim of this paper is to identify those of the 68 social innovations that 
are characterised by pronounced potential growth effects. By focusing on 
these ‘extreme types’ in terms of growth effects we can identify ideal-typi-
cal forms of social innovations. A social innovation was only selected as an 
‘extreme type’ if the number of relevant growth stimulation indicators cor-
responded to a maximum of 25% of the number of relevant growth indepen-
dence indicators of the same social innovation (and vice versa, i.e. opposing 
effects are small). This ensured that clear tendencies can be recognised. In 
total, eight social innovations were classified as these two ‘extreme types’. 
These innovations fulfilled at most 7 of the 19 growth stimulation indicators 
and at most 12 of the 20 growth independence indicators. The remaining 
60 social innovations in the inventory are not further considered in the fol-
lowing discussion: either they display few growth effects or they have many 
growth effects in both directions. 
The four social innovations with the most indicators pointing to growth 
independence are a cooperatively organised Alpine dairy and cheese com-
pany, a community supported agriculture (CSA) project, a cooperatively 
organised multi-generational house, and a building group within the frame-
work of a solar energy cooperative in which members construct their solar 
systems together.
These social innovations have in common that they utilise no, little or 
interest-free external capital. The planned multi-generational house is par-
tially financed by the interest-free capital of members of the housing asso-
ciation (Zukunft Hasliberg, 2019: 12). Interest-free finance is provided for 
the CSA in advance by purchasers of the products. A donation enabled the 
dairy and cheese company to be developed with little external investment. 
Growth independence through social innovations? 127
The solar energy building group is financed by the group members. Those 
who install a solar system are supported by other members who already have 
such a system. The working hours invested by others are then worked off by 
those who already have the new system when they help construct another 
member’s system.
These four social innovations are also characterised by short and regional 
value chains and close links between the actors involved. The cooperative 
dairy and cheese company, for instance, only uses milk from the surround-
ing farms, which leads to a close relationship between the suppliers and the 
processors of the milk. The same is true for the CSA where consumers pur-
chase the products directly from the farm without an intermediary. The rela-
tionship between the producers (farmers) and the consumers is exceptionally 
close, in part due to direct cooperation in production.
For three of the four social innovations prosumers play an important 
role. Prosumers are consumers who are also involved in the production of 
the product or service that they later consume. The CSA is one such model, 
and in the solar energy cooperative a significant proportion of the solar sys-
tems is also built by those who will later use them. These forms of production 
represent a de-commercialisation of production. The work that prosumers 
put into producing the service is not remunerated in monetary terms. This 
is similarly seen in the concept of the ‘caring community’ that is pursued by 
the generational house. It states that the ‘need for care should not be ful-
filled only by professional institutions’ but rather by cooperation between 
non-professional actors like neighbours or volunteers with state and profes-
sional partners (Zukunft Hasliberg, 2019: 7).
Furthermore, three of the four social innovations have guaranteed pur-
chasers. For example, the dairy and cheese company can rely on sales to a 
major Swiss distributor, while the farmers of the CSA have guaranteed pur-
chasers in the form of the prosumers. Three social innovations also have a 
low level of capital intensity in their production. In the solar energy cooper-
ative, the solar systems are mostly installed by hand using little machinery. 
In comparison to industrialised cheese production, a great deal is also done 
by hand in the cooperative cheese company and there is little mechanisation. 
The same is true in the agricultural project thanks to the involvement of the 
prosumers.
The four social innovations with pronounced growth stimulation effects 
are a bad-weather insurance for holidaymakers; a tour package that com-
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bines Alpine bus tours with historical hikes; a specially equipped direct train 
to a skiing destination; and a partnership between five golfclubs with a ded-
icated membership card. 
All four social innovations are commercial tourist ventures that are 
actively advertised and are characterised by economic growth goals. The 
weather insurance is intended to bring new visitors and thus increased 
revenue to the tourist businesses at the destination where the insurance is 
available. The same objective is pursued by the direct train connection and 
the hiking package. The golfclub membership card aims to make paying to 
become a member of a club more attractive and to increase the golfclubs’ rev-
enues.
Another characteristic of all four social innovations is that production 
and consumption of their offerings occur in a (physically) spatially dispersed 
value chain. In three of four cases this is linked to the more distanced rela-
tions between the stakeholders involved. An illustrative example is provided 
by the weather insurance. It was developed by an established insurance com-
pany in a Swiss city outside the mountain region, is sold by a tourism organ-
isation in an Alpine holiday destination and is purchased by tourists from 
all over the world. The profits go to the insurance company and the tourism 
organisation. The relationships between the actors are somewhat distanced, 
both spatially and socially.
Two of these social innovations are active in highly competitive markets. 
First, the bus/hiking tour which offers historical hikes combined with post-
bus trips to distinguish itself from other more unspecific hiking offers. Sec-
ond, the weather insurance, which covers a very specific risk that is not yet 
catered for by the insurance market.
Two social innovations involve product innovations that are intended 
primarily for status consumption or are advertised using emotional brand 
communication. The genuine characteristics of products intended for status 
consumption serve the purpose of social display and not the direct satisfac-
tion of needs (Reisch/Raab, 2014: 933). The golfclub membership card is an 
example of status consumption because the costs amount to several 10,000 
Swiss francs, which can hardly be fully justified by the actual benefits – play-
ing golf. It is possible to identify emotional brand communication in the case 
of the bus tours and historical hikes. Advertising draws on the well-loved 
Swiss tradition of postbuses and aims to trigger emotions and thus win cus-
tomers. 
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Discussion and prospects
This paper ref lects on the various effects of social innovations in growth 
terms. Based on an inventory of social innovations in a Swiss mountain 
region, we analysed the potential growth effects with a set of indicators 
specifically developed for this purpose. Eight of the 68 social innovations of 
our inventory can be assigned to two extreme types: social innovations with 
potential growth independence effects and social innovations with potential 
growth stimulation effects. Based on the characteristics of these extreme 
types we devised two ideal types of social innovations, as seen in Table 2.
Table 3: Ideal types / Source: authors












A social innovation that promotes growth 
independence comprises a new form of 
cooperation, which frequently involves 
private individuals� The new idea is often 
an alternative form of production and 
consumption that focuses on social and 
ecological goals� Conventional economic 
goals take a backseat�
A social innovation that stimulates growth 
comprises a new form of cooperation bet-
ween actors who primarily pursue economic 
goals� The new idea that is developed is often 
a commercial product or service that can be 
assigned to a specific sector. Non-economic 











- No, little or interest-free outside capital 
- Minimal advertising expenditure 
- Close ties between producers, consumers, 
suppliers
- Short and regional value chains
 
- Economic growth goals
- Advertising expenditure for commercial 
products 











- Guaranteed market / fair prices
- De-commercialisation of products/services
- Low level of capital intensity 
- Short value chains
- Regional value chains
- Regional sales structures
- Weak relations to consumers
- Active communication of financial indicators
- Symbolic consumption / emotional brand 
communication 
- High level of competition
- Differentiated product innovation
The growth effects of social innovations presented here are potential effects 
and have not been measured empirically. To gain more robust results, the 
indicators and their interactions need to be empirically investigated and, to 
further improve understanding, research should focus on preconditions for 
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the emergence of social innovations in regional contexts. The motivation 
of the various actors plays an important role, especially with regard to the 
growth effects. Innovation biographies would be an appropriate tool (Kle-
verbeck/Terstriep, 2018). In addition, the set of indicators shows that further 
investigation must include both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. 
In light of the diverse challenges facing mountain regions, this paper 
demonstrates that it can indeed be appropriate for regional policy to focus 
on social innovations. If regional policy aims to promote growth indepen-
dence then it should not promote social innovations per se, but must rather 
target the characteristics of the social innovation projects and initiatives 
described above. It may therefore be helpful to promote a combination of 
characteristics in order to initiate sustainable and growth-independent 
regional development. 
It seems necessary to ask whether such developments can advance the 
transformation to a post-growth society. Undoubtedly the examples identi-
fied here are niche projects of very limited economic significance. Nonethe-
less, they demonstrate what distinguishes social innovations and enterprises 
that contribute towards growth independence, and what aspects and factors 
should, for example, be promoted by regional and economic policy in order 
to expand growth independence. At the same time, the examples serve as 
role models and strengthen the economic independence and resilience of a 
region. They also show that the well-being of the population can benefit from 
economic activities in a post-growth society, compared to a growth-oriented 
economy. Impulses from peripheral areas are certainly not sufficient to lead 
to higher-level structural changes in, for instance, welfare and employment 
systems, as would be necessary for a post-growth society. However, region-
al-economic restructuring in such regions can reduce local socio-economic 
problems and improve quality of life.
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Criteria for post-growth residential development: 
The example of the city of Zurich 
Olivia Wohlgemuth, Marco Pütz 
1. Introduction
In most large cities in Switzerland, population and economic growth com-
bined with changed lifestyle habits and a demand for more living space have 
led to a shortage of land as a resource. Revised spatial planning legislation, 
which came into force in 2014, puts an end to continued urban sprawl and 
requires that future development be located in existing building zones 
(LaRES 2014). The creation of additional housing presents some difficulties 
as 95% of the building zones in Zurich have already been developed, which 
means that the focus is now primarily on densification (Wüest Partner 2018: 
73). Numerous innovative housing projects demonstrate how inner urban 
development can be successfully realised and that densification can create 
value for the entire population.
Growth independence concepts are attracting increased attention from 
spatial sciences. The post-growth debate could therefore provide an approach 
that allows urban development to focus on ensuring future growth is more 
sustainable, quality-oriented and goes beyond the purely quantitative eco-
nomic growth paradigm. The strategy for sustainable spatial development 
in the canton of Zurich (LaRES 2014) and other guiding principles for good 
building already include requirements for ecological and social housing, so 
approaches from the post-growth debate are also being addressed. These 
include, firstly, innovations in building techniques and, secondly, housing 
concepts that reduce individual land consumption and counter social indi-
vidualisation through f lexible uses and shared areas.
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This paper is based on a Master’s thesis that investigated the city of Zurich 
as a case study, exploring the extent to which post-growth can be a guiding 
principle for residential development and examining which preconditions 
are required for post-growth housing (Wohlgemuth 2019). The paper aims to 
develop criteria for post-growth housing projects. To this end the following 
sub-questions are analysed:
• What are the criteria for future-oriented residential development and 
what is required for these criteria to be fulfilled?
• To what extent are existing requirements for sustainable, ecological and 
social housing already post-growth oriented?
The paper is structured in five sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
and conceptual framework. Subsequently Section 3 gives an overview of the 
methodological approach. The findings are presented and discussed in Sec-
tion 4 and Section 5 provides conclusions.
2. Urban development, housing and post-growth
The topic of urban housing offers much scope for realising post-growth econ-
omies or a post-growth society. It is obvious that urban development, urban 
planning and an appropriately organised housing industry could make post-
growth housing possible. Thanks to cooperatives or other non-profit devel-
opers, housing is traditionally a topic that is very close to post-growth ideas. 
However, even though numerous current housing projects have a great deal 
to do with post-growth, the theme has been subject to little conceptual 
research and is comparatively new. In the volume Housing for degrowth – Prin-
ciples, models, challenges and opportunities, Nelson and Schneider (2019) pro-
vide one of the few up-to-date overviews of the challenges and unfavourable 
developments that characterise the property industry and discuss how post-
growth approaches could offer a response. However, the volume primarily 
presents examples from practice, ranging from squats to collective forms of 
living to architectural innovations. The focus is not on a theoretical-concep-
tual categorisation.
In order to demonstrate the conceptual relations between housing and 
post-growth, in the following we first outline the most important challenges 
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faced by housing in the future and then formulate three central post-growth 
approaches for housing/residential development.
2.1 Challenges for housing in the future 
The challenges for housing in the future that are discussed in the scientific 
and grey literature generally include both ecological and social aspects. To 
describe the specific situation in Zurich, in this section we draw primarily 
on planning documents and literature with a clear link to the city of Zurich:
• Impulse zur Innovation im Wohnungsbau (Impulses for innovation in hous-
ing) (Birrer and Glaser 2017)
• Auszeichnung für gute Bauten der Stadt Zürich (Award for good building of 
the city of Zurich) (Hochbaudepartement Stadt Zürich 2019)
• Leitfaden und Checklisten zur nachhaltigen Arealentwicklung für Städte und 
Gemeinden (Guidelines and checklists for sustainable site development 
for cities and municipalities) (Hugentobler and Wiener 2016)
• Langfristige Raumentwicklungsstrategie Kanton Zürich (Long-term spatial 
development strategies canton of Zurich) (LaRES 2014)
• Leitfaden – Erfolgsfaktoren sozial nachhaltiger Sanierungen und Ersatzneu-
baten (Guidelines – Success factors of socially sustainable redevelop-
ments and replacement new builds) (Martinovits/Diethelm/Durisch et 
al. 2015)
• Raumplanungsbericht (Spatial planning report) (Kanton Zürich 2018)
• Akzeptanz städtischer Dichte: Erwartungen und Prioritäten zum Wohnen in 
der Stadt Zürich (Acceptance of urban density: Expectations and priorities 
for housing in the city of Zurich) (Zimmerli 2018)
On the basis of the current planning documentation and literature we iden-
tified eight challenges for housing in the future:
1. Resource and energy efficiency: Housing projects should be as 
resource-conserving as possible and consider energies from renewable 
sources. They should also contribute towards achieving the objectives of 
a ‘2000-watt society’. Buildings should retain their value in the long term 
and have long useful lifetimes, they should thus be as adaptable and f lex-
ible as possible.
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2. Green spaces and open spaces: Sufficient green spaces are important for 
a good urban climate and biodiversity. In addition, high-quality outside 
spaces are needed where residents can spend quality time. Concepts for 
sharing, swapping and building communities need suitable settings and 
spaces that can be collectively used.
3. Planning procedures: Information and transparency are important 
aspects of planning procedures and increase acceptance of changes. 
Good dialogue between the authorities, developers and the people 
affected is also indispensable. Furthermore, the public should partici-
pate in planning and thus improve projects.
4. Densification: Inner urban development is an overall objective. A high 
density of uses and efficient land use are crucial. The densities applied 
should be specific to the locality and in keeping with the surrounding 
area. Occupancy densities must be increased so as to keep per capita con-
sumption of residential space to a minimum.
5. Society: Buildings must support the development of socially and func-
tionally mixed neighbourhoods. Furthermore, community life, cohesion 
and belonging should be strengthened, which leads to lively settlements 
with collectively used spaces. Buildings must contribute towards a city 
for all.
6. Housing forms: Buildings must be constructed for f lexible use and resi-
dential space must offer qualities for various lifestyles. This includes new 
forms of dwelling and an attractive mix of housing with diverse dwelling 
typologies. Ground f loors should also be diversely utilised.
7. Quality of life and sustainability: Buildings should provide a frame-
work for sustainable ways of life and dwelling. Furthermore, sustainably 
conceived housing projects can strengthen awareness of sustainability 
issues. In general, a project should improve the quality of life of residents.
8. Fair prices and affordable rents: Low-cost and affordable housing should 
always be the objective of residential construction. The post-growth 
debate proposes the idea that the pursuit of profit and speculation must 
be renounced.
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2.2 Post-growth approaches for housing
In the well-known and seminal works of the post-growth debate, the topics of 
housing and urban development play a rather minor role. Thus the works of 
Victor (2008), Latouche (2009) and Jackson (2016), all important in the inter-
national debate, focus primarily on critiques of growth and capitalism, pro-
viding introductions and overviews. The key publications of the German-lan-
guage post-growth literature also mainly provide orientation and cover the 
most important terms, concepts and backgrounds of the interdisciplinary 
debate (e.g. Seidl/Zahrnt 2010, Paech 2012, Schmelzer/Vetter 2019). These 
fundamental works and also many other publications, often with an applied 
approach, mention numerous projects and initiatives that are planned and 
implemented in cities. However, the link to the city tends to remain implicit. 
Cities or urban neighbourhoods are usually just locations for, e.g., transi-
tion towns or urban gardening initiatives. Urbanity, city milieus and the role 
of urban development and planning receive very little attention. Xue (2019: 
185 f.) clarifies that it is necessary to explicitly view the city and post-growth 
together: 
ʻDegrowth depicts a desirable future society that is ecologically sustainable, 
enhances quality of life and achieves social justice. This means achieving 
social welfare and social justice while shrinking our levels of production and 
consumption due to the existence of ecological limits. Both research and 
social practices need to bridge the domains of welfare and environmental 
sustainability. For urban planners, the integration of both domains raises 
a question: What is required to make a sustainable city socially just, or, to 
make welfare societies ecologically sustainable in the urban context?ʼ
Post-growth is not yet used as a guiding principle for urban development. 
It is equally rare for housing and post-growth to be considered together in 
the literature. When, however, post-growth is discussed as an approach for 
housing, it is possible to identify three general thematic fields: sufficiency, 
the good life and housing justice.
Sufficiency: Sufficiency on the individual level means requiring fewer 
material resources and changing lifestyles and consumption habits. Suffi-
ciency ‘aims for people to change their behaviour without compulsion and to 
limit or replace practices that overuse resources. It strives for the sufficient, 
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environmentally friendly consumption of energy and materials through low 
demand for resource-intensive goods and services’ (Stengel 2011: 140). It is 
important to note here that a sufficiency strategy does not demand that peo-
ple do without what is necessary but rather assumes that an understanding 
of what is necessary will lead people to voluntarily do without (Stengel 2011: 
140).
Good life: In a broad sense, post-growth is about striving for a good life 
for all. This is not about understandings of prosperity based on material con-
sumption, but about different understandings that rather ‘include the com-
plexity of people as relationship beings, overcome the division between pro-
duction and reproduction and give more space to needs that are not focused 
on growth and optimisation – like time prosperity, stable and intensive rela-
tionships or meaningfulness’ (Schmelzer/Vetter 2019:169).
Housing justice / a right to housing: The current debates on rising prop-
erty prices and housing shortages trigger questions about who owns the land 
and how cities should develop in the future (Schulz 2017: 13). In particular, 
population groups with low incomes find it increasingly difficult to rent 
housing in cities. Post-growth views housing as a human right and a basic 
need, which means that a dwelling should be neither a financial investment 
nor a status symbol (Schneider 2019: 16).
In addition to these three topics there are numerous other post-growth 
oriented approaches that could play a role in urban development (Schulz 
2017: 11 f f.): solidarity economies (e.g. neighbourhood shops, swap shops, 
local currencies), alternative energy concepts (e.g. energy cooperatives oper-
ating for the common good), community food production (urban garden-
ing, urban farming), shared offices (e.g. co-working spaces) or shared forms 
of use (e.g. spaces and infrastructures for the sharing economy). As these 
approaches are not directly related to housing they are not further pursued 
here.
3. Methodology
Methodologically speaking, this investigation is based on a qualitative, 
interpretative research design. The data were gathered for three case studies 
in a total of 17 guided, semi-standardised expert interviews. The interviews 
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were transcribed and evaluated using a structured and summarising form 
of content analysis.
The case studies were selected from housing projects that had won prizes 
in the ‘Competition for good buildings’ (‘Wettbewerb für gute Bauten’) of the 
city of Zurich. Every five years building projects are chosen and presented 
with awards by an expert jury consisting of architects, town planners, other 
specialists and representatives of the city council and administration. These 
projects act as role models for high-quality building and make an important 
contribution to the quality of the city of Zurich (Amt für Städtebau Zürich, 
2016). As the current competition cycle has not yet been finalised, the last 
prizes awarded for buildings constructed between 2011 and 2015 were con-
sidered as possible case studies. Of these, residential buildings were filtered 
out and three case studies were chosen, all of which were developed by coop-
eratives. Overall, three or four people from the board of the cooperatives 
or the team of architects of each project were interviewed. In addition, the 
interviews covered a fourth group of experts from consultancy, the urban 
administration and research.
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Family Home Cooperative Zurich (Fami-
lienheim Genossenschaft Zürich, FGZ)
Developer
Building cooperative ‘more than 
housing’ (‘mehr als wohnen’)
Developer
Non-profit Building and Rental 
Cooperative Zurich (Gemeinnützi-
ge Bau- und Mietergenossenschaft 




The first replacement new build of the 
FGZ� A contemporary garden city with 
low rows of buildings and small, private 
front gardens was created�
Description
A car-free development with 13 
different residential buildings, high 
density and a mixed community with 
strong social cohesion�
Description
Clover-shaped building with a 
shared park by two cooperatives 
with different philosophies�
Special feature
A hybrid type of construction was cho-
sen for the new build� Today 490 people 
live in Grünmatt, where previously 
only 200 people lived in single-family 
homes on the same site (+145%)� Land 
consumption is very low, 33 m2 per 
person� The previously large private 
gardens have given way to a shared 
exterior space�
Special feature
The Areal was developed as a jubilee 
project for the 100th anniversary of 
the Zurich housing cooperatives and 
serves as a platform for innovation 
and learning� The entire Areal is 
based on a community concept 
with community rooms and meeting 
zones� There is a large social mix of 
inhabitants, reflecting the population 
of the canton of Zurich�
Special feature
The shape of development provides 
a large interior courtyard, a high-
quality and exciting outside space� 
Architectural interest is provided 
by the two-storey loggias that are 
staggered across the floors, while 
the treetops divide up the façade� 
This avoids the impression of a 
six-storey building�
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4. Results 
Based on current planning documents and literature, Section 2.1 identified 
eight challenges for housing of the future. These challenges were empirically 
assessed in the interviews, allowing the requirements for future-oriented 
housing development to be documented. These requirements have been 
linked to the post-growth debate and further developed to create a catalogue 
of criteria (Table 2).
Table 2: Catalogue of criteria for post-growth housing / Source: the authors
Inner urban development
Create compact structures 
Land consumption
Limit individual living space
User density
Strive for high social density 
High density of interaction
Promote high levels of interaction through architectural and organisational measures   
Mixed land uses
Interlink housing, work, retail and recreation to guarantee short distances 
Diversity
Mixed population (lifecycle, lifestyle, income, profession, etc�)
Energy sufficiency/ saving resources
Reduce energy consumption and use energy from renewal sources; save resources in 
construction and utilisation
Green spaces
Extend and protect green spaces for a good microclimate
Appropriation areas
Ensure areas are available that can be freely designed and managed
Participation
Involve those who are affected in the planning process and in design
Price
Affordable housing for all population strata
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5. Inner urban development
Inner urban development and densification are central elements of spatial 
development. This enables as many people as possible to live in the city and 
protects open spaces. The focus here is on building density, i.e. the built fab-
ric, the ratio of the volume of built structures to the surface area of the plot 
(Wüest Partner 2018: 12). A high building density is equivalent to a high vol-
ume of built structures per hectare of the built-up zone.
The dark side of urban sprawl is the loss of natural areas and the increase 
in traffic. However, densification is also criticised as it is often seen as neg-
ative and constricting. Densification therefore needs to always be linked to 
quality of life − denser is not fundamentally better or worse.
Land consumption
In order to realise inner urban development and densification, limiting per-
sonal living space is crucial. Equally, it is important that the city is accessi-
ble as a place of residence for all. Better exploitation of space means there 
is room for more people in a building or city. This can, first, be achieved by 
improving the housing, for instance through well-designed f loorplans that 
omit as unnecessary additional square metres of living space that do not cre-
ate higher quality. A second option is to limit individual living space with 
occupancy regulations. A third possibility is provided by collectively used 
areas like guest rooms or offices that can be shared by a number of people 
if required.
‘Housing is something very existential, it needs great care. If you say that 
you must give up a family dwelling because the children have moved out, I 
think that’s right. You have to do it like that, because otherwise the concept 
doesn’t work, that you say that you do without living space but have instead 
high-quality and low-priced living space and would like to again make that 
available then perhaps a generation later to new people. The security of 
housing, that nobody needs to be afraid of ever being without suitable hous-
ing, must be there.’ (Interview 15)
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User density
User density refers to the number of people who spend time in a place and 
is seen as a prerequisite for people meeting one another (Kretz/Kueng 2016: 
55). User density can also be understood as population density or social 
density and should not be seen as equivalent to built density. A high built 
density does not in itself mean that more people spend time in a place. If 
space requirements per person increase and built density remains the same, 
then the user density sinks. With inner urban development it is important to 
ensure that the use of land is sufficiently great rather than simply building 
more concrete.
High density of interaction
A high user density does not guarantee that people meet and exchange expe-
riences. Loneliness is said to be a problem of modern societies as people feel 
alone even though urban densities are relatively high. To counter this, hous-
ing constructions must allow interaction between residents. Architectural 
and organisational measures should thus promote rather than hinder com-
munity life and exchange between the residents of a building. The design 
of exterior spaces and the management of semi-public areas has a great 
inf luence on whether a building can be collectively used or not. In addition 
to architectural measures, such as the design of stairways and entrances, 
shared rooms and infrastructures, e.g. workshops, are important for cre-
ating a collective living environment. Among the organisational measures 
are neighbourhood events or the decentralisation of specific administrative 
tasks and the organisation of leisure commissions, which include cultural 
and leisure committees.
To protect the private sphere, it is necessary to find a balance between 
community and options for withdrawing. An additional difficulty is that 
such measures are strongly dependent on the residents. Nobody can be 
forced to communicate with other people. Nonetheless, a framework should 
be created that promotes and supports such exchanges, should they be 
desired.
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Mixed land uses
Ground-f loor uses create more lively neighbourhoods with more diverse 
functions so that the direct surroundings are not just a place of residence 
but also a place where leisure time can be spent. As well as retail options and 
leisure facilities in the neighbourhood, co-working spaces can increase the 
mix of uses. In a ‘city of short distances’ with a compact structure and mixed 
land uses, the daily trips to work, the shops and for leisure activities can be 
undertaken on foot or by bicycle (Beckmann/Gies/Thiemann-Linden et al. 
2011: 64). Concentrating retail facilities in shopping centres or pronounced 
mobility hinder the development of a city of short distances. This leads to an 
acceptance of longer trips for sport and leisure activities (Beckmann/Gies/
Thiemann-Linden et al. 2011: 61). Nonetheless, mixed uses are necessary to 
create an attractive residential environment and ‘short distances create the 
possibility of doing without motorised transport so that less resources need 
to be used. Short distances are also building blocks of a lifestyle and con-
sumption profile that leaves a smaller ecological footprint’ (Beckmann/Gies/
Thiemann-Linden et al. 2011: 50).
Diversity
According to Kretz and Kueng (2016: 50), diversity means ‘that different uses, 
user groups, social milieus and spatial manifestations are present in one 
space’. In relation to residential development, diversity means that different 
population groups should be represented in a housing project. A mix of ages, 
incomes and lifestyles improves the quality of an area and counters segre-
gation. Social mixing of this sort can be achieved in an apartment building 
by providing different types of dwelling units that attract different people. 
Such mixing hinders the emergence of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Fur-
thermore, a high level of diversity can also prevent the development of luxury 
neighbourhoods for population groups with high incomes. There are, nev-
ertheless, arguments in favour of segregation. The spatial concentration of 
people in similar situations and with similar interests facilitates the develop-
ment of specific facilities and infrastructures (Häussermann/Siebel 2001: 73).
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Saving resources and energy sufficiency
The ecological footprint of the building industry is enormous: worldwide, 
the industry uses 40% of global resources (Emprechtinger 2019). In order not 
to exceed the ecological viability of the planet and due to increasing short-
ages of building materials like gravel and sand, future building must be as 
resource efficient as possible. In addition to an economical use of resources 
for building construction, renewable energies must be used for power in the 
finished building. No reliance should be placed on technological advances, as 





lead to using less resources at all, but just that you’ve optimised something.’ 
(Interview 12)
Furthermore, the height, orientation and colour of façades affect the climate. 
Varied building heights are better for wind effects, and paler colours ref lect 
more light so that the buildings heat up less.
Green spaces
As well as protecting the landscape, the treatment of green spaces inside the 
city is crucial. A compromise must be found between green space and inner 
urban development. Green spaces can make a decisive contribution towards 
adaptation to climate change and provide protection from overheating. In 
addition, consideration must be given to the greening of facades, species 
conservation and biodiversity. Thus native plants should be utilised and not 
all areas be built with basements so that large trees are able to develop deep 
roots. Green spaces also increase the attractiveness of the residential envi-
ronment and housing quality.
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Appropriation areas
By appropriating open space around dwellings, it becomes possible for peo-
ple to inf luence their own living environments. Areas must therefore be 
planned that have no defined use and that can be managed by the urban res-
idents themselves. Appropriation areas of this sort help a neighbourhood to 
develop its own distinct character and allow residents to identify with their 
surroundings. Appropriation is only possible if there is a low level of regula-
tion and a high degree of f lexibility in utilisation so that people are as free to 
act as possible (Kretz/Kueng 2016: 72).
Participation
The idea of a participative procedure is that development can occur with the 
public and their thoughts and ideas can be included in the planning process. 
Furthermore, pursuing collaboration and co-design with the public means 
that changes are more readily accepted and the quality of the project benefits.
‘There is also a certain capital that is brought in. People invest their time, that 
is their free time, and there are certainly also good and justified idea.’ (Inter-
view 16)
It is, however, always important to define precisely who can participate and 
what the goal of participation is.
Price
The provision of affordable housing for all strata of the population enables 
the foundations for a good life to be laid. Housing is a basic need and is exis-
tential, which is why urban housing must be affordable for everyone no mat-
ter which income bracket they are in.
‘I don’t  like anything about this profit-oriented housing, which isn’t sustain-
able, because people say that they just want to get money out of it now, with 
overpriced rents.’ (Interview 1)
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As there are different income structures there are also different notions of 
affordability. It is therefore important that in the future all price segments 
should be represented in the city. This is the only way to enable diversity. 
Similarly, there should be different price structures on the project level, 
which can be achieved with different types of dwellings.
6. Conclusion 
The paper shows that much of the housing that is described as future-oriented 
or sustainable is already in the spirit of the post-growth debate. Post-growth 
can be a future-proof guiding principle for residential development in cities 
and supplement existing principles (inner urban development, quality of life, 
‘2000-watt society’). Post-growth approaches to urban development have to 
date seldom been analysed in relation to classical housing projects and estate 
developments, and instead have usually emerged as alternative approaches 
parallel to the housing market. Although the link to such projects is import-
ant, an approach with majority appeal is required, one that is also supported 
by developers on the classical housing market. The paper demonstrates that 
post-growth in housing can indeed be generalisable and need not be limited 
to alternative concepts like transition towns.
Cooperatives play a key role as their form of organisation gives residents 
a voice and allows their participation in the design of the residential envi-
ronment. In addition, cooperatives are well known for their experimentation 
with new ideas and alternative paths. Non-profit developers remove land 
and real estate from speculation and provide dwellings according to the cost-
rent principle, the housing is affordable for most population strata and is 
usually cheaper than on the classical housing market. The goal of non-profit 
developers is to provide environmentally and socially sustainable housing. 
They are often also pioneers in the transformation of existing forms of hous-
ing. Cooperatives are therefore suitable partners for post-growth housing 
projects.
As well as the non-profit developers as an innovative, post-growth ori-
ented form of organisation, innovations are needed on the technical side and 
in infrastructure and architecture. With their manifesto for future-proof 
architecture and structural engineering, architects, engineers and urban 
planners have demonstrated that they too can act as pioneers of change and 
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can assume responsibility for transformation (DAI 2009). Urban develop-
ment stakeholders involved in housing development have, firstly, responsi-
bility for ensuring that enough dwellings are available for all at a reasonable 
price. Secondly, housing developers need to ensure that the right housing is 
planned and built, i.e. dwellings that meet the needs of residents with their 
different lifestyles and that respond to changes in society.
If post-growth is recognised as a guiding principle for future-oriented 
housing development, the ‘Competition for Good Building’ in the city of 
Zurich could in the future become a competition for post-growth housing. 
The award-winning projects are already post-growth oriented. A change 
of terminology for this competition would lead to the post-growth con-
cept becoming better known and could allow the ideas behind it to be more 
broadly disseminated. Although post-growth is familiar to many academics, 
a focus on the planning and practice level would further strengthen aware-
ness.
The award-winning projects that were used as a basis for selecting the 
interview partners, can be viewed as showpieces because they fulfil many of 
the criteria for post-growth housing. A distinguishing feature of the Hun-
ziker-Areal is that functional neighbourhood infrastructures have been 
developed in the exterior to create more than just a residential estate. The 
entire Hunziker-Areal is conceived in terms of community with numerous 
collective areas and meeting zones. There are over 40 neighbourhood groups 
active in various fields. Furthermore, the residents of the development 
ref lect the population mix of the canton of Zurich. The whole development 
experiments with different forms of dwelling and architectural measures. 
A post-growth perspective suggests, however, that the Hunziker-Areal 
requires more green spaces. It would be possible to have less sealed surfaces, 
even though commerce needs a delivery zone for trucks. Green spaces would 
ensure that the development remains cooler in the summer and would pro-
vide inviting places to spend time in, especially as there are very few green 
spaces in the surrounding area.
The apartment complex Klee in Zurich-Affoltern is an attractive housing 
development with 340 dwelling units for just under 1000 residents, located 
on the edge of the city. The social density is high, but the skilful architecture 
provides many open spaces that can be used by residents. The fact that two 
cooperatives with different philosophies collaborated on this project made 
it possible to attract different people. A stricter implementation of all the 
Criteria for post-growth residential development 153
post-growth criteria could achieve a better mix of uses. Although Affoltern is 
somewhat remote, a focus on public uses in additional spaces on the ground 
f loor would bring life to the area throughout the day.
The Grünmatt project shows how a neighbourhood of single-family 
homes can be redeveloped to provide attractive dwelling space for more peo-
ple than before. There are now almost 500 people living in the development 
where 200 people previously lived. The new build resembles a modern gar-
den city with numerous shared exterior spaces and rooms. Individual con-
sumption of space is thus low, just 33 m2 per person. Another important point 
is the intelligent heating concept of the Family Home Cooperative (Familien-
heim Genossenschaf t), which recovers waste heat from large companies in the 
city, stores it in three boreholes and uses it for heating. From a post-growth 
perspective, efforts should be made to attract a broader mix of residents. The 
development is very attractive for families and draws many families with 
small children, but a greater mix of residents would increase quality of life.
In this paper, post-growth has been examined as a guiding principle 
for housing in the city of Zurich. It would be interesting to apply the same 
approach to the municipalities of the agglomeration, which is where most 
land take is currently occurring. This would also allow investigation of 
whether criteria that are relevant for future-oriented housing projects in 
the city are also applicable to the municipalities of the agglomeration. As the 
topic of housing cannot be considered in isolation, future research should 
also focus on urban development as a whole. This would allow consideration 
of topics like mobility and the construction of offices and commercial build-
ings.
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Makerspaces 
Third places for a sustainable (post-growth) society?
Matti Kurzeja, Katja Thiele, Britta Klagge
1. Introduction
For several years there has been discussion of the significance of so-called 
‘third places’ for a sustainable and future-oriented society. The currently 
much-discussed open workshops or makerspaces are third places of this 
kind (e.g. Lange 2017). Although a theoretical debate on the importance of 
third spaces and third places has been ongoing for decades in social sciences, 
makerspaces are a relatively new phenomenon. Such cooperation between 
people in collectively used places is particularly interesting and is discussed 
in the post-growth debate as a hopeful symbol of urgently needed social 
transformation towards sustainability (e.g. Simons/Petschow/Peuckert 2016, 
Smith/Light 2017).
By questioning the classical relationship between production and con-
sumption, makerspaces provide important stimuli in all three dimensions of 
sustainable development and are thus considered as a positive vision of a new 
industrial DIY/DIT revolution (DIY = Do-it-yourself, DIT = Do-it-together) 
(Gershenfeld 2005). Taking the transformative potentials of third places as a 
starting point, we argue that makerspaces are catalysts for more sustainabil-
ity, especially with regard to their social functions. This is because they (can) 
contribute towards consolidating a culture of making and thus to imple-
menting a post-growth society. We begin the discussion by considering what 
third places actually are and how they contribute towards a sustainability 
transformation. Attention then turns to the specific phenomenon of maker-
spaces, considering their potentials as third places in the post-growth con-
text. The article closes with a conclusion and prospects for further research.
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2. Third places and sustainable development
The terms ‘third space’ and ‘third place’ can be traced back to debates in and 
on cultural and social theory. Important authors are Ray Oldenburg (1989), 
Homi K. Bhabha (1994) and Edward W. Soja ([1996] 2007). Third spaces and 
places have received much attention within post-colonial studies (Struve 
2017: 227) and have also been discussed in geographical research. This article 
draws on the various concepts and then applies them to makerspaces in the 
context of post-growth.
2.1 From ‘third space’ to ‘third place’ – theoretical approaches
Third space is concerned with the interaction of culture, identity, space and 
power relations. Drawing on postmodern definitions of space as the articu-
lation of social power relations (Massey 1994: 120), Bhabha proposes reading 
spatial identities and individuals’ movements in space as the result of history, 
hybridity and hierarchy. Bhabha conceptualizes third space at the interface 
between the representation of space and representational space, which is 
where change emerges (Elmborg 2011: 342 ff.). In terms of the transforma-
tional power of cultural difference, ‘third space is the space of potentially 
meaningful contact between cultures and people’ (ibid.: 344) and thus a kind 
of space of possibilities that emerge from cultural exchange between people 
(Struve 2017: 226). Edward W. Soja ([1996] 2007) refers further to the differ-
ence between third space as opposed to first space and second space. While 
first space is understood as a ‘real’ space, limited by the built environment, 
and second space is the space that is perceived and negotiated in discourse, 
third space refers to the combination of the two (Soja [1996] 2007: 56f.). This 
understanding views third space as being characterised primarily by hybrid-
ity and openness (Austen 2014: 49).
The spatial theory conceptions of Bhabha and Soja are characterised by 
a high degree of abstraction (Struve 2017: 228) and do not provide a tangi-
ble basis for the analysis of concrete places and their potentials. However, 
since the late 1980s numerous authors have tackled the issue of transferring 
these concepts and applied third place concepts to everyday places like cafes, 
kiosks, neighbourhood centres or libraries (e.g. Elmborg 2011, Peterson 2019). 
One of the first who conceived of third place as a public place was the urban 
sociologist Ray Oldenburg (1989: 20 ff.) . From his perspective, transforma-
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tion can only emerge in a public place that is outside the home (first place) 
and place of work (second place), as encounters between strangers on neutral 
ground can only occur in a place to which nobody has personal ties (ibid.: 
26). There must also be low thresholds for participating in interaction pro-
cesses. People’s social status should not play a role, or at least plays much 
less of a role than in other places. The precondition for encounters between 
different people is that the place is open and freely accessible (Sleeman 2012: 
37). This includes ensuring that the atmosphere is inviting and fulfils the 
needs of users, but standards should nonetheless be simple (function before 
appearance). In addition to openness towards new participants, communi-
cation is seen as decisive for setting things in motion and managing change. 
The design of third places therefore needs to focus on community and enable 
collaborative work. The conversational atmosphere should not be tense 
but needs to be playful and conspirative, giving the individual a feeling of 
warmth and belonging to the group. This can be further underlined by regu-
lar joint activities and events (ibid.). Before our attention turns to how these 
conditions are fulfilled in makerspaces, we discuss the extent to which third 
places are relevant from the perspective of sustainability.
2.2 Third places and their role in sustainability transition
Since at least the 1970s, critiques of growth have been an established part 
of scientific debate. At the beginning of the 2020s, these critiques are 
often thought of under the heading of ‘sustainability’, a term which is used 
extremely vaguely and is linked to numerous different concepts (Pufé 2018: 
93). Drawing on the concept of the sustainability triangle (ibid.: 112 f.), we 
do not consider the three dimensions of sustainability (ecological, social and 
economic dimensions) as pillars standing next to one another but as an inte-
grative ‘common whole’ (ibid.: 113, translated from German). This approach 
to sustainable development can also be applied to third places. 
If we consider the global sustainability goals (SDGs) developed by the 
United Nations (UN 2015) and the sustainability principles as summarised by 
Pufé (2018: 116), it can be seen that third places offer a whole series of start-
ing points for a sustainability transformation. As meeting places they enable 
encounters and networking between people of different age groups (principle 
of intergenerational justice) and between those of different origin, gender, reli-
gion and social status (principle of intragenerational justice) (ibid.). As they are 
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generally intended as long-term structures, they support the creation of inclu-
sive and resilient social and cultural infrastructures in towns and cities (SDG 11) 
– also in line with the sustainability principle ‘think global, act local’ (Pufé 2018: 
116). Thanks to the opening up and pooling of cultural offerings, education and 
encounters, third places are ‘anchor points for cultural diversity and a cultural 
contribution towards strengthening social cohesion, creating equivalent liv-
ing conditions and strengthening identity’ (MKW NRW 2019, translated from 
German). In the long run, they contribute to the promotion of psychosocial 
well-being (SDG 3) and lifelong learning (SDG 4) and support the transforma-
tion of processes of production and consumption from a growth-based econ-
omy towards a socio-ecological economy focused on the common good (SDG 8).
Third places are primarily relevant for meeting social sustainability goals, 
although there are complex interactions with other dimensions (Bauriedl 
2008: 33). In the following, the example of makerspaces is used to explore 
how third places function and contribute towards a social transformation to 
(more) sustainability. 
3. Makerspaces as third places of the post-growth society
In order to understand why makerspaces can be understood as third places, 
they are initially described in brief. Subsequently, their potential as infra-
structure for a sustainability transformation is critically discussed in the 
context of post-growth discourses. 
3.1 High-tech workshops for everyone: Development, organisation 
and examples 
Debates held in the 1980s and 1990s about the predicted end of mass produc-
tion and the increasing f lexibilisation of industrial production (Piore/Sabel 
1985) have been spurred on since the turn of the millennium by radically new 
digital and networked production and additive manufacturing technologies. 
This is the context in which authors like Gershenfeld (2005, 2012) and Ander-
son (2012) developed a positive vision of a new industrial DIY/DIT revolution, 
in which the relationship between production and consumption is renegoti-
ated through cooperation between people using shared production facilities.
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Figure 1: Map of makerspaces in Germany
Source: the authors (data research: Matti Kurzeja; graphics: Irene Johannsen)
In the international literature, makerspaces are variously referred to, for 
instance as ‘community-based fabrication workshops’ (Hielscher/Smith 
2014). In German-speaking countries the term Makerspace describes open 
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workshops with digital infrastructure that are dedicated to ‘collaborative 
(digital) production in publicly accessible spaces’ (Simons/Petschow/Peuck-
ert 2016: 29, translated from German). It thus acts as an umbrella term for 
various manifestations of workshops (Smith 2017: 6) that make available tools  
and technologies  which were originally confined to the sphere of industrial 
production (Gershenfeld 2012: 44). Makerspaces are a global phenomenon 
and are growing in number: in 2006 there were only a few dozen, by 2016 
almost 1400 (Browder/Aldrich/Bradley 2019: 461). In Germany alone there 
are now over 200 makerspaces spread across the whole country, although 
primarily in the larger cities (Figure 1).
The origins of today’s maker movement (Anderson 2012, Hatch 2013) can 
be traced back to the hacker community of the late twentieth century, who 
worked collaboratively on software and hardware in so-called hackerspaces 
(Cavalcanti 2013a). Indeed, some makerspaces call themselves hackerspaces, 
drawing on the hacker movement, although this is not an established term, 
unlike that of fab labs (fabrication laboratories), a concept initiated in 2001 
by Neil Gershenfeld from MIT which also had considerable inf luence on the 
maker movement and serves as a point of reference for many makerspaces 
(Gershenfeld 2005). The magazine Make, in existence since 2005, and ‘maker 
faires’, festivals where makers can present their projects and creations, have 
further encouraged the emergence of places worldwide that are dedicated to 
collaborative digital production in facilities open to the public (Burke 2014: 
11). The maker movement differs from previous open workshop movements, 
DIY movements and independent work initiatives in two ways. First, the 
available technologies and open hardware concepts enable participants to 
develop their own new technologies. Second, social-media platforms allow 
intensive forms of cooperation over large distances, based on digital collab-
oration (Smith 2017: 7).
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‘DingFabrik’ Cologne
The ‘DingFabrik’ (‘ThingFactory’) founded in 2010 in Cologne describes 
itself as a ‘combination of open workshop, hackerspace and fab lab’. It is 
organised as a non-profit association and run by about 120 association 
members (as of mid-2019). The DIY principle characterises its offerings, 
such as workshops and information sessions, and it is a grassroots dem-
ocratic organisation with regular plenums where all important deci-
sions are discussed. Both the operations and the premises are largely 
financed by membership fees. The premises house a store for materials 
and areas for woodwork, metalworking, screen printing, sewing and 
bicycle repairs, but also facilities for working with hardware and soft-
ware and computer-based maker tools like a laser cutter, 3-D printer and 
a CNC milling machine. There are courses to learn how to use specific 
tools, lectures, working groups and projects that explicitly focus on the 
sustainable use of resources and offer corresponding ‘help to self-help’ 
(e.g. repair cafes). The weekly crafting afternoon is perfect for getting 
an idea of the place. What happens in the ‘DingFabrik’ is just as diverse 
as the raw materials and tools used: from bicycle repairs to making fur-
niture and musical instruments to the development and construction of 
complex technical equipment like CNC-milling machines or laser cut-
ters. The ‘DingFabrik’ is thus an example of a makerspace initiated and 
run by civil-society actors. 
Further information at: https://dingfabrik.de/
A makerspace at the urban district library of Cologne-Kalk
The library of the urban district Kalk is run by the city of Cologne and 
was comprehensively renovated in 2018. Since then, it has a making 
room, with finance provided by a fund for neighbourhoods with special 
development needs. The library was designed with the aim of creating 
a non-commercial place for cultural interaction, experimentation, tin-
kering and participation. The design process included the architects and 
the library team but also involved the active participation of residents of 
Kalk. Based on the concept of an ‘open library’, the premises can be used 
without staff support during the opening hours of the district town hall. 
Visitors identify themselves with their library cards at the entry panel 
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and can use the place independently. The makerspace is located on the 
ground f loor and in close vicinity to the library itself with its communal 
areas to spend time in and a comprehensive collection of media. It pro-
vides a 3-D printer, educational robots, laptops, tablets, soldering equip-
ment and corresponding self-help literature. Every week tools and tech-
niques are explained in workshops to anyone interested. In addition to 
courses for learning to use 3-D printers, there are courses on program-
ming and building electric circuits, on robot control systems and on 
single-board computers. It is also possible for individuals to hold their 
own courses in open hours for ‘Kalk’s makers’. Another part of the Kalk 
makerspace concept is the ‘Maker Mobil’, a cargo bike that can be used 
f lexibly for events in the city and promotes the makerspace among the 
general public. Through its integration in the urban district library, the 
Kalk makerspace illustrates how state actors, especially public libraries 
and museums, are embracing the DIY movement and the concept of 
third places, thus finding ways to embrace digitisation and the resulting 
social change (Rasmussen 2016: 547, Braybrooke 2018: 41).
Further information at: https://www.stadt-koeln.de/artikel/04943/
index.html
Among those running the makerspaces are associations, which have often 
emerged from local (grassroots) initiatives (see the example in Box  1), but 
also research institutes, universities, schools, public libraries (see the exam-
ple in Box 2) and even businesses. The focus and facilities provided by the 
workshops are correspondingly varied: from spaces for learning to empow-
ering places of DIY production to state-funded ‘innovation laboratories’; 
from voluntary, grassroots democratic organisations to classical enterprise 
hierarchies. Makerspaces are often financed by membership fees but also 
by donations, public funds, sponsoring or proceeds from events (Cavalcanti 
2013b). Despite these different forms of organisation, makerspaces can be 
regarded as third places, especially due to the low-threshold access to (digi-
tal) production equipment and the particular significance of community, as 
the two case studies from Cologne illustrate.
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3.2 Makerspaces as infrastructure for transformation? 
In the context of sustainability and post-growth debates, makerspaces are 
exciting because they provide spaces and opportunity structures for alter-
native and potentially transformative economic practices. Even if they lead 
something of a niche existence within society as a whole, they point to paths 
towards a sustainable post-growth economy (e.g. Lange 2017: 40). Smith 
(2017) suggests that activities in makerspaces facilitate participation, open-
ness and community and can generate transformative social innovations. In 
their capacity as third places, makerspaces are a kind of technical and social 
infrastructure for a socio-ecological sustainability transformation. By pro-
moting a culture of repairing and upcycling (for instance in repair cafes), 
they enable digital, decentralised production and can, thanks to extended 
product lifecycles and closed material cycles, contribute to a reduction of 
resource consumption and CO2 emissions (Smith/Light 2017:164).
3.3 Open access to resources as a basis for encounter  
and interaction
For third places to emerge as places of social participation they must have a 
low threshold of access. Although practices vary between makerspaces1, it is 
this ‘open access for the broad public’ (Simons/Petschow/Peuckert 2016: 29, 
translated from German) that defines them as ‘community-oriented spaces’ 
(Smith/Hielscher/Dickel et al. 2013: 4). In addition to access to material 
resources like tools, they provide access to non-material resources, especially 
knowledge. With the growing importance of access to technology and its 
use for social participation (Ringwald/Schneider/Cagan 2019), makerspaces 
carry out groundwork in a rapidly changing technology landscape. There 
are diverse opportunities for participation ranging from attending work-
shops to membership to designing your own offerings. As the example of 
the ‘DingFabrik’ in Cologne clearly demonstrates, makerspaces are in many 
cases established and run by their users. Makerspaces in public institutions, 
like in the urban district library of Cologne-Kalk, are more closely managed 
1  In line with their settings, there are periods for selectively public processes in most mak-
erspaces (e.g. for members, university students, school students, etc.), which temporarily 
limit access.
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but here users are also increasingly involved in the design of premises and 
offerings (Rasmussen 2016: 547).
Access to resources often involves collective forms of property. Due to 
the collaborative organisation of production, several authors discuss mak-
erspaces as a version of ‘commons-based peer production’ (Kostakis/Niaros/
Giotitsas 2015). However, there are examples of makerspaces with a com-
mercial, hierarchical form of organisation (e.g. the business TUM Maker-
Space GmbH near Munich), and even in non-commercial, association-based 
makerspaces the process of communalisation can be limited, for instance 
when working with consumable materials (Seravalli 2014). At the same time, 
however, the production practices based on open-source software and hard-
ware make it possible to avoid many of the exclusions that are characteristic 
of classical concepts of property. Furthermore, the vast majority of maker-
spaces in Germany are run as associations or public corporations and do not 
have a direct profit orientation.
3.4 Lifelong learning through and with community  
Makerspaces offer their users ‘neutral ground’ where they can realise indi-
vidual and collaborative projects within a community. Surveys reveal that 
community is a decisive factor here: in addition to the production of objects 
and software-hacking, social aspects and learning have been identified as 
central reasons for participation (e.g. Moilanen 2012). There is continuous 
interaction between collaboration, mutual teaching, learning by making and 
the finished products. Makerspaces in general – not just the ones in public 
libraries – thus become places of informal education and demonstrate the 
strong link between social capital and lifelong learning (Ferguson 2012: 26). 
While the concrete culture of community is shaped in diverse ways, import-
ant principles are captured by the headings of the ‘Maker Movement Mani-
fest’ by Hatch (2013): ‘make’, ‘share’, ‘give’, ‘learn’, ‘tool up’, ‘play’, ‘participate’, 
‘support’ and ‘change’. 
A particularly important aspect of the community in makerspaces is its 
playful and conspirative character: ‘Play, fun, and interest are at the heart 
of making’ (Martin 2015: 35). The movement is characterised by a positive 
culture of failure which understands experimentation and tinkering as new 
impulses for learning, so that in the end skills are acquired and goals reached 
(ibid.). As informal places of education, makerspaces offer their users an 
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opportunity structure for empowered, voluntary and informal (adult) learn-
ing processes (Schön/Ebner/Grandl 2019). There is furthermore potential 
for their use in formal educational institutions like schools and universi-
ties (Barrett/Pizzico/Levy et al. 2015, Martin 2015), as is already the case in 
Cologne-Kalk, where the Maker Mobil is used for school events (see Box 2). In 
any case, in and through makerspaces, users are becoming prosumers; they 
can acquire and share knowledge, and develop and experiment with sustain-
ability innovations at a local level. They thus provide ideas and approaches 
for a post-growth society.
3.5 Critical reflection on the post-growth potential of makerspaces
Use of the term ‘makerspaces’, like that of ‘third places’, has become almost 
inf lationary and tends to be applied to a diffuse space of possibility. Peter-
son (2019: 35) argues nonetheless that it is important not to abstract encoun-
ters in such places from their historical, political and geographical contexts. 
Rather, they do not exist outside of social power relations, which are mate-
rialised in such places and impact on the individuals involved (Berlant 2016: 
395). It is therefore necessary to investigate concrete examples to establish 
the extent to which makerspaces in practice fulfil expectations and which 
exclusions they (re)produce.
In terms of the ecological effects of makerspaces, Hielscher and Smith 
(2014: 44), for instance, emphasise that positive ecological evaluations of 
‘grassroot digital fabrication’ remain speculative because the relevant effects 
depend on which materials are used for production. It is rather the case that 
a whole range of conditions must be met if the decentralised and individu-
alised production in makerspaces is to be described as ecologically sustain-
able (Petschow/Ferdinand/Dickel et al. 2014, Olson 2013). Similarly, not all 
makerspaces are characterised by the radical break with capitalist growth 
logics that post-growth approaches demand (Schmid 2019: 3). Indeed, there 
are diverse and increasing interactions between makerspaces and processes 
of capitalist exploitation (Morozov 2014). For example, in the RepRap project 
the idea of a freely available and easily replicable 3-D printer ended up as a 
commercial and very profitable product (Söderberg 2013). This example indi-
cates the problems caused by commercial and political actors (for instance 
state institutions in China and the USA) who support ‘making’ as a way to 
promote economic growth and innovations (Morozov 2014). At this point, 
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logics of commercial exploitation and growth collide and compete with the 
self-image of many makerspaces as collective economic spaces for indepen-
dent making and as alternatives to a consumer and throwaway society. The 
claim that makerspaces are places of low-threshold access should also be 
critically examined. The costs for machines, premises, insurance, etc. can be 
considerable (Cavalcanti 2013b), which, for instance, means that members of 
the ‘DingFabrik’ pay a minimum monthly fee of 23 euros (17 euros for low-in-
come groups). Many makerspaces have voluntary or progressive (solidarity) 
fees, demonstrating the efforts made to promote inclusivity and broad social 
participation, but in practice people with low incomes are unlikely to feel 
addressed by the initiatives in the first place. Finally, in a number of cases 
the ongoing commercialisation of makerspaces runs counter to any logic of 
inclusion (Hielscher/Smith 2014: 49).
The divergence between aspiration and reality is revealed by a glance at 
the users of makerspaces, who are not representative of society as a whole, 
but are more often than average white, male and well-educated (Make 2012). 
Several initiatives have attempted to tackle this problem by focusing on tra-
ditionally underrepresented groups. In this vein, special makerspaces offer 
socially marginalised groups like people of colour (‘Liberating Ourselves 
Locally’ in Oakland) or people with disabilities (‘Selfmade’ in Dortmund) 
access to the making culture in a protected space. However, such places, and 
explicitly feminist makerspaces (e.g. the ‘Mz* Baltazar’s Lab’ in Vienna), do 
not follow the concept of an openly accessible third place but rather the con-
cept of a safe space ‘in which boundaries offer both safety and a platform for 
political resistance’ (Toupin 2014: 7).
4. Conclusion and prospects
The notion that, as third places, makerspaces can provide impetus for sus-
tainable development in the sense of post-growth must be critically assessed, 
particularly in light of the increasing capitalist exploitation of such spaces. 
Sustainability, equitable participation, empowerment and a democratisa-
tion of production are not necessarily inherent to makerspaces. Nonetheless, 
as collaboratively used, participative places, they bring people into contact 
with one another and with technology. They thus offer diverse points of 
departure for post-growth discourses and relate to all three dimensions of 
Makerspaces 169
sustainable development (ecological, social, economic). Particularly on the 
social level, they promote collective learning processes and are important 
places of encounter where digital participation can be experienced, and they 
can therefore contribute towards achieving social sustainability goals. Mak-
erspaces are thus starting points for, and the result of, transformation pro-
cesses, as well as catalysts and opportunity spaces for testing and developing 
transformative practices.
Nevertheless, makerspaces are embedded in existing social power rela-
tions and produce their own exclusions. The growing interest of commer-
cial actors is associated with the threat of commercial appropriation, which 
constrains the transformative power of makerspaces. Simultaneously, the 
concept of makerspaces as third places is being increasingly seized upon by 
municipal actors involved in urban development (policies). From a geograph-
ical perspective, it is particularly exciting to observe the extent to which such 
places (can) challenge hierarchical management styles (Braybrooke 2018: 43) 
and how their participative structures and processes (can) develop and real-
ise into new governance styles and forms, e.g. in urban development.
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The relationship between alternative economies 
and urban planning in Dortmund 
Le-Lina Kettner, Samuel Mössner
1. Introduction: Alternative economies  
in urban planning processes
In light of the urgent global crises, both science and practice alike empha-
sise the necessity of a ‘progressive, emancipatory, socio-ecological trans-
formation’ (Acosta/Brand 2018: 17, translated from German). Key actors 
of the transformation process are so-called alternative initiatives, whose 
approaches aim to establish local resources and regional economic cycles in 
the context of critiques of the traditional growth paradigm. Alternative ini-
tiatives are often located in urban areas characterised by dynamic and high 
concentrations of exchange and diversity that encourage spaces of oppor-
tunity for the emergence and testing of alternative economic approaches 
(Krueger/Schulz/Gibbs 2017). These spaces are often fiercely contested (Kipp 
2018: 212). They are locations of political negotiation, as practices of trans-
formative innovation and alternative action are associated with a question-
ing and criticism of the hegemonial settings and patriarchal power relations 
linked to traditional economic understandings.
At the heart of the critique is an understanding of success and growth 
that focuses primarily on quantifiable variables. Numerous initiatives and 
social movements therefore try to counter these traditional economic forms 
with other ways of assessing value that use alternative and non-quantifiable 
factors. Such approaches include practices of solidarity, civil society self-or-
ganisation, sufficiency and all notions that focus on social well-being, health 
and social justice. Particularly prominent in the literature are discussions of 
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‘transition town movements’ (Hopkins 2008), revived debates about urban 
commons (Helferich 2012; Nikolaeva/Adey/Cresswell et al. 2018), economies 
for the common good and cooperative approaches. All of these approaches 
are characterised by their criticism of conventional patterns of consumption, 
production methods, top-down forms of organisation and competitive mar-
ket economy behaviour (Schmelzer 2018; Schmid 2018; Müller 2018; Lange 
2017). Both science and practice therefore see such approaches as playing a 
significant role in driving the transformation of society.
While resistance as protest can indeed function outside of social struc-
tures, this article argues that it is not only resistant activities outside of 
social norms and fields that are of great importance. In order to establish 
and perpetuate alternative approaches and initiatives, ultimately an inter-
face with the societal mainstream is required. For alternative initiatives this 
interface primarily involves cooperation with municipal administrations, 
planning and politics. Alternative initiatives are frequently dependent on 
spaces and areas in the city which urban planning authorities allow them 
to use (sometimes temporarily). Urban administrations and policies enable 
the emergence of these niche spaces, protect them from market forces (even 
if often only temporarily) and, ideally, provide the necessary infrastructure.
At the same time many of the focuses of the heterogeneous post-growth 
initiatives mentioned above coincide with the original tasks of urban plan-
ning. Beyond a neoliberal ‘public management’ approach (Peck/Theodore/
Brenner 2013; Fuller/Geddes 2008), urban planning continues to be viewed as 
the guardian of urban processes (Klaer 2008: 203) and is tasked with creating 
opportunities for social action and managing them within the framework of 
political guidance. Urban planning should focus on the objective of creating 
good living conditions for all parts of society (Wiezorek 2017: 53). 
Urban planning administrations are thus less rejecting of alternative 
approaches than the classical neoliberal critique implies. Nonetheless, in the 
context of well-rehearsed and routine administrative practice, the initia-
tives are often (benevolently) marginalised, which hinders the development 
of cooperative, equal relations between alternative initiatives and urban 
planning. The literature contains research on the emergence of alternative 
economies, sub-cultural initiatives and growth-critical innovations in local 
areas and their diffusion on different spatial scales (Gibson-Graham 2008; 
Roelvink 2011; Fuller/Jonas 2003; Schulz/Affolderbach 2015). However, the 
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nexus between alternative initiatives and the bodies of urban administra-
tions and planning has received comparatively little attention to date.
In light of the lack of research into the potential of interactions between 
initiatives and urban planning, the empirical study on which this article is 
based attempts to identify theoretical, abstract and explanatory approaches 
from the empirical field (Strauss/Glaser 1967). Using the case of the city of 
Dortmund, the empirical research focused on the requirements and support 
needed by the initiatives to enable better urban integration beyond neolib-
eral appropriation. To this end, interviews were held with representatives 
of various initiatives and the urban administration and participant observa-
tion was conducted in the period from February to May 2019. 
It quickly became clear that there were significant gaps in the interaction 
and cooperation between urban planning and initiatives, as we brief ly out-
line in Section 2. A possible explanation for such gaps is provided in Section 
3, drawing on the social theory of Judith Butler (1991; 1995). On a conceptual 
level, we argue that it is important to recognise the gap between the exter-
nally defined, hegemonic characterisation of what alternative initiatives 
should be, on the one hand, and the self-performance and lived-out position 
of the initiatives, on the other hand. This gap is responsible for the speech-
lessness alternative initiatives and urban planning mutually experience and 
for potential misunderstandings between them. We want to demonstrate 
here that Judith Butler’s notions of performativity and processes of subjec-
tification, which were originally related to social constructions of gender 
identities, can also be applied in research of economic dualism (mainstream 
– alternative) and have particular potential for providing explanations of the 
lack of effectiveness of alternative initiatives in urban contexts.
2. The marginalisation of alternative economies  
in urban planning 
The growing number of alternative approaches in the fields of supply, con-
sumption or sufficiency and mobility indicates not only the great potential 
here for urban development and planning but also the increasing spatial rel-
evance of these activities. However, despite numerous proposals for sustain-
able, democratic and participative urban planning (Elsen/Reifer/Oberleiter 
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et al. 2015; Klaer 2008), post-growth initiatives and approaches have so far 
been largely marginalised in urban planning processes.
Although in theory towns and cities are called upon to apply post-growth 
initiatives, in practical terms this does not occur. However, on the level of 
federal state politics in, for instance, North-Rhine Westphalia, such initia-
tives are given considerably more attention (WIKUE). The consumer advice 
centres and other organisations that are concerned with the networking of 
so-called ‘spaces of possibilities’ (Kerekes 2015, translated from German) also 
refer to the significance of these initiatives and their contribution towards 
the transformation of society. A similar position is adopted by planning sci-
ences. The (urban) policy side occasionally recognises individual potentials 
but seldom specifies ways of fully exploiting these potentials. Accordingly, 
in many cities – including Dortmund – there are strong networks between 
individual initiatives, but for questionable reasons they tend to be reluctant 
to involve urban planning and administration.
In Dortmund, for example, structural change resulting from the steel 
crisis that started in the 1970s enabled the early establishment of a broad 
landscape of alternative initiatives and approaches. Dortmund is charac-
terised by a comparatively high number of still unutilised brownfield sites, 
and in recent years there has been a strong focus on promoting the cultural 
and creative economic fields. The city particularly favours a policy that pro-
motes a creative economic milieu true to neoliberal maxims (Florida 2005). 
This involves, firstly, a creative approach being taken to the brownfield sites. 
Secondly, it recognises an innovative strength in niche economies and cre-
ative initiatives that can successfully overcome the effects of deindustriali-
sation (Wascher/Hebel/Schrot et al. 2018: 4). The policy is f lanked by a focus 
on the university as a locational advantage and the embedding of the city in 
the ‘Spatial Strategy for the Ruhr 2035+’ (‘Raumstrategien Ruhr 2035+’), which 
inter alia aims to attract and retain businesses (Wagner/Hegmanns 2017: 91 
f f.).
A creative scene has developed in the shadow of this classical neolib-
eral economic policy, giving rise to many initiatives based on alternative 
economic approaches. These initiatives benefit from the availability of the 
old brownfields and comparatively low-price housing and commercial sites. 
However, they also profit from the political promotion of creative and small-
scale innovation, the creative milieu surrounding the colleges and univer-
sity and a supra-regional planning strategy that supports such approaches. 
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Nonetheless, there are barriers to the development of alternative initiatives, 
but – in the general opinion of the various actors – they could be overcome 
with the use of cooperative approaches by the urban administration and 
planning. 
In Dortmund, however, this kind of cooperation is extremely rare in 
practice. In our research interviews, representatives of alternative initia-
tives repeatedly referred to a lack of f lexibility and openness and insufficient 
trust and goodwill on the part of urban planning. The wish was expressed 
that there should be more courageous support of approaches that the city 
does not view as contributing significantly to traditional economic growth. 
In this context, reference was made to the need for better support and the 
development of growth-independent criteria for urban planning (Lamker/
Schulze Dieckhoff 2019). 
A central role is played by the interpretation and application of (legal) 
regulations, statutes and ordinances, which – in the opinion of the initia-
tives – could sometimes be more creative, even within the framework of 
the existing provisions. Due to their low degree of institutionalization, the 
alternative initiatives often have great difficulty fulfilling or complying with 
rules and regulations. From the point of view of the alternative initiatives, 
the urban administration’s self-conception of themselves as the ‘guardian of 
laws and regulations’ and their associated notion that ‘all [rules] are enacted 
for a good reason’ (Interview 6 2019) is not conducive to f lexibly supporting 
the concerns and projects of the initiatives. Especially for initiatives that are 
active at the borders of regulation conformity or that move outside the pro-
visions, urban planning needs to apply small-scale, cautious and situation-
ally specific efforts to transfer them into formal structures. However, this is 
only possible if the initiatives’ activities are recognised as valuable in the first 
place. Moreover, it is often unclear which regulations apply to new or differ-
ent ideas, which can then lead to misunderstandings and later to rejection. 
In addition to the problem of adherence to a largely inf lexible set of regula-
tions, the initiatives also criticised the inertia and anxiety of urban planning 
vis-à-vis innovations and change and in this context ‘wished […] that then the 
plans of thirty years ago were not dug out but that people would really look at 
the current situation and really determine the true needs’ (Interview 2 2019). 
Many initiatives were discouraged by the fast and direct rejection of their 
ideas. There was a wish for more dialogue about the reasons for the rejection 
so that it would perhaps be possible to together identify a different way in 
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which the individual projects could be implemented (Interview 1, 2, 5 2019). 
Lastly, attention was drawn to the discrepancy between bureaucratic pro-
cesses and procedures and the temporal and spatial routines and rhythms 
practised by the representatives of the initiatives. This is a classic problem of 
cooperation between alternative initiatives and urban administrations and 
is much discussed in the literature (Cramer 2013; Selle/Wachten 2011; Selle 
1997). 
Private-sector planning offices (Interview 6 2019) also support this 
impression of a lack of f lexibility and exercising of individual discretion. 
This similarly confirms the need to allow experimental trial-and-error to be 
part of planning and to ‘first let things just go their own way a bit’ (ibid.). 
This is, however, only possible under cooperative conditions when there is no 
shying away from conf lict.
These and other statements seem to contradict the self-definition and 
self-perception of urban planning within the urban administration. Those 
responsible for planning suggest that informal instruments help them to be 
particularly agile and react f lexibly to different claims and types of use. The 
urban administration furthermore emphasises that urban planning pro-
cesses are extremely ‘people-oriented’ (Stadt Dortmund o. J., translated from 
German). Interviews with representatives of the urban administration also 
clearly show that seeking individual solutions and especially compromises is 
indeed a major concern of planning. Here reference was made to the way in 
which the requirements of alternative initiatives had been accommodated 
by making generous use of the scope for weighing up interests (Interview 5 
2019): ‘They are colleagues with whom you can consider how you can manage 
something like that and how you can do that. And a great deal is possible 
there’. The urban administration demonstrates openness towards proj-
ects with an uncertain or risky outcome (ibid.) and explicitly states in this 
context that funding does not depend on success or on agreements about 
objectives. Projects that planning representatives predict will fail even right 
at the beginning are particularly difficult to fund, but plausible reasons are 
nonetheless put on the table: ‘Why should I fund a project that I think from 
the outset will fail? […] Well, basically I just fund the learning process. How 
many euros is a learning process worth in comparison to a project that you 
can see will work?’ (ibid.).
In summary, the empirical insights show that alternative initiatives and 
projects are fundamentally possible in Dortmund but they have to be based 
Performing gaps 179
primarily on established visions, values and understandings of the meaning 
and success of urban planning. In addition to the focus on traditional ideas, 
the empirical findings also suggest there is mutual misunderstanding and 
that this results in a lack of support. The mutual misunderstanding is not 
caused only by inertia within the urban administration. The f lexibility often 
displayed by the urban administration frequently goes unrecognised by the 
initiatives. The relationship between the urban administration and the alter-
native initiatives is characterised by different perceptions, contrary expec-
tations and conf licting ideas which lead to a general speechlessness with one 
another.
The selection of empirical approaches discussed above demonstrates 
that alternatives to established, conservative and traditional structures and 
values are not always understood by the urban administration as criticism. 
They are rather viewed as open spaces and innovative experiments and are 
acknowledged by the dominant system of urban planning. The relation-
ship between urban planning – which represents the dominant hegemo-
nial system – and alternative initiatives – which understand themselves as 
counterprojects to existing capitalist routines – is characterised by power 
asymmetries (Healy 2009). The initiatives coexisting in economic and plan-
ning niches are therefore denied the ability to effectively represent a justi-
fied counterproposal to capitalist economic forms. Even with well-intended 
funding and support they are basically assessed as trivial and incapable of 
entering into real competition with capitalism (North 2007: 22). They may be 
viewed as interesting and promising exotics but are nonetheless degraded 
and marginalised within the existing system. 
Closer observation reveals, however, that this marginalisation, as 
already implied above, does not take the form of one-sided exclusion or sim-
ple repression. Rather, a complex coexistence between dominance (urban 
administration) and alternative (initiatives) emerges in which the margin-
alised alternative as a ‘constructed other’ develops into an indivisible part 
of the identity of the whole (Hillebrand/Zademach 2013: 11). The marginali-
sation is thus part of a complex and mutual dependency between the hege-
mony and the marginalised. As Healy (2009) puts it, marginalised initiatives 
are indivisibly linked to the acknowledgement of dominance. He describes 
this interaction as binarity (ibid.: 6).
While this view of marginalisation is, on the one hand, helpful for further 
consideration of the interface between urban planning and alternative econ-
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omies, on the other hand it carries the risk of misunderstanding the ambiva-
lence of the alternative within the hegemonial system. Alternative initiatives 
can only exist within the dominant system (Linnemann 2017: 8 f.) but they 
nonetheless still attempt to subvert and reformulate existing power rela-
tions (Müller 2018: 218 f.). It would therefore be fatal to write off alternative 
initiatives as integrated elements of the dominant system and thus to accept 
their marginalisation as a matter of course. 
In Section 3 we take a theory-oriented look at the interface between dom-
inance and alternative and, starting from the marginalisation of alternative 
initiatives, shed more light on this complex coexistence. The aim is to con-
ceptually grasp the mutual speechlessness outlined above, which contrib-
utes to the underpinning of the dominant and the alternative. This should 
increase understanding of what hinders the development of a cooperative 
coexistence of initiatives and urban planning. Our focus is therefore on what 
and how the positions of the alternative initiatives and urban administration 
are constituted. Here we draw on Judith Butler’s understanding of perfor-
mativity as this allows a conceptual approach that helps to render the incom-
prehension of those involved explicable and tangible by revealing so-called 
performing gaps.
3. ‘Performing gaps’: on the difference between  
the performativity and self-perception of alternative 
initiatives in urban planning
With her work in the social sciences, the US philosopher Judith Butler has 
made a significant contribution to understanding individual and social dif-
ferences as the result of a process of social construction. At the heart of But-
ler’s proposition is the idea that existing power relations are fed by ritualised 
speech acts which emanate from specific performative constructions. Such 
constructions are the result of hegemonial attributions, practices, values 
and ideas in society, which are stabilised by the performativity of the social 
environment (Healy 2009: 4). Butler understands performativity as the result 
of specific, cultural constituted performances (Fischer-Lichte 2013: 41). For 
Butler these performances manifest themselves, for instance, in the social 
perpetuation of binary gender identities, or for Healy in the dominance of 
neoliberalism (Butler 1991; Healy 2009). Everything that exists outside of 
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these settings appears (inter alia) as economically vulnerable and temporary 
or, for instance, as scientifically or socially irrelevant and becomes margin-
alised (Callon 1998; Healy 2009: 4). 
The discursive constitution of otherness and difference and the resulting 
marginalisation does not always or only occur via language and speech acts 
(Austin 1962), but is also expressed via symbolic actions (Fischer-Lichte 2013: 
41 f f.). The ‘speechlessness’ with which urban planning and alternative ini-
tiatives encounter one another (as described in Section 2), and their mutual 
inability to recognise the potential of the other, can be understood as the dif-
ference between externally ascribed and self-perceived positions. In theoret-
ical-conceptual terms, we argue here that this represents the gap between 
alternative initiatives and urban planning that must be overcome – it results 
from different performativities, that is, from different constructions of the 
self in relation to an other. 
The social marginalisation of alternative initiatives occurs primarily 
through a distancing from capitalist structures. Their marginality becomes 
apparent through the lack of an accurate fit with the established and institu-
tionalised rules and ideas of growth-oriented planning. However, the posi-
tioning of alternative initiatives occurs not only through attributions from 
the outside – for instance on the part of the urban administration, planning 
or traditional business ventures. The initiatives themselves understand their 
lack of fit, difference and marginalisation vis-à-vis the mainstream as the 
core of their own identity (see Section  2). They use strong symbolics and 
speech acts related to their marginalised position to articulate their other-
ness and, for instance, more sustainable nature as alternatives. Terms like 
solidarity, cooperation, market independence, sustainability and nature 
conservation and, on the other hand, terms from which they consciously and 
decidedly distance themselves – growth, market and competition, resource 
exploitation – become powerful attributes with which the initiatives repro-
duce their own subordination.
The initiatives thus actually strengthen the boundaries of the discourse. 
Their self-attribution reinforces these boundaries instead of weakening 
them and this in fact undermines the actual intention of the initiatives. Their 
existence is made possible by their own reproduction of the discourse but 
at the same time limited by it. What alternative initiatives have to be, how 
they have to design themselves, what positions they should criticise, and 
what institutions and forms of the economy they should address – all this 
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is defined from the outside. Paradoxically, this limits their ability to act to 
precisely the sphere in which they are also visible to the outside under the 
discursive hegemonial conditions (Butler 1991). Alternative initiatives are 
only perceived as long as they appear as utopian, largely ineffective activities 
that do not fit into existing structures and routines, that disregard rules and 
that even dare to criticise. Outside of these boundaries they are irrelevant 
for urban planning.
Here the performing gap between the expectations placed on alterna-
tive initiatives from the outside and their own self-positioning becomes 
clear. They have potential as actors of urban development where they fulfil 
the expectations of the system: as urban gardening projects that enhance the 
inner city in terms of design, participation and attractiveness; as open bicy-
cle repair shops that contribute nicely to social integration in the neighbour-
hoods; or as activists who self-organise to utilise an old-industrial space for 
creative and artistic projects, at a low cost to the administration. Here they 
comply with common ideas of volunteering and civil society engagement, 
enriched in their case by an exotic unconventionality. Outside of this per-
ception of the exotic alternative, initiatives often go unnoticed, for instance 
as innovators of a holistic and more sustainable urban food supply who also 
address aspects of formal planning. Or as supporters of the mobility transi-
tion, which must also be integrated into current and future transport plan-
ning. Or as evidence that the existing regulations and legislation (such as the 
Federal Building Code) are long outdated and inappropriate.
While these boundaries of the discourse are initially accepted by alterna-
tive initiatives and are even underpinned by their self-positioning as ‘alter-
native’, they themselves see their strength primarily in the outwards shifting 
of this boundary. They wish to be integrated in planning as a serious part-
ner capable of making a coherent and important contribution to planning 
change. The performing gap can be explained by drawing on the well-known 
tales of Till Eulenspiegel: as long as the court jester wore his jester’s cap and 
amused people, he was accepted even when his stories and antics contained 
serious criticism of the ruling system. But he was never accepted as an advi-
sor to the court, although he perhaps considered himself to be precisely that. 
This perspective offers a possible explanation for the inhibited inter-
action and the speechlessness between the initiatives and urban planning 
described above. Clearly the societal definition of alternative economies is 
much narrower than their self-definition and self-perception. Urban plan-
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ning (as the dominant system) exclusively adopts the prevailing discourse 
on alternative economies, so its scope for action is similarly limited to the 
socially recognised space or discourse. It remains unrecognised that the 
identity formation of the initiatives deviates in parts from the categories of 
the socially hegemonic discourse about alternative economies. In the con-
structed niche of their own marginalisation, alternative initiatives can act 
and prevail. If they emerge from the marginalisation and position themselves 
as something beyond the expectations attributed from outside, then they are 
no longer perceived. It is therefore impossible for alternative initiatives to 
stimulate substantial and fundamental change. The key finding is that this 
performing gap is constructed with recourse to hegemonial discourse from 
outside (for instance from the urban administration and planning) but is 
also constituted by the initiatives themselves through their self-attribution 
as alternative and marginalised. The gap between the external definition and 
inner performativity thus represents the space of their own failure. Their 
ability to act increases the more they confirm the hegemonial discourse with 
their self-definition.
4. Conclusion
It seems that the present understanding of planning faces a dilemma. On the 
one hand, the intentions of urban planning to improve the quality of urban 
life correspond with the motivations of the initiatives. On the other hand, 
urban planning is subject to a striving for growth while the initiatives have 
a no-profit orientation and act outside the existing regulatory framework. 
This means that serious interaction between the two makes little sense. 
The results of our article suggest that the balance of power between alter-
native economies and urban planning is not only subject to structural, legal 
or formal restrictions. Rather the cooperation is also inf luenced by mutual 
spoken contradictions and contextual factors. Differences in perception 
about what urban planning and alternative initiatives should achieve play a 
role in the lack of interest in mutual interaction. 
External hurdles also make the existence of the initiatives more diffi-
cult. Their willingness to cooperate with urban planning is generally lim-
ited, particularly due to an avoidance of dependencies. The structures of the 
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dominant economic system prove particularly decisive for the conditions of 
interaction.
Judith Butler recognises the failure of performative acts as providing 
potential for change and the emergence of subversive spaces (Wucherpfen-
nig/Strüver 2015: 111). Political discursive strategies can create spaces of pos-
sibility for difference and promote a broader social definition of ‘alternative’ 
and of ‘urban planning’. Butler speaks here of interventionist practices that 
make local contradiction possible (ibid.: 115). In this way performative rein-
terpretations allow space for change to develop as emerging confusions lead 
to new ways of thinking. This should lead not only to diverse thinking about 
economies but equally to discussion about a more diverse understanding of 
urban planning. The debate about post-growth planning offers opportuni-
ties for precisely this, such as the reinterpretation of planning instruments, 
more creative and daring processes and a radical rethinking of the funda-
mentals of urban planning (Grotefels/Mössner in Lamker/Schulze-Dieckhoff 
2018: 6). The alternative initiatives are part of and an expression of dynamic 
developments that live new rules of the game and can develop social impact. 
Their potential to generate discursive effects should therefore not be under-
estimated and confined to a marginalised space.
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Town and countryside in flux 
The significance of urban functions for the vitality 
of rural areas and the importance of individual and 
systemic solutions for the realisation  
of a growth-critical way of life
Anna Szumelda
Rural life can be described in many different ways depending on who is 
talking, thinking or writing about precisely which rural areas. Descrip-
tions of rural areas often view them in relation to urban centres and distin-
guish between rural areas that are close to cities and those on the periph-
ery. What is the importance of cities for people who live in rural areas far 
away from urban centres? How important is physical distance from areas of 
economic growth for the everyday life and work of these people? What indi-
vidual and systemic solutions are there and could there be that would make 
a growth-critical way of life possible? This is the subject of this article. The 
discussion is based on the example of statements, observations and experi-
ences of people who live in rural areas, some of which are remotely located. 
Firstly, examples are drawn from qualitative interviews that I conducted as 
part of an empirical investigation in two different rural areas in east and 
south-east Poland. Secondly, the findings are based on my own observations 
of everyday life and work in a small village located far from urban centres in 
north-west Poland (see Figure 1 for the location of the case-study regions).
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Figure 1: Location of the districts of Szczecinek (north-west), Lubartów (east) and 
Krosno (south-east), where the case studies described below originate. The map 
also shows the distribution of town and cities (grey), the spheres of inf luence of 
urban centres (red-orange-yellow) and the distribution of peripheral areas (green) 
in Poland.
Source: author based on Bański/Czapiewski (2009)
In order to gain a better understanding of the context of the case studies 
discussed below, I first present some general characteristics of rural areas in 
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Poland. In addition, I brief ly describe how a number of political documents 
view the relationship between rural and urban areas in Poland. In some mea-
sure, rural areas in Poland are conversely defined as non-urban, as ‘districts 
beyond the administrative boundaries of cities, thus as rural municipalities 
or as rural parts of urban-rural municipalities’ (MRiRW 2014: 75). Whether 
municipalities are regarded as urban or rural depends on the population 
density. This categorisation classifies 93.1% of Poland’s territory as rural and 
suggests that 39.2% of the Polish population live in rural areas (see MRiRW 
2014: 8). However, even if definitions of rural areas distinguish them from 
urban, elsewhere the two spatial categories are described as being interre-
lated. Strategic and conceptual documents like, e.  g., the ‘Strategy for the 
sustainable development of rural areas, agriculture and fishing 2012–2020’1 
and the ‘National spatial planning concept’2 describe both the diversity of 
rural and urban areas – their diverse socio-economic constellations and 
associated functions, problems and development opportunities – and 
also the mutual relations between rural areas and cities. When examined 
more closely, however, these documents are concerned with the relation-
ship between rural areas and a specific type of urban area: the economically 
prosperous, infrastructurally well-equipped and culturally attractive urban 
centres. The focus is thus on the relationship between rural areas and urban 
areas characterised by economic growth and its consequences – desirable 
and undesirable. Rural areas account for by far the largest share of the terri-
tory of Poland. While the network of towns and cities is spread quite evenly 
across the country it is not as dense as, e. g., in Germany, which is of similar 
size. This means that in Poland a fairly high proportion of rural areas are 
located comparatively far away from urban centres and ‘growth areas’ (see 
Figure 1).
Of interest here is the importance for rural dwellers not only of the poten-
tial accessibility of the administrative entity ‘city’ but also of the actual avail-
ability of specific functions associated with (economically prosperous) cities. 
This will be demonstrated in the following using examples from the everyday 
1   Original title of the document: ‘Strategia zrównoważonego rozwoju wsi, rolnictwa i rybactwa 
na lata 2012–2020. Załącznik do uchwały nr 163 Rady Ministrów z dnia 25 kwietnia 2012 r. (poz. 
839).’ (MP 2012 poz. 839)
2   Original  title  of  the  document:  ‘Koncepcja przestrzennego zagospodarowania kraju 2030. 
Załącznik do uchwały nr 239 Rady Ministrów z dnia 13 grudnia 2011 r. (poz. 252).’ (MP 2012 poz. 
252)
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life of people who live in rural areas, in some cases in peripheral locations. 
The examples are related to the topics of mobility, agriculture and securing a 
living, and lifestyle preferences. They ref lect many socially and ecologically 
problematic phenomena, the causes and increase of which are linked to eco-
nomic processes of growth and concentration and solutions for which are 
sought in the growth-critical sustainability discussion.
Mobility
Mobility makes it possible to reach an urban centre from a rural area in 
the first place. A great deal can only be dealt with in the city – purchases 
beyond what can be bought in the village shop, attending school and cultural 
events, visits to (specialist) doctors and the authorities, and not least gain-
ful employment. Access to this social infrastructure is necessary. In order 
to access it despite the lack of or marginal nature of public transport links 
from villages to the nearest urban centres, individual motorised mobility has 
been increasing for years. This is also the case in the rural areas which are the 
focus of this article. The effects of this individual mobility on the volume of 
traffic and the way in which the relationship between urban and rural areas 
has been changed by the accessibility thus created is impressively demon-
strated by the following quote:
‘My husband and I live with our two grown-up children in the countryside. 
Two years ago, we moved to a house in a village. It’s wonderful and we 
never want to go back to the city. But we can only say that because four cars 
are parked in our backyard. In the mornings each of us takes one of them 
and drives of f in a dif ferent direction. Ten years ago, we would never have 
moved to a village because if you lived in a village then there was simply no 
chance of getting away from it.’ (WSPGOA)3
3  The quotes come from interviews that were carried out for the empirical investigation de-
scribed above, and from private conversations. Both the interviews and the private con-
versations were conducted in Polish. The abbreviations at the end of the quotes (e. g. WSP-
GOA) provide information about the origin of the interviewee or interlocutor, but remain 
encoded here to ensure data protection.
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The quote shows how the solution to problems on the one hand can have 
consequences on the other hand. Individual mobility has made cities and 
important social infrastructure accessible to the residents of rural areas. 
The decision of the woman speaking and her family in favour of a lifestyle 
oriented towards ‘less’ has consequences in the form of a simultaneous 
‘more’. ‘Less’ here refers to the slower or generally more restricted availabil-
ity and utilisation of goods and services found in the city, as called for in 
the growth-critical debate with demands for a sufficient lifestyle (see Linz/
Bartelmus/Hennicke et al. 2002; Mölders/Szumelda/Winterfeld 2014; Paech 
2012; Sachs 1993; Stengel 2011). However, ultimately this ‘less’ is not necessar-
ily sufficiency oriented and the ‘less’ with regards to urban noise and built-up 
space is associated with a ‘more’ in terms of the traffic volumes, noise and 
emissions pollution, congested streets, higher resource consumption etc. 
that are linked to individual motorised mobility. The tone of the quote cited 
above suggests that the speaker is conscious of the ambivalence of increasing 
individual mobility. However, for the family decision, the scales tipped in 
favour of the desired life in the countryside (which they did not necessarily 
view as growth critical), as the availability of individual mobility meant that 
they did not have to give up links to the city.
Such decisions, and the wish of rural residents to be connected to urban 
infrastructure, are understandable. To counter the consequences associated 
with increased individual mobility, it is therefore worth considering a poli-
cy-based or entrepreneurial approach to creating or maintaining connectiv-
ity between rural areas and cities. In the rural district of Szczecinek in north-
west Poland, there are examples of both. A private bus company from the 
area has taken on the task of providing bus connections between a number 
of surrounding villages and the city of Szczecinek. The service is compara-
tively frequent, which makes it an attractive alternative to the car, providing 
good mobility in particular for older people from the villages and school stu-
dents. Since September 2019, the city of Szczecinek has also offered a free 
bus service. These free bus routes are restricted to the urban area − buses 
travelling beyond the urban area to the nearest villages must still be paid for, 
although options are being explored for making at least some of them free of 
charge in the future, as was once the case for a limited period of time. The 
motivation for the free buses is not necessarily to be found in the town coun-
cil’s ecological or growth-critical convictions, but rather in the need to fulfil 
election promises made at the last municipal election. It is possible for the 
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municipality to finance the venture thanks to business taxes received from a 
large and prosperous company located in the urban area – income that is not 
available to every municipality. However, despite all reservations concerning 
motivation and finance, ultimately the free urban service makes a notable 
contribution to reducing car traffic in the city.
Agriculture and securing a living
The rural regions where the examples used in this article are located, are on 
the opposite geographical sides of Poland (see red circles in Figure 1). The dif-
ferences between the regions in east and south-east Poland and the region 
in the north-west in terms of agricultural structures could hardly be greater. 
Even in the socialist era there were scarcely any large state agricultural 
enterprises in east and south-east Poland and today agricultural structures 
continue to be characterised by small-scale family farms, while the north-
west was dominated by large state farms until 1989 and today still displays a 
large-scale agricultural structure. Thus, for instance, in 2019 the average size 
of farms in the south-eastern voivodeship of Podkarpackie was 4.90 hectares, 
while in the north-western voivodeship of Zachodniopomorskie it was 31.44 
hectares (ARiMR 2019). The social upheavals and challenges associated with 
the regionally specific, structural transformation of agriculture are none-
theless quite similar in both regions. Agriculture has lost significance as a 
source of income since the 1990s. Particularly in the south-east, the major-
ity of the agricultural holdings are simply too small to generate a sufficient 
and satisfactory income (see Szumelda 2019). In the north-west, the closure 
of the state farms after 1989 put almost all the employees out of their jobs 
without enough alternative sources of income having developed outside of 
agriculture.
Being able to make a living is essential to rural dwellers. Both in the east 
and south-east with their small-scale agricultural structures and in the 
north-west with its large-scale structures, there are fewer and fewer oppor-
tunities to do so within agriculture, which has left more people dependent 
on sources of income from elsewhere – usually in cities. Farmers from the 
small-scale agricultural structures of east and south-east Poland who I 
spoke to in the course of the empirical investigation, repeatedly reported on 
the migration of their adult children to the nearby (or in some cases, more 
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distant) cities, because the children did not see any chance of earning their 
livings with jobs in the countryside. In light of the limited profitability of 
the small agricultural enterprises in particular, a number of farmers actually 
explicitly advise their children not to remain in farming but to focus rather 
on a different profession, as the following statement from a farmer makes 
clear:
‘I already told my sons and my daughter in the past, you can live in the coun-
try but work in the city. Because this farm doesn’t bring in any income. I 
won’t persuade any of my children to stay here in the village and take over 
the farm when we are no longer here. There’s no point, just turning over the 
field. But they can live here.’ (WLPLAK)
If no employment is available in a nearby city then several of the farmers do 
not see any way in which they could leave farming and pursue another pro-
fessional occupation. They remain in agriculture due to a lack of alternatives 
and assess their work in farming with corresponding diffidence: 
‘Maybe I like it, maybe not, you get used to it so and just keep doing it. And 
also where would you find another job here?’ (WPPKOA).
These examples also highlight the ambivalence of a number of (suppos-
edly) growth-critical lifestyles and the problematic phenomena associated 
with them, particularly social aspects. On the one hand, in many respects 
there is extremely justifiable criticism of the intensive, industrial and very 
growth-oriented production methods that are often associated with large-
scale agricultural structures. However, on the other hand, it is not possi-
ble to draw the reverse conclusion that ‘small-scale’ agricultural structures 
are per se and unreservedly compatible with (growth-critical) sustainabil-
ity concepts simply because they seem to fulfil demands formulated in the 
growth-critical debate for sufficient and subsistent lifestyles. As the exam-
ples presented above demonstrate, from the point of view of those who run 
the small farms and have to independently earn their livings from them, 
‘small’ is sometimes ‘too small’. If they are unable to extend their farms and 
hence their incomes, then this can result in the inadequate securing of their 
livelihoods and in poverty. And if the farmers only remain in agriculture 
because they lack alternatives and not because of a freely made decision, 
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then this can lead to great dissatisfaction with the situation or to a resigned 
attitude, as illustrated by the farmer’s statement above. Both phenomena – 
the inadequate securing of a livelihood and dissatisfaction with a way of life 
that was not chosen voluntarily – are incompatible with (growth-critical) 
sustainability considerations, especially in social terms.
However, the talks with farmers in east and south-east Poland showed 
that there are ways of earning an adequate income and securing a satisfac-
tory living even with a small farm. Some farmers recognise and make use of 
options within farming. For instance, they come together to form producer 
organisations, specialise their farms, make optimal use of the natural con-
ditions and enter into various formal and informal collaborations. In this 
way they are able to earn an adequate and satisfactory income with their 
small farms. The farmers express satisfaction with their professional situa-
tion, their income and general living conditions. An example from the rural 
region in north-east Poland furthermore shows that it is not only small-scale 
agricultural structures that are potentially compatible with a growth-criti-
cal lifestyle. The large biodynamic farm where I work is located in this area 
and covers about 2000 hectares. Given the size of the farm it is tempting to 
apply growth-related criticism but, especially in agriculture, it is not only the 
size of structures that is important but also the kind of agricultural meth-
ods in use. The biodynamic approach is growth critical in that it consciously 
renounces quick, short-term and large financial profits and has many eco-
logical advantages. In social terms, the large structure is also advantageous 
because having many workers means that each individual can take holiday 
and days off and also find cover for illness – something that farmers working 
on their own often struggle with, especially those in animal husbandry.
The EU’s common agricultural policy with its pronounced spatial impact 
has a particular role to play in enabling the systematic take up of individual 
or entrepreneurial solutions of this kind. In order to avoid only supporting 
agriculture that is based on the growth of farms and production, funding 
should be directed particularly towards producer organisations and sustain-
able farming methods, which often require a greater number of labourers 
(and are thus more cost-intensive) and therefore are not currently used by 
the majority of farms.
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Lifestyle preferences
In the relationship between urban and rural, many people are attracted not 
least by the urban lifestyle. Naturally tastes differ and different people come 
to different conclusions about what it is like to live in the city or in the coun-
tryside. For instance, a number of rural dwellers particularly value things 
that are often linked to rural areas – the quiet, the few people, being sur-
rounded by nature. A farmer in east Poland told me:
‘I  like to fish. Then I sit by the river and the frogs croak. Sometimes in the 
evening, if it’s warm, my wife and I sit on the steps and listen to the frogs 
croaking from the meadows. Anyone who hasn’t experienced that will 
probably ask themselves, what does he see in these frogs? But they should 
just come and listen. It’s really wonderful when you sit there at night and 
the nightingale sings. Those are things that you don’t pay attention to in 
everyday life because nobody has time for them, but if you have a moment 
and attend to it, then it’s very lovely. Sometimes my wife asks me why are 
you going there, to the river? Why don’t you sleep in? […] But when I sit there, 
even if I’m not sleeping, I rest.’ (WLPLOK)
For another farmer from south-east Poland I spoke to, it cannot be deserted 
enough, even in a sparsely populated area:
‘There are more and more people here, everything’s being built up. There 
are still a few villages in the area but everything’s being bought up. You 
can’t  find  peace  and  quiet  anywhere  now.  I’m  thinking  of  emigrating  to 
Ukraine…’ (WPPKIB)
But it is not like that for everyone and not everyone finds themselves in the 
countryside by choice, as the statement by one farmer shows:
‘I love cities, I like marketplaces best. I love them. I can’t see enough of the 
old buildings. […] Here in the village it’s pitch-black, except when the moon 
shines at night, then it’s lovely. I love it when the moon shines, that’s beau-
tiful, but only then. […] I love it when it’s light, I don’t like the dark, not at all. 
And then it’s also so quiet here, a deathly silence. […] In the countryside it’s 
quiet, yes, but you also get bored with this quiet.’ (WPPKZK)
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Opportunities for children and young people to venture beyond a particu-
lar radius around the village where they live also contributes to their edu-
cation and self-confidence. The head of a village in south-east Poland who is 
particularly committed to children and young people from her village, talks 
about the great experience it was for them to take part in sporting events 
and thus to have the opportunity to travel as they had never before ‘got beyond 
D.’ (WPPKAW). She explained that the self-confidence of the children and 
young people benefited enormously, afterwards they behaved quite differ-
ently in school and also generally.
These examples are related more to the cultural than the material level 
of the everyday life of rural dwellers, but they too highlight the field of ten-
sion between the sufficiency lifestyles called for by growth critics and the 
consequences that arise from a rejection of these (not always freely chosen) 
lifestyles. Lifestyle preferences are an individual decision. It is difficult to 
imagine being allowed to prescribe whether someone should live in the city 
or in the countryside. Someone who feels more comfortable and fulfilled 
with an urban way of life or who seeks the proximity of a centre of economic 
growth for simple ‘reasons of survival’ (securing a livelihood) cannot be 
blamed for this. Nonetheless migration to (prospering) cities, that is, to cen-
tres of economic growth, causes problematic phenomena like urbanisation, 
high population density, rising rents, overloaded communication and supply 
infrastructures, etc., while the rural areas face difficulties associated with 
the thinning of the population (depopulation). 
It is thus even more important to consider the examples presented above 
that illustrate how individual lifestyle preferences can be taken into account 
on a systemic level without causing problematic phenomena – accompanied 
by the decoupling of cities from rural areas, or centres of economic growth 
from areas with too little growth. The examples show the importance of the 
anchor functions that cities have in the countryside surrounding them. For 
rural dwellers it is important not just that cities are accessible. Rather, above 
all, certain cultural and material urban functions must be maintained so 
residents can pursue their lifestyle preferences without necessarily having 
to leave the rural areas where they live. The Polish network of cities is spread 
fairly evenly across the country, which provides good potential for estab-
lishing anchors of this sort throughout the country. However, especially the 
smaller urban centres with less than 50,000 inhabitants face challenges in 
maintaining their urban functions. Many of these centres are just as affected 
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by outwards migration as the rural areas. The closure of businesses and the 
downsizing of the administration and supply structures has meant that they 
can provide fewer and fewer gainful employment opportunities and are 
therefore increasingly unattractive, especially for younger people. In con-
trast, in Poland businesses and people alike are particularly attracted by the 
so-called Big Five, the metropolitan regions of Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan and 
Wroclaw and the region of Gdansk, each of which has over a million resi-
dents. Economic growth and population increase are concentrated in these 
metropolitan regions. Businesses and people decide to move to these met-
ropolitan regions rather than to smaller urban centres, which leads to the 
smaller cities becoming progressively smaller until at some point they are 
‘too small’ to fulfil their urban functions and thus their anchor functions for 
the urban population and for the residents of the surrounding rural areas, as 
Przemysław Śleszyński, Professor at the Institute of Geography and Spatial 
Organisation of the Polish Academy of Sciences,4 explained in an interview 
with the newspaper Gazeta Prawna (2018). This presents regional planning 
research and policy with the task and challenge of developing instruments 
that can counter this pull effect and the problematic phenomena associated 
with it on many levels, both in the metropolitan regions and in the areas 
located beyond them.
Resumé
This article has discussed examples from the everyday lives of people who 
live in rural areas, some of which are located far from urban centres. It has 
illustrated the great importance of the accessibility of cities and the mainte-
nance of urban functions, especially in smaller urban centres. This ensures 
the vitality of the surrounding rural areas and facilitates sufficiency-ori-
ented lifestyles. The examples referred to the topics of mobility, agricul-
ture and securing a living, and lifestyle preferences. They highlight some 
of the consequences of the concentration of excessive economic growth in 
a few regions and the simultaneous absence or at least severe restriction of 
growth processes in other regions. The case studies show the effects that 
the unequal distribution of economic growth processes has on the every-
4  Polish name of the institute: Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN
Anna Szumelda200
day life of people dwelling in rural regions, some of which are far from the 
centres of economic growth. The strong concentration and thus unequal 
distribution of economic growth processes can be countered on individual, 
entrepreneurial and systemic levels. The examples discussed show that the 
local (municipal), national (regional planning) and international (agricul-
tural policy) political levels can be effective here. From a growth-critical 
and sustainability-oriented perspective, it is valuable to consider cities and 
rural areas in their functional interconnections. Especially instruments of 
spatial planning and agricultural policy should target this functional con-
nection much more strongly than has been the case to date. It is important 
to work towards maintaining the urban functions of (small) towns in order 
to strengthen their anchor function for the rural areas surrounding them, 
promote regional economic cycles and counteract the emergence of social, 
economic and ecological imbalances between regions.
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The role of interstitial spaces 
in the growing urban region of Hamburg
An interview with Michael Ziehl, conducted by Mai Anh Ha, Meret Batke  
and Bastian Lange
‘Urban upcycling’ is involved in various projects that contribute towards the sus-
tainable transformation of cities. Such projects include the promotion of social 
innovations, new forms of cooperation and implementation processes. They are 
user-driven and therefore suitable for contributing to the common good.
www.urban-upcycling.de
What does urban upcycling mean to you?
Michael Ziehl: For me, urban upcycling is a practice in which I focus primar-
ily on two resources: first, on the built fabric where instead of demolition 
and new builds it is more about the conversion and repurposing of existing 
buildings; second, on locally embedded networks in the neighbourhood and 
communities of users, for instance, artists, makers and activists. In many 
cases, these networks need to be developed or at least strengthened. Over-
all, I guide and support such user-driven project development for existing 
buildings.
What is special about the activation of brownfields or interstitial spaces?
Michael Ziehl: From a spatial theory perspective, this is not about space as a 
container but rather about social processes. I act primarily as an advisor and 
intermediary between the various actors that are relevant for user-driven 
development processes. These actors normally include the users themselves 
but also political and administrative stakeholders, investors and residents.
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Would you describe yourself as a kind of initiator of such developments?
Michael Ziehl: When I first started working in this field, then I initiated these 
sorts of developments myself. In the meanwhile my activities have shifted 
somewhat. These days, I initiate fewer concrete projects but focus rather on 
platforms or agencies like ‘urban upcycling’ that support user-driven devel-
opments.
How do agencies and initiatives of this sort operate?
Michael Ziehl: Every project’s different of course, but there are still parallels 
between them. Normally a relatively loosely knit network or fixed group of 
people have a specific place in mind where they want to implement some-
thing.
What sort of places are these?
Michael Ziehl: Often they’re buildings that are empty and are meant to be 
developed. My clients feel the need to have at least some input into these 
developments or to develop the entire property in line with their own ideas. 
This means that guidance is needed in many areas.
What does the advisory or intermediary service of the agencies and initiatives con-
sist of?
Michael Ziehl: What is important here is the self-organisation, how a group 
can get organised so that it is able to act and how it maintains that ability. 
Often, the group lacks a legal form, or existing structures need to be profes-
sionalised. As urban development also always involves conf lict about access 
to and the use of space, it may be important for such groups to gain a better 
negotiating position vis-à-vis other stakeholders. Later on, guidance about 
dealing with buildings and the authorities is required, especially in connec-
tion to building permits and use permits. Financing these projects is also a 
challenge. Public funding often plays a key role, but foundations and pri-
vate investors who are concerned about sustainable urban development are 
also important. In many cases they’re not seeking maximum returns but of 
course they don’t wish to lose money either.
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Can you name a concrete example here, also with regard to Hamburg?
Michael Ziehl: A good example is the ‘Zählerwerk’ [‘Meter Works’] on the site 
of the former power station Bille in Hamburg-Hammerbrook. This is an 
on-going project that is just coming into being. The users first approached 
me because of construction and licensing issues regarding the utilisation of 
the ‘Schaltzentrale’ [‘Control Centre’]. Then an idea emerged about combin-
ing community-oriented uses with new forms of work in the much larger 
‘Zählerwerk’ which is directly next door. At the moment, I’m working with 
the initiators on a development concept of this kind and on the specific objec-
tives that they wish to achieve with it. In many cases, formulating a concrete 
strategy for implementation is one of my tasks. We’re currently holding talks 
with political representatives, the city administration, the owners and the 
neighbours so that these stakeholders are involved at an early stage.
Who else is involved and contributes other expertise to the projects?
Michael Ziehl: For ‘Zählerwerk’ the Heritage Office is also important. For 
instance, they contribute technical expertise when it comes to types of ren-
ovation or conservation. As a rule, architects also play a central role, espe-
cially in planning and construction processes. During construction work, all 
sorts of building firms are naturally also involved. In addition, numerous 
authorities contribute their expertise. For my work, the urban development 
authorities are also relevant because the focus is often on areas in transi-
tion, urban development areas. I often also work with the ‘Hamburg Kreativ 
Gesellschaf t ’ [‘Hamburg Creative Company’]. They’re owned by the city and 
have experience in supervising real estate projects. Even though they’re pri-
marily interested in promoting the creative economy, they can be an import-
ant intermediary between users and relevant stakeholders in politics and 
administration.
How does the practice of repurposing match to the context of the city of Hamburg, 
where the focus is on growth and expansion?
Michael Ziehl: The projects I’m involved in are of course always in the context 
of the growing city. I understand many of them as alternatives to an urban 
development that’s largely dependent on growth, because they attempt to 
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find an alternative way of approaching urban growth and its consequences. 
At the heart of many of the user-driven projects is that the protagonists want 
to mitigate socially negative effects on the neighbourhood level, by creating 
public spaces with rather low rents and by trying not to encourage gentrifi-
cation processes.
How can processes of urban upcycling contribute to a post-growth society?
Michael Ziehl: To become a post-growth society, in my opinion we actually 
also need growing economic sectors and areas of society. Areas must grow 
that are really sustainable and that contribute to the resilience of cities. In 
relation to urban development, what should not be promoted are rather 
practices that rely on demolition and new builds. So I think that user-driven 
projects in existing properties can contribute to realising alternatives to 
growth-focused and profit-oriented project development. Their impact on 
growth-oriented urban development is hard to evaluate, but I often observe 
that users who say, ‘We want to do that ourselves, we want to take on more 
responsibility in urban development,’ are motivated by exactly that, even if 
they wouldn’t express it like that.
Is there an example in Hamburg where it was possible to conserve structures of this 
sort?
Michael Ziehl: It’s not primarily about conservation but about development 
paths that offer an alternative to the logic of growth. Many contradictions 
arise here. That can be seen in the example of the ‘Alte Bahnmeisterei’ [‘Old 
Railway Depot’]. The building is in the ‘Kreativquartier Oberhafen’ [‘Creative 
Quarter of Oberhafen’] and is part of the Hafencity [waterfront urban devel-
opment area]. It’s been repurposed and ateliers, collective workshops, a 
co-working space and a large club have been developed, all as interim uses. 
Of course, this creative quarter is part of the growing city of Hamburg and is 
intended to make it more attractive for creative talents from elsewhere, who 
often appreciate a tolerant environment. It’s thus also a positive location fac-
tor for internationally active companies looking to locate in Hamburg. At the 
same time, the ‘Alte Bahnmeisterei’ is a place with low rents where people can 
risk experimenting − in this concrete case, for instance, by putting a great 
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deal of voluntary commitment into running a club there, which is seen by 
many as a rare creative space in Hamburg.
What contribution do projects like the creative quarter of Oberhafen make to Ham-
burg?
Michael Ziehl: I think that an important aspect is that these spaces are used 
to negotiate what kind of future urban development we want to have. In 
Oberhafen there have been, for instance, conf licts about how exclusive and 
expensive it should be allowed to become there. Should it be more of a pro-
ductive place or primarily an event location? From my point of view, the users 
of the ‘Alte Bahnmeisterei’ make their presence felt positively in these debates. 
Whether they can actually be successful with their aims is another question.
Are there other challenges?
Michael Ziehl: Especially areas that are in transition often only make tem-
porary contributions to urban development: interim uses that are then often 
displaced by more expensive, economically more conventional projects. 
Especially because of this, an important aspect of my work is to get away 
from just interim uses to projects that have long-term security and develop-
ment prospects for users, e.g. through leasehold contracts or the purchase 
of property.
Are there successful examples of that in Hamburg?
Michael Ziehl: I view the area of Gängeviertel with its recently adopted 
75-year leasehold contract as a very successful example. Another exam-
ple is the Viktoria barracks which the users bought as the fux-cooperative 
and are now developing for the long term. In the immediate proximity of 
the ‘Schaltzentrale’ mentioned above, there is the f lood basin area where the 
development process was initiated and managed by the ‘Hamburg Kreativ 
Gesellschaf t ’. There at least it was possible to get 20-year contracts of use.
What opportunities do you see in these niches, abandoned or precarious spaces in 
relation to safeguarding urban space?
Michael Ziehl210
Michael Ziehl: The niches provide opportunities to try out models of alterna-
tive project development, which then must not remain restricted to the niche. 
Upscaling and outscaling definitely have to occur. Especially with the Gän-
geviertel there’s a hard fight going on to ensure that it doesn’t remain a one-
off exception but is the opposite: a model project. The stakeholders involved 
in the ‘Zählerwerk’ also have this aim. My concern is to further develop the 
diverse user approaches to models that support other user-driven projects. 
That doesn’t in any way mean that it should all be like, e.g. the Gängeviertel, 
because people’s needs vary greatly. Fundamentally, for me it is about work-
ing with people locally and with the material potentials of places to circum-
spectly develop our cities. In my view, thinking about urban and neighbour-
hood development in this way is an important key for a post-growth society.
‘Hobbyhimmel’ – an open workshop in the context 
of post-growth
An interview with Martin Langlinderer, founder of ‘Hobbyhimmel’ (‘Hobby Heaven’), 
Stuttgart ’s first and largest open workshop, which opened its doors to the public 
in 2015.
Post-growth played a central role in the project from the very beginning. Through 
sharing tools and machines, people are given the opportunity to produce and 
repair things themselves and in doing so to (re)learn old and new skills and rela-
tionships to materials and objects. 
The collective use of the workshop means that tools and knowledge are shared. 
This not only ensures efficient use of  the  ‘tools’ as a  resource but also enables 
mutual learning and collective doing.
In addition, the workshop allows organisations with a sustainability or social 
focus to use the fully equipped premises, in some cases in return for a donation, 
in some cases free of charge, and in this way supports the organisations’ activi-
ties.
More than 40 volunteers support ‘Hobbyhimmel’, which is independently 
financed and receives no subsidies.
Interview conducted by Benedikt Schmid
Could you brief ly describe for the readers what ‘Hobbyhimmel’ is and how the proj-
ect works?
Martin Langlinderer: ‘Hobbyhimmel’ is the first open workshop in Stuttgart. 
You can imagine it as follows: a large factory hall of over 300 m² with lots of 
materials, machines, tools and equipment, which we make available to the 
public, especially to private individuals. In the hall there are different areas 
for manual work with wood, metal or textiles, and also areas for electronics, 
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bicycle repairs and modern production technologies – a fab lab [fabrication 
laboratory] with laser cutters, 3-D printers and a large CNC milling machine. 
So, we offer equipment from all possible trades and crafts, and the idea 
is primarily that people who otherwise have no access to tools or machines or 
who rarely need them, use the workshop collectively. We are open seven days 
a week for everyone, especially in the evenings and on weekends. The work-
shop is only run by volunteers. We have between 40 to 50 volunteers who look 
after the project and run the place in their free time – opening the workshop, 
invoicing, being available to provide information, giving instructions and 
offering courses.
A particularly important point is that we are completely self-financed. 
That means we don’t have any external funding to work with, but rather in 
the meanwhile – 2019 is the fourth year – the project finances itself com-
pletely independently and is also profitable. 
The user groups of the workshop are very diversified. The main part is 
made up of private people who simply have no way of doing handicrafts 
at home – usually in their apartment they can’t make noise, they can’t get 
things dirty, they don’t have the necessary tools and it’s usually not reason-
able to buy them if the tools are only used occasionally. But of course there 
are also other user groups. As well as the private users there are the commer-
cial users who manufacture products or produce prototypes in the workshop. 
We also have training courses from private colleges or other educational 
providers who use the workshop, especially during the day. In addition, we 
have team events for companies, not forgetting the many non-profit organi-
sations that use the workshop for their projects. 
‘Hobbyhimmel’ is a project of the Verein zur Verbreitung Of fener Werkstätten 
[Association for the Distribution of Open Workshops], which has dedicated 
itself to the goal of increasing broad social awareness of the topic of open 
workshops. 
Can you brief ly tell us what role the project plays for a post-growth economy or how 
‘Hobbyhimmel’ can be described from a post-growth perspective?
Martin Langlinderer: For me, post-growth is the opposite of what most peo-
ple currently believe: that we can produce more and more, sell more and more, 
consume more and more and do that at the expense of the global resources 
available to us. The post-growth economy is basically the antithesis, which 
‘Hobbyhimmel ’ 213
says that we don’t need constant growth. We must use resources much more 
efficiently and focus more on sufficiency, which will also make us more inde-
pendent of external factors. 
In our practical example it is firstly about people preferring to collectively 
use good, long-lasting tools rather than everyone buying their own cheap 
tools. With us, apart from tools people also share knowledge. If a number of 
people meet in one place and share their know-how then everyone can bene-
fit from one another. 
An important point apart from sharing is, secondly, the topic of repair-
ing, so with a little effort keeping things that already exist running for lon-
ger. Repairing has become increasingly difficult in recent decades – due to 
poor supplies of replacement parts, planned obsolescence and other obstruc-
tions. Especially with our regular repair cafes we want to make it as easy as 
possible for people to get access to special tools and the necessary knowledge. 
And thirdly, the topic of do-it-yourself. I have a different relationship to 
things I’ve made myself and I tend to use them longer because I know how 
much work I put into them and how to fix them.
In addition to private users, we also support local initiatives that deal 
with sustainability issues. They can use the workshop very cheaply, usually 
for free, and this makes it easier for them to implement their projects and 
activities, which are also moving towards a post-growth economy. 
‘Hobbyhimmel’ has been supported by the ‘Association for the Distribution of Open 
Workshops’ for some time. Can you explain a bit what that’s about?
Martin Langlinderer: From the very beginning the basic idea of the workshop 
was: one workshop is good, a lot of workshops are much better. But open-
ing and running many workshops involves a lot of effort. Our approach is 
to organise this as simply as possible. This has led to the development of a 
social-franchise concept. That means that we make all the know-how that we 
have gained – all the documentation, the processes – available to other peo-
ple free of cost and on an open-source basis. We also provide on-site advice 
so that new workshops don’t have to learn everything from scratch.
That’s why we founded the association, which is dedicated to the goal 
of helping other workshops to set up and to get established, and we provide 
them with anything we can give. We also collect tools through donations 
from private people, firms and e.g. school closures that we can pass on to 
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new projects. If a number of workshops all operate according to the same 
principle, then the founding of each additional workshop will get easier. 
And the aim is that in every urban neighbourhood low-threshold work-
ing space should be available to people, with very short distances on foot or 
close connections to an open workshop and very easy accessibility. That’s 
why being open seven days a week is a cornerstone for us. In terms of price 
our workshop is also very accessible, which contributes towards acceptance 
and ultimately also the broad offerings and the diverse range of tools. We 
have tools and equipment in all possible fields. It’s a holistic, low-threshold 
approach that we pursue here. Those are the components with which we try 
to really increase the reach and the impact of the topic of open workshops. 
If you imagine that people from urban planning and local politics came to you and 
would like to support you in your project. What would you like those people to do?
Martin Langlinderer: Of course. I would be delighted if these people would 
approach us. Then we could say that we want free premises or start-up fund-
ing. Basically, I think that it’s important that cities and municipalities see 
open workshops as important social components and start to establish them 
or at least promote their future development. 
For me open workshops have a similar status to youth centres, swimming 
pools or libraries. These are all establishments that are open to everybody 
and are financed with public money. These establishments are an import-
ant component for society: for social cohesion, for personal development, for 
exchange of knowledge and so on. 
They’re all important establishments but they too are always only used 
by part of the population. And that’s where I see open workshops, they’re 
also used by certain people and like a library − to stick with this example 
− they contribute a great deal to knowledge generation and knowledge dis-
semination. Perhaps not necessarily on an intellectual basis but in the field 
of practical knowledge: old knowledge about handicrafts but also new tech-
nical competences. The mutual exchange is an extremely important element 
because otherwise, to put it bluntly, we all degenerate to simple consumers 
who just believe what people tell them: it’s not possible to repair that, the 
only option is persistent gluing, there are no replacement parts, you need 
to throw that away and buy a new one, the fabric can only be washed three 
times. As a consumer, you become increasingly dumb if you’re not knowl-
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edgeable about these things and then you can’t make any active, conscious 
decisions in terms of a post-growth economy, which is about long-lasting, 
resource-saving products and processes. In relation to open workshops, pol-
itics and planning should use the principle of libraries as a role model: in 
every urban district there’s a local library and open workshop and perhaps 
there’s a large central library and a large central open workshop where there 
are more and specialised tools and machines. And the urban planners can 
then think: ‘In both, important resources are shared, in one case books, in 
the other case machines, but in both cases knowledge’ – there are so many 
parallels that you can draw. So, if you ask what tip I have for urban planning, 
then I would try to tighten this connection in their minds so that they can’t 
forget it. 
How do you imagine a transformation beyond the topic of open workshops? 
Martin Langlinderer: My approach is one of small steps and setting an exam-
ple. Every time I try to think consciously about what I buy and where I go. 
I certainly don’t always get it right, in that I don’t always make the most 
ecological, most efficient decision that favours sufficiency. For me it’s also 
important that I no longer just use my labour in the regular economy but 
mainly invest it in other topics that I believe are more socially relevant. This 
means that I have significantly less money than I used to have but more fun 
and more freedom. 
I sure think you can inspire people to think about things, to take small 
steps. But it’s a long and small-scale process that’s apparently not going to 
occur top-down. That’s why we need a solid grassroots basis. There’s prob-
ably not going to be much change from politics so for me it’s a bottom-up 
process.
Many thanks for the interesting discussion.

Neighbourhood farms as new places 
for participation and grow-your-own
An interview with Heike Brückner and Jan Zimmermann, conducted by Mai Anh Ha, 
Meret Batke and Dr Bastian Lange
The neighbourhood farm (Quartierhof) project was developed with the ‘Urban 
Farm Dessau’ in the Dessau neighbourhood ‘Am Leipziger Tor’. The idea behind 
the project is to test strategies for creating local food supplies and grow-your-
own approaches for healthy food and renewable energies. The aim is to create 
an urban farm that also serves as an innovative place of learning where eco-
nomic value creation is linked to education and social work. 
www.urbane-farm.de
Heike Brückner is a landscape planner who focuses on post-industrial cul-
tural landscapes and productive urban landscapes. Since 2010 she has been 
researching post-fossil urban and regional development and initiated the 
‘Urban Farm Dessau’ project. Among other things, she brings knowledge on 
permaculture to the project.
Jan Zimmermann is a qualified horticultural engineer and owner of a company 
of fering ecological garden services in Dessau. Since the beginning of the proj-
ect he has been involved as a leader, gardener and visionary.
What is the ‘Urban Farm Dessau’?
Jan Zimmermann: In Dessau we have green areas that we’re trying to make 
usable. There are various options here, e. g. food production or the produc-
tion of renewable energies. A most important point with the Urban Farm is 
education, which plays a role because of course we’re not doing it just for 
us but also for interested people and children who want to learn something 
and need education.
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What is characteristic of the project?
Jan Zimmermann: The area’s directly surrounded by five-storey prefabri-
cated buildings. We’re on open meadowland in-between. The project grows 
a little every year as the area is enlarged a bit every year. As to what grows 
there, for example vegetables, herbs or potatoes.
Heike Brückner: We like to talk about our project as a ‘neighbourhood farm’ 
– a kind of urban farm that is collectively worked by neighbours and people 
from the neighbourhood. We ask ourselves what we actually need to supply 
ourselves with food or renewable energies in the city. So how, e. g., a cycle 
of soil improvement can be organised or how a waste management cycle 
can be created. We tried out the latter with children in an educational pro-
ject by fermenting lef tover food in a mini biogas plant. We use the gas to 
boil water for tea and the lef tovers from this mini biogas plant are used to 
fertilise the beds – a simple way to celebrate and demonstrate such circular 
approaches.
What is the spatial extent of the neighbourhood farm?
Jan Zimmermann: There are a number of separate segments that together 
make up a cultivated area of about 500 to 600 square metres. 
Heike Brückner: I would describe it as a decentralised farm, one that’s not 
necessarily traditional with a farmhouse in the middle from which beds 
and fields are then cultivated in rays or rings. But rather according to the 
principle that wherever a stakeholder starts to cooperate with us, like for 
instance the adjacent Volkssolidarität [People’s Solidarity] or the women’s 
centre, something’s created – for example, a raised bed, an orchard or the 
potato field.
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How does the network of the neighbourhood farm work?
Jan Zimmermann: From the very beginning we organised a gardening 
meeting that’s held for two or three hours every Wednesday af ternoon. 
One of us is present and various, very dif ferent people come − ranging from 
retired people to children who drop by on their way to and from school. 
Participants are people from the neighbourhood but also some from the 
suburbs. They join in because they think that the project’s exciting and 
want to be part of it.
Heike Brückner: Between about 3 and 13 people participate. In winter there 
are somewhat less but then in summer there are sometimes about 15 to 20 
people. 
Do you own the area?
Jan Zimmermann: We use it in consultation with the owner without a com-
plicated set of contracts.
Heike Brückner: The advantage for the owner is that the area is cared for. 
Is the project based on the idea of a commons?
Heike Brückner: Yes, we focus on the principle of a commons in terms of 
a collectively farmed area. Decisions about what’s farmed where or, e. g., 
where the soil should be improved are made collectively. Which projects do 
we want to support together? Should animals be included and who will look 
af ter them? We discuss all these and other questions collectively.
Jan Zimmermann: An association was founded to bear responsibility for 
the project. But also primarily so that it’s not a loose network and to make 
it possible to apply for public and private finance.
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What ef fect does the regional context of Dessau have on the project? What is the 
spatial context that the project refers to?
Jan Zimmermann: In Dessau we have the phenomenon that there’s been 
a great deal of demolition and that means that a lot of brownfield sites 
have emerged without anyone knowing what should be done with them. 
Especially where neighbourhoods still exist, the demolition of houses led 
to open areas that then became overgrown, which was not really to the lik-
ing of the residents. That’s how we developed the idea of making use of 
these brownfields. Then with the implementation the question of what is 
actually possible emerges. The idea of making a vegetable garden is simple 
but then really implementing this on a brownfield of this sort is something 
completely dif ferent. That’s what I would describe as the specific Dessau 
context, that we have a lot of areas available and that demolition has led to 
the emergence of new open areas.
What is the background against which the project developed and what resources 
does Dessau provide?
Heike Brückner: The background consists of the themes of shrinkage, 
shrinking cities, and how you can plan and manage cities with no growth. 
Between 2002 and 2010 the Bauhaus Dessau tackled this issue, focus-
ing especially on what instruments were required. In the course of the 
2010 Internationale Bauausstellung (IBA), Stadtumbau [International Build-
ing Exhibition Urban Redevelopment], we developed an instrument to 
encourage people to cultivate vacant areas. With reference to the gold-
mining times in bygone America, we named these areas ‘claims’. People 
could adopt 400 square metres of open space for an interim use or in the 
form of a concession agreement. That was fairly successful. The urban 
farm can be understood as a further development of the claims project. 
Then, of course, there are the big social issues. For instance, that sourcing 
organic food from far away is outrageous when Dessau has the potential to 
produce it locally. Or when, on the one hand, young people don’t know what 
they want to do professionally in the future and, on the other hand, we see 
what a desperate need there is for a new generation of gardeners who can 
work with ecological cycles. These are the wider social contexts that also 
motivate us here. 
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What is the relationship between the region and your neighbourhood farm?
Heike Brückner: We notice that a structure like the neighbourhood farm 
is relevant when you think about transformation strategies for working 
towards a sustainable, post-fossil society. What we are testing here is 
also relevant for cities that are in economic growth. Our experiences are 
also transferable to other contexts like that. Every neighbourhood, every 
municipality needs a neighbourhood farm of this sort. A neighbourhood 
farm as an infrastructure that allows people to participate, to learn a 
future profession and to practise ecological cycles. Gaining the know-how 
and the practical experience that we need for the future.
Are you transferring this project approach to other regions?
Jan Zimmermann: The topic of urban farming, local supplies and grow-
your-own is definitely relevant in many areas. Whether in Berlin, Leipzig 
or Hamburg, everywhere there are people who are interested in producing 
their own food in a dif ferent way. Of ten there isn’t enough space, which 
means that the implementation varies. But no matter whether in a vegeta-
ble crate, a potato sack or on the balcony... the idea that there are alterna-
tives to the supermarket of ferings of conventionally produced food that’s 
been transported over great distances, that idea is there already. Lots of 
people come to us who want to see how we’ve done it, who are inspired by it 
and who then create their own development path. 
What connections are there between your project in Dessau and projects in other 
cities?
Heike Brückner: A special feature in Dessau is that we understand the proj-
ect as a structuring element in a spatial reorganisation of the entire city. 
We have adopted the image of an ‘urban garden realm’ here, a landscape 
with islands of urban development. 
Nuclei for local supply and grow-your-own initiatives of this sort are 
developing in many places, for instance the Stadtgärtnerei Annalinde [Urban 
Gardens Annalinde] in Leipzig or the various initiatives of the Solidarische 
Landwirtschaf t [Community Supported Agriculture (CSA)]. The link is cre-
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ating small urban units and productively using the landscape in between 
so that cycles of local supply and grow-your-own can develop. 
What is the relationship of the neighbourhood farm to the historical idea of the ‘Gar-
tenreich’ [‘Garden Realm’]? 
Heike Brückner: The link can be found in the idea of productivity. The Des-
sau-Wörlitzer Gartenreich has the guiding principle of combining utility and 
beauty. But people of ten forget that behind this aesthetic landscape was an 
economy. Decentralised farms were scattered throughout the countryside, 
cultivated the landscape and made it useful. 
Is there a specific link between the individual projects? 
Heike Brückner: I think that overall this allows a negotiable space to emerge, 
a new commons. If people can relate to how their food is produced, then an 
understanding develops of how a cycle is organised etc. That’s certainly the 
connecting factor between the various projects in the dif ferent places. 
Is the project being copied in the region?
Heike Brückner: This ef fect, that we trigger a kind of activating impulse, 
that is occurring. But we haven’t yet got the potential to fully duplicate the 
project. You always need people who can then implement the idea.
Jan Zimmermann: A student project has been founded and has led to a gar-
den being developed, one that’s collectively used. At the university there’s 
also a demand for raised beds which will be used for growing food. Or in 
childcare facilities. We already have quite a presence in Dessau. In talks 
with a range of people we discover that they know and appreciate what we 
do. That’s an interesting observation, but of course you never know what 
inf luences have led to any specific idea.
III. Spaces of Conflict
‘The need [for post-growth] arises from sustainabil-
ity issues, social injustice and international inter-
actions which growth logics fail to acknowledge, 
define as problematic or view as necessary.’
Kim C. von Schönfeld
Provincialising degrowth 
Alternatives to development and the Global South
Antje Bruns
1. Introduction
The exploitation of people, raw materials and nature is leading to an inten-
sification of socio-ecological crises on a planetary scale, with links between 
environmental change and inequality becoming increasingly clearly defined. 
At the same time, these links reveal the international division of labour. The 
Global North consumes, produces and emits. The environmental risks and 
impacts are externalised – especially at the expense of societies in the Global 
South.1 A fundamental transformation of the resource-intensive patterns of 
production and consumption in the Global North is thus necessary in order 
to make a socially and environmentally just life possible for everyone, includ-
ing those in the Global South. Degrowth is a transformative approach that 
calls for fundamental changes to the economic and social model in the Global 
North (Brand/Krams 2018). It draws on a tradition of thought that reaches 
back to the concept of ‘décroissance’, which should be read as a criticism of 
the hegemonial idea of development. Development, as a Western invention, 
is indivisibly connected to economic growth and builds upon inequalities 
between North and South (Latouche 2006). 
1  Global North and Global South are not geographical concepts although the majority of 
the rich human population live in the northern hemisphere and a large share of the poor 
population live in countries in the south. ‘North’ and ‘South’ are rather metaphors for the 
social, economic and ecological inequality which is caused by capitalism and colonialism 
on a global scale.
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Degrowth focuses on the need for transformation in the Global North. 
This highly necessary search for alternatives must not lose sight of the 
global interactions and long-distance impacts of ‘our’ transformation. The 
socio-ecological systems in the North and South are so closely intercon-
nected that socio-ecological transformation processes in the Global North 
can reproduce new geographies of inequality in the Global South. Precisely 
because we are trying to achieve a good life for all, it is important to bear 
these relational patterns in mind, as we are primarily the ones who are liv-
ing ‘not beyond our means but beyond the means of others’ – as Stephan 
Lessenich expresses it, referring to global socio-ecological inequalities and 
non-contemporaneity (Lessenich 2018: 203, translated from German). These 
inequalities, with winners and the privileged on the one hand and losers and 
the marginalised on the other hand, are deeply inscribed in (neo-)colonial 
and capitalist economic and social systems (Latouche 2006). The historical 
roots reach far back, dividing the world into colonised and colonisers. In the 
world order thus created, the project of European Modernity became hege-
monic (Mignolo 2007; Quijano 2000), which is why any search for alterna-
tives to the capitalist system must tackle its dark side – colonialism. Histor-
ical amnesia would disregard the lines connecting the colonially established 
system of resource exploitation to the Eurocentric world order and knowl-
edge system. 
Despite the critical voices heard from sustainability and transformation 
studies, ways of thinking and approaches from the Global South seldom 
inf luence theory building, the development of concepts or policy strategies. 
Elsewhere, attention has been drawn to gaps in the fields of climate policy 
(Bauriedl 2015) and urban development (Bruns/Gerend 2018). It is thus right 
to ask who actually speaks for the future of the Earth (Lövbrand/Beck/Chil-
vers et al. 2015) and who is absent or rendered absent from this discourse 
(Escobar 2016). The marginalisation of voices constrains discourses and is 
associated with a dominance and standardisation of knowledge – a process 
that has been described as epistemic violence (Spivak 1988). Often epistemic 
violence takes the form of subtle concealment, as is the case, for instance, 
when we speak of a global world society. This supposedly integrative plan-
etary perspective conceals unequal relations, disguising discrepancies 
between this representation and the agency of those people who have scarcely 
contributed to the socio-ecological crisis but are particularly affected by it. 
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In this article, inequalities between North and South and their historical 
development are used as an analytical lens through which to focus on differ-
ent settings and narrative strands of the socio-ecological crisis and trans-
formation discourse. This highlights colonial continuities in the discourse 
of the Anthropocene and further emphasises that decolonial options must 
be included in the degrowth debate. The narrative adopted by earth system 
sciences targets the planetary scale and draws a veil of ignorance over the 
geographies of inequality. In contrast, it is precisely the inequality caused 
by colonial practices and mentalities that is the focus and starting point of 
theories and approaches from the Global South. As epistemic disobedience 
(Mignolo 2011), such approaches offer decolonial alternatives to Eurocentric 
thinking, knowledge and action and are therefore – and this is the central 
argument of the article – indispensable for the degrowth debate. 
The involvement of epistemologies from the South (Escobar 2016) is nec-
essarily a ref lexive process that is associated with a calling into question of 
Western knowledge production and orders. It enables the recognition and 
acceptance of critical and alternative ways of thinking from the South – such 
as post-development and environmental justice – acknowledging them as 
productive questioning of Western theories. In this way it becomes possi-
ble to decentralise and provincialise the Eurocentric perspective on the 
socio-ecological crisis in the Anthropocene (Chakrabarty 2008).
2. The socio-ecological crisis in the Anthropocene…
Discussion about the necessity of transformation is – especially in the Ger-
man-language spatial sciences debate – strongly linked to the Anthropocene 
discourse. This implies that colonial continuities are produced or revealed, 
as is demonstrated below. There is namely no single narrative about the 
Anthropocene. It is rather the case that there are different understandings 
about what characterises the crisis in the Anthropocene and which impera-
tives of action should be derived.
Antje Bruns228
3. … from the perspective of earth system sciences 
This reading of the Anthropocene suggests that human beings inf luence 
processes relevant to the earth system on a global scale, and that this devel-
opment accelerated with industrialisation and the associated growth in the 
use of fossil fuels (Steffen/Crutzen/McNeill 2007). Urbanisation and global-
isation have contributed to the ‘great acceleration’, culminating in the geo-
logical era known as the Anthropocene. Geological eras are commonly deter-
mined by the discipline of geology which uses a ‘golden spike’ in sediments 
and rocks to declare a new stratigraphical era. 
The characteristics and also the drivers of planetary transformation are 
the extensive and widespread exploitation, sealing and degradation of land 
and natural ecosystems and the emissions caused by the use of fossil fuels. 
These processes, which indicate the interwovenness of social and natural 
processes, result in global climate change, the loss of biodiversity and the 
accumulation of plastic in water bodies, soil and animals (Zalasiewicz/Wil-
liams/Smith et al. 2008). The speed and dimensions of this transformation 
are so great that there is increasing evidence of exceeding the tipping point 
and crossing planetary limits (Steffen/Richardson/Rockström et al. 2020). It 
is assumed that within certain social and biophysical boundaries, the earth’s 
system is dynamic and variable and can deliver central functions. If, on the 
other hand, tipping points are exceeded, then the socio-ecological system 
behaves non-linearly and is beyond regulation. To prevent the socio-ecologi-
cal collapse of the earth’s system, there is a need for political intervention. On 
the international scale, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are viewed 
as a promising instrument. They are now also implemented on national and 
subnational levels to promote and support a sustainable and just future 
by combining state action, economic measures and civil society activities. 
Although the SDGs are not legally binding, the resonant optimism about 
governance that they embody can hardly be ignored. In this ideal, global 
sustainability and justice are negotiated as feasibility issues to be tackled 
by techno-managerial governance. The combating of poverty continues to 
be linked to economic growth, with an emphasis on the role of private busi-
ness (BMZ 2016). There is still an assumption that technological solutions 
and economic modernisation in the context of a ‘policy of controls’ can suf-
fice (Adloff/Neckel 2019, translated from German). However, this model of 
Provincialising degrowth 229
transformation does not focus on reducing structural, political or economic 
inequality as part of a profound change of path. 
Furthermore, this narrative of planetary transformation in the Anthro-
pocene is problematic due to its ‘universalised interpretations of causes’ 
(Bauriedl 2015: 16, translated from German). These interpretations conceal 
the fact that not all people are equally responsible for the increased energy 
consumption or ecological footprints related, for instance, to tourism, but 
rather just the few who have the necessary socio-economic status and 
passports. This concealment is associated with the depoliticisation of the 
Anthropocene discourse, which is significant in that it fosters neo-Malthu-
sian arguments and racism. For instance, it is argued that unbridled popula-
tion growth (in the Global South) and the demand for resources that results 
from it are responsible for the crisis (Gottschlich/Schultz 2019). It is a small 
step from such arguments to controlling population in the name of climate 
protection. Furthermore, attention is def lected from issues of justice and 
distribution and the necessity of changes in patterns of production and con-
sumption in the Global North.
4. ... from the perspective of critical geography
In contrast, narratives about the socio-ecological crisis in the Anthropocene 
told from the perspective of critical geography focus on deeper causes and 
contradictions and highlight inequalities in the architecture of responsibil-
ity between North and South. The socio-ecological crises are not the respon-
sibility of ‘humanity’ but are products of an unequal colonial and capitalist 
world order in which there are a few winners and many losers (Brand/Wissen 
2011). In the colonial past, geologists contributed to this world order by map-
ping raw materials and precious metals. Once the position and distribution 
of the deposits were known, they began to be mined so as to feed industrial 
development and wealth in the Global North. The colonial powers were inter-
ested in raw materials such as gold or colonial goods – e. g. cocoa. Today’s 
Ghana even used to be called the ‘Gold Coast’ after the coveted metal, and 
was colloquially known as ‘the mine’, making the matter even clearer (Yusoff 
2018). The many slave castles along the ‘Gold Coast’ tell the story of another 
aspect of colonial exploitation in which people became a commodified good. 
Kathryn Yusoff, Professor for Inhuman Geography, explains how closely the 
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emergence of the Anthropocene is interlinked with this inhuman system, 
which transformed (black) people into a means of production. Yusoff shows 
that the connection between geological knowledge and the development of 
political power constitutes the Anthropocene (Yusoff 2016). 
The question of when the Anthropocene began is thus not an innocent one. 
Investigation into its origins reveals the historical continuities in the way in 
which the processes of extraction and the appropriation and exploitation of 
nature are associated with processes of wealth accumulation and the devel-
opment of the capitalist world system (Yusoff 2018). This asymmetry is char-
acteristic of the Anthropocene, which, viewed in this way, began long before 
industrialisation. On the other hand, if the search for the ‘golden spike’ is 
reduced to finding evidence of certain markers in sediments, not only is the 
question of the Anthropocene’s origins depoliticised but the suffering and 
deaths of black enslaved people are erased from global history. This creates 
an absence which is sustained into the present time and is important for the 
spaces of thought and action which make the future.
5. Inequalities and externalisation 
The discussion above has shown that ‘business-as usual’ is not only or pri-
marily precluded by the danger of crossing a biophysical or social tipping 
point in the future. A profound change of path is also urgently required by 
historically rooted socio-ecological inequalities and injustices, which are 
actually worsening at the present time.
5.1 Inequality
Inequality is primarily understood and measured as economic inequality. 
This makes it even more astounding that up to just a few years ago, there was 
no sound data analysis from which reliable conclusions about the develop-
ment of worldwide inequality could be drawn. It seems unnecessary to say 
that this is not viewed as a coincidence but rather as the result of the further-
ing and protection of particular interests (Ernst/Losada/María 2010).
Thomas Piketty’s book Le Capital au XXIe siècle drew attention to the lack 
of inequality research. Piketty analysed historical data going back to indus-
trialisation and showed how wealth concentration has increased since the 
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middle of the twentieth century. This growth in inequality is the result of 
political decisions which promised that economic growth, technological 
advances and increased private investment – e. g. in infrastructure – was to 
the benefit of all. Instead, prioritising the economy over social and/or ecolog-
ical needs led to an increase in inequality that substantially threatens demo-
cratic and social development (Piketty 2015). 
Increasing inequality, whether between countries or within societies, 
runs counter to the goals of transformation, particularly as there is a widen-
ing divide between private and public capital. In many rich countries, pub-
lic capital has been declining since 1980 while private capital has increased 
(Alvaredo/Chancel/Piketty et al. 2018), a trend due in part to privatisation 
policies. This restricts the scope for public action and management intended 
to achieve socio-ecological change – a dramatic development in light of 
the challenges. In Germany, as in many other countries, the public sector 
is responsible for services of general interest and for providing social and 
technical infrastructure and pursues the goal of creating equivalent living 
conditions in all areas of the country. De facto, however, the public sector is 
increasingly unable to provide basic services for the benefit of all. Various 
studies of recent years have shown that in Germany and in other countries, 
the divide between poor and rich, and between prosperous and declining 
regions, is growing ever larger and limits the future viability of regions (Slu-
pina/Dähner/Reibstein et al. 2019). 
Future viability begins with imaginings about the future that cognitively 
structure action. Local urban and regional research (on the knowledge level) 
and urban and regional planning (as policy practice) are still steeped in a 
way of thinking that follows the dictates of growth, modernity and devel-
opment. They thus reproduce colonial mentalities (Bruns/Gerend 2018). This 
is revealed, for instance, by the elevation of the European city to the very 
definition of a developed, modern city. A contrast is provided by the Ori-
ental (and hence underdeveloped) city which is devalued by this process of 
comparison. Such an understanding of the underdeveloped Oriental city is 
recorded as ‘knowledge’ in the textbooks of urban research. It is then trans-
ferred and given substance when neighbourhoods with a higher proportion 
of residents with a migrant background are automatically termed ‘problem 
neighbourhoods’ (Ha 2014). A critical review of these derogatory attributions 
is necessary not only in light of the increasing diversity of society. The ‘repro-
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duction of racism as a colonial legacy in the city’ (ibid.: 42, translated from 
German) must be countered as a matter of principle. 
The term ‘development’ (and ‘underdevelopment’) and the idea of ‘moder-
nity’ are central elements of the Eurocentric world view and are ref lected in 
notions of the ‘city’. In cities like Accra (Ghana), where many people live with-
out secure access to water, water provision is only thought of in terms of the 
central, networked water infrastructures which are required by structural 
adjustment support programmes and funded by World Bank investments. 
This is in line with Western imaginations of the modern city. Such reforms 
and investments have failed to reduce socio-ecological inequality2 in terms 
of access to drinking water, but they have proved a lucrative source of income 
for Western investors. And it seems that this is precisely the reason that a 
decentralised, heterogeneous system of water infrastructure consisting of 
water sellers, tankers, wells and waterpipes, is inconceivable (Bruns/Gerend 
2018). Or, to put it another way: alternative infrastructure solutions that are 
adapted to everyday practices and lifeworlds would challenge the Western 
hegemony.
Contributions from the South promote ontological and epistemological 
options that allow thinking to embrace a pluriverse (instead of a universe): 
‘the understanding of the world is much broader than the western under-
standing of the world. This means that the transformation of the world, and 
the transitions to the pluriverse or the civilizations transitions adumbrated 
by many indigenous, peasant, and Afrodescendant activists, might happen 
(indeed, are happening) along pathways that might be unthinkable from 
the perspective of Eurocentric theories’ (Escobar 2016: 16). A transformative 
change of path that manifests epistemological openness and thus ref lexively 
includes decolonial options inevitably questions power and dominance rela-
tions.
The geopolitical dimensions of development and transformation can 
be demonstrated using current discussions about energy policies. While 
decarbonisation of the fossil energy system combined with a drastic drop 
in energy use is of key significance for successful, socio-ecologically just 




ties between North and South. Even the International Energy Agency clearly 
identifies such contradictions in the world energy outlook on their webpage:
The gap between the promise of energy for all and the fact that almost one 
billion people still do not have access to electricity. The gap between the 
latest  scientific  evidence highlighting  the need  for  evermore-rapid  cuts  in 
global greenhouse gas emissions and the data showing that energy-related 
emissions hit another historic high in 2018. The gap between expectations of 
fast, renewables-driven energy transitions and the reality of today’s energy 
systems in which reliance on fossil fuels remains stubbornly high. And the 
gap between the calm in wellsupplied oil markets and the lingering unease 
over geopolitical tensions and uncertainties. (IEA 2020). 
The sense of calm in the face of the disparities is shocking. By way of compar-
ison: energy use per capita in Germany is circa 164 gigajoules per annum (BP 
2019) and in Ghana is circa 1.5 gigajoules per annum (Energy Commission 
Ghana 2018). It speaks volumes that the figures for Ghana are not even ite-
mised in the annual energy report by BP but are simply included in the ‘rest 
of Africa’. 
European energy policy is not just about energy security (especially not in 
the Global South), but is about safeguarding the existing geopolitical order, 
as the European Commission’s Green Deal demonstrates. In January 2020, 
the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen presented the new 
strategy for the EU’s foreign trade policy, which includes ambitious emis-
sions goals for 2030 and aims for the EU to be completely climate neutral by 
2050. To this end, European Union policy, especially growth policy, is to be 
redirected to pursue the overriding objective of ‘combating climate change’. 
The reorientation of growth policy is embedded in geopolitical notions con-
cerning the position of Europe in light of global political changes (weaken-
ing of the USA and an up-and-coming China). This calls for a united Europe, 
which requires disparities between the European countries to be reduced. 
Even if the financial package is entitled ‘Just Transition Fonds’, the ‘just’ 
refers only to disparities within Europe – between old coal mining districts 
and abandoned industrial areas on the one hand and the economically pros-
perous regions on the other (Europäische Kommission 2020). The energy 
transformation in Europe thus continues to be based on a concept of growth 
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(even if it has been green-washed), and this growth in Europe requires an 
exterior space that uses less resources than it provides.
5.2 Externalisation
Unlimited growth is impossible and will only be made possible by drawing 
boundaries between spaces, income segments, ethnicities or other mark-
ers of difference. Growth as an element of ‘capitalism cannot sustain itself 
from itself. It lives from the existence of an “exterior” […].’ (Lessenich 2018: 
42, translated from German) This unequal order of global resources (Altvater 
1992) is deeply inscribed in people’s lifestyles and everyday practices, in the 
form of an ‘imperial way of life’, as Ulrich Brand and Markus Wissen describe 
it. ‘The way of life of the Global North is imperial in that it requires funda-
mentally unlimited – politically, legally and/or forcibly secured – access to 
resources, space, labour capacity and sinks elsewhere’ (Brand/Wissen 2011: 
82, translated from German). Externalisation is thus a constituting element 
of the asymmetrical relationship between North and South. It is related both 
to the extraction of resources and the outsourcing of environmental impacts, 
risks or sinks (Gerber/Raina 2018; Foster 2011), and the impacts of the latter 
are at least as drastic as the extraction of resources. 
Climate policy is one of the newer externalisation trends. For instance, 
the expansion of biodiesel in Europe has enormous effects on local land use 
and thus on the livelihoods of many people in the Global South. The emis-
sions trading system used to implement the Kyoto protocol also follows 
imperial logic because industries in the Global North can buy their way out of 
obligations to reduce emissions – at the cost of development opportunities 
in the Global South. This system is therefore correctly described as ‘carbon 
colonialism’ (Bauriedl 2015: 16, translated from German) in that it repro-
duces existing inequalities and consolidates power relations. Countries of 
the Global South that – like Ghana – are characterised by a consumption of 
energy and resources that is far below average are left with hardly any scope 
for development. 
The inequality of lifestyles and development options is conceptualised 
and evaluated differently in degrowth and post-development approaches: 
It is clear that many countries in the South with very low per capita incomes 
cannot  afford  degrowth but could use a kind of sustainable development, 
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directed at real needs such as access to water, food, health care, education, 
etc. This requires a radical shift in social structure away from the relations of 
production of capitalism/imperialism (Foster 2011: 7). 
Social movements in countries such as Ecuador or Bolivia are testing alter-
natives as part of this ‘shift’. The matrix of objectives here is not built around 
profit but around social needs. However, Foster’s choice of the term ‘sus-
tainable development’ is misleading, as development is understood as the 
opposite of underdevelopment and is therefore rejected as (culturally) impe-
rial. Therefore, the term ‘post-development’ was thus coined, not to refer to 
alternative developments but rather to convey a notion of alternatives to the 
ideal of development that involve local and plural knowledges (Escobar 1995; 
Ziai 2012).
6. Alternative spaces for thought and action –  
Provincialising degrowth 
Although degrowth, with its fundamental criticism of the imperial lifestyle, 
has indisputable parallels to approaches like ‘post-development’, a num-
ber of authors argue that degrowth lacks links to the needs and knowledge 
of people in the Global South. This disconnectedness is seen as the reason 
why degrowth has no significant position in social or scientific debate in 
the Global South (Rodríguez-Labajos/Yánez/Bond et al. 2019). Escobar, for 
instance, suggests that there is no natural alliance between the different 
concepts and approaches in the transformation discourse, but that a pact 
could be produced in a productive process of mutual encounter, learning and 
unlearning (Escobar 2015). 
Learning can be drawn from the social movements and the indigenous 
groups that have come together in South America to demand and live an 
alternative to the threats of overexploiting nature and resources. ‘Buen Vivir ’ 
(‘Good Life’) is an alternative, post-extractivist model intended to overcome 
the multiple capitalist crisis. It embraces plural imaginings of the world 
and the future and is therefore understood as an epistemological paradigm 
change (Gann 2013: 84). The participative and emancipatory character of the 
constitutions in Ecuador and Bolivia is emphasised, as is the resulting rel-
ativisation of Western modernity. The opening up of the concept of work is 
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central here, as this allows different social configurations and a good life. 
Buen Vivir can thus be understood as a concrete utopia with which to over-
come colonial continuities. 
In comparison, degrowth seems to be a relatively narrowly defined 
movement that could profit from greater ref lection on North-South rela-
tions on the one hand and the plural epistemologies of the South on the other. 
In this sense degrowth requires provincialisation to expose Eurocentric per-
spectives in a ref lexive process, so that ultimately the European context can 
be transcended and new epistemologies accepted. This is important for crit-
ical spatial and transformation sciences, but equally so for spatial planning. 
Political practice makes local and regional decisions that affect development 
trajectories and result in resource needs, governing far into the lifeworlds of 
people in the Global South. 
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Financing post-growth?  
Green financial products for changed logics 
of production 
Sabine Dörry, Christian Schulz
1. Introduction
Current debates on ‘green finance’ and ‘sustainable investments’ are shaped 
by the search for alternative ways of investing large volumes of capital to pro-
vide economic returns while abiding by certain social and ecological stan-
dards. The large institutional investors pursuing such goals include pension 
funds, insurance companies and foundations – as well as sovereign wealth 
funds. At the same time, many of the international financial centres (IFCs) 
where ‘green’ financial products are ‘produced’ are attempting not only to 
rebrand their core activities, but also to create new conditions for ‘green’ (and 
sustainable) investments. These new conditions comprise, e. g., regulations 
and standards, new trading platforms, new degree programmes at univer-
sities and marketing techniques. Despite such dynamic developments there 
is currently no indication that the financial sector is reassessing or question-
ing the growth-based principles, mechanisms and motives of a financialised 
global economy. In contrast, the real economy is increasingly turning to 
alternative approaches, especially in regional contexts, such as the circular 
economy and enterprises with a common good orientation, some of which 
are funded by civil society or are semi-public, e. g. the social and solidarity 
economy, citizens’ cooperatives, etc. Due to their specific focus, orientation 
and, not least, size, many of these activities are of negligible relevance for the 
large investors mentioned above. There is an obvious discrepancy in gran-
ularity here with large investments primarily targeting large, international 
climate protection projects; however, there is also a conf lict of institutional 
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logics and motivations. This article attempts to explore this field of tension 
and illustrates possible post-growth approaches within the financial econ-
omy.
Post-growth debates and research have paid intensive and increasingly 
differentiated attention to topics like production, consumption, models of 
working hours, land ownership and infrastructure (Weiss/Cattaneo 2017; 
Demaria/Kallis/Bakker 2019) but has to date displayed little concern with 
the financial sector. Although work on alternative or parallel currencies, the 
renaissance of cooperative banks or ethical forms of investment has fairly 
explicit links to post-growth, more fundamental and critical consideration 
of the established financial system has only been undertaken on a more gen-
eral level. This includes, for instance, neo-Marxist critiques of financialisa-
tion and civil-society debates about the social and ecological dimensions of 
the global financial economy (e. g. Finance Watch).
When postulating a post-growth reorientation of the economy, two 
perspectives on the financial sector seem particularly interesting. First, 
what is the role of finance in the transition to more sustainable economic 
approaches (for initial findings on the energy transition see, e. g., Zademach/
Dichtl 2016)? Second, to what extent do the business models and practices of 
the financial economy remain entrenched in growth logics or indeed them-
selves create continued pressure for growth (for instance for corporations 
and banks) through the prevailing loan and interest system? Socio-economic 
and socio-ecological transformation is not possible without the credible par-
ticipation of the financial institutes. However, ‘profit-seeking, risk manage-
ment and regulation’ have made a political-moral problem into an economic 
one where ‘the much-maligned capital markets… play a central role’, as the 
news magazine Der Spiegel recently commented (translated from German)1. 
The discussion in the article concerned carbon emissions trading, the EU’s 
‘key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively’2 and large 
infrastructural projects in the energy field. Such projects result from one-
off decisions in favour of solar energy or other sustainable energy sources 
1  https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaf t/soziales/kann-uns-der-kapitalismus-noch-ret-
ten-a-f70ee45b-fab3-4740-9a06-60678b5b1dcf?sara_ecid=soci_upd_wbMbjhOSvViIS-
jc8RPU89NcCvtlFcJ (20.01.2020)
2  https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en (09.01.2020)
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and then define long-term, transregional or even transnational development 
paths.
Against this background, it seems particularly important to consider 
more closely the current dynamic development of a financial sector that 
increasingly portrays itself as be(com)ing ‘green’. This development is driven 
by the growing pressure for adaptation (climate debate, divestment cam-
paigns, new policies, etc.) faced by the financial industry in light of the new 
circumstances and requirements of the real economy. Furthermore, the 
financial industry needs to contain the speculative forces that are currently 
arising from a horrendous imbalance between too much capital3 and too 
few (profitable) investment options. The demands for a more sustainable 
financial system that were made during the most recent financial crisis in 
2008/2009 went largely unheard. Indeed, it is unclear how this restructur-
ing should occur and which direction it should take. A ubiquitous catch-
phrase that describes one version/vision of the financial system of the future 
is ‘green finance’, a term that is not only scintillating but also imprecise 
(Dörry/Schulz 2018). The emerging decisions that indicate possible direc-
tions of development are unfolding on many levels and along diverse fault 
lines defined by conf licting interests and philosophies. Like in the manu-
facturing sector, it is possible to make a distinction between advocates of 
a ‘technological fix’ and proponents of a more fundamental transformation 
of the economic system. Those supporting a technological fix focus primar-
ily on tackling symptoms rather than causes. They thus call for a ‘business 
as usual’ approach, continuing the growth-oriented economic model of the 
past (in the sense of ‘weak’ ecological modernisation; Christoff 1996). This 
distinguishes them from the proponents of a fundamental restructuring of 
the economic system.
This dualism is manifested in the financial economy between advo-
cates of the prevalent greening hype and advocates of alternative financial 
3   Of  relevance here  is  the  significance  of  speculatively  driven financial  activities,  but  dis-
cussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of the paper. Further, massive private wealth is 
a continually growing part of the financial industry largely based on the legal  ‘coding’ of 
capital (Pistor 2019), which, together with sophisticated tax regulations, ensures the unre-
stricted protection of private rents. This represents an enormous field of assets which po-
tentially could productively release immense sums of private capital and thus contribute 
to more social justice and environmentally friendly investments (although this is illusion-
ary in the current circumstances).
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approaches. The latter aim to initiate fundamental change and view financial 
capitalism as inadequate for the challenges lying ahead. Currently, alterna-
tive financial approaches tend to be assessed as marginal and barely scalable. 
They therefore receive comparatively little political attention – this is also 
the case against the background of the failure of the Madrid climate sum-
mit in December 2019. Nonetheless, new ways of thinking of this sort offer 
opportunities on the regional level (Zademach/Hillebrand 2014). On the 
global level, increasing equity gaps are evident, i. e. a funding gap of private 
capital amounting to billions of euros that must be filled by public sponsors 
and venture capital finance in order to fund transformation, especially in 
the areas of social and physical infrastructure (energy, mobility, education, 
etc.). UNCTAD estimates that funding the ambitious Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDG) in the long term will require about ca. 5-7 billion US dollars 
annually (UNEP FI 2018: 3).
Strengthening the role of the public sector also provides opportunities for 
correcting certain trends in the current financial system. In this respect, by 
2050 the EU aims to achieve the ambitious objective of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions by 80-95 % in comparison to 1990. A gigantic transformation 
of this sort requires not only long-term funding but also the restructuring 
of the financial economy and its governance to create a sustainable system. 
This is, among other things, a significant driver for the recent development 
of a green taxonomy, which was developed under the leadership of the EU 
Commission and entered into force on 12 July 2020. In a certain sense, it sets 
high standards for rethinking the European financial sector. There is a link 
here to the pending reorientation of the national development banks (e.  g. 
KfW) and their European counterparts (EIB and EIF) to focus on promoting 
innovation and sustainable business practices by European companies. At 
present however, sustainability in the financial economy is primarily related 
to the ‘green’ domain, which focuses particularly on climate finance.
The two superordinate fields – the sustainable and the ‘green’ financial 
economy – in turn harbour numerous nuances and ventures, which cannot 
be comprehensively addressed here. Due to space limitations, we restrict 
ourselves rather to broad distinctions and speak, for example, of ‘green 
finance’ as an important sub-sector of an emerging ‘sustainable’ financial 
industry. The article attempts to systemise the broad lines of argument and 
to provide an overview of the current state of this complex discussion, fol-
lowed by succinct consideration of whether and where areas of intersection 
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can be identified and brought together in practice. We believe it is important 
to include spatial-social dimensions of financial activities (preferably ones 
that are in transformation) and to outline their effects on regional econo-
mies, as these issues are largely ignored by the dominant discourse of the 
economic mainstream. Hence, this chapter seeks to exploratively outline 
how and to what extent green financial technologies could contribute to the 
development of sustainable, post-growth, regional economic cycles. The dis-
cussion provides an overview of current scientific approaches and the policy 
programmes of green finance (Section  2), considers the essential specifics 
of financing dynamics and logics on different scales (Sections 3 and 4), and 
concludes by looking ahead and attempting to bring both areas together 
(Section 5).
2. ‘Green finance’ – an overview of the current debates and 
state of research
The research field of green finance is still in the process of emerging. It is also 
characterised by a somewhat unclear structure, as different disciplines pur-
sue their own research foci and individual institutions bring the interests 
of strategically important industries and large companies (lignite, automo-
tive industry, etc.) more or less prominently into the discussions. Further-
more, mainstream economists continue to focus on economic growth and, 
in particular, on elaboration of new rules based on market mechanisms, an 
uncritical development of financial capitalism that is inherently at odds with 
sustainable finance. Examples are market-based policy instruments such 
as emissions trading systems or the attempt to reorder the markets using 
financial products like green bonds, despite the questionable certification 
processes related to such bonds (see Section 3 on certification agencies). On 
the international level, programmes like REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) ref lect the parallel implementation of 
economic and ecological logics, which – like other programmes – have very 
different local, subnational and national effects and hinder international 
harmonisation of green certification for financial products. These individual 
spatial sensitivities are still hardly considered in the new regulations of the 
international economic organisations, as we demonstrate in Section 3.
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In light of the increase in financial, business and market activities that 
do not question the growth ideal but are supposed to help solve a multitude 
of environmental and social problems, it is also important to explore what 
happens in the transition process when conf licting goals arise from envi-
ronmental and financial interests. It is necessary to investigate the extent 
to which an economisation of environmental and development policy leads 
to processes of rent seeking / rent capture, i. e. to intensified commodifica-
tion and financialisation – and thus to inequitable access to ubiquities like 
clean water and clean air, to mention just some examples. The relevance of 
cross-disciplinary investigation of green finance is thus obvious. But what 
is meant by ‘green finance’? Green finance is part of and not clearly distinct 
from sustainable finance, which is succinctly defined by the ‘Finance Ini-
tiative’ of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP FI 2018): ‘Sustainable 
finance … seeks alignment with sustainable development targets and poli-
cies’ (ibid.: 48).
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are intended to ensure 
sustainability in economic, social and ecological terms for the foreseeable 
future. The concept of the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
criteria is to set binding standards for sustainable capital, investment and 
finance, although green finance focuses primarily on environmental invest-
ment criteria and climate finance. However, problematic in the long term is 
that the entire programme of inf luential international organisations (OECD, 
UNO, etc.) and multilateral development banks (EIB, ADB, World Bank, etc.) 
focuses on economic growth, as revealed in the wording of encouragements 
to private capital investment, for example: ‘…these could crowd in private 
investors … as it becomes compellingly clear that the prosperity and well-be-
ing of communities is the best way to grow markets and remain competitive’ 
(UNEP FI 2018: 23).
Another issue affecting green finance is insufficient awareness of the 
importance of context, as ref lected in the way in which green finance is 
assigned different roles in different settings. The investments and financ-
ing mainly target the long-term development of non-fossil energy sources 
and large infrastructure projects (power grids, etc.), which should be accom-
panied by more social justice and, in particular, long-term returns. In the 
context of the European and Western industrialised states, green finance is 
intended to primarily help drive the climate-neutral / climate-friendly trans-
formation of society and the economy. The prevailing line of thought, as seen 
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in the taxonomies, programmes and guidelines for the coming years, is one 
of a ‘technological fix’. However, the aim for the developing and emerging 
countries is to develop their economies in a climate-friendly and sustainable 
fashion from the outset, not least to prevent migration and provide growth 
options for the saturated markets of the Western world. The challenges and 
parameters therefore differ. In many countries, the implementation and 
supervision of projects financed (and certified) as ‘green’ and included in the 
portfolios of large institutional investors are non-existent or do not com-
ply with Western standards, which then hinders or even prevents urgently 
needed investment.
In the Western world, large investors and enterprises, reacting among 
other things to increasing public pressure (Fridays for Future, etc.), have 
started to reschedule (and redeploy) their investment portfolios (and supply 
chains). In this way, they are breaking away from the long-dominant, prof-
its-at-all-costs approach dictated by the shareholder-value paradigm and 
instead pushing for ‘impact investments’. While impact investments aim 
for wealth creation through economic goals, they also want to make positive, 
measurable (and thus communicable!) social and ecological contributions. 
A ground-breaking warning was recently issued by Larry Fink, head of the 
world’s largest asset manager BlackRock4, in which he stressed the rising 
capital costs and increasing investment risk that would arise if climate and 
sustainability risks were not adequately addressed. In addition, Fink expects 
a ‘significant reallocation of capital’, which is already beginning to manifest 
itself despite the failed Madrid climate summit. The necessity of decarboni-
sation is thus driving a shift in the financial and the real economy towards 
ESG goals (Green and Sustainable Finance Cluster Germany 2018). However, 
many corporate and bank balance sheets still rely on carbon-based produc-
tion, and the conversion of large corporate groups to green(er) supply chains 
is almost unachievable in the short term. The political field in Germany 
waited too long to introduce binding requirements. But leading industrial 
enterprises also tend to underestimate the force of the current transition, 
as demonstrated by the example of Siemens continuing to build new infra-
structure for large Australian coal-fired power plants despite pressure from 
the general (young) public. While it is necessary to give up ‘brown energy’, 
4  https://www.blackrock.com/ch/individual/en/larr y-fink-ceo-letter?switchLocale=Y 
(20.01.2020)
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it is an extremely risky process in financial terms (G20 2016; Hebb/Hawley/
Hoepner et al. 2016; TCFD 2017) as investments made today are tied up in the 
long-term, often for decades. The pressure to take action means that inves-
tors and financiers, as well as political players, are exposed to the danger of 
choosing the ‘wrong’ technology paths. Large volumes of disinvestment will 
therefore also have a significant impact on regional and national economies 
with primarily CO2-based energy supplies. This is unchanged by the fact that 
in the context of quantitative easing (QE) launched in 2012, the ECB under 
Christine Lagarde declared ‘protecting the environment’ to be a new core 
task, promoting green bonds in particular.
These examples clearly demonstrate how important it is to better under-
stand the spatial dimensions of the financial economy – and particularly new 
financial instruments and financial technologies, in order to address the 
‘territorial gap’ in research and policy related to the implications of particular 
financial instruments (ESPON 2019). In this context, the literature on financ-
ing economic growth has long pointed to both the enormous importance of 
‘patient capital’ and of effective institutions and governments (Commission 
on Growth and Development 2008) for the productive use and efficient allo-
cation of long-term investments.
These praiseworthy developments are, however, still countered by a 
certain presumptuousness in the financial industry – to a certain extent 
underpinned by a lack of corporate resources and knowledge – concerning 
how the ESG goals should be incorporated in their own portfolios and cor-
porate strategies. This enormous need for new knowledge is being met by 
many associations and educational/research institutions but their new and 
evolving offerings in turn require verification and harmonisation. The inter-
national financial centres (IFCs), often associated with renowned financial 
degree programmes at universities, are important localities where this bun-
dled knowledge circulates. However, there is increasing criticism of such 
one-sided assertions of knowledge sovereignty about green finance, and 
ever louder calls for the integrative degree programmes of social and envi-
ronmental sciences to be incorporated in sustainable financial degree pro-
grammes.
In face of the complexity of the transition in the financial industry, in 
2018 the European Commission adopted the ‘Commission Action Plan on 
Financing Sustainable Growth’, advising on which economic activities are 
ecologically sustainable. This includes reference to the ‘Green Taxonomy’ 
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of the EU on financing sustainable economic activities, which provides a 
benchmark for green investments and disclosure of the individual fulfilment 
of ESG targets. Furthermore, new rankings of ‘green’ IFCs (UNEP 2017) indi-
cate that their financial ecosystems (including regulators, banks/non-banks5, 
rating agencies, law and accounting firms, etc.) have recognised the need for 
sustainable financing measures and a ‘greening’ process. Critics also com-
ment on the strong tendency for ‘green washing’ (Technical Expert Group on 
Sustainable Finance 2019), not least because sustainable (direct and indirect) 
finance is primarily undertaken by powerful financial corporations whose 
activities are closely embedded in the existing logics of financial capitalism. 
An important focus in the literature on the relationship between finance 
and economic development is on the significant shift of global finance and 
investments away from the banks to private lenders and ‘non-banks’ who use 
financial innovations (e. g. social bonds and blended finance, as discussed 
below) to add ‘value’ to the portfolios of both private and public investors. 
This provides the financial industry with an increasing range of new options 
for the sustainable financing of innovative enterprises and infrastructures 
(Kaminker/Youngman 2015; UNEP 2011; G20 2016). It also entails a need 
to better tailor the new financial instruments to the individual financing 
requirements of regions in order to support their individual capacity build-
ing and resilience in the face of future challenges. Little of the progress pro-
claimed in these progressive visions has so far been implemented or, indeed, 
can be implemented.
While avoiding ‘green washing’ is important, so too is preventing 
so-called ‘white washing’ where financial institutions only react superficially 
to the financing needs of social enterprises. This requires a re-evaluation of 
‘social impact investments’ and ‘ethical investments’. To this end, the EU has 
established a Social Impact Accelerator, a public-private finance partnership 
for impact investments and social entrepreneurship throughout Europe (EIF 
2017). Among the leading financial instruments for impact investments are 
social impact bonds (SIBs), a controversial results-oriented form of impact 
investment in which state interventions intended to solve social problems 
are financed with capital from private investors who expect a corresponding 
return on investment. In connection to this, impact investments known as 
5   In the jargon of the financial economy, ‘non-banks’ refers to credit institutions other than 
banks, e. g. investment funds, venture capital funds and sovereign wealth funds.
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development impact bonds (DIBs) and blended finance have emerged, a form 
of public-private impact investment that is currently important for fund-
ing social care and addressing socio-economic inequalities. As with green 
finance however, taxonomies for ‘ethical’ and ‘social’ investments are still in 
their infancy, have seldom been tested and depend on the development of 
definitions of a common terminology and on harmonisation with the goals 
of green (and blue = water-focused) taxonomies.
Furthermore, digitalisation and technologisation provide opportunities 
to ‘disrupt’ the established financial system and to promote and accelerate 
a transition to sustainability. However, few connections have to date been 
established between sustainable finance and FinTech/digitisation. ‘FinTech’ 
is a fairly new term that refers to the convergence of finance and technol-
ogy, facilitating the creation of digital and online financial products and ser-
vices. Yet, FinTech also raises questions about systemic risks and appropriate 
alignment with urban and regional agendas (Dowling 2017; UNEP 2016). The 
expectation is that in the course of these developments, the IFCs will also 
have to adapt to shifting roles in the production of sustainable finance. In 
addition to new growth opportunities, all this also involves new uncertain-
ties about whether existing financial enterprises and industry networks 
can profit from the new market participants and technologies, for instance 
when new, alternative forms of finance emerge, such as peer-to-peer lend-
ing (crowdfunding) or new kinds of supply chain finance (UNEP 2016; CISL 
2017). The ‘FinTech Action Plan’ (European Commission 2018) aims to pro-
mote a more competitive, innovative and stable European financial sec-
tor with innovative business models on the EU level; yet again, the action 
plan is based on growth and has no explicit link to ‘sustainable finance’ or 
GreenTech (also see Messner/Schlacke/Fromhold-Eisebith et al. 2019; Tech-
nical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance 2019).
3. The logic of green classification systems
New green standards are now used to classify financial products. The fol-
lowing discussion considers the recently developed EU taxonomy for envi-
ronmentally sustainable economic activities and the role of certification 
agencies for sustainable financial products and investment strategies, and 
explains the basic mechanisms of these legitimising green norms. The eco-
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system of green standards has already established itself in many financial 
centres, and this ‘engine room’ of IFCs is – also for the reasons mentioned 
above – inf luenced by powerful interests from industry, politics and society/
science. 
EU taxonomy6
The ‘Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities’ is part of a series of directed mea-
sures within the EU Action Plan on Sustainable Finance. The classification 
system consists of a list of economic activities with performance criteria 
that should significantly contribute towards six environmental goals – cli-
mate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, protection of water and 
marine resources, transition to a circular economy, pollution prevention, 
protection of ecosystems (Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance 
2019: 3). This is intended to attract capital to achieve the sustainability goals. 
According to the EU, the ‘Green Taxonomy’ itself is a ‘f lexible’ and ‘dynamic’ 
list of economic activities and criteria relevant for sustainability that ‘based 
on latest scientific and industry experience’ (ibid.: 5) can be altered and 
extended. Ensuring the compliance of the financial strategies and invest-
ment portfolios of large institutional investors with these criteria is one of 
the key challenges for the transition to a more sustainable financial economy. 
This is audited and communicated by independent certification agencies.
Another closely linked problem that inf luences the transition to a green 
financial market is that the taxonomy is a simple binary system: an invest-
ment is either green or it is not green. This problem has received scarcely any 
attention to date; the so-called ESG data shocks (Schumacher/Baek/Nishi-
kizawa 2021) that result can, however, be devastating for investors, halving 
the market value of enterprises overnight. The principle can be demonstrated 
with the example of VW’s diesel scandal – unrelated to the green taxonomy. 
An independent study undertaken by the ICCT first officially detected the 
elevated pollutant levels at VW, rather than the car manufacturer itself or 
the state supervisory authorities. VW’s market value fell substantially after 
the results were published and the economic and reputational damage for 
6  The article describes the situation at the beginning of 2020. The EU taxonomy debate has 
developed considerably since then, as have other phenomena covered/addressed in this 
chapter.
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the corporation were significant. A similar logic would apply in a situation 
where certification agencies were too generous when certifying green finan-
cial products. Independent ex-post audits could then lead to the shares losing 
their green status. This would not only impact on investors who purchased 
the shares in good faith for their green investment portfolio but also on the 
enterprises that had profited from this green investment and now lost their 
financing and an essential element of their long-term business plan. Such a 
case is also likely to lead to ruinous damage to the reputation of the certifi-
cation agencies and thus of the financial centres and financial supervisory 
authorities that host and supervise the agencies. 
Certification agencies
Certification agencies like LuxFlag (Luxembourg) or FNG (Germany) are 
now a significant element of the ecosystem of IFCs. They are committed 
to ecological and sustainable principles but primarily use common market 
and growth logics for implementation and certification. There are large dif-
ferences between the certification agencies, for instance in terms of trans-
parency in cases when the ‘green’ standard is awarded. Several testing agen-
cies disclose their questionnaires and the results of their evaluations (at least 
in part) and thus make their decisions easily comprehensible to the public, 
but others keep a lower profile, seemingly exploiting this advantage to pro-
vide faster certification. If the increasing number of NGOs in the environ-
mental sector and other independent institutes make spot checks of such 
certifications and reach different conclusions to the testing agencies, this 
will directly affect the performance of regional and global investment port-
folios. Trading in green securities, which then would no longer be ‘green’, 
would decline rapidly and thus also directly affect trading on the secondary 
markets; as a result, many large investors like insurance companies and pen-
sion funds would want and need to dump significant bond investments with-
out this green ‘label’. At least in the short term, the market would collapse 
due to a lack of buyers. In short: the market for green finance would suffer 
considerable and lasting damage. The economic and social consequences 
of a so-called ESG data shock would be similarly far-reaching: all kinds of 
projects (e. g. climate and infrastructure projects) that represent large, long-
term investments and drive local development would face financing difficul-
ties overnight.
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Sections 2 and 3 have broadly outlined the logics of green finance and 
its classification by certification agencies. Clearly, it is not only the defini-
tion of new green standards that is complex and complicated, but also their 
implementation. For reasons of brevity, we have omitted discussion of the 
way in which governance structures must change to support the transition 
of the financial system across very different scales. What should be noted, 
however, is that the transition to a green financial system at least promises 
to move away from the short-term focus on shareholder value and to bring 
long-term ecological and social criteria back to centre stage. The public sec-
tor has a major role to play in the form of start-up finance and risk assump-
tion, providing important impulses and incentives for private investment. 
We believe that this can also open up regional scope for individually linking 
private sector approaches with sustainable finance. However, this requires 
that appropriate parameters are created by developing regional institutions 
and governance to enable the upscaling and equal raison d’être of successful, 
regional and alternative forms of economic activity and financing. Section 4 
discusses a few such examples.
4. Alternative finance instruments and logics 
Similar to the situation with the internationally propagated green econ-
omy (UNEP 2011) and alternative, post-growth variations (Kenis/Lievens 
2015; Bina 2013; Davies 2013; Gibbs/O’Neill 2017; Schulz/Bailey 2014), there 
are alternatives to the global ‘greening’ financial sector that are motivated 
by fundamentally different interests and are generally more public-welfare 
oriented. By way of example, three increasingly popular instruments are 
presented here and assessed in terms of their transformative potential: first, 
complementary currencies and their role in regional value creation; second, 
forms of the ‘collaborative economy’ that are supported and co-financed by 
civil society; and third, the ‘renaissance’ of cooperative organisations and 
their investment models. 
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Complementary currencies
Also known as ‘regional currencies’, these complementary means of payment 
have emerged in many places since the 1990s. They are a way to develop and 
support regional circular economies that – embedded in the logic of alter-
native economies – successfully break away from over-consumption, specu-
lation with natural ‘assets’ and land, and economic inf lation at the regional 
level (Thiel 2011; Seyfang 2001). They can promote socially and environmen-
tally sustainable production with short, primarily regional supply chains 
(Kopatz 2015). Regiogeld (regiomoney), as regional currencies are also known 
in German-speaking countries,
… is a type of money privately issued in the form of hard cash and accepted by 
a number of participants. Its validity is regionally limited, it carries a negative 
interest rate (or is at least interest-free) and it pursues non-profit objectives 
(Thiel 2011: 134, translated from German).
Advocates of regional currencies, whose experience goes back to about the 
2000s (North 2006, 2007; Lietaer/Dunne 2013), suggest that they bring 
great regional benefits linked to the explicit promotion of non-profit proj-
ects (Gelleri, 2013). In Germany, such currencies include the ‘Chiemgauer’ 
(founded in 2002), the ‘Tauber-Franken’ (2005), the ‘Landmark’ (2004) and the 
‘Berliner Regional’ (2005). It is argued that the regions that practise such alter-
native forms of self-organisation are more stable and effectively crisis-resil-
ient than open regional economic systems that are closely integrated in global 
value creation and speculation systems (Kopatz, 2015: 105). Such stability is 
supported by the constant circulation of the regional currency, driven by its 
interest-free character and stringent devaluation, which often involves ‘stat-
utory depreciation days’ (Thiel 2011, translated from German). Furthermore, 
local identity and the social cohesion of inhabitants is strengthened through 
voluntary work, exchange, cooperation and other social innovations. Sey-
fang (2001) notes that in the 1990s, the goals of many regional currencies 
were extended to include broader social and political objectives in addition 
to ecological aims, especially targeting the formation of community spirit 
through reciprocity and local participation. In the German debate, increas-
ing attention is being paid to questions concerning the institutionalisation 
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of complementary currencies in market-based economic systems (Degen 
2016; Doerr 2019).
Current debates about regional currencies are usually conceptually 
anchored in or inspired by much earlier and more fundamental attempts 
to develop complementary currencies. The pioneer of such approaches and 
probably the most successful project to date was the Swiss ‘WIR-Bank’, 
which has existed since 1934. Based on Silvio Gesell’s ‘free economy’ ideas, 
the ‘Wirtschaf tsring’ (‘Swiss Economic Circle’) was founded as an alternative 
network which today comprises over 50,000 small and medium-sized enter-
prises. With a turnover of more than 5.5 billion Swiss francs (in 2019), the 
Wirtschaf tsring is considerably larger in terms of volume and geographical 
reach than the aforementioned regional currencies (Stodder/Lietaer 2015). 
The ‘WIR-francs’, like a growing number of other regional currencies, today 
often use electronic methods of payment (cash cards, smartphone apps). 
There is hope that such developments will improve public acceptance of such 
currencies thanks to their low threshold use.
Collaborative economies and financing models
The example of the community supported agriculture (CSA) is used to 
demonstrate how civil-society initiatives and idealistic, financial and opera-
tional commitment can maintain and further develop sustainable economies. 
‘CSA’ initiatives have emerged not only in urban hinterlands but also in more 
rural regions and represent a particular form of social engagement working 
to preserve and develop farming and agriculture in line with sustainability 
goals. Members of the public can become financially involved (see below) but 
can also play an active role on the farm. As prosumers who develop an emo-
tional link to the food they purchase, they thus contribute towards the farm’s 
survival (on the role of alternative food networks see Rosol 2018 for more 
detail). There are various diverse ‘CSA’ funding models, ranging from formal 
participation (shares, participation certificates, cooperative shares, partial 
land ownership) to specific subscription models7 and concepts based on the 
commons. In order to gain the basic finance necessary for an operating year, 
7   In  comparison  to  commercial  subscriptions  (such  as  ‘vegetable  boxes’),  they  are  often 
more tied to the subscriber’s personal contribution/shares and are more dependent on the 
harvest.
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the commons approach, for example, holds so-called ‘bidding rounds’. After 
a budgeting plan and a minimum budget have been presented, all members 
are asked to voluntarily submit bids to finance some part of the operations 
in line with their individual capacities. These bidding rounds are repeated as 
often as necessary to secure the target annual budget. In contrast to models 
based on participation certificates or subscriptions, this approach decouples 
the ‘giving’ and ‘taking’. Silke Helfrich sees a ‘general pattern of social trans-
formation’ in this abandonment of ‘the principle of equivalent exchange’ 
(Helfrich 2015: 47, translated from German). A similar decoupling, i. e. finan-
cial commitment with no expectation of an absolutely equivalent return, can 
also be observed in the increasingly popular (internet-based) crowdfunding. 
Cooperative banks and investments for the common good
Growing criticism of the financialised world economy, the decoupling of the 
business models of the financial economy from the financial needs of the real 
economy, and, not least, issues linked to ecological sustainability and social 
justice have led to louder calls for finance to focus more strongly on the com-
mon good. In addition to the established cooperative banks (e. g. Volks- und 
Raiffeisen-Banken, GLS-Bank) and public financial institutions (e.  g. Spar-
kassen), a number of civil society initiatives have led to the establishment of 
more ‘citizens banks’. These banks tend to offer their members ESG-compli-
ant savings and deposits options and specific financing concepts. The spec-
trum of organisations ranges from small local cooperative banks to regional 
players (e.  g. Caisse Solidaire Nord-Pas-de-Calais/Lille) to nationwide and 
even cross-border models (e.  g. Triodos Belgium/Netherlands, Alternative 
Bank Switzerland, etika Luxembourg) (also see Dörry/Schulz 2018).
Alongside the establishment of alternative banks, voices from civil society 
are also demanding that the goals and business practices of public institu-
tions should be more closely aligned with the common good. In Belgium, for 
example, where the state rescue of the Belgian branch of the DEXIA bank in 
2012 led to the creation of a new public bank (Belfius), the movement ‘Belfius 
est à nous’ (‘Belfius belongs to us’) is vehemently demanding more trans-
paren cy and co-determination. And in Germany, increasing complaints can 
be heard about the void left by the ‘Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft’ (BfG), pri-
marily in the context of current debates on affordable housing, public hous-
ing construction and municipal real estate holdings. The real estate sector 
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provides another interesting example. Not only are the business practices of 
this increasingly financialised industry being critically questioned, but alter-
natives with a common-good orientation are being tested and established 
with new forms of housing and associated financing and planning models 
(e. g. joint building ventures [‘Baugruppen’], new housing cooperatives, inde-
pendently organised apartment building projects [‘Mietshäuser Syndikate’]).
5. Conclusion and discussion
The above examples show that fundamental changes in production and con-
sumption are, and will increasingly be, dependent on a transformation in 
the finance sector. These adaptations will need to extend beyond consider-
ation of ethical, social and ecological minimum standards in established 
products and investment strategies. The finance sector is rather called upon 
to question conventional business models and their one-sided growth fixa-
tion and to focus on the common good. The challenges associated with this 
are immense – not only in light of the enormous sums of finance that need 
to be administered and relocated but also in terms of inert systemic con-
straints. Systemic constraints can be found both in the financial sector itself 
(new standards, business practices, self-conceptions, value systems, train-
ing focuses, etc.) and at a higher level (tax, interest and depreciation policies, 
economic and research funding, financial market regulation).
If a possible post-growth transition is understood as a democratic pro-
cess involving the redefinition of societal goals, then it is clear that the reori-
entation of the financial economy will be part of this process of negotiation. 
This is obviously easiest where, for example, new public-interest banks are 
founded (see above), but it can also occur where banks are already publicly 
or cooperatively owned and, for instance, municipal decision-makers have 
a right to be heard. Greater proximity to the local dynamics of the real econ-
omy and to changing financial needs and investment strategies may favour 
more fundamental transformations here. At the same time this could offer 
a new perspective for banks, which are increasingly deprived of their tradi-
tional commercial basis in these times of low interest rates, digitalisation 
and (re-)regulation. It remains to be seen whether this pressure to adapt 
also similarly impacts non-banks which are practically exempt from bank-
ing regulation despite their similar business models. Generally, however, 
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there is also increasing pressure to adapt in the non-banking sector. And 
it can be assumed that the shift to technology-based fields only postpones 
the more fundamental need for solutions. The forces of inertia are complex, 
systemic and integrative, as revealed, for instance, in the daily provision of 
global liquidity via (largely unregulated) interbank trading and the great 
dependency of our social security systems on the global financial industry, 
for instance via the banks, pension funds, life insurance companies and, not 
least, the functionality of important financial market infrastructures such 
as SWIFT, Clearstream and Euroclear.
In view of current debates on global climate protection, distributive jus-
tice and taxation justice, it seems probable that a central role will be played 
by the international financial centres with their knowledge bases, innova-
tion potentials and geostrategic positions. It is not yet possible to predict 
the extent to which the current ‘greening efforts’ of IFCs favour or facilitate 
the fundamental transformation of the sector or whether the ‘business as 
usual’ policy that they imply actually hinders such a transformation. It is, 
however, beyond doubt that a significant reorientation of the sector towards 
post-growth goals will not be able to develop from within the financial sector 
alone. Rather, strong political, regulatory and scientific support for the pro-
cess is needed – ideally based on a broad social consensus on the necessity 
and desirability of transition.
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‘Status quo avant-gardists’ and 
‘prevention innovators’ 
Food for thought for the geographical  
post-growth debate 
Bastian Lange, Hans-Joachim Bürkner
1. Polarised discourses and antagonistic reactions to 
transformations
Political and media discourses in Germany about climate change, energy 
efficiency, ecological transformation, urban transition and a renunciation 
of economic growth principles are currently characterised by all the signs 
of moral polarisation. It is apparently once again about the eternal fight 
between good and evil, right and wrong. In contrast to many other politi-
cal controversies, in these discourses the opponents cannot be easily divided 
into the powerful and the dominated. Rather, new asymmetrical coalitions 
can be observed – most recently in the compromise reached for phasing out 
coal at the end of 2019. Here the government and its previous critics come 
together in rarely seen agreement to commit to the future good and renounce 
past evil. In contrast, the majority of the population remains largely silent. 
Although socio-economic polarisation is progressing, there are only a few, 
sporadic examples of ‘deep drilling’ (Bude/Medicus/Willisch 2011) research 
into geographical milieus that bring differentiation to the coarse-grained 
debate. Even investigations of environmental awareness in specific milieus 
often fail to be particularly differentiated, especially if they are loosely based 
on the well-known Sinus milieus drawn up by the Sinus Institute (Barth/
Flaig/Schäuble et al. 2018; cf. www.sinus-institute.de). Such research tends 
to point out the general relevance of ‘young distanced’, ‘marginal’ and ‘tradi-
tional’ milieus (Bundesministerium für Umwelt 2019: 14, 75-78), groups that 
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are said to have little interest in possible solutions to ecological and envi-
ronmental change. To date, the spatiality of such milieus is still unclear. The 
only findings about their spatial distribution or the spatially differentiated 
self-understandings of actors suggest – if at all – a vague urban-rural divi-
sion (ibid.). 
All other milieus, i.e. the so-called established milieu, the critical-cre-
ative milieu, the idealistic milieu and also parts of the bourgeois milieu 
(Bundesministerium für Umwelt 2019: 15), can be lumped together as one 
side. These groups react to the pressing ecological and economic crises by 
deriving imperatives to change capitalist economic models, consumption 
patterns and lifestyles. On the other side are those who do not want to sub-
mit to these imperatives, or at least not yet (the ‘marginal, ‘young distanced’ 
and ‘traditional’ milieus). In the broad public discourse, they are often indis-
criminately represented by their adversaries as opposing modernisation, 
denying ecological reason and rejecting dialogue.1 Furthermore, they are 
also geographically localised and regionalised: the progressive forces are 
seen as being located in the urban centres, primarily in West Germany, in 
contrast the reactionary forces are found in rural areas and in the ‘left-be-
hind’ peripheries, especially in East Germany.2 
The terms formulated in the title of this paper, ‘status quo avant-gardists’ 
and ‘prevention innovators’, are not understood here as political battle cries. 
Rather, they are viewed as impartially as possible as heuristic and exploratory 
concepts. They are motivated by a decided analytical interest in the identifi-
cation of milieu-specific, i.e. situated social innovations (see Bürkner/Lange 
in this volume). This allows research and policy prospects to be identified, 
ones that ref lectively focus on groups that resist transformative policies, 
changes in values and recommended change. Such resistance takes various 
forms − sometimes subversive and quiet, but often in open communication, 
demonstrating discursive skill, political well-informedness and aesthetic 
value judgements. Those involved are not usually members of previously 
1  For example, Chancellor Angela Merkel commented in her speech to the World Economic 
Forum in Davos on 23.01.2020 that a refusal to engage in dialogue ‘should result in sanc-
tions by society’ (Gersemann/Zschäpitz 2020).
2   On the same occasion, Chancellor Merkel also reported that these groups need to face dif-
ferent profits and costs in line with their locations: urban dwellers will quickly benefit from 
the transformation while rural dwellers will bear a large share of the costs (Gersemann/
Zschäpitz 2020). 
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defined Sinus milieus or lifestyle groups, nor are they everyday ‘constructors’ 
of social spaces that have already been empirically reconstructed.
Attributable forms of expression and the groups that support them have 
an enormous socio-political share in the success or failure of transformation 
efforts. Their performance and impact are usually overlooked in the public 
discourses, which mostly concentrate on the ‘progressive’ protagonists of 
intended change. Significantly, however, their mere presence and public vis-
ibility very quickly lead to shifts in the familiar and morally oriented catego-
ries of what is supposedly ‘good’ and ‘right’ in ecological terms. 
Progressive ecological thinking has a counterpart that is often its con-
trary in terms of worldviews but is not so far apart in subject matter. This 
cannot simply be described with the popular categorical dichotomy of ‘mod-
ern versus antimodern’. For instance, the catchwords propagated by mem-
bers of the party ‘Alternative for Germany’ (‘Alternative für Deutschland’, AfD) 
and ‘right-wing environmentalists’ in rural areas promote a backward-look-
ing, exclusively ‘German’ attachment to the homeland and thus a return to 
their ‘own’ native soil (Röpke/Speit 2019). Ironically, there are links here to 
the basic convictions held by the progressive forces of younger post-growth 
orientations, even if only to a limited extent. One example of this is found in 
the emphasis that both political camps put on local communities, milieu-spe-
cific autonomy and a return to manual activities or more simple technologies 
– thus celebrating a paradoxical conservatism, simultaneously reactionary 
and progressive. At least a certain amount of green and left-wing moralising 
may well be due to the perplexity caused by this paradox: such actors sense 
that they cannot muster convincing arguments to defend themselves against 
right-wing appropriation.
In a search for the forces working to preserve the status quo, it may ini-
tially seem that the centre of society is beyond suspicion. Increased public 
awareness of dramatic global warming and the related signs of crisis mean 
that the urgent need for a speedy transformation of the economy and society 
is now being recognised by the political mainstream. Many political calls and 
positions adopted by science suggest that it is necessary to implement and 
enforce changes in the behaviour of the wider population in terms of food, 
mobility and consumption. In addition to the argumentative basis provided 
in mainstream discourse, pending legal and procedural regulations are 
intended to achieve this goal. However, by the end of 2019 there was no nota-
ble or measurable change to be seen in figures related to passenger f lights 
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or to the food habits of the German population, for instance in a reduction 
in CO2 emissions. Even when all possible lag effects are taken into consid-
eration, it seems clear that inertia and resistance to change continue to be 
ubiquitous and are by no means exceptions to the rule.
2. Why think in terms of ‘status quo avant-gardists’ and 
‘prevention innovators’? 
In this article we argumentatively approach those designated modernisation 
and transformation opponents, dialogue blockers and deniers of environ-
mental reason as impartially as possible. To this end, we develop a stance 
that rejects rampant prejudgements in favour of open analysis and thus turn 
the page in heuristic terms. We call on our readers to enter into thought 
experiments and accept a deliberate change of perspectives. 
We therefore purposely use the terms ‘status quo avant-gardists’ and 
‘prevention innovators’ to address groups that are often stigmatised. This 
shall allow for an unprejudiced and precise view of their positioning vis-à-
vis issues of ecologically motivated social change. It shall also illuminate 
the positions they adopt in larger discourses. By employing these terms, we 
attribute the putative blockers with the fundamental ability to make orig-
inal innovations relevant to everyday life. We thus conceptionally distance 
ourselves with this research programme from the public culture of latent or 
open prejudgement, which can be contagious within an unsettled research 
landscape. We perceive the unclear contradictions between an apparently 
institutionalised, rational neoliberalism and more ad hoc, highly emotion-
alised and shifting political polarisations to be particularly unsettling.
The article also draws attention to the spatial connotations of rapidly 
increasing political and social polarisations. In contrast to previous time 
periods when contrary characteristics were attributed to specific groups of 
the population and ‘their spaces’, current social antagonisms are not simply 
the result of slow auto-dynamic processes of social differentiation, such as 
social mobility and the emergence of lifestyles. Rather, it can be assumed 
that the contrasts are deliberately co-produced by politics, and further pro-
moted, in some cases with manipulative intent, to the advantage of the polit-
ical spokespeople concerned. 
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Existing socio-economic and socio-spatial disparities in West European 
societies are thus being politically reframed and rhetorically inf lated. They 
are popularly expressed in opposites like modern/antimodern, progressive/
reactionary or eco-conscious/environmentally unfriendly. Conceptual pairs 
of this sort overlap and colour prosaic opposites like rich/poor, prosperous/
crisis-ridden or rural/urban, linking them to moral accusations and assign-
ments of political position. 
Crude rhetorical simplifications are no longer limited to the linguistic 
sphere of everyday media (e. g. digital social networks) but have extended 
into specialist political, planning and social-policy debates, leading to 
changes in discursively produced compartmentalisations. Previously 
empathic narratives of undeserved marginalisation have become narratives 
containing attributions of anti-progress and latent social threats. They now 
call for dissociation, a withdrawal of solidarity and sanctions. Simultane-
ously, such narratives often express general unease with the speed of social 
transformation and the sudden visibility of social differences rather than 
convinced political will.
It is not only the apparently progressive discourse that can be interpreted 
as expressing this unease but similarly also the increasing number of people 
who are turning to political ‘alternatives’ with their right-wing nationalist 
and, in some cases, neo-Nazi policies. These latter ‘alternatives’ signalise 
clear intentions towards inertia and a preservation of the status quo (how-
ever it may be defined), combined with a tendency towards collective opin-
ions which are anti-progressive, counter-enlightenment and reactionary. 
The social split associated with progressiveness and reactionaryism proba-
bly represents only the tip of a proverbial semantic iceberg. It reduces the 
far-reaching and complex differentiations of the respective perceptions and 
policy orientations to simplifying catchwords. 
In contrast, social-ecological3 emancipatory research, which is dedicated 
to the manifold interactions between societies and natural phenomena, 
should embrace this social upheaval with curiosity and critical ref lection. 
3  We use the attribute ‘social-ecological’ to refer to the social transformations that are asso-
ciated with individual and collective engagement with environmental problems. This in-
cludes social change that comprises changes in ideas and ideologies, social relations, policy 
orientations, everyday practices and forms of communication. We are aware that similar 
notions were established by US urban sociology in the twentieth century. However, since 
our focus is not primarily on the city, misunderstandings should be rare. 
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Urgently required pointers about the emergence of new discursive coalitions 
and divisions can be gained from a detailed and accurate understanding of 
milieu-specific and regional interpretations of the situation. The task is to 
explore the varieties of the construction of meaning and entrenched per-
spectives relevant to ecologically motivated transformation processes. Like-
wise, it can be expected that such an approach will uncover new potential 
for social integration and building bridges. Not least, it should also enable 
the formulation of suitably inclusive language, policy and options for insti-
tutionalisation. 
From the perspective of social and spatial sciences, it is particularly 
interesting which constructions of meaning, patterns of interpretation 
and concepts of self-affirmation characterise the activities of the resistant 
milieus. Which categories (e.  g. safety/threat, stability/upheaval, custom/
unpredictability, transparency/uncertainty) do these apparently extensive 
social groupings use to interpret their social and spatial surroundings? How 
is it that subjective statements are made that seem to be ‘contrary to bet-
ter and available ecological knowledge’? How ‘skilfully’ do these collectives 
ignore the dominant discursive frames and the claims to facticity embedded 
therein? What interpretations of their own otherness do they use to counter 
them? How are their concepts of otherness locally or regionally created? How 
effective are the corresponding patterns of interpretation in the public dis-
courses?
In order to provide context and specific detail to this somewhat coarse-
grained description of otherness, there is an urgent need to shed more light 
on the connections between the mainstream’s disadvantaging, stigmatis-
ing and derogatory ascriptions (‘modernisation opponents’ and ‘dialogue 
blockers’) and the discursive processes that promote them. The aim is thus to 
confront the unspecific and imprecise ascriptions made by social and polit-
ical opponents, and their representations in the media, with precise, con-
text-sensitive and scientifically ‘grounded’ observation. 
We assume that there are largely invisible but potentially inf luential prac-
tices of the ‘status quo avant-gardists’ and ‘prevention innovators’. The very 
fact that they give rise to harsh reactions in politics and the media illustrates 
the impact they have already acquired. Therefore we embark on a journey to 
uncover the underlying collective motives, logics of action and patterns of 
interpretation. On the one hand, the aim is to enable a balanced analysis of 
social transitions that not only considers for the normatively charged drivers 
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of change but also gives adequate space to their social counterparts. On the 
other hand, it is also about driving back the pejorative rhetoric which has 
spread like wildfire in both public and scientific descriptions of change-re-
sistant milieus as being supposedly anti-modern and socially ‘left-behind’. 
The purpose then is to highlight simplifications that contribute to further 
political polarisation of social change. Under the surface of crude political 
and medial representations there is often much more hidden than these 
representations suggest about the nature of social conf licts and insider-out-
sider relations. When, for instance, ‘Fridays for Future’ activism is abruptly 
compared with banal ‘counterreactions’ under the heading of ‘Fridays for 
Engine Capacity’ (Fridays for Hubraum)4, this is seldom a realistic portrayal 
of direct action and reaction, but rather a sham battle stage-managed by the 
media. However, a closer look reveals that there is an underlying game with 
numerous subtle commendations and disparagements. This game is already 
a fixed element of everyday repertoires of thought; it is extensively played in 
social practice. 
In light of the deficit of research to date, it is necessary to decipher and 
understand not only the changes in social practice but also the supra-indi-
vidual process logics and discursive reproduction mechanisms involved. The 
latter are probably in part responsible for reifying the deniers and ‘deviators’ 
from the mainstream. The mainstream may be defined by political elites and 
the media but mostly this lacks empirical evidence.  The terminologies used 
tend to promise something that preemptive normativity turns into ‘facts’. 
Against this backdrop, the reason for pursuing a focused analytical goal can 
be encapsulated in one sentence: there has been extremely little investiga-
tion of the concrete reasons for the popularity of othering. It must be clar-
ified which functions are fulfilled by images of a persistent clinging to the 
status quo, both on the part of the practitioners and by the victims of oth-
ering. We need to know more about the social functions fulfilled by images, 
e. g. as perceived threats to a community or triggers of insecurity and wishes 
for homogeneity. To get an idea of the nature of the social-ecological tran-
sition that has just begun, we should also know the extent to which images 
and concepts of ‘others’ are constitutive of current social-ecological change, 
beyond evident discourse rhetoric. 
4  As was recently done by the daily Süddeutsche Zeitung, see https://www.sueddeutsche.de/
panorama/fridays-hubraum-facebook-greta-klimakrise-1.4646132 (27.02.2020).
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Another objective is therefore the detailed analysis of the milieu-spe-
cific interpretations of the denials and alternate values consciously chosen 
by the change-resistant milieus. This in no way means that the intention is 
to employ analytical rhetoric to vindicate or even dignify these change-re-
sistant milieus wholesale. The point of departure is rather an intention to 
comprehensively evaluate the phenomenon of ‘preserving the status quo’ 
through an analysis that pays attention to context and detail. This necessi-
tates adopting manifold changes of perspective, as required by the logic of 
qualitative social research (Glaser/Strauss 2008). Only with such changes of 
perspective will it be possible to determine why the actors concerned view 
their interpretations of meaning as ‘logical’ and ‘convincing’ even though 
they may contain paradoxical elements.
3. Change and status quo in social-ecological  
sustainability research
3.1 Approaches in transition research
To date, a dominant part of transition research has focused primarily on the 
explanation, assessment and evaluation of various ways of handling eco-
logical dilemmas. Descriptions are given, for instance, of possible routes to 
sustainable, resource-efficient and energy-saving social practices. Processes 
of change, alternative regional pathways of development, the divergence of 
pro-ecological initiatives from the mainstream, institutional restructuring 
and the new governance arrangements they require have attracted signifi-
cant interest in economic geography and neighbouring disciplines. Spatial 
differentiation is usually undertaken in terms of urban-rural contrasts and 
by localising sectoral clusters. In addition, this research focus adopts a crit-
ical attitude towards development indicators of the Global North and South 
(Geels/Schwanen/Sorrell et al. 2018).
This impacts upon the way in which socio-political opposition is man-
ifested in the extra-parliamentary sphere. The migrant crisis, the climate 
crisis and the global food crisis have triggered resistance to government 
policies which is supported by initiatives like Fridays (Scientists, Parents, 
Mothers, Teachers, Students etc.) for Future, Transition Towns and Extinc-
tion Rebellion, and also by globally active NGOs like Greenpeace, Sea Shep-
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herd and diverse climate alliances. In apparent consensus, they refer to sci-
entific knowledge on the finite nature of planetary boundaries, knowledge 
that has been available and well-accepted for decades, and call on science 
to use this as a basis to advocate substantial changes in economic systems, 
consumption and the associated material f lows. The investigative focus of 
researchers lives up this call. Recently, increased attention has been paid to 
key actors from ecological vanguard milieus, who are promptly addressed 
as post-growth pioneers, especially in Western Europe and the Global North.
Numerous models and theories on ecologically relevant social and spa-
tial change explain shifts in development and emerging path deviations and 
processes of change by referring to the actions of such individuals. Heroic 
actors play a central role here: risk-friendly entrepreneurs from the green 
economy; post-growth pioneers experimenting with collective sharing, 
swapping, repairing and making-at-home (Gebauer/Sagebiel 2015); early 
adopters of new technologies with their particular values, mobility styles, 
aesthetics and mindsets; and also prosumers who both consume and pro-
duce their own products. They usher in new forms of practice and also allow 
new regional development paths to become recognisable. These individuals 
seem unusually open to change and have extraordinarily close experience of 
transformation. They are assigned attributes like ‘innovative’, ‘creative’, ‘pro-
gressive’ and ‘modern’ and are praised as economic innovators. This labelling 
practice is in line with the tradition of evolutionary economics, where sim-
ilar designations are given to central players in innovative regions, creative 
milieus and clusters (Spigel/Harrison 2018).
In contrast, the opposite side is colloquially described using attributes 
like ‘anti-modern’, ‘against progress’ and ‘lagging behind’ or – in sociologis-
ing jargon – as ‘de-coupled’, ‘isolated’ or ‘change resistant’. These are social 
milieus of unknown size, probably equipped (but not empirically evidenced) 
with high internal cohesion. Their members obviously strive for settled lives 
and focus on stable interpretations of meaning. Nonetheless, these milieus 
are rarely understood as sui generis phenomena, i.e. as legitimate struc-
turing elements of social change that should be taken seriously. Transition 
research is far more concerned with describing them as relicts of all that 
needs to be overcome and thus as transitional phenomena. This creates the 
impression that they might unnecessarily lay the groundwork for inconsis-
tent and erratic actionist policies. 
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Incidentally, this involves not only the NGOs, independent initiatives and 
coalitions for action but also the government policies of the mainstream. For 
instance, during the German federal election in September 2017, the German 
government was primarily concerned with ‘making’ the recalcitrant milieus 
compatible with modest mainstream approaches towards changed lifestyles, 
mobility and food. This was clearly seen in the case of the planned climate 
package for CO2-reduced infrastructure (see the interview in this volume 
with C. Mohn on the situation in the Lausitz region). The federal government, 
however, spoke much less about the social costs implied, or the significance 
of protests and other forms of opposition for successful transformation, 
never mind actual negotiations with the ‘locals’ affected.
3.2 Value-action gaps:  
Explanations for phenomena of transition resistance
The focus of emerging post-growth analyses has seldom been on explain-
ing the development of resistance to modernisation and progress. Worthy 
of mention are several interpretations of ‘resistance despite knowing bet-
ter’, which are based on psychological experiments. It is suggested that three 
factors play an important role here: diffusion of responsibility, pluralistic 
ignorance and ‘fear of judgment’ (Baecker 1999). First, models of diffusion of 
responsibility suggest that there is usually a sufficient number of individu-
als in society ready to undertake the practical implementation of any policy 
project. From the individual point of view, it can thus always be argued that 
‘the others should do it first’ (ibid.). Second, notions of pluralistic ignorance 
suggest that in unfamiliar situations individuals automatically prefer to base 
their behaviour on that of others. However, if – to put it brief ly – nobody 
does anything, then nobody can serve as a model of active intervention and 
possible change. Third, the concept of ‘fear of judgment’ suggests that acting 
in a supposedly wrong way leads to the actors concerned being negatively 
judged by others. 
Psychological consumer research and environmental and sustainability 
studies offer more explanations. They assume that a discrepancy between 
knowledge and action exists, known as the value-action gap (Kollmuss/
Agyeman 2002). This is said to ensure the retention of familiar and proven 
patterns of action. In contrast to the similar theory of cognitive dissonance, 
which holds that resisting change in difficult circumstances is due to people 
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reviewing their motives for past choices (Beckmann 1984), the value-action 
gap approach does not focus primarily on motivation but rather on actors’ 
knowledge. Particularly during the spread of social innovations, in society 
as a whole the paradoxical situation arises that, on the one hand, there is 
sufficient information to demonstrate that certain lifestyles are disadvanta-
geous. On the other hand, the same lifestyles continue to be led unchanged. 
For example, missing information about the individual and collective costs 
of changed behaviour can hinder implementation. We draw further on this 
concept below in the context of a more fundamental discussion of transfor-
mation theory.
3.3  Transformation and milieu analyses
The complexity of comparatively change-resistant social milieus has recently 
been demonstrated by long-term studies in ‘left-behind’ East German 
regions such as Wittenberge (Bude/Medicus/Willisch 2011) and similarly by 
qualitative research undertaken in the prefabricated housing estates of Lüt-
ten Klein near Rostock (Mau 2019). The historical dimension of such milieus 
has received considerable attention, but observations suggest that there are 
current milieu constellations in eastern Germany which are equally troubled 
but have been subject to considerably less research. Such milieus are facing 
a third social-ecological transformation. The first transformation was trig-
gered by the peaceful revolution of 1989/1990 in the GDR, while the second 
transformation began with the turn of the century during a dynamic surge 
in globalisation. It too required people to fundamentally reorient their lives. 
Finally, the federal government’s climate pact of 2019 led to the emergence of 
another transformation decided upon ‘on high’. Henceforth support will be 
directed towards lifestyles characterised by sustainable and resource-saving 
mobility and energy. In this complex third transformation, digital technol-
ogies and the use of digital communication media play a prominent role in 
intensifying social and spatial inequality.
The current reactions of the milieus affected by the aforementioned 
upheavals extend far beyond the visible political resistance seen in eastern 
Germany. The everyday cultural interpretations and positionings adopted 
by a cross-section of social strata draw on everyday biographies that include 
collective experiences with the authoritarianism of the GDR, memories of 
the powerlessness felt during the transformation of the system in the 1990s, 
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and sustained notions of the apparently unavoidable victimhood of ‘ordi-
nary people’. This is exacerbated by signals of uncertainty from the politi-
cal camps, which were newly established after German reunification. Such 
signals include a declining belief in the self-healing properties of market 
forces on the part of the liberals, but also the increasing relinquishment of 
old expectations of equality and participation by the social democrats. These 
changes are of course also ref lected upon and interpreted by the milieus. 
In such a situation, the popularity of change-resistant mechanisms can be 
plausibly explained by transformation theory in terms of people’s growing 
fear that they will have to face further demands and losses of their vested 
rights in the course of new upheavals.
3.4  Paradoxes of the current social transformation
Leaving aside the special case of post-socialist transformation and the sub-
sequent post-transformation, it is possible that the incipient post-growth 
focus, together with increasingly rigid climate policies, may create a par-
adoxical situation for society as a whole. On the one hand, specialist and 
everyday knowledge about the finite nature of resources and planetary 
boundaries is increasing, with equally significant contributions from pub-
lic discussions, media reportage and political discourse. On the other hand, 
there is a decline in robust experiential knowledge about how people can 
give up habitual consumption and ecologically unfavourable lifestyles. Many 
individuals are unclear about what adaptations to the new conditions could 
look like. Willingness to engage with these changes is stagnating in wide 
sections of the population, in line with the inability to formulate concrete, 
attractive objectives and increasingly strong visions of sacrifice and demise. 
Other explanations counter such suggestions by underlining the potency 
of stable behavioural routines, e. g. habitual practices of everyday consump-
tion, food, mobility and leisure. This seems a defence strategy enacted by 
political elites who often suggest that habits pass unchanged from genera-
tion to generation and can only be inf luenced by drastic measures. It follows 
that ecologically ‘unreasonable’ behaviour can be defined as a generational 
problem, while environment-consuming production models and neoliberal 
policies remain unmentioned. The Fridays generation can be safely cele-
brated as innovators and receive official government approval for justifiably 
punishing the generations of their parents, grandparents and great-grand-
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parents. Quite apart from the paternalist understanding of politics thus 
exposed (‘…they are finally coming to their senses’), the corresponding rhet-
oric fits into another context of interpretation and narrative that addresses 
the potential danger to the state posed by an underlying tendency to resist 
change. This includes recent political accusations concerning the revival of 
right-wing radicalism, as though it has simply hibernated among the popu-
lation in recent generations and cannot be controlled without intervention 
from ‘on high’. However, the proponents of notions of habitualism fail to 
shed much light on the concrete forces working to preserve the status quo in 
the social milieus. 
This is similarly true of the narrative hoping for a technicistic solution to 
the environmental and climate dilemma (Blühdorn/Butzlaff/Def lorian et al. 
2018) and the latest EU Green Deals based on CO2 pricing and climate-friendly 
economic restructuring (Claeys/Tagliapietra/Zachmann 2019). As paradig-
matic technology models, both approaches are intended to replace the cur-
rent era of production and create a CO2-neutral good life for everyone on the 
planet. This too tends to deny the ability of the population to regulate and 
emancipate itself. Furthermore, it largely ignores that a reliance on policies 
with a technical focus is somewhat paradoxical. It suggests that the negative 
consequences of technology should be countered with further technological 
measures rather than with alternative, everyday conceptual approaches. A 
utopia is thus propagandised but, against the background of increasing crit-
icism of technology, the issue of its concrete implementation receives little 
consideration. It is assumed that old habitualisations can be simply replaced 
with new ones, without more precisely analysing the role played by habits 
in social communities that are already burdened by past transformations. 
This seems an irony of history rather than a promising strategic inventory of 
rational policy approaches. Once before, socialist human-beings were to be 
created on the ruins of habitualised bourgeois lifestyles.
4. Blank spots on the map of transformation research
Social science and social-ecological analyses of transition scenarios have 
played a considerable part in ensuring that certain ways of dealing with eco-
logical imperatives have already been canonised, collectively internalised 
and defined as guiding policy principles. They suggest that environmental 
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destruction and climate change largely preclude political alternatives or pol-
icy options. In the public debate, science thus presents itself as a social avant-
garde and proves amazingly compatible with a number of parallel political 
discourses. For instance, recent sustainability studies (Geels/Schwanen/Sor-
rell et al. 2018) have drawn up normative frameworks intended to provide a 
basis for future transition. They then focus primarily on issues of planning, 
consumption, culture or policy linked to the implementation of the ‘nec-
essary’ transformations, especially in the field of material cycles, mobility 
resources, fossil fuels and food. 
In epistemological terms this normative research orientation has clear 
consequences. Established imperatives constructed in the political and 
everyday spheres are used as an implicit yardstick governing investigative 
logics, even in advance of the research. The research interest is directed 
towards the practical enactment of new and unquestioned norms, rather 
than towards constructions of meaning or the specific rationality of incip-
ient social transformation. Numerous best-practice case studies, feasibility 
studies, impact analyses and efficiency evaluations are therefore employed to 
develop applied and practicable findings for user-related policy approaches. 
Interest is thus directed towards designing the transformation towards 
more sustainability and future-proofing rather than focusing on exactly what 
the transformation means for different actors, what unintended side-effects 
it brings about, and how socially equitable it promises to be (Hargreaves/
Hielscher/Seyfang et al. 2013; Wolfram/Frantzeskaki 2016). In this respect 
sustainability studies conform to urban transition research, as well as much 
of the post-growth research undertaken by social and spatial sciences. They 
all share a subcutaneous attitude that involves following imperatives that 
are viewed as universally applicable, not only by ecological action groups but 
also by the political establishment. In the following, we use the neologism 
‘imperativism’ to describe such dispositions to act. 
This research focus puts the potential actors involved in the pending social 
transformation at the centre of attention of the spatial and social sciences. 
As pointed out by the rapidly expanding scholars’ debates on post-growth 
economies (Schulz 2012), much of the research concentrates on supposedly 
‘new’ actors (Lange 2017), e. g. post-growth pioneers, their obvious practices 
and spatial utilisation patterns (Othengrafen/Romero Renau/Kokkali 2016). 
If possible, these actors should have already experienced post-growth trans-
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formations relevant to their everyday lives and material f lows (Baier/Hans-
ing/Müller et al. 2016) or at least be working on their implementation. 
So far, so good? Unfortunately not, for two reasons. First, there has to 
date been no thorough analysis of the continued phenomenon of justified 
and voluntary resistance to change, i.e. the clinging on to a hard-earned sta-
tus quo. This refers primarily to the mental dispositions, ways of thinking 
and forms of habitus of those who do not allow themselves to be convinced 
by the new imperativism or who at least maintain a certain distance to it. 
Second, there is scarcely any discussion of the social upheavals that clearly 
accompany the imperativism. 
The deniers discussed above are not simply behaving in an unreasonable 
way, wanting to keep old habits for reasons of convenience or due to a lack 
of education or knowledge. On the contrary, they draw their recruits largely 
from the high-status middle classes, i.e. relatively well-off and better edu-
cated groups who are often viewed as the key performers in society. Busi-
ness elites are also included (Marg/Walter 2015). Nonetheless, they and their 
views are strangely marginalised in the political discourse, as though real-
world power structures were irrelevant for future-oriented ecological debate. 
After all, these groups command above-average cultural and economic capi-
tal. In addition, little is known about the current forms of communitisation 
developed by these actors, especially about the social relationships inside the 
social milieus they belong to. 
In addition, for problem-oriented social and spatial research, questions 
arise as to the social preconditions favouring change resistance and the 
social impacts of such forces. Do those resisting transformation reject all 
kinds of ecologically motivated changes – including the value-based renun-
ciation of economic growth postulates – or do they actually accept the ‘great’ 
imperative while refusing to support the many small changes associated 
with it? Do they in this case direct their attention rather to regional and sec-
toral growth, which they continue to view as desirable? In the light of a lack 
of empirical data it is only possible to speculate here. These issues are also 
connected to collective imaginaries, narratives and legitimising practices – 
phenomena that maintain growth moments in the face of the environmental 
consequences quasi ‘despite better available knowledge’. 
The resisters and deniers deserve more serious attention than they have 
hitherto received, whether they are considered as forces braking ecologi-
cal-political progress or as responsible ref lective thinkers or even as inno-
Bastian Lange, Hans-Joachim Bürkner278
vative reformers divorced from the social-ecological mainstream. Social 
science research is ill-prepared for such an endeavour. In practical research 
terms, for instance, disciplinary approaches lack important conceptual 
building blocks and connective links that would enable them to adapt exog-
enous knowledge. 
The perspectives of other disciplines can be used in a targeted fashion to 
critically question widely practised normativisms. The initial aim is to exam-
ine the situations requiring explanation by using unaccustomed terms and 
unfamiliar descriptive rhetoric.
5. Discursive dimensions of the resistance
5.1  Discursive framings
As a first step towards filling the research gap discussed above, sociologi-
cal approaches related to milieu theory and practice theory appear promis-
ing. However, important as they are, it might not be sufficient to concen-
trate on them. In addition to investigating the character of the resisters and 
their milieus, it is also important to focus on the discourses in which they 
appear. More precisely, research should target the manifestations, drivers 
and functions of political positions of resistance in the discourses about 
social-ecological transformation and post-growth. From the perspective 
of media theory, the hegemonic framings that drive the marginalisation of 
resisters, impeders and other non-conformists must first be described. In 
particular, the localisation of ‘deviators’ in certain regions and socio-spatial 
configurations can be a central element of framings of this sort – providing 
a new research object for basic geographical investigation of socio-spatial 
disparities. Framing theory of the late 2000s and early 2010s offers a theo-
retical foundation here (Chong/Druckman 2007; Matthes 2012). It allows the 
medial and discursive representation of individual population groups and 
circumstances to be addressed in terms of pre-existing inclusion-exclusion 
mechanisms and othering processes (Borah 2011). 
The concept of othering refers to the practice of attributing ‘other’ char-
acteristics that deviate from those of one’s own group to groups viewed as 
socially undesirable or inferior (Jensen 2011; Schwalbe 2000). This is closely 
related to practices of social identity formation and community building. 
‘Status quo avant-gardists’ and ‘prevention innovators’ 279
Therefore, research on othering can easily be combined with milieu theory. 
Exemplary analyses of ‘resistant’ milieus and deniers in East Germany may 
thus reveal othering practices as ‘real’ social phenomena, i.e. social facts 
existing beyond the imaginaries implemented in discourse. This makes it 
possible to explore the external ascriptions and the self-labelling of those 
affected, both of which transport hegemonic interpretations of otherness. 
The small shift in perspective towards hegemony and power relations allows 
othering to be defined as an outcome of social and political co-production. 
By considering power relations, othering can be defined as an elite project, 
namely as the process of forming and addressing political opponents. Oth-
ering is thus described as a dual phenomenon, as both everyday practice and 
as a political discursive process.
With a view to East German sensitivities however, it is possible to move 
even beyond in-depth descriptions of the ‘underdogs’ of othering. The self-po-
sitioning of the resisters in the discourse can also be adequately addressed. 
In particular, innovative and constructive elements of resistances and their 
effects can be uncovered. By investigating the winners of previous transfor-
mation spurts (e. g. successful entrepreneurs or lifestyle pioneers), it is pos-
sible to identify interpretations of the situation that enable those affected to 
develop proactive attitudes, produce original solutions and take successful 
strategic action. Simultaneously, the individual and milieu-specific counter-
forces to such attitudes can be clearly described, especially the tendency to 
accept victim roles. Such roles may appear to members of the milieu as part 
of their own concept of action and personality; yet they also see victimhood 
as a collective fate. Here what requires clarification is the extent to which 
frustration and resignation are cultivated as milieu-specific attitudes with-
out abandoning the intention to change the circumstances. 
This could provide answers to important questions concerning the con-
stitution of ‘status quo avant-gardists’ in the social, political and media dis-
courses. Similarly, the issue of role assignments and the chances of prevail-
ing in discourse can be addressed. From the perspective of social geography, 
these ideas are linked to an aspiration to speak as precisely as possible about 
the emergence of social and spatial inequality among those who do not ‘join 
in’ with ongoing processes of social change.
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5.2 Hegemonic perspectives on ‘status quo avant-gardists’ and 
‘prevention innovators’
In recent German history, transformation discourses have always been hege-
monic discourses. In them, their winners usually describe situations of mas-
sive change as necessary, compulsory and legitimated by impending dan-
gers. Precisely this hegemonic view is celebrated with startling regularity in 
debates on the post-socialist transformation of the 1990s and the post-trans-
formation since the millennium. Whether the focus is on the permanent eco-
nomic crisis following the transfer of West German institutions to the East, 
or on the dismantling of socialist industries, or on demographic change and 
population loss in the ‘new federal states’, or on the eastwards expansion of 
the EU and revision of the German and European border regime (Bürkner 
2020), or on the symbolic geopolitical build-up against the new and old 
opponent Russia, or on the consequences of the destabilisation of the Mid-
dle East and the waves of refugees from European neighbours – deviations 
from political common sense are repeatedly attributed to the losers of the 
social transformation of the last 30 years and particularly localised in East 
Germany. 
According to many government statements and media representations, 
it seems that in East Germany there are large zones characterised by mal-
contents, modernisation opponents, recalcitrants and even (old and new) 
enemies of democracy. This is undoubtedly a powerful construction of space 
that those in power can conveniently use in line with the divide et impera 
(‘divide and rule’) motto of ancient Rome. Good and evil thereby organise 
themselves in a quasi-natural spatial division of labour. 
What initially appears to be a continuation of Germany’s domestic trans-
formation debate – reduced to a crude East-West dichotomy – hides the 
many nuances and differentiated views on the connection between ecology, 
the economy and system transformation. Furthermore, this superficial view 
disguises the internal conditions in the two ‘geographical’ camps. It is by no 
means the case that there are no resourceful innovators in the German cri-
sis regions. Innovative start-ups in the high-tech industry in eastern Sax-
ony and environmental sector companies active on the world market with 
international networks indicate that there are not only losers and deniers in 
East Germany. It is also not the case that West Germany has no opponents 
to ecologically motivated modernisation. For example, the West hosts the 
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permanently crisis-ridden Ruhr area and the rural areas of Lower Saxony 
with their continued ecological disasters (e. g. the factual and literal ‘manure 
pits’ of Germany produced by regional industrialised agriculture). How-
ever, these maldevelopments have not triggered noteworthy critique of the 
relevant politics. On the contrary, these regions are examples of mental and 
political resistance to change where refusers range from local elites to ordi-
nary citizens.
The national policy discourse and the media debates in Germany do 
not, however, focus on cooperative learning from the political conf licts 
surrounding social renewal and the possibility of post-growth. Rather, old 
resentments are used to further everyday political interests, both to increase 
newspaper circulations and to gain votes.
6.  On the emancipation of the ‘status quo avant-gardists’ in 
the post-growth debate – an initial résumé 
It cannot be overlooked that in interest-driven discourses, views are strate-
gically advanced that decide on the collective ascription of particular char-
acteristics to people and places. The confrontation with resisters, impeders 
and ‘blockers’, and even with their apparently natural habitats, is not only 
argumentative but also emotionally ridden and moralising. It can be easily 
identified as part of a hegemonic discourse and corresponding framing. 
This opens up promising fields of activity for social and spatial sciences 
concerned with the phenomenon of change resistance. The first step must 
be to consider the relevant actors, their political positions, social practices 
and discursive interventions more closely. It can do no harm to apply a lit-
tle dialectics in order to avoid the suggestive power of polarising figures of 
thought. We draw on the dialectic concept of the Frankfurt School of sociol-
ogy (Adorno 2000) which aims for the open-ended reconstruction of social 
developments with all their contradictions. In social practice, supposedly 
conservative elements are always associated with progressive elements. 
Their individual meaningfulness becomes apparent only in relation to their 
respective counterparts. Accordingly, a clinging to the status quo can only 
arise from the actors’ cognitive, emotional and social engagement with 
the alternative positions and modes of behaviour – in this case with active 
change. 
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In concrete terms, this may mean that the supposed deniers have good 
reasons for not (or not immediately) affiliating themselves with superficial 
action postulates and instead favour more fundamental engagement with 
alternative ideas. These ideas need not necessarily be reactionary or igno-
rant of the problem. Especially in times of symbolic policymaking and hectic 
actionism, pronounced obstructors can also be sources of innovative inspira-
tion. These actors often declare their own forms of social practice, everyday 
experiences and sensibilities as the starting point of a search for practicable 
solutions – and thus reject abstract, untried or ideologically preformulated 
blanket solutions (see Marg/Walter 2015 on the mental and strategic orien-
tations of medium-scale entrepreneurs). Social-ecological analysis should 
focus more closely on precisely these actors and their deliberate positioning 
in difficult discursive terrain. 
Those affected may hope for open debate, but at present their attempts to 
inf luence the future development of society with their ‘divergent’ demands 
meet with a rather violent rejection of the thinking on which they are based. 
Ironically, in the current debates on climate and post-growth – with their 
rhetoric of urgency and a lack of alternatives –, demands for emancipation 
and open-ended search processes are in constant danger of being margin-
alised. With the rhetorical figure of illegitimate ‘divergence’, such demands 
can easily be stigmatised as politically undesirable by advocates of the sup-
posedly incontrovertible imperative. This can foster a new authoritarianism 
that is diametrically contrary to the goals of a broadly based ecological tran-
sition and the inquisitive testing of post-growth practices. 
This tendency can become a marked brake on innovation, namely if the 
hegemonic ascriptions of others are repeatedly adopted by those affected. 
From the perspective of social sciences, it is therefore necessary to carefully 
observe the extent to which milieu-external sovereignties of interpreta-
tion paralyse willingness to act and proactive strategies. In the future, the 
ambivalent situation of those already marginalised in political space or those 
threatened with marginalisation must be made visible in good time. This 
ambivalent situation arises from the dilemma of wanting to be socially and 
economically innovative but being assessed as incapable of innovation. 
The inclusion-exclusion problem involved in othering practices and 
framings of ‘divergence’ makes clear that the primary concern of the polit-
ically marginalised can only be to work towards their own emancipation. 
Future analyses must therefore aim to uncover the emancipatory elements 
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of the change-resistant perspective and to describe the degree to which 
the actors concerned are potential or de-facto avant-gardists, rather than 
treating them as marginalised groups who lack any potential for change or 
even a claim to power. If such research findings then feed into the ongoing 
post-growth debate, then it may be possible to shift the emancipatory per-
spectives, which are still frequently labelled as a minority concern, into the 
mainstream.
7.  Further ideas and consequences for the discipline
The recognition of research deficits immediately triggers further conceptual 
questions. From the perspective of milieu theory and discourse theory, it is 
necessary to provide a context-oriented analysis of change resistance and 
its impacts, focusing on social differentiations. It can be assumed that sup-
posedly isolationist movements – especially if they are perceived as regional 
phenomena – indicate more general social resistance that should be anal-
ysed and discussed on a broader basis. 
It should be noted here that social transformation discourses are not 
only inf luenced by abstract norms, values and action logics but also by the 
interests of heterogenous actors and their prospects of prevailing. Actors 
enter the confrontations with different socio-economic statuses, different 
amounts of social capital, different concrete (social, economic and symbolic) 
profit expectations and different ascribed (qua status) and acquired (in dis-
course) power or ability to assert themselves. 
Greater contextualisation of the regionalisation processes of change 
resistance is also urgently required. These processes should be understood 
as an expression of individual and temporary assertions of sovereignty, 
which emanate from regionally anchored milieus. In their particular spa-
tial-temporal manifestations, such regionalisations can overlap with older 
socio-spatial disparities. For example, transition processes prescribed by 
policy from ‘on high’ (the phase-out of coal, the mobility transition, the taxa-
tion of fossil fuels) can lead to a weakening of socio-economic positions sim-
ply as a result of marginalising actors because of their spatial distribution, 
especially when they live in peripheral regions or act as commuters at some 
distance from centres). 
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Are these change-resistant milieus then really interested in preventing 
further socio-economic marginalisation and that is the only reason why they 
cling to apparently obsolete patterns of mobility, lifestyles and consumption? 
Or are the denial positions adopted rather as a consequence of the margin-
alisation of these milieus in the public and political discourses, i.e. tenden-
tially independent of concrete experiences of spatial-social disparities? Such 
research questions indicate the need to consider new geographical fragmen-
tations and processes of social peripheralisation as normal objects of investi-
gation in post-growth research. 
Finally, it is time to pursue focused analyses of discourses and framings 
to gain important indications of paradoxes, hybridisations and ambivalences 
in the post-growth debate. Social sciences have for some time been aware 
that these phenomena are central characteristics of postmodernism; how-
ever it is nonetheless easy to lose sight of concrete symptoms and indicators. 
Ref lexive processes are found much more frequently in situations of transi-
tion than in plateaued phases of social development. This is because dissent, 
diverging policy objectives and social upheavals are then more apparent than 
in less conf lictive times. Discursive processes of marginalisation and the 
imposing of public sanctions on ‘deniers’ have a direct impact on the social 
positioning and scope of inf luence of those affected – which often results in 
what was weak resistance developing into tougher opposition. In such cases, 
the attribution ‘denier’ becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Under these conditions, the critical social sciences must urgently reject 
hegemonic opinions concerning what is ‘good’ and ‘right’. A failure to do so 
risks the development of a knowledge culture that affirms existing power 
imbalances. Such developments are hardly compatible with emancipation 
and calls for debates on equal footing for all.
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The growth fixation of the European Union 
A commentary on the draft Green Deal
Christian Schulz
As the introduction to this book describes, in the wake of the so-called 
‘economic and financial crisis’ of 2007/2008, the EU was – along with the 
OECD and the UN – one of the most powerful and visible actors worldwide 
to address the growth paradigm. The 2009 publication of ‘GDP and beyond. 
Measuring progress in a changing world’ (European Commission 2009) was 
unusually clear in its description of the inadequacy of conventional mea-
surement methods and indicator systems for assessing economic develop-
ment and social prosperity and proposed the overdue inclusion of ecological 
and social indicators. Similarly, the fact that in subsequent years the EU-Par-
liament addressed post-growth approaches, at times very visibly (see the 
interview with Tom Bauler in this book), suggests that there may have been a 
rethinking of the development goals of economic, infrastructure and social 
policy. Details of the European ‘Green Deal1’ presented by the ‘Von der Leyen 
Commission’ at the end of 2019 were therefore eagerly anticipated  (Euro-
pean Commission 2019). Even though mid-February 2020 is too early for a 
systematic evaluation of the Green Deal, which has so far only appeared in 
broad outline, an initial assessment of this quite remarkable paper is under-
taken here. The focus is primarily on the following questions: 
1. What understanding of growth does the Green Deal employ? To what 
extent is it possible to identify reorientations in comparison to previous 
1   On the general debate about the post-growth compatibility of Green (New) Deals – also 
including the US approach, the special issue ‘Green New Deal’ of the journal politische ökol-
ogie (Fuhrhop 2019) and the report by the European Environmental Bureau (EEB 2019) are 
recommended.
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development principles – e.g. the Europe 2020 Strategy (European Com-
mission 2010)?
2. To what extent is the Green Deal ‘space sensitive’ both in terms of the 
inner-European diversity of spatial contexts and conditions (also see the 
article by Szumelda in this volume), and in terms of global distribution 
and justice issues (see the article by Bruns in this book)?
I am fully aware that this evaluation may shortly require revision but believe 
that a consideration of current political activities on the EU level is nonethe-
less a valuable contribution to this compendium. 
Figure 1: Elements of the EU Green Deal / Source: European Commission 2019: 3
The understanding of growth in the Green Deal
The Green Deal is presented as ‘a new growth strategy that aims to transform 
the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient 
and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse 
gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use’ 
(European Commission 2019: 2). Even just in this preamble, it is possible to 
discern continued belief in an efficiency-based solution to the resource prob-
lem. The subsequent text is dominated by terms such as ‘efficiency’, ‘smart’ 
and ‘competitive’ and similarly by an evident technology orientation – e.g. 
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‘keep its competitive advantage in clean technologies’ (ibid.: 19) or ‘leverage 
the potential of the digital transformation, which is a key enabler for reach-
ing the Green Deal objectives’ (ibid.: 7). The term growth itself is not prob-
lematised and is used throughout with positive connotations (see Table  1). 
The terms of ‘sufficiency’, ‘less’ and similar concepts do not appear at all.








Textual basis: European Commission 2019
1 excluding names like European Investment Bank or InvestEU
2 with positive connotations throughout
More serious questioning of market-based mechanisms and the resulting 
patterns of consumption is only undertaken in the section that discusses the 
upcoming action plan on the circular economy, which includes ‘measures 
to encourage businesses to offer, and to allow consumers to choose, reus-
able, durable and repairable products. It will analyse the need for a “right to 
repair”, and curb the built-in obsolescence of devices, in particular for elec-
tronics. Consumer policy will help to empower consumers to make informed 
choices and play an active role in the ecological transition. New business 
models based on renting and sharing goods and services will play a role as 
long as they are truly sustainable and affordable’ (ibid.: 8). 
In contrast, other sections reveal a reliance on large-scale technological 
solutions and the substitution of, e.g., fossil fuels: ‘EU industry needs “cli-
mate and resource frontrunners” to develop the first commercial applica-
tions of breakthrough technologies in key industrial sectors by 2030. Priority 
areas include clean hydrogen, fuel cells and other alternative fuels, energy 
storage, and carbon capture, storage and utilisation. As an example, the 
Commission will support clean steel breakthrough technologies leading to 
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a zero-carbon steel making process by 2030’ (ibid.: 10). In the field of renew-
able energies, the development of offshore wind parks is highlighted as par-
ticularly relevant, a very specialised and centralising approach.
The recommendations that are made for the transport sector do not 
problematise avoidable causes of mobility (e.g. in freight transport or set-
tlement structures). They rather focus exclusively on changes in choices of 
transport mode (modal split) and, above all, on zero and low emission vehi-
cles and alternative fuels. The investments planned in the building sector, 
primarily refurbishment intended to improve the energy performance of the 
existing building stock, focus on thermal insulation and especially on tech-
nology-based (smart) approaches. In contrast, there is hardly any mention 
of new forms of housing, reduced land take, combating high vacancy rates, 
directing new building activities, etc. (also see Fuhrhop 2019).
Statements made by the Green Deal in the field of agriculture and food 
production remain extremely vague. The planned ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy 
calls for higher product standards and the reduced use of fertilisers and pes-
ticides. However, the inherent structural problems of industrialised agricul-
ture in general and factory farming in particular are not addressed.
The criteria to be applied to sustainable investments (European Com-
mission 2019: 17) will be defined in the EU taxonomy that is currently being 
developed (see article by Dörry/Schulz in this volume). The taxation reforms 
announced present the prospect of ‘shifting the tax burden from labour to 
pollution’ (European Commission 2019: 17). This refers primarily to CO2 tax-
ation rather than to the fundamental taxing of resources and materials – as 
the post-growth movement and the ecological economy have demanded for 
some time.
Spatial dimensions of the Green Deal
There is no closer consideration of spatial structures or of the role of spatial 
planning and regional/local conditions for socio-ecological transition pro-
cesses. Spatial differentiation is only undertaken in the context of structural 
and social policy measures designed to mitigate new regional inequalities. 
‘At the same time, this transition must be just and inclusive. It must put 
people first, and pay attention to the regions, industries and workers who 
will face the greatest challenges’ (ibid.: 2); ‘The Just Transition Mechanism 
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will focus on the regions and sectors that are most affected by the transition 
because they depend on fossil fuels or carbon-intensive processes’ (ibid.: 16).
Spatial interdependencies are discussed for the sectoral policies on a 
global level:
a. In relation to the boundlessness of environmental problems and their 
causes, e.g. ‘The drivers of climate change and biodiversity loss are global 
and are not limited by national borders’ (ibid.: 2);
b. With regard to possible relocations or migration processes (‘pollution 
havens’) and the substitution of European products by imported arti-
cles from countries with lower environmental standards, e.g. ‘there is 
a risk of carbon leakage, either because production is transferred from 
the EU to other countries with lower ambition for emission reduction, 
or because EU products are replaced by more carbon-intensive imports’ 
(ibid.: 6);
c. Referring to the prospect of attractive international markets for ‘green’ 
technologies and products, e.g. ‘There is significant potential in global 
markets for low-emission technologies, sustainable products and ser-
vices’ (ibid.: 7).
Part 3 of the Green Deal (European Commission 2019: 20–22) is dedicated 
to the global role of the EU, primarily in relation to reliance on pioneering 
(product-) standards, the modernisation of global production chains (envi-
ronmental and social standards) and the development of trade barriers for 
products that do not satisfy EU standards. Furthermore, there is favourable 
mention of global trading of emissions certificates and carbon offsetting 
measures, direct investment in renewable energies, sustainable everyday 
practices (‘clean cooking’) and urban infrastructures in countries of the 
Global South (especially in African countries). The somewhat utilitarian per-
spective adopted here is evidently one specific to industrialised countries 
and includes little serious ref lection of global interdependencies or neo-co-
lonial attitudes (see the article by Bruns in this book for more detail).
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Conclusion
In comparison with previous strategies, the European Green Deal aims to 
drive much more ambitious climate policy goals and more determined, 
cross-sectoral reforms. Nonetheless, the rather uncritical use of the growth 
concept, coupled with a strong emphasis on competitive technological devel-
opment, market leadership and export opportunities, suggests strong par-
allels to other primarily efficiency-based approaches of the green economy 
(UNEP 2011). However, in contrast, e.g., to the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (primarily SDG 8, see the Introduction to this book), this proposal does 
not use gross domestic product as a parameter for future development or 
define concrete growth goals. Whether this in itself indicates a move away 
from GDP and a reorientation towards development goals seems, however, 
doubtful.
As the article discussed here is only a communication, a proposal by the 
Commission to the European Parliament and Council, the Green Deal will be 
the subject of further discussion in the near future. This coincides with the 
contentious negotiations of the first post-Brexit budget and the budget dis-
cussions will also examine the content and objectives of the Green Deal and 
its funding needs. Initial reactions from the member states (such as France 
on the topic of agriculture) make it clear that the already moderate ambitions 
of the paper will be further watered down. There is an opportunity here to 
use the momentum of current debates on climate policy and growth-critical 
discussion found in much of society and the economy to take a major step 
forward. However, the Green Deal finally adopted – if it survives the nego-
tiation process at all – seems very likely to fall far short of its original ambi-
tions. And it will thus have still less in common with a post-growth reorien-
tation than the document discussed here. 
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We have a responsibility      
to be a bit more pragmatic 
An interview with Dr Yvonne Rydin, conducted by Christian Schulz
Yvonne Rydin is Professor and Chair of Planning, Environment and Public Policy 
at the Bartlett School of Planning, University College London. In her research 
on sustainable development, she focuses on planning processes, questions 
of democratic participation, political power and governance, and the role of 
civil-society organisations. Her ground-breaking book ‘The future of plan-
ning: Beyond growth dependence’ (2007, Policy Press) critically addresses the 
growth paradigm of spatial planning.
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/planning/prof-yvonne-rydin 
What do degrowth approaches mean for your own research?
Yvonne Rydin: My current work is actually focused on planning for low-
growth areas. What I’m interested in is looking at areas that seem to be 
beyond the reach of growth-orientated policies and seeing how they are cop-
ing, what their options are. So, the work I’m focusing on at the moment is a 
comparative study. 
In England, this looks at Cambridge and Cambridgeshire. Cambridge 
is very well known for the Cambridge Phenomenon, a lot of growth both 
in the hi-tech industry, but also housing and residential development with 
new urban centres, and I’m setting that in the context of Cambridgeshire, 
which is very much a county of two halves. In the area to the north and the 
east, an area we call Fenland and East Cambridgeshire, the settlements are 
much poorer, with some severe public health problems, severe problems of 
unemployment, and benefit dependency. It’s very, very different to the city 
of Cambridge, so that makes a good contrast. I’m comparing that with a case 
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in Sweden, in southern Sweden, which is Malmö, also very well known for 
undergoing a shift from a post-industrial city to a knowledge city. There is 
also growth along the Malmö-Helsingborg corridor. But in the county of 
Skåne and in the eastern and northern areas, there is much less economic 
growth to drive change. 
So, what I’m really interested in is looking at the contrasts and identify-
ing what are the options in both cases to the areas to the north and east of the 
growth centres, beyond simply trying and failing to attract growth. What do 
you do with the bits that are – and I don’t like this language, but people use it 
– ‘left behind areas’? Maybe it’s not so much that they are left behind, but that 
they need something else. For the future, they need a new kind of planning.
I think that planners have very little in the way of tools or visions avail-
able for these areas. For instance, in Cambridgeshire I looked at the different 
districts and their plans; all of them bar one are basically saying ‘well, we 
need more growth’ and they just have no idea of how to get that! One district 
has gone for a more community-based approach, but interestingly they find 
themselves in conf lict with the central government organisation that exam-
ines local plans, and that’s an interesting story that is still ongoing. 
To what extent do these phenomena challenge your textbooks for future planners?
Yvonne Rydin: We have less reliance on textbooks today to be honest, but I 
think if you look at the syllabuses, even in my own school, and what most of 
the research is about, it tends to focus on big developments, the big money, 
the big shifts, urban regeneration, public-private partnerships, mega-proj-
ects; it’s all very focused on the growth paradigm. I think that’s fairly embed-
ded, and I think it does take a bit of rethinking right down at the core; what 
is the economic model behind this and is it a model that is actually working 
or not? And I do think this is very much about rethinking the differences 
between working with big capital and working with small capital, and also 
working across the economy/society divide. The conventional economic 
model starts from the differentiation between the household and the firm, 
two sectors, two sides of the diagram, and I think we need to reconceptualise 
that relationship as well. So, I’ve started to play around with ideas of – and 
I’m sure other people are doing this too – the localised economy, the localised 
society and localised planning as a way of rethinking how these relationships 
actually work.
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Certainly, what we need is a more hybrid planning system; we need to 
move away from a one-size-fits-all solution which tends to be the growth 
solution, and we need hybridity in the planning system, with a recognition 
that you need to know your context and you need to customise your solution 
to that context. When you look at context, a localised context, we’ve got used 
to looking at the resources of civil society, but I think we’re much less used 
to looking at the resources of endogenous, very small-scale capital. And we 
need to think about how to work better across the civil society / small-scale 
capital divide, and consider what capital can do in relation to this. Also we 
need to work with some of the more localised, embedded, larger scale capital. 
It might be private sector, it might be public sector, or be on the very fuzzy 
boundary we now have between the public and the private sector. 
I’ve been reading quite a lot about what happens in the United States; 
it’s very interesting the way that universities and philanthropic founda-
tions very often act as anchor institutions helping to build different kinds 
of local economy, often with the cooperation of smaller, endogenous, locally 
owned businesses. They are more accepting of growth coalitions, they are 
more accepting of urban regimes, and they don’t have the same trust in the 
planning sector that we have, so they are starting from a different place, but 
there is something here that we can learn from.
Do you see particular methodological implications resulting from this?
Yvonne Rydin: It’s much easier, as I tell all my students, to research what’s 
there, and what has happened. And of course, if one is looking, in these lower 
growth areas, for the options that haven’t been tried, that’s really, really dif-
ficult! You end up in thought experiments, and as academics, you can sort-of 
look a little silly. You can promote ideas that are not realistic. So, I think 
there are quite important methodological issues here about how you actu-
ally look for what has been missed – the silences, the absences – and then 
think about how those can be filled, but in a way that makes sense, that isn’t 
just idealism. I think we have a lot of academic papers that do very rigorous 
research but end with rather idealistic suggestions; we have a responsibility 
to be a bit more pragmatic in what we actually recommend. 
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The local scale seems to be of key interest for your work. Why is that?
Yvonne Rydin: In planning, there is a national and even international frame-
work, and we must always take into account that it makes a huge difference: 
that is, the institutional arrangements that central government puts in place, 
or state governments in different kinds of political systems. But the question 
is usually what can you do at a local level – with this site, with this city? So 
the locality is very much the scale that we want to operate at – to think about 
what is actually possible at that kind of scale. My hunch or hypothesis is that 
the kind of knowledge that local planning works with is absolutely central. 
And the kind of knowledge used – not just data, but also assessments and 
evaluations – focus the attention in particular kinds of ways. Certainly in 
the UK system, where I have studied this so far, knowledge is very focused 
on particular growth dynamics and concerns about releasing land to meet 
those growth dynamics. I suppose one of the things I am looking for is: what 
are the alternative knowledge claims, the alternative knowledge sets that we 
might draw upon to think about doing planning in a different way? 
There is a lot of interest in lay and experiential knowledge, and I think 
that’s important where communities are trying to resist the negative effects 
of growth. But beyond this, I have a feeling that we really need to develop 
new knowledge, and I suspect some of this is around the knowledge of the 
local economy, what actually is happening particularly in the SME sector, 
and what is going on there; generally, we know very little to nothing. And if 
we don’t know about it, how do we harness it, how do we support it? So, my 
hunch is that I need to look at the different kinds of knowledge claims as a 
way of thinking about the different kinds of planning that can happen in 
localities. The interesting picture here is often on the boundary of academic 
and grey literature and it’s about all the little case studies of what’s going on 
all around the world, and trying to pull together all those case studies and 
learn from them. With conventional methodologies it is difficult to have a 
rigorous framework for doing that; it’s almost detective work, I think.
A lot is written about best practices, in that you have to recontextualise 
them when you move them to a different space; this is about the knowledge 
you need about your locality in order to recontextualise well, so that you’re 
not just borrowing things inappropriately. That isn’t just about knowing the 
best practice example, it’s also knowing about the context into which you 
are trying to situate it. So, if you have a training scheme that’s a good idea in 
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an American small town, that helped to build the capacities of lower income 
communities and got them into various kinds of employment, okay, that 
seems like a good idea. But if we take it to somewhere like Cambridgeshire, 
then we need to know about the differences between the localities, about 
how we may retool that idea for this place. 
If you were given an unconditional degrowth research grant allowing you to hire a 
postdoc for two years, what would be the topical focus of your project?
Yvonne Rydin: What I think I would do is I would get somebody and make 
sure that they are situated in one or a small number of low-growth areas, 
but get them really embedded in there. Not to do the sort of f ly-in f ly-out 
research, which we very often have to do if we are not working in our own 
backyard. Instead do a quasi-ethnography with local SMEs and smaller busi-
nesses and with smaller NGOs, to get to really know this locality and use 
that to think about how we could work through changes that could actually 
be put into effect. This would take into account knowledge that is being cre-
ated elsewhere, but also the barriers that are in place and the institutional 
arrangements, as in financial or market structures. What I think I would 
ideally like to do would be to have that embedded kind of research, the 
opportunity for which I’ve not had for a very long amount of time now.
This is very demanding and involves a long-term commitment to com-
munities in order to work with them and alongside them. I think it’s easier 
to do that if you do it in your own backyard. I have colleagues who work with 
communities within London and it works very well; and I can see you have 
universities in the States, where there is a long distance to the next large 
place, so academics automatically work on their own town. We in Europe 
have been pulled away from that a little bit, and have been encouraged to 
cross boundaries – till now.

We should continue this dialogue    
with the EU institutions
An interview with Prof Dr Tom Bauler, conducted by Christian Schulz
Tom Bauler is Chair of Environment and Economy at Université Libre de Brux-
elles (ULB). In his research on socio-ecological transition he focuses, among 
other things, on questions of environmental governance, alternative indicators 
of social welfare and social innovations. In 2018 he was the academic partner 
and co-organiser of the Post-Growth Conference at the European Parliament.1
http://igeat.ulb.ac.be/fr/equipe/details/person/tom-bauler/ 
How did it come about that the Post-Growth Conference in 2018 was hosted by the 
European Parliament?
Tom Bauler: There are different layers of explanation as to why we were 
involved in this. A very personal one is that it was an initial initiative by a 
Member of Parliament, a Belgian politician called Phillipe Lamberts, who is 
in ‘Ecolo’, so part of the Group of the Greens in the European Parliament. I 
know him a little bit, his parliamentary assistant was a former student of 
mine and he wrote his Master’s thesis under my coordination on material 
f lows in Wallonia and how to re-configure these material f lows under a 
degrowth programme, what would happen with these material f lows once 
you accept that there is some form of degrowth. And Phillipe actually was 





The people around Vincent Liégey and Federico Demaria – involved in the 
‘degrowth&science network’ – started to initiate a ref lection on how to cre-
ate a more formal science-policy interface – a degrowth science, degrowth 
movements, degrowth activism, policy democracy sort of interface. Their 
first move was to set up a roundtable session on ‘degrowth in parliaments’ 
at this conference. They were looking for keynote participants for the round-
table, and the idea emerged that Phillipe was the MEP to invite. He’s a bit 
atypical as a member of the Green Party, at least for Belgium, because he 
engages very much with industry and more generally economic activities. As 
a consequence, he sits also on the more ‘hardcore’ commissions of the Euro-
pean Parliament, so not the environment or energy, but the industry and the 
trades and that sort of stuff. He has a very precise idea on what degrowth 
means for him. 
So, it started with that roundtable session and then Phillipe came back 
from Budapest with quite some enthusiasm, with the consequence that then 
Olivier came to me in order to request some local academic support for a 
Brussels EP-conference on de-/post-growth. Olivier reached out to other 
parties, so there were people from the socialists, from here and there, and 
they formed a coalition actually, a cross-party group. Phillipe also financed 
a study on macro-economic modelling exercises, what would it mean, a 
degrowth trajectory for Europe, in terms of macroeconomic effects. They 
gave that to colleagues in Barcelona and Italy. When Philippe had that report 
on his table, Olivier came back to me with more concrete plans. The call came 
thus actually from two sides, both the degrowth people around Vincent 
Liégey and Federico Demaria and Giorgos Kallis, and this working group at 
the European Parliament, and a little bit in between that, ourselves, the local 
academic partner, and the European Environmental Bureau, which is a fed-
eration of environmental NGOs, a lobbying group. We all came together and 
thought we need to do something and then after a couple of discussions it 
became quite quickly clear that we had to try to see how far we could enter 
into a dialogue with the hardcore chief economists of the different European 
institutions.
So, the event was finally hosted by the Parliament, in their premises?
Tom Bauler: There is a very obvious aspect to this choice. If you want to do 
something in the European Parliament, you can either be hosted by a Mem-
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ber of Parliament (MEP) or by a group of MEPs. If it’s a trans-party group, it 
achieves more importance in the Parliament itself, you get more attention, 
and obviously also bigger funding. At one point the leverage was sufficient 
for Phillipe to try to get the president of the European Parliament (EP) on 
board. As a consequence, the entire initiative formally became an initiative 
by the entire Parliament and not just of a bunch of specific MEPs. The line 
of reasoning was that in 2007 and 2009/10 the EP had organised a series of 
‘Beyond GDP’ conferences, and the present initiative could be linked to that 
line of debate, ten years later. They understood that that sort of heterodox 
thinking had already gained access once to the Parliament, and with quite 
some success as people still speak of it as if the Parliament had had a lead 
role in that international discussion around the renewal of indicators. So the 
EP saw a chance to do something like this again, with a post-growth agenda 
this time.
Was it a one-of f event? Or did something happen af terwards in terms of  perpetu-
ating this dialogue?
Tom Bauler: Well, the dialogue between the European Parliament and 
degrowth academia and degrowth movements goes on, in both ways. That 
relatively loose working group has been extended a little bit at the level of 
the European Parliament, which has also had to digest the latest elections 
and the debate around the new Commission. The next move – at the level of 
the degrowth community – is to organise something at the ‘International 
Degrowth & Ecological Economics Conference’ in Manchester this year 
(2020). So that dynamic goes on. 
At the end of the 2018 conference, we had indeed in mind – because we all 
found the initiative quite productive – that we would continue some of the 
encounters with the EU officials. The plan was to let the European elections 
pass, to wait for the new Parliament and the new European Commission, and 
to then redo a bigger event in Brussels. So if everything goes right we will 
have a bigger initiative in Brussels again at the level of the institutions. In 
parallel, meanwhile there is a sort of formalisation of the dialogue, as there 
have been a series of closed-door events in Brussels. Actually, the call came 
from the more central orthodox economists at the level of the institutions – 
to have closed-door events, to discuss more technical issues such as social 
protection on a degrowth agenda. 
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In your everyday work as a university teacher and researcher, to what extent can 
you include degrowth approaches?
Tom Bauler: It is marginal, I would say in my research work, I don’t have 
proper projects that I would say are really on degrowth. I had some activities 
in the past on alternative economic indicators, which some people say is part 
of the degrowth agenda, but maybe not. I did something on social innova-
tion. Some of these social innovation issues are also part of a degrowth sce-
nario because of their disruptive nature. Broadly I would say, I don’t have a 
research agenda which focuses on degrowth. 
But teaching is very different. My main teaching activities are related 
to ecological economics, so I teach a form of heterodox economics where 
macroeconomic issues become very prominent. As a consequence, I quite 
strongly question growth trajectories being an avenue to bring us to being 
able to respect climate objectives and adjacent environmental objectives like 
that. For instance, in my main course I have a whole chapter on degrowth, 
macroeconomics, macro-ecological economics, which is basically degrowth 
economics. I also teach a course on environmental consumption and psy-
chology, where I also teach things like frugality and sufficiency which could 
be seen as being part of a degrowth agenda. The teaching embodies actually 
quite a lot of links to this literature and its whole mindset.
How do you deal with the fact that most of the textbooks in your field are still rather 
orthodox?
Tom Bauler: I have a regular textbook which is on environmental economics, 
I tell my students that that is the technical part of the story, if you want to 
understand what a market is or what a price is, those sort of technicalities, 
they should go to that textbook. And then for each chapter, so to speak, for 
each topic, I have identified a set of more focal readings, which are not text-
books anymore, because textbooks don’t exist in all of these fields, it’s more 
a set of papers.
In your research on social innovation, do you face any particular methodological 
challenges related to the degrowth approach?
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Tom Bauler: Yes, I think the biggest challenges are on the methodological 
side. At the moment we struggle with the fact that all these objects of studies 
are entangled in very intense dynamics and are changing more rapidly than 
you can get the data on them. ‘Social innovation in the making’ is really very 
challenging in terms of stabilising your object of research and your unit of 
analysis. It’s one of the classical things: it’s not so difficult to characterise 
them, to stay with them one or two years, but to stabilise the object in order 
to really understand what is happening is really a challenge.
Another challenge that is a little bit more traditional is that there is quite 
a high demand from a lot of these ‘objects’ to actually use transdisciplinary or 
co-creation approaches. For a lot of obvious reasons and for a lot of good rea-
sons, but that methodological avenue is tending to monopolise the method 
choice a little bit, it’s starting to become like a hegemony of method. If you 
want to study social innovation, you almost are supposed to do it in a co-cre-
ational way. I can understand that call in particular, but it gets quite mono-
lithic. I don’t like that particularly, I’d prefer more variety, especially when 
it comes to some of the funding. For Brussels’ regional funding for instance, 
if you want to do research on social innovation, it almost for sure has to be 
in a co-creational mode. Simultaneously, students, but also PhD candidates 
or postdocs tend more and more to favour transdisciplinary or co-creation 
processes. Which is very interesting as such, but it should not be only that.
If you were given an unconditional degrowth research grant allowing you to hire a 
postdoc for two years, what would be the topical focus of your project?
Tom Bauler: There are two answers to that, the first one is more linked to 
the current state of affairs in policy design, maybe the transition agenda or 
something like that. The topic would be defined by a lack of work on the gov-
ernance of ‘exnovation’, i. e. trying to understand how to make policies to 
help society to do the opposite of innovation. Phase out specific socio-tech-
nical systems in particular socio-economic sectors. That is one research 
agenda which is interesting me right now very much; but it would not be a 
lifetime project. The thing that troubles me at the moment is that I get the 
impression very selfishly within academia, there is a long way to go to bring 
us away from the current, present ‘bizarreries’ which configure our institu-
tions and our activities. In particular the configuration around ‘fast science’ 
(fast publications, fast projects, fast solutions …) which I really find increas-
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ingly difficult. I’m not saying everything is bad in the present science busi-
ness, but I have more and more the impression that academia is a little bit 
like a headless chicken at the moment, in terms of how my professional life is 
organised and the activities and lives of those around me. 
It’s a rich struggle in how to teach, how to research, how to do science 
actually. What if your projects followed a sort of a degrowth agenda on doing 
science? That could be very interesting. So one avenue could be to develop 
some research in a prospective mode on how to understand the future of sci-
ence, that would be really interesting I guess.
Another thing we are facing over here in Brussels which I am trying to 
get my head around is to capture the memories of our European institutions. 
If I look at the very very senior civil servants in the European institutions, 
I’m surprised by the level of capacity for controversial debates these people 
have. They are not the typical managers of policy implementation or so; most 
of them really also see themselves as forging the future of (parts of) human-
ity; and they come up with deep classical traditional philosophical strug-
gles. Some of them are very conscious about ecological issues, and really 
pay attention to their own intellectual development because what they are 
doing is not just implementing policies, designing policies; it’s much more 
important. Being so close to the European institutions really helps to make 
these observations. A second avenue for future research could be to try to 
better capture the debates and struggles of ideas which are present in the 
institutions. 
IV.  Spaces of Design
‘Post-growth planning is also art and experimentation. 
Failure is part of it and simultaneously the start of a new 
experiment aiming at achieving social-ecological trans-
formation.’
Viola Schulze Dieckhof f
Spatial transformations: Process, goal, guideline?
Markus Hesse
This article aims to situate ‘transformation’ in spatial and planning practice, 
primarily in the debate about spatial guidelines. This focus arises from the 
widespread impact that talk of the transformation has now achieved, at least 
in the German-speaking world. The term ‘transformation’ has implicit if not 
explicit guideline character, both in German-speaking countries (WBGU 
2011) and internationally, although the focus of ‘sustainability transitions’ is 
here somewhat different (Frantzeskaki/Broto/Coenen et al. 2017). Both dis-
courses are increasingly relevant for operationalising paths of post-growth 
development.
The primary research question addressed by this chapter is: Can spatial 
transformation be viewed as a guideline and if so, how does this manifest 
itself specifically in analytical, normative or procedural terms? Does trans-
formation lay claim to being generally applicable or does it have specific 
focuses – what is the concrete formulation of goals for which level? Or should 
transformation be understood primarily as a procedural standard, as a met-
aphor for collective mobilisation towards change, the substance of which 
tends to remain hidden behind sometimes quite cumbersome participatory 
processes? Before answers to these questions are explored, the two concepts 
at the heart of this discussion are brief ly considered.
(Great) transformation
The first focus of this discussion is the ‘great transformation’ (Große Trans-
formation, GT) or its semantic sister ‘sustainability transitions’ (STs), which 
became extremely popular in research and practice in the 2010s. The use 
of ‘great’ in the transformation discourse clearly draws on the work of Karl 
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Polanyi (1944) as an ideological-historical source, which offers an extremely 
stimulating synopsis of social, economic and political development. The 
focus here is on two things: firstly, on experience of the decline of liberal 
political constitutions under authoritarian regimes and, secondly, on the 
tension between market liberalism and democracy described by the term 
‘double movement’. Polanyi viewed this tension as being basically unresolv-
able as it is unlikely that large-scale political restructuring can be recon-
ciled with democratic principles and practices to any great extent. Part 3 of 
Polanyi’s book then deals with the conditions of freedom in complex societ-
ies. Nevertheless, fundamental to Polanyi’s thinking is the notion that eco-
nomic dynamics must be socially ‘contained’ or re-embedded by an active, 
interventionist state.
(Great) transformation is related to this tradition of the re-embedding 
of unfettered technological and economic dynamics in society. This refers 
to the ‘massive, ecological, technological, economic, institutional and cul-
tural process of transition’ (Schneidewind 2018, translated from German) 
facing the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It seems that 
this transition is the only way to solve the many crises of the industrial, nat-
ural, economic and social system. Transformation and sustainability tran-
sitions thus now represent a kind of mainstream of current environmental, 
technological and sustainability research (Zolfagharian/Walrave/Raven et al. 
2019). As was demonstrated by the choice of topics for the 2019 ARL Congress, 
which then gave rise to this volume, transformation is now also established 
in urban and spatial discourse. The heightened sensitivity to evolutionary 
change found in the transitions debate is particularly inspiring, because at 
its heart is the search for transitions (!) from situations that really exist to 
favoured or apparently necessary states. This is linked to questions concern-
ing alternative discourses and how generalisable strategies for sustainability 
can emerge from niche or pioneer concepts. 
The reports by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissen-
schaf tlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen, WBGU) 
contributed tremendously towards popularisation of the great transforma-
tion (WBGU 2011, 2016). The WBGU addressed the great transformation in 
its 2011 report ‘World in Transition’ (‘Welt im Wandel’) and emphatically the-
matised the subject of a ‘social contract’. In its 2016 report ‘The Relocation 
of Humanity: The Transformative Power of the Cities’ (‘Der Umzug der Men-
schheit: Die transformative Kraf t der Städte’), transformation was considered 
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in a specific spatial and urban setting for the first time. The report focused on 
urbanisation processes and cities, linking global, socio-ecological contexts 
with the question of urbanisation processes. However, the WBGU’s argu-
ments are not free of causal fallacies. This is particularly the case for the spe-
cific construction of the urban: the fact that the majority of the population is 
localised in urban areas does not mean that the essence of the problem can be 
solved in the cities or by the cities or, indeed, that this should be the primary 
gaol. Angelo and Wachsmuth (2015) criticised this perspective as ‘method-
ological cityism’; the focus on the cities overlooks the crucial role played by 
the nation states and supranational regulation even in the so-called urban 
age.
In order to achieve the goals of the great transformation in the urban 
context, the WBGU report (2016) discusses ambitious normative stipula-
tions. Urban areas – and spatial planning within them – have a key role in 
the implementation of transformative strategies. ‘We need spatial planning!’ 
(translated from German) was the credo proclaimed by Dirk Messner when 
he presented the report in a keynote lecture at the Dortmund Conference 
for Spatial and Planning Research in 2018. However, the audience, consist-
ing mostly of representatives of spatially relevant planning and research, 
were not inclined to automatically accept this dictum – a scepticism that 
is probably based on a realistic assessment of the status and actual per-
formance of spatial planning. In terms of policy and planning theory, the 
WBGU’s rejection of incremental solutions in favour of one large initiative is 
somewhat troublesome – especially as the relevant sponsors, strategies and 
instruments are not identified: ‘Within a few years, a paradigm shift must 
take place in cities: away from incremental approaches, towards transfor-
mative changes, in order to preserve the natural foundations of human life 
and people’s quality of life in the long term’ (WBGU 2016: 20, translated from 
German). In contrast, other authors see GT as part of a traditional incre-
mental understanding of planning which uses adaptive strategies to react to 
increasingly disruptive change (Iwaniec/Cook/Barbosa et al. 2019).
By using the term ‘great’ (Große Transformation), the WBGU report explic-
itly refers to the political-economic tradition of thought associated with 
Polanyi. It is therefore all the more surprising that it is in this field that the 
paper displays its greatest weaknesses: ‘It would only be possible to speak of a 
great transformation in Polanyi’s terms if alternatives to the self-regulating 
market system and market-conform adjustments were sought. If we use this 
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yardstick as a basis, then the half-heartedness of the WBGU’s reference to 
Polanyi becomes clear, as indeed is the case with many other contributions to 
transformation research’ (Thomasberger 2016: 34, translated from German). 
The WBGU’s urbanisation report of 2016 also remains vague about who may 
be able to tackle the comprehensive task of social transformation in a rela-
tively short time – the global society, pioneers of change, key actors? It con-
tains little of significance about institutions. While general statements are 
made about land and property, there is a lack of robust proposals on how it 
might be possible to implement a reorientation of property relations and how 
the frictions and conf licts inevitably associated with this could be resolved. 
Schneidewind (2018) is more concrete in his proposals and also ref lects on 
the conditions of the political economy. However, his notions are not nec-
essarily easier to implement: basically, he suggests, all levels and actors of 
the transformation need only to be properly interconnected with each other. 
The redesign of local practices as genuinely transformative action can 
undoubtedly bring new blood to politics, which has clearly manoeuvred 
itself into dead-ends with its administrative routines, entrenched conf licts 
of interest and piecemeal solutions. The temptation to overcome such dilem-
mas with one large initiative is obvious. However, practised transformation 
has yet, I believe, to prove its effectiveness – and inherent advantages to 
existing practices. Questions are rightly being asked about the almost inf la-
tionary use of real labs: it is at least unclear exactly how existing institutions 
are to be incorporated into new practices and approaches. And the equally 
inf lationary demand for public participation in whatever transformation 
may be implemented (although no objections can be raised to participation 
in principle), triggers the following question: What can be done to avoid the 
problems of randomness, erraticism and particular interests that are usu-
ally found in the ‘nightmare of participation’ (Miessen 2012, translated from 
German)? 
Guidelines
Guidelines form the second focus of this discussion – against a backdrop 
that assumes that the great transformation has itself become such a guide-
line. There seems to be widespread consensus that GT should not be an 
objective in itself and also that it is not primarily about the process as such, 
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even though this is the impression occasionally made. In its comprehensive 
approach, GT represents a guideline, a model, a kind of utopian narrative 
(Giesel 2007; Dahlstrom 2014; Zieschank/Ronzheimer 2017). It offers alter-
natives to the status quo in what initially appears to be a consistent frame-
work and links general issues (such as the question of growth) with practical 
and local strategies. In spatial terms, GT builds upon well-known elements 
of sustainable urban and spatial development, linking them to the narra-
tive of a larger whole. However, the construct of ‘transformation’ is like its 
predecessors. They all, de facto, comprise a rather contradictory mixture of 
control and development goals, of spatial and sectoral focuses, and, finally 
and decidedly, of procedural elements. In practice, they tend to be somewhat 
heterogeneous and always extremely abstract, and in this way they achieve 
a certain hegemony or majority support. Over time such guidelines have 
proved changeable, occasionally even opportunistic, driven by the Zeitgeist 
(Hesse/Leick 2013). Not only do individuals pursue specific problem inter-
pretations and need to compete for funding, but they are also dependent on 
temporary fashions, conjunctures and constructs.
This is well-illustrated by the spatial policy discourses of the 2000s and 
early 2010s, which experienced two major ‘turns’ and hence changes in focus, 
at least in the German-speaking and European context. Since the mid-1990s, 
many European countries have been characterised by a focus on growth 
instead of the traditional objective of ‘spatial balance’; this has been equally 
true of countries with a decidedly statist planning tradition like Great Brit-
ain, the Netherlands and Germany. The focus on growth was associated – 
not necessarily empirically – with cities or metropolitan regions thanks to 
their supposed role as drivers of economic development (Aring/Sinz 2006). 
In the last decade, the multi-layered development processes of urbanised 
areas (both metropolitan areas and medium-sized urban regions) and 
changed political perceptions have led to a shift in focus to peripheralisa-
tion processes and the areas affected by them, especially rural areas, periph-
eral regions and places with shrinking populations and negative economic 
development. Attention is now being paid to places that are ‘left behind’, not 
least because their populations have increasingly expressed political dissent 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2018). Most recently, discourses about guidelines and mod-
els have begun to include notions of homeland (Heimat) and spatial identity, 
occasionally in a fruitful way, occasionally in association with rather plati-
tudinous attitudes and associations. GT appears here as a unifying super-
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structure, the really major approach among current narratives on ‘green’ and 
‘smart’. 
What do these experiences of framings of guidelines for policy and plan-
ning strategies teach us for the GT? What should we expect with the ‘great’ 
challenges? Are they, as it were, once-in-a-century problems which demand 
the use of all the big tools the guideline offers and with which practice is cor-
respondingly equipped…? Or are there good reasons for restraint in light of 
spatial planning’s critical self-image (see Lamker/Levin-Keitel 2019 and other 
papers there)? At first glance, there seems to be much in favour of bringing 
great narratives into the real world, not least because the problematic situa-
tion clearly demands this. At the same time, however, caution is called for: it 
is important to know what the challenges are and how risks should be dealt 
with (Blythe/Silver/Evans et al. 2018). It follows that the GT discourse should 
not only be pluralised but should also be normatively disarmed. It should 
certainly be possible to describe the extent of the challenge with appropriate 
precision without losing all humility in the face of the demands made on pol-
icy, planning and the shaping of society. If a surplus of normativity leads to 
positivist traps or promises solutions prematurely, this is also unfavourable 
for planning. 
Critical evaluation
What does all this mean for science and practice? The economist Frank 
Beckenbach has described the deliberate transition from the transforma-
tion of society (or more precisely, from the self-transforming society) to 
the transformation society as a ‘transformation illusion’ (Beckenbach 2017). 
He argues that the term and the concept awaken three types of unrealistic 
expectations concerning the shaping of society: a planning illusion in terms 
of the predictability and controllability of complex societies; a regulating illu-
sion in terms of targeted collaboration between market actors, state actors 
and civil society actors; and finally an acceptance illusion concerning the will-
ingness of society, and not just social niches, to follow such a path. His sum-
mary, which he substantiates in scientific (economic) terms, is that the great 
transformation is unsuitable for use as a guiding principle. The sociologist 
Armin Nassehi (2019) recently expressed this in more everyday language in 
an interview with the newspaper taz that is well worth reading: ‘Anyone can 
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formulate goals’ (translated from German), he comments rather sardonically. 
On the other hand, he argues, formulating robust strategies, implementing 
those strategies in complex societies and reliably evaluating their effects 
is much more demanding. This appears to be the real challenge of targeted 
transformation policies.
This leads to the observation that, at heart, transformation debates still 
appear to be strongly inf luenced by the logics and demands of research, as 
can be seen in the sheer quantity of relevant publications. In comparison, 
new paths leading to changed practices are greatly underdeveloped. Or, as 
Koch, Kabisch and Krellenberg (2018: 13) expressed it in their review: 
‘While the normative understanding of urban transformations has gained 
considerably  in  importance  in  urban-related  studies  and  even  first  steps 
towards a transformative turn can be identified, this is not reflected in cur-
rent development processes in cities (…). An implementation gap between 
the theoretical concept and the empirical cases is clearly visible.’ 
Furthermore, the literature contains sufficient evidence of implementa-
tion problems of the sort that have long confronted normative concepts like 
sustainable development. Many of the transformation paths that are imple-
mented on a sectoral level are not particularly new and thus do not necessar-
ily enrich the discussion or promise a more effective impact. It seems typical 
that the corresponding lists fail to actively address past experiences or deal 
with the barriers to implementation faced by targeted transformation.
This begs the question as to what is genuinely new about transformation – 
except for greatly increased ambitions concerning social control. I argue that 
what is new is, firstly, the specific relationship between research and practice. 
Science has assumed an engaged role and adopted a narrative position, prob-
lem-oriented rather than fusty, transdisciplinary rather than traditional. Of 
course, knowledge production and dissemination are fundamental to every 
transformation, but this development nonetheless triggers questions. With 
the missionary, almost religious approach of some of the apologists for total 
transformation, science is, I believe, treading on thin ice – it is making itself 
dependent on good intentions and interests. Familiarly, this does not always 
end well. In my opinion, arguments drawn from the philosophy of science 
speak for more scepticism, perhaps also restraint. I most certainly do not 
share the view that universities should prioritise their third mission – i.e. 
Markus Hesse318
to promote ‘transfer’ in addition to research and teaching – so it becomes 
their first mission and should subordinate all practices to this goal (Schnei-
dewind 2018, Section 21). Instrumentalising research in this way would not 
only fail to make transformation more realistic, it would also damage sci-
ence. This problem was addressed in detail in a statement on dealing with 
‘great societal challenges’ (translated from German) issued by the German 
Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat 2015). The great com-
plexity, global dimensions and disciplinary composition of the new types of 
problems complicate the process of finding the right positioning for science 
policy and strategy. This has repeatedly led to critical discussion in the ‘inner 
circle’ of transformation research (see Grunwald 2015, Strunz/Gawel 2017; 
Grunwald 2018). Perhaps the interplay of two ideal-types of actors could lead 
to changed practice: the positioning of research as an ‘honest broker’ (Grun-
wald 2018) as postulated by Roger A. Pielke (2007), and the understanding 
of practice as the action of ref lexive practitioners (Schön 1983). This combi-
nation could give rise to robust approaches. However, a positioning of this 
sort demands from both sides ‘a high degree of ref lexivity and argumenta-
tive transparency, the ability to learn not only in analytical-empirical terms 
but also in normative terms, and a constant questioning of former positions’ 
(Grunwald 2018: 116, translated from German).
What would be new, secondly, would be if transformation research con-
sidered the implementation of its proposals in more detail, specifically in 
terms of framework conditions, potentials and barriers (see Dörre/Rosa/
Becker et al. 2019). This has similarly not yet been successfully undertaken by 
sustainability research. Transformation and sustainability approaches share 
a common problem in that the extension of the normative timeframe for 
targets has not automatically led to an increase in their effectiveness. What 
adjustments should institutions make, how should social security systems 
be restructured to meet new requirements, what consequences would sys-
tem transformation have for policymaking, for distributive justice? Which 
hard cuts can be expected and which gains could compensate for them? In 
my opinion, a sober view of political realities is required rather than euphe-
mistic talk of a great transformation (see Bettini/Arklay/Head 2017). Valuable 
stimuli could also be provided by the established political-science field of 
transformation research, which attracted increased attention in the course 
of the political transformation of 1989/90 (see Kollmorgen/Merkel/Wagener 
2015). Transformation research traditionally investigates the significance 
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of systemic change (political, economic) for institutions, economic systems, 
practices of political regulation and lifeworlds. Drawing on the overview in 
Kollmorgen, Merkel and Wagener (2015), there appear to be numerous ideas 
for further developing the discussion. On the other hand, this most compre-
hensive presentation has few links to ecological transformation, and even 
fewer to spatial development. Both discourses deserve more interaction with 
the other.
Conclusions
Returning to the primary research question, it seems that the charm of 
‘transformation’ may be found in the fact that this term offers an appropri-
ately differentiated notion of evolutionary social change. This represents 
true progress: this analytical dimension of the term is convincing and should 
be explored further. On the other hand, it seems unclear whether the concept 
is sufficient to robustly guide the intended change – does transformation 
offer more substance than, for instance, sustainable development? Not that 
this should be understood as opposing the experimental, open and subver-
sive character of transformation per se. However, engaging on the level of 
the great transformation requires more than just a collection of individual 
measures and bullet points listing everything that can be thought of or has 
perhaps been heard around the place, occasionally with a touch of radicalism. 
I follow Ulrich Brand’s (2016) dictum here, that the strategic use of ‘transfor-
mation’ does not necessarily help solve the manifold crises of our times. This 
is particularly true of the inf lationary use of the term – which leads to the 
specifics of the approach being blurred in a melange of everything and any-
thing, obscuring the potentials of redefining social change dynamics and the 
corresponding policies not only in terms of terminology but also of content.
If the aim is to credibly, not only metaphorically, engage on the large scale, 
then concrete ideas for macro-management are required, ones that appro-
priately inf luence fundamental determinants of socio-economic devel-
opment (such as the taxation system, a possible basic income, the recently 
discussed land question, the role of growth as a driver and constraint ...). 
And there must be some notion of how such ideas can be implemented and 
what effects and secondary effects their introduction will have, especially 
in social terms (Blythe/Silver/Evans et al. 2018). If entry into a post-growth 
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era does indeed turn out to be a ‘crisis-like and mostly undesirable conse-
quence of structural change’ (Wiesenthal 2019: 379, translated from German), 
then multifaceted frictions are inevitable and we will need to react to them. 
Only against this background is it possible to consider, experiment with and 
try out concrete planning tasks. However, this involves a certain dilemma 
for spatial discourses, which have good reasons for remaining small scale 
rather than tackling the large scale. As long as the great transformation 
omits the macro-level (Thomasberger 2016) and aims to provide blueprints 
for micro-processes instead, then it is nothing more than sustainability in 
a new guise. This would lead to transformations but not necessarily to the 
great transformation. Under these conditions, the added value of the grand 
narrative would be exhausted in ‘enchanting’ reality, as Tom Sieverts puts 
it (Sieverts 2015: 19, translated from German). It would not by any means, 
however, fundamentally change this reality and it is also unclear whether 
it would in fact be any more suitable than other concepts discussed to date, 
such as sustainable development. There is therefore a risk that the debate 
on transformation simply represents a short-lived hype. In the labyrinth of 
transformations that are really taking place – the desirable, the unintended 
and the accidental –, it seems that the concept of the (great) transformation 
has still to prove itself as an effective vision. 
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Cornerstones and positions of a precautionary 
post-growth economy1 
The end of the growth-based model of prosperity
Ulrich Petschow, Nils aus dem Moore, David Hofmann,  
Eugen Pissarskoi, Steffen Lange
Environmental crises are increasingly acute. Particularly prominent in the 
public debate is the climate crisis. The increases in greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere is only one particularly striking anthropogenic 
intervention in the ecosystems (see Bindoff/Stott/AchutaRao et al. 2013: 869). 
Humanity has already put other fundamental earth system processes in a 
critical condition. Thus, for instance, the global volumes of phosphorus and 
nitrogen entering soils and water bodies have also exceeded critical limits 
(see Rockström/Steffen/Noon et al. 2009a/b, Steffen/Richardson/Rock-
ström et al. 2015). Less prominent in the public debate is the biodiversity cri-
sis (see IPBES 2019). These developments threaten future generations with 
drastic and irreversible disadvantages. In contrast to ‘traditional’ industrial 
environmental pollution, which can at least to a certain extent be ‘filtered 
out’ (and relocated) using add-on technologies, these ‘new’ challenges are 
closely linked to our way of life and economic model, which are based on eco-
nomic growth.
Particularly in the early industrialised countries, this model has 
undoubtedly contributed towards welfare gains, ref lected for instance in 
greater life expectancy. Globally speaking, in particular the catch-up devel-
1  This article is based on a study undertaken for the German Federal Environmental Agency 
(Umweltbundesamt) (Petschow/aus dem Moore/Pissarskoi et al. 2018), which was conduct-
ed by the Institute for Ecological Economic Research (Institut für ökologische Wirtschaf tsfor-
schung) and the RWI Leibniz Institute for Economic Research (RWI Institut für Wirtschaf ts-
forschung). It is available for free download on the Federal Environmental Agency website.
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opment of China and the dramatic economic growth associated with it have 
led to a clear reduction in poverty rates. There is thus little controversy about 
the positive correlation between economic development and social well-be-
ing. However, questions are increasingly being asked about whether and to 
what extent future generations will ultimately have to pay for these gains. 
The early industrialised, prosperous countries are responsible for a dis-
proportionately high share of the impacts on natural systems (in relation to 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG-emissions) see Caney 2009: 126). This arti-
cle therefore focuses on the following questions: What role is played by eco-
nomic performance and its future development in more prosperous coun-
tries like Germany with relation to adhering to planetary boundaries? What 
(environment) policy implications arise from this? We address these ques-
tions by introducing the historical and current growth debates, providing 
an overview of prominent positions and undertaking a critical analysis that 
allows us to derive a new proposal: the precautionary post-growth position, 
which we present for discussion. 
Growth and welfare discussions 
The discussion about economic growth and growth limits was long neglected 
in economic discourses, receiving attention mostly from ‘outsiders’. Thus, in 
his essay ‘The economics of the coming spaceship earth’, Kenneth Boulding 
(1966) firstly referred to a metaphor popular at the time, that of ‘Spaceship 
Earth’, and secondly pointed out the significance of limits (also of the substi-
tutability of factors of production). The first report on ‘The limits to growth’ 
by Meadows et al. (1972) led to considerable discussion, even if the possibility 
of substitution was certainly underestimated in detail. Georgescu-Roegen 
(1987), and also his pupil Daly (1977), called for other economic models. Con-
sideration of these ‘early’ warnings underlines that it took the recent changes 
in the social and media climate at the end of the 2010s to bring sufficient 
pressure to bear and enable the issue of growth to be addressed again.
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Figure 1: Global development of income over time 
Source: Clark 2007
At least in the long term, economic growth has not in any way been a con-
stant of human development but is rather closely linked to the industrial 
revolution (Clark 2007). It was the industrial revolution that enabled escape 
from the ‘Malthusian trap’.2 The special European path emerged not (only) 
due to the development of technology, but also due to the social conditions 
that determined whether and how this technology was used.3 In this vein, 
Mokyr (2016) highlights the cultural conditions of this social change (“cul-
ture of growth”) and focuses particularly on fundamental beliefs, suggesting 
that the transformation of the belief system was primarily linked to percep-
tions of nature. In combination with the specific contexts in Europe (com-
petition between smaller states or cities) and the emergence of networks 
(in science and engineering), this transformation was ultimately decisive 
for the industrial revolution. McCloskey (2016) suggests that it was not the 
2  Malthus (1803) analysed the relationship between population growth and crop yields. He 
suggested that population growth occurs in geometric progression while food production 
increases in arithmetic progression so that there is a natural ceiling due to limits on pos-
sible increases in food production. This, according to Malthus, makes economic growth 
almost impossible (Clark 2007, Fertig/Pfister 2012).
3  As seen in the inventions that were well-known in China but did not lead to similar eco-
nomic growth.
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available energy resources, the innovations of the nineteenth century or the 
emergence of market institutions that were decisive, as all these factors also 
existed in other regions. She rather assumes that cultural factors and ideas 
were key, for instance the emergence of the natural sciences and the ‘Repub-
lic of Letters’ (Mokyr 2016) and thus the development of scientific networks. 
Denzau and North (1994) also refer to the role played by ideas and institu-
tions in social change. It hence becomes clear that both economic histori-
ans and institutional economists see ideas and guiding principles as playing 
an essential role in economic development. These findings are also relevant 
for the sustainability discussion, as illustrated by Meyerhoff und Petschow 
(1996).
The increase in per capita income that occurred as a consequence of the 
industrial revolution was immense – Figure 1 illustrates the relative develop-
ment in comparison to the base year of 1800.
This historical growth provided the basis for the emergence of today’s 
dominant growth paradigm and corresponding path dependencies. It was 
crucially based on the use of fossil and natural resources. The development of 
income was and is closely correlated with climate gas emissions but also with 
pressure on various ecosystems. The use of fossil resources has in addition 
led to other diverse impacts, including profound changes in land use which 
has had immensely negative consequences for biodiversity. There is a close 
correlation between the transgression of planetary boundaries and observ-
able economic growth. 
Traditionally, gross domestic product (GDP) has been viewed as the key 
‘well-being indicator’ and thus became extremely important for economic policy. 
But as currently defined, it is not a comprehensive measure of welfare or even 
economic well-being. It was developed in the context of the economic depres-
sion at the end of the 1920s in the USA, largely by Simon Kuznets. As a measure 
of the value of goods and services produced annually, it was not conceived as 
a comprehensive indicator of well-being. Nonetheless, even today it contin-
ues to exercise immense inf luence on the actions of national, international 
and supranational organisations and is deeply embedded in decision-making 
structures. Criticism of the use of this indicator came to a head in the economic 
crisis of 2008. A particular milestone was marked by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi 
commission (2010), which was convened by the French president Sarkozy to 
discuss different indicators of economic performance and social progress. This 
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triggered diverse follow-up processes on national and international levels but 
could do little to limit the pre-eminence of the GDP indicator. 
The global challenge of socio-ecological transformation 
With the 1.5°C or 2°C objective a central international climate policy goal was 
stipulated in the Paris agreement. If this goal is taken seriously, then sub-
stantial adaptations are required within a period of just a few decades. To 
date, environmental policy and sustainability policy have not achieved any-
thing close to a sufficiently strong reduction in emissions or ecological dam-
age. Similarly, the world is far from fulfilling the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) that lay down 17 objectives for sustainable development in the 
economic, social and ecological spheres. 
Figure 2, cited from O’Neill, Fanning und Lamb et al. (2018), clarifies the 
global challenge of the necessary transformation, which, on the one hand, 
requires a massive reduction in resource use and, on the other hand, an 
increase in well-being (here termed ‘social threshold achieved’), particularly 
in the Global South.
In Figure  2 the y-axis represents the social thresholds that countries 
reach. The x-axis shows the biophysical boundaries and the transgressing 
thereof. Early industrialised countries like Germany are shown to have 
reached a higher standard in terms of the social dimension but clearly trans-
gress the biophysical boundaries. In contrast, other countries, e. g. Sri Lanka, 
remain largely within the biophysical boundaries but there is considerable 
room for development in terms of the social dimension.4 
Central to the line of argument in this article is that ultimately the aim 
is to adhere to (biophysical) planetary boundaries and, at the same time, to 
stabilise the social dimension (social well-being) on a high level, or to further 
develop it to that level. It therefore comes down to ‘filling’ the empty quad-
rant on the top left. It is necessary to develop appropriate development paths 
based on the different starting positions. In the early industrialised countries, 
there is a dual goal of reducing resource utilisation and maintaining/further 
developing quality of life (especially for socially disadvantaged citizens).
4   In addition, it should be noted that the early industrialised countries can also dif fer consid-
erably in relation to both biophysical and social boundaries.
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Figure 2: Fields of tension: biophysical boundaries and social thresholds
Source: O’Neill/Fanning/Lamb et al. (2018)5
5   The methodological considerations on which this figure is based are very complex and are 
therefore not discussed in detail here. Various relevant concepts are combined. Here it 
should simply be noted that the x-axis comprises the biophysical boundaries transgressed 




thresholds, drawing on the work of Raworth. Based on Max Neef’s human needs approach, 
Raworth developed a ‘safe and just space’ (SJS) framework (doughnut approach), which 
combines the concept of planetary boundaries with the complementary concept of social 
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In Germany as elsewhere, there is far-reaching consensus in the scientific 
and political spheres that ecological limits must be adhered to in the long 
term. How this basically consensual goal is to be achieved is, however, the 
subject of controversial discussion in both fields. 
Two levels can be discerned here. First, there is no agreement about 
what contribution an individual nation state can and should make to tack-
ling global ecological challenges (see Enquête-Kommission 2013: 477–521). 
Second, there is key dissent about whether and how the economic system of 
an early industrialised prosperous country should be changed so as to suf-
ficiently contribute towards an adherence to planetary boundaries without 
endangering standards of social justice. The relevance of economic develop-
ment or economic growth for achieving the goals of environmental policy is 
an especially contentious issue. This is the focus of the rest of this article. We 
aim to improve understanding of this controversy and derive policy options. 
To this end, in the next section we develop a systemisation of positions 
within this social discourse.
Positions in the growth debate
The terms employed in the growth debate – ‘green growth’ (OECD 2011), 
‘green economy’ (UNEP 2011), ‘a-growth’ (van den Bergh 2011), ‘post-growth’ 
(Zahrnt/Seidl 2010) and ‘degrowth’ (Demaria/Schneider/Sekulova et al. 2013) 
– are not always utilised in a distinct and clear-cut fashion. At the same time, 
it should be noted that in some cases the motivations and discourse contexts 
behind these terms differ greatly. The discourse surrounding degrowth is 
fed, inter alia, by feminist positions (a lack of recognition for informal work), 
anti-capitalist positions (exploitation and self-exploitation), cosmopolitan 
positions (global inequalities) and of course ecological positions (adherence 
to planetary boundaries) (see Steffen/Richardson/Rockstrom et al. 2015). The 
post-growth approach aims to reduce dependence on economic growth in 
order to overcome ecological challenges and social injustices. For the posi-
tion ‘a-growth’, supported particularly by economists, the focus is rather on 
boundaries. SJS includes 11 social objectives (selected from the documents of ‘Rio plus 20’ 
(2012) and the SDGs), which also take into consideration stocks of critical human and social 
capital (the basic needs requirement). 
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achieving aims related to quality of life and adhering to planetary boundar-
ies, while the question of growth is of secondary importance as long as the 
ecological and social goals can be realised (abandoning the one-dimensional 
indicator GDP). The green-growth position (which does not use one-dimen-
sional GDP as a key performance indicator) assumes that there is no contra-
diction between growth and respecting planetary boundaries, GDP should 
rather continue to grow so that environmental objectives can be achieved. 
Degrowth versus green growth
Two particularly prominent and clearly antagonistic positions exist within 
the growth discourse, and their policy consequences clearly contradict one 
another: degrowth and green growth.
Within the degrowth discourse models, there is much discussion of 
political measures and instruments that go hand in hand with (or are meant 
to lead to) a reduction in economic performance. Representatives of the 
green growth approach instead focus on economic policy measures intended 
to make it possible to combine further economic growth with enhanced 
environmental protection. In order to understand where these two positions 
contradict each other, we have reconstructed their respective (deductively 
valid) arguments with the help of philosophical argumentation theory. This 
analysis shows that the degrowth and green growth positions contradict 
each other in two theses: a descriptive and a normative one. First, they hold 
differing views on how economic performance would develop in an early 
industrialised economy (such as Germany) if the country made a sufficiently 
strong contribution to meeting global environmental goals. Second, they 
contradict each other in their assessments of the relevance of further eco-
nomic growth for maintaining quality of life in a society.6 
6  Degrowth and green growth proponents very rarely make explicit which conception of 
quality of life they hold, i. e. which conception of quality of life should be accepted from 
their respective perspectives. Mostly, similar abstract terms are used: ‘welfare’ and 
‘well-being’ (especially in green growth), ‘happiness’, ‘good life’ (especially in degrowth). 
The conceptions of quality of life widely used in philosophical and economic literature are 
discussed in Petschow et al. 2018, 2020a and 2020b.
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Representatives of the degrowth position are committed to the follow-
ing two propositions (e.  g. Kallis 2011, Paech 2012, Demaria et al. 2013 or 
Latouche 2015a/b):
1. Further economic growth in wealthy countries is not necessary in order 
for them to maintain their quality of life, which can be preserved or even 
increased even if aggregate economic output falls.
2. It is reasonably certain that economic output in wealthy countries will 
decline if they reduce their levels of ecological damage sufficiently.
In contrast, representatives of the green growth movement hold contrary 
positions (e.  g. OECD 2011, World Bank 2012, Jacobs 2013 or Bowen et al. 
2014):
1. Further economic growth is still necessary in an early industrialised, 
prosperous economy in order to maintain or improve quality of life in 
these societies.
2. It is reasonably certain that with the help of green growth instruments, 
prosperous countries can sufficiently reduce the ecological damage they 
cause. Their economic output – albeit in a qualitatively different form – 
could continue to grow. 
We then examined the extent to which these core theses of the two basic 
positions can be scientifically justified. There are fundamental objections to 
the degrowth propositions. According to our understandings of quality of 
life based on the philosophical literature (hedonism, desire fulfilment theory, 
theories of objective values), the first degrowth thesis does indeed apply. Fur-
ther economic growth is, in principle, not necessary to maintain the quality 
of life in a society. However, degrowth representatives do not convincingly 
explain whether and in particular how this quality of life can be maintained 
if GDP per capita (very) sharply declines.
The second degrowth proposition claims that it is impossible to suf-
ficiently decouple economic growth from environmental impacts. This is 
scientifically untenable. Representatives of the degrowth position usually 
point out how extensive the ecological challenges are, how short the period 
for reducing ecological burdens is, and how little previous environmental 
policy efforts have achieved. They also emphasise that a positive correlation 
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between economic growth and the consumption of natural resources and 
greenhouse gas emissions has been observable since the nineteenth century. 
The parameters relevant to the success of decoupling – the decarbonisation 
rates of an economy, development of energy and resource intensities – how-
ever, can be inf luenced politically (e. g. by taxes, incentives, technology pro-
motion, etc.). Thus, forward projections of trends based on a past in which 
there was no or insufficient political control cannot be used to prove that 
decoupling cannot or will not succeed in the future.
Whether or not the first proposition of the green growth position is true 
crucially depends on one’s understanding of social quality of life. Some of the 
views expressed in the philosophical literature on what constitutes a good life 
or social quality of life do not support the green growth thesis. Conversely, the 
core thesis of green growth can be justified particularly well if one uses the 
concept of quality of life supported by welfare economics: quality of life 
(‘welfare’ in the language of economics) is then an aggregate of the extent to 
which individual preferences are met. However, it is not clear why this par-
ticular understanding of quality of life, as the fulfilment of individual pref-
erences, should guide political action.
Turning to the second green growth proposition, economic-ecological 
models demonstrate that it is theoretically possible to decouple future eco-
nomic growth from critical resource consumption and ecological damage. 
However, model results to date do not demonstrate that this will succeed to 
a sufficient extent within the available time frame. In addition, the models 
assume that the technologies required for decoupling will be invented and 
adopted in good time. It seems hardly possible to make scientifically serious 
statements on this – at least, such statements must be fraught with great 
uncertainty; in addition, rebound effects must be considered. Last but not 
least, there is no robust knowledge about the consequences for future eco-
nomic performance of reducing all the ecological impacts relevant for com-
pliance with planetary boundaries simultaneously, as opposed to pursuing 
just one ecological goal, such as the reduction of GHG emissions.
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The precautionary post-growth position: a new consensus?
The above discussion demonstrates that degrowth and green growth posi-
tions are based on core assumptions that cannot be adequately justified or 
substantiated scientifically. Neither position can thus claim to serve as the 
sole strategy for environmental policy action. Based on this criticism, we 
have developed a third, ideal-typical approach, which we refer to here as 
the post-growth position. In contrast to degrowth and green growth, post-
growth is open and unbiased. It has no strong ex-ante premises regarding 
either (i) an evaluation of future economic growth or possible future con-
traction, or (ii) the possibility of sufficient decoupling. According to this 
position, it is uncertain as to how economic performance will develop if 
the economies of prosperous countries are fundamentally changed in line 
with global environmental objectives. There is, however, a serious possibility 
that economic output will no longer increase or even significantly decrease 
as a result of this transformation. At the same time, we note that economic 
performance and the income it generates play an important role because 
of the current state of the early industrialised, prosperous countries. They 
are crucial to the functions of fundamental social institutions that provide 
the components of a good life (e. g. social security systems, expenditure on 
education, etc.). From this position, we can derive the goal of transforming 
these social institutions as a precautionary measure, thus ensuring that they 
can continue to perform their functions independently of economic output. 
Greater independence from growth would make it possible to maintain a 
high level of social quality of life even if economic output stagnates or falls. 
In a society that is more independent of growth in this sense, there would be 
fewer conf licting goals between economic and environmental targets. Envi-
ronmental policy measures would thus be less subject to reservations about 
possible growth impacts.
We chose the term post-growth for this ideal-typical position, devel-
oped as a third choice between degrowth and green growth. The key polit-
ical implication of this position – the creation of social institutions that 
are (more) independent of growth where possible – was, to our knowledge, 
first emphasised in the volume Postwachstumsgesellschaf t – Konzepte für die 
Zukunf t (Post-growth society – Concepts for the future) by Angelika Zahrnt 
and Irmi Seidl (2010). In addition, there are overlaps in content with the posi-
tion of authors who advocate the concept of ‘a-growth’ (e. g. van den Bergh 
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2011) or are close to it content-wise (Jakob and Edenhofer 2014). Moreover, in 
parallel to the study on which this paper is based, other scientific papers have 
been presented that have reached similar conclusions, such as van den Bergh 
(2017) and Scientific Working Group (2018).
We aim to build on these contributions with our precautionary post-
growth position. In doing so, we would like to add that the involvement of 
the public and key stakeholders in deliberative processes is central to a post-
growth position. When it comes to developing strategies and instruments, it 
is in fact dependent on them. Only a deliberative discourse with broad public 
participation can clarify the level or amount of services that a specific area 
of society or a specific public institution should provide. In our view, a close 
iterative exchange between politics, science and the interested public can 
support such a discourse.
Precautionary post-growth position and societal change 
In the growth debate, the green-growth and degrowth positions adopt dif-
ferent perspectives based on central normative considerations and evalua-
tions, some shared, some not. 
The commitment to respect planetary boundaries is considered essen-
tial by representatives of the positions ‘green growth’, ‘degrowth’ and ‘post-
growth’, as well as by the team of authors of the study undertaken on behalf 
of the Environmental Protection Agency (Petschow/aus dem Moore/Pissar-
skoi et al. 2018) on which this paper is based. 
For example, to be successful green-growth approaches require a decou-
pling of economic growth and environmental pollution through technologi-
cal innovations and this to an extent that has not yet been attempted. It also 
remains unclear whether the necessary decoupling could be achieved quickly 
enough. Furthermore, the notion that a forceful and far-reaching green-
growth strategy (which has not yet been consistently introduced) will not 
have negative impacts on economic growth in the short and medium term 
can be disputed.
Regarding the degrowth approach, on the other hand, it is uncertain 
whether the quality of life in society can be maintained by implementing 
degrowth measures, and the question of which interpretation of quality of 
life should be sustained remains normatively controversial.
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The societal discourse on environmental policy is characterised by a 
high degree of segmentation and polarisation, documented most visibly 
in the dispute on the issue of growth. In this debate, green growth and 
degrowth mark the opposite ends of a broad and varied spectrum of indi-
vidual positions. This situation impedes the productive use and combination 
of important insights from both strands of the debate. Against the backdrop 
of the antagonistic positions of green growth and degrowth and the need to 
develop a consistent sustainability policy, it seems highly desirable to explore 
the potential for mutual understanding in the sustainability debate by trying 
to identify consensual elements that can be productively applied in policy.
In concrete terms, it should also be noted that the above-mentioned 
positions still have limited significance for the policy and society. Solution 
approaches are available but have not been sufficiently taken up. The pro-
ponents of a green-growth approach undoubtedly propose suitable instru-
ments from a theoretical perspective, but nevertheless political ‘demand’ for 
these instruments and their effective implementation in practice have so 
far been very limited. Similarly, the ideas and models developed within the 
ecologically oriented post-growth discourse have so far also had only limited 
appeal and acceptance.
In view of path dependencies and doubt regarding the directional reli-
ability of the strategies pursued, the precautionary post-growth position 
aims to initiate a design-oriented search process that focuses on key notions 
such as the precautionary principle and societal resilience. This participa-
tory, long-term process of societal change can only be controlled to a lim-
ited extent. It is intended to open up new options for action and develop-
ment and must take account of initial social conditions. Compliance with 
planetary boundaries requires far-reaching societal change. Against the 
background of our limited knowledge, there is no single concrete transition 
path or approach that should be pursued in isolation. In our view, instead, 
action-oriented strategies and corresponding ‘policy mixes’ must be devel-
oped that include combinations of efficiency, consistency and sufficiency.7 
On the one hand, these should draw on appropriate and mutually compati-
ble elements of different strategy approaches and, on the other hand, should 
connect to ‘the here and now’. It will be crucial to promote bottom-up initia-
7   On the debate about efficiency, consistency and sufficiency, see for example Huber (1994), 
current discussion in Schneidewind and Zahrnt (2013) and Loske (2015)
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tives and experiments. These can be supported in particular by national and/
or international frameworks. For approaches that have been evaluated and 
assessed by ongoing critical research and thus can provide ‘proof’ that they 
achieve what is desirable and intended, the next step is to examine their scal-
ability and whether they can be adopted as top-down policies. Relevant con-
texts for testing such approaches exist, for example, both in regions under-
going structural change and in the more general challenges of decarbonising 
energy supplies or promoting the circular economy. 
The competing concepts of ‘green growth’, ‘a-growth’, ‘post-growth’ and 
‘degrowth’ differ in their fundamental orientations, in some facets consid-
erably, and are to some extent incompatible with regard to central premises. 
However, in terms of the recommended instruments, reform approaches 
and concrete paths for transformation, it is certainly possible to identify 
considerable overlaps. The precautionary post-growth position draws on 
these overlaps and is composed of four action strategies which are outlined 
below (see Petschow/aus dem Moore/Pissarskoi et al. 2018, aus dem Moore 
and Hofmann 2019, Petschow/aus dem Moore/Pissarskoi et al. 2020a, 2020b).
From the culture of growth to the culture of sustainability
The first action strategy promotes cultural change from a ‘Culture of Growth’ 
to a ‘Culture of Sustainability’. Direct management of this cultural process is 
only possible to a very limited extent. Nonetheless, it can be seen that social 
discourses echo the sustainability debate and, currently even more so, the 
climate and biodiversity discourse. The post-growth/degrowth movement, 
which is shaped by civil society, is itself an expression of incipient cultural 
change.
On the question of which factors significantly inf luence profound pro-
cesses of social change, there are very different answers in the relevant aca-
demic discourses. In discourses on economic history and institutional eco-
nomics, the thesis is increasingly being advanced that cultural changes can 
be regarded as the trigger for growth dynamics and the emergence of the 
growth society. As discussed above, economic growth only became relevant 
with the start of the industrial revolution and finally began to guide action 
and policy with the development of the growth indicator GDP. 
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The hitherto dominant culture of growth is deeply embedded in the for-
mal and informal institutions that ‘steer’ our societies. If policy approaches 
are to lead to us living within planetary boundaries, they must therefore go 
beyond material goals and the instruments directly geared to such goals and 
must also consider cultural change towards a possible culture of sustainabil-
ity. A robust process of change towards a sustainable society that enables 
societal well-being within planetary boundaries will not be possible without 
a profound transformation (also) of formal and informal institutions (see 
Williamson 2000, Geels 2011)8.
Effective design of economic frameworks
The second building block of the precautionary post-growth position is adjust-
ment of the economic parameters, in particular through the resolute use of 
(market-based) instruments to internalise negative environmental external-
ities and thus ensure effective and systemic coarse-grained management. 
These instruments include cap-and-trade systems (in emissions trading, for 
example) or eco-taxes for the cost-effective internalisation of the environ-
mentally harmful effects of production and consumption.
In this respect, there is widespread agreement between the positions in 
the growth debate. Moreover, most actors putting forward economic argu-
ments consider relative prices to be significant for individual behaviour and 
the overexploitation of natural resources (such as energy carriers or sinks 
or the absorption capacity of the atmosphere). Thus, across the board, i. e. 
among both degrowth and green-growth advocates, changing relative prices 
is considered an important regulatory element.9  
Remaining within planetary boundaries, the far-reaching need for 
change and the necessary economic instruments with which to address this 
change are all clearly associated with considerable potential for social con-
8  The multi-level perspective (Geels 2011) is currently a widely used heuristic for complex 
social change processes.
9  It should be noted that, especially in the degrowth and post-growth discourse, this is rare-
ly made explicit but is rather applied more generally, leading to the development of be-
havioural orientations which can often have an ‘overwhelming’ ef fect on individuals.
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f lict (for instance with issues of distribution). This must be f lanked by addi-
tional measures.
Exploration and potential development of new paths  
of societal development
The third approach of the precautionary post-growth position involves 
exploring and opening up new paths of social development and is comple-
mentary to the previously discussed degrowth and green growth approaches. 
The exploration of more sustainable options for action must be stimulated, 
accompanied and supported by participatory societal search processes, 
experimental spaces for new social practices, new innovation policies and 
research policy approaches. 
Inevitably, this means that growth of GDP should no longer be seen as 
the dominant target of society. Instead, the focus should be increasingly on 
socially desirable target states (societal well-being, good life, etc.). The social 
shift towards a culture of sustainability also requires other systems of indi-
cators to guide societal (self-)management. 
Innovations will play an important role in these search processes, but 
relying solely on technological innovations is by no means sufficient (see also 
Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 477). In the context of defining the ‘Grand Chal-
lenges’ on EU level, prominent calls for more social innovations were heard, 
i. e. for innovations that focus less on technology and more on new social 
practices. Since then, the concept of social innovations has been increasingly 
important in the field of innovation promotion. 
These new ways of generating innovations are now also found in the 
mainstream, with the establishment of real-world laboratories and exper-
imental spaces becoming increasingly ubiquitous ways of generating solu-
tions. At the EU level and also at the national level, consideration is being 
given to how real labs or experimental spaces can be designed to engender 
new, sustainable solutions − for example, through the promotion of real-
world laboratories in Baden-Württemberg or with a more technical focus 
like in the German government’s energy research programme (BMWi 2018). 
Calls for these social innovations come particularly from representatives 
of the post-growth discourse. The aim is to identify new generalisable solu-
tions that should then be supported by regulation or infrastructural develop-
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ment. Against this background, there is a need to strengthen transformative 
elements in innovation policy to address socio-technical regimes as a whole, 
in line with the goals of society. Such an innovation policy would encour-
age social experimentation and social learning processes so that previously 
unknown paths to sustainable development become possible. 
This is also necessary given the characteristics and path dependencies 
of the dominant socio-technical ‘system’, such as current high energy and 
resource consumption. Representatives of the multi-level perspective believe 
that economic instruments alone are hardly sufficient to overcome these path 
dependencies (Kern/Rogge/Howlett 2019). The ‘deep transition’ approach 
(Schot/Karger 2018) is linked to this multi-level perspective. Both emphasise 
the importance of social innovations and do not consider the prevalent focus 
on technological innovations as sufficient to drive social change processes. 
Reduction of growth dependency
Another and therefore fourth important path dependency concerns the 
dependence of important spheres of society and institutions on growth. 
Consequently, we see a fourth element as constitutive for our proposed pre-
cautionary post-growth position: identifying and developing the potential 
for designing more growth-independent societal institutions and processes. 
This is, we believe, also essential to increase the resilience of important social 
systems. Appropriate measures should be implemented if they are shown to 
be effective and socially acceptable. To this end, appropriate pilot projects 
should be designed, implemented and evaluated.
If a strategy of increasing growth independence is successful, social 
acceptance of environmentally motivated policy measures may well increase, 
despite their potentially negative impact on economic growth. Such policies 
would suffer less from ‘growth proviso’ and there would be more scope for an 
ambitious environmental and sustainability policy.
Existing approaches intended to achieve greater independence from 
growth are currently proving to be only marginally effective (Petschow/
aus dem Moore/Pissarskoi et al. 2018, Petschow/aus dem Moore/Pissarskoi 
et al. 2020a, 2020b). Fundamental reform approaches, if any, have to date 
only been considered for small sections of society and pursued in a series of 
small experiments. It is therefore hardly possible to draw any conclusions 
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about the generalisability of such approaches or their potential to reduce the 
existing dependence on growth. However, the prospects of success of the 
dominant approach so far, the green growth strategy, are uncertain in terms 
of the chances of decoupling economic growth from negative environmental 
impacts. It thus seems necessary to continue working on the conception and 
testing of models that are less dependent on economic growth. We see a con-
siderable need for research in this area.
Conclusion: The precautionary post-growth position  
as a platform for further discourse 
The precautionary post-growth position represents, first, an integrative 
approach and, second, provides general impetus for further discussion on 
transformation paths, especially with regard to the economic discourse. The 
concept of ‘growth independence’ aims to change prevailing social models 
and path dependencies and, in this sense, has the potential to bring about 
far-reaching processes of change. 
However, the goal of ‘societal well-being within planetary boundaries’ 
must ultimately be specified in processes of societal negotiation, and effec-
tive narratives must be developed in a participatory manner. We interpret 
the precautionary post-growth position, both conceptually and practically, 
as a relevant and important building block of a yet-to-be-conceived, consis-
tent and global strategy for adhering to planetary boundaries and the SDGs, 
and for promoting individual quality of life and societal well-being. 
From a policy perspective, a post-growth position understood in this way 
can also be seen as a starting point or essential component of an overarching 
resilience strategy motivated by responsible ethics. Given the uncertainty 
about future economic and societal developments, this would enhance the 
robustness of the transformation process towards a sustainable society 
within planetary boundaries.
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New roles in collective, growth-independent 
spatial organisation 
Christian Lamker, Viola Schulze Dieckhoff
In the twenty-first century, urban and spatial planning still stands at the 
fundamental interface between state power, private capital and public inter-
est (Stein 2019: 12). Planners hold a key position for organising the spatial 
conditions of our society. Responsible spatial development requires all plan-
ners to take roles that ref lect the great diversity and complexity of society. 
Collective responsibility must be converted into new ways of thinking and 
acting by courageously leading processes of collective spatial and institu-
tional design. However, economic growth cannot solve the urgent challenges 
of spatial transformation encapsulated by keywords like ‘sustainability’, ‘cli-
mate change mitigation, ‘climate change adaptation’ and ‘social justice’. Nei-
ther can these problems be successfully dealt with as part of a growth-based 
agenda, for instance through the accelerated designation of building land or 
technological solutions. 
Movements like Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion have greatly 
increased public awareness of long-term catastrophic impacts. Nonetheless, 
findings concerning the loss of biodiversity, climate change and the negative 
effects of a focus on growth do not in themselves provide policy options or a 
clear transformation strategy. The following sections begin by clarifying the 
significance of the collective organisation of space and responsible planning, 
situating planners’ responsibility within this. The focus then moves to the 
question: Which roles can planners use to lead a complex sustainable trans-
formation (again)? This chapter adopts a perspective from organisational 
and system theory to lay the groundwork for a new ‘turn to action’ (Lam-
ker/Levin-Keitel 2019: 112) and identifies which roles may be promising for 
growth-independent planning.
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Collective organisation of space
In the twenty-first century, there is no absolute shortage of material wealth, 
housing or resources for people who live in Germany, in Europe and in most 
other industrialised countries. Nonetheless, familiar ways of thinking and 
modes of action have been unable to achieve or safeguard a satisfactory dis-
tribution of resources within ecological limits. Growth imperatives create 
socially specific scarcity and continue to be deeply rooted in social, economic 
and planning institutions, affecting every single individual (Rosa 2016; Sav-
ini 2019: 74–76; Schmelzer/Vetter 2019: 42–68; Stein 2019). Correspondingly, 
urban and spatial planning develops ways in which growth and space can be 
linked (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
2007; Galland 2012; Rydin 2013; Schulz 2018).
Spatial organisation has always been a matter of concern for all human 
beings. Our image of urban and spatial planning began to shift as early as 
the 1970s towards people with their knowledge, interests and opinions. 
Communication and participation are now established elements of all spa-
tial planning processes. Today’s debates on post-growth and transformation 
particularly emphasise that the organisation and, especially, the fundamen-
tal redefinition of space are tasks that everyone can actively pursue (e.  g. 
Schneidewind 2018). Planning is the process by which we continuously orga-
nise the design of space over time (van Assche/Buinen/Duineveld 2017: 223; 
Stein 2019: 13). Terms like ‘spatial entrepreneurs’, ‘change agents’ and ‘pro-
sumers of space’ focus on the fact that each individual acts in space and can 
deliberately direct this action to further a (socio-ecological) transformation.
In this way, agents of spatial change gain access to diverse and compre-
hensive resources for engaged action. Planners are relieved of the burden 
of having to conceive and implement all spatial changes. On the other hand, 
they acquire the burden of more actively leading transformative processes 
and their spatial dimensions in complex networks. Following this line of 
thought, this also means that organising the limited space requires more 
attention to be paid to commonalities, which can act as a focus and guide for 
action. Since at least the end of the 1990s, the discussion has focused inten-
sively on improving communication within planning processes and devel-
oping instruments that enable broad participation on all levels. The basic 
approach of urban and spatial planning has changed to favour coordinating, 
integrating and facilitating activities (Innes/Booher 1999: 11; Lamker 2016: 
New roles in collective, growth-independent spatial organisation 349
222). The methodological repertoire has become correspondingly diverse 
and increasingly elaborate. Managing uncertainty has replaced the search 
for fixed certainties (Abbott 2005). At least since the Nobel Prize for Econom-
ics was awarded to Elinor Ostrom in 2012, spatial planning has increasingly 
supplemented state and market-based solutions with a reliance on the abil-
ity of people to organise themselves for sustainable resource management. 
At the same time, community control is challenging in itself and a shift to 
community decision-making processes will not be a sufficient solution alone.
Today we stand at a difficult turning point. On the one hand, participa-
tion is anchored at all spatial levels. On the other hand, we face increasing 
social and spatial differences as well as limits to participation and economic 
growth (e.  g. Hagelüken 2017; Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2017). Communica-
tive processes therefore occur in settings where there are absolute limits to 
development that consensus cannot overcome (e.  g. limited building land) 
or should not overcome (e. g. the destruction of habitats and biodiversity). 
Every single decision can lead to a proportion of these resources being irre-
vocably lost. We see the cumulative effects of individual choices – even if 
many of them are quite well-balanced decisions in themselves. 
The collective organisation of space primarily involves finding a just bal-
ance between different people in one space and between people in different 
spaces – right up to an intergenerational and global level. Thinking about 
post-growth draws particular attention to ecological and planetary boundar-
ies and the interconnectedness of our actions and their effects in global pro-
cesses (as in Brand/Wissen 2017; Raworth 2018; for planning, the relational 
approach of planetary urbanisation by Brenner 2014 is comparable). The 
uncomfortable truth is that without rapid and clear decisions, things often do 
not work. Complexity and uncertainty are core elements of planning action 
and cannot be fully or permanently eliminated (Abbott 2005: 238; Lamker 
2016: 3–11). Urban and spatial planning are becoming increasingly politicised, 
analogous to the post-growth discourse (Schmelzer/Vetter 2019: 226). For the 
collective organisation of space, planners need a basis which they can use to 
make decisions despite persistent uncertainty, and they require soft as well 
as hard instruments. There are many decisional situations in which economic 
growth is incompatible with ecological limits and available resources, partic-
ularly if a long-term perspective is taken or the decision at hand is linked to 
other decisions. This begs the question: What are just decisions under these 
conditions and how can we imagine just spatial development? 
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Responsibility of planners
This raises important questions about the responsibility of planners, a 
responsibility that extends beyond a single delimited space, a short period 
of time and the people who are alive today. Institutional, collective and indi-
vidual responsibility are all involved, and the essential rules governing our 
lives together and our individual courses of actions must thus be adapted. 
Global change and local action are no longer contradictory. Rio 1992 and 
many local Agenda-21 processes have installed ‘think global, act local’ as a 
new quality of joint action in an unequal world characterised by widely dif-
ferent points of departure. Acknowledging joint responsibility therefore also 
means including the consequences of actions on individuals and communi-
ties that are unknown to the decision-makers (see Gunder/Hillier 2007). In 
urban research, Brenner (2014) calls for consideration of the negative conse-
quences of urbanisation processes to include the most remote areas on Earth. 
He uses the term ‘planetary urbanization’ to refer to the networks of global 
material f lows. Finally, the time horizon of today’s decisions extends inter-
generationally into foreseeable and potential future generations. 
It would be extremely easy to address the responsibility of planners in 
the narrow context of the planning system: responsible planning within the 
established system of public urban and spatial planning involves fulfilling 
rights and duties imposed by formal or informal institutions (similarly here 
see Needham/Buitelaar/Hartmann 2018: 12; also see Gunder/Hillier 2007: 61). 
Planners must carry out the tasks and abide by the policy guidelines. The 
spatial reach of responsibility ends at the boundaries of the administrative 
jurisdiction or at the boundaries set by mandate. Metaphorically speaking, 
planners are only an unimportant cog in a machine that fits seamlessly into 
higher-level processes. A perspective of this sort may be appropriate when 
working with statutory planning instruments. Defining responsibility so 
narrowly, however, leaves no room for important post-growth impulses. 
Change must then come from those who delegate power and responsibility 
to planners, for instance via political decisions. 
Today, social movements like Fridays for Future demand more creativ-
ity and more immediate action, especially from established institutions. 
The call for action is directed not only towards politicians but also explicitly 
towards all public institutions. There must be situations in which responsi-
bility involves direct action and reacting rapidly to urgent problems. Ever 
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fewer problems stop at administrative boundaries and ever fewer challenges 
can be tackled within defined jurisdictions.
This discussion extends the concept of responsibility to include the micro- 
and meso-levels: even the smallest element and/or the smallest movement 
can change a large system (as also argued by Ekardt 2017; Stein 2019). A small 
agent may not necessarily be aware of all the effects, but it is very well aware of 
its own condition and options. This means that the possible ways of changing 
the system of ‘planning’ can indeed be conceived within the system of ‘plan-
ning’. Politicians remain the final level of decision making for urban planning. 
However, most planning instruments are so complex that it is difficult for 
politicians to fully understand them, not to mention change them. Planners 
themselves are thus those who best know their own practice and who can 
identify and provide immediate starting points for change. In planning situ-
ations characterised by undecidability (Gunder/Hillier 2007: 78–82), strength 
lies in taking responsibility for collective decision-making capacity. Gunder 
and Hillier (2007: 79–84) emphasise that responsible decisions include the 
risk of making mistakes. They suggest that planners are responsible for act-
ing as individuals and taking on responsibility that is different to following 
rules and more than behaving dutifully. Thought of in this way, responsibility 
is endless, extending across space to the global effects of our actions, across 
time to potential later generations and across matter to the animate and inan-
imate environment. This aspect, for example, is highlighted in critiques of a 
Western, imperial mode of living (Brand/Wissen 2017). Nonetheless, Gun-
der and Hillier (2007) reduce the burden of responsibility by directing their 
appeal equally to all planners and by ruling out the possibility of always tar-
geting the correct action in complex contexts.
Role images
At the interface with transformation research, spatial planning is beginning 
to be reconceptualised, providing integrated, descriptive and explanatory 
approaches to organise and manage space without growth impulses (Schnei-
dewind 2018; Schulz 2018; Wittmayer et al. 2017: 49–50). Many of these 
approaches underline that there are possibilities for change, but that cour-
age is required to take the first steps and to encourage others to do the same 
(Lamker/Schulze Dieckhoff 2019: 8). Debates on planning theory increasingly 
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discuss the fact that planners can accompany, manage or lead, but can never 
achieve a complete overview – i.  e. complete certainty (e.  g. Abbott 2005; 
Lamker 2016). Identifying and assuming individual responsibility requires 
opportunities to think beyond what is known and to expand the boundaries 
of possible action – also expanding individual understandings of planners’ 
roles. Tangible roles help planners to increase their own ref lexive capacity 
and to capture new behavioural patterns in comprehensible mental images. 
They encapsulate the basic attitude of planners, which is increasingly shift-
ing towards actively accompanying transformation processes in pursuit of 
the abstract goal of greater sustainability (Lamker/Levin-Keitel 2019: 109).
The basis for the understanding of roles employed here is found in organ-
isational and system theory. Roles summarise expectations and thus provide 
stability in complex systems (Lamker 2016: 93–97). Acting under uncertainty 
is viewed as normality (Abbott 2005), involving a search for agency despite 
complex interactions and undecidabilities. Organisational research has lit-
tle difficulty in recognising action as being fundamentally incomplete and 
temporary (Schreyögg/Geiger 2015: 13). Clarity about one’s own possible roles 
and the possible roles of others serves to provide temporary stability through 
coherent behavioural patterns, which are expected to be reciprocal (Lamker 
2016: 94). It is fundamentally impossible to completely record, describe or 
reliably control other systems. Today, a transformation of planners’ roles is 
occurring just as planners who have adopted appropriate roles are also sup-
porting spatial transformation (Wittmayer et al. 2017: 53). Role-ref lexivity 
is especially important in concrete situations where it can offer support and 
stability in uncertainty (Lamker 2019: 204). 
Roles are used here as a tool to further the collective understanding, 
ref lection, support and organisation of transformation in the context of irre-
solvable uncertainties (Lamker 2019: 201). They serve to reduce complexity 
within the system of ‘planning’, i. e. to structure it in comprehensible and 
manageable elements. As complex behavioural patterns, roles can be applied 
and adapted, even for roleplay and improvisation in different contexts (also 
see Innes/Booher 1999: 12; Wittmayer et al. 2017: 50). Instead of fixed actions, 
planners should have a f lexible toolbox of roles with which they can test spa-
tial action, right down to basic assumptions concerning the potentials for 
change in post-growth approaches. Today’s great pace of change means that 
changing the training of future planners is just as inadequate as relying on 
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the slow diffusion of new ideas. The new roles that are necessary must also 
be filled by people who want to plan and change in the here and now.
Decoupling strict assignments of roles and people creates a bridge 
between today’s reality and possible futures. The decoupling does not force 
planners to question their own identity. Rather it provides them with an 
opportunity to better understand their own role in interaction with others 
and to temporarily ‘slip’ into other roles in order to improve planning action 
and increase collective ref lexivity and agency with other actors (see Innes/
Booher 1999; Lamker 2019). In the following, roles are used to help transfer 
important behavioural patterns from the post-growth debate to urban and 
spatial planning. With their focus on agency, they introduce enriching new 
patterns of behaviour and promote the responsible use of the new paths thus 
created.
Post-growth impulses
On the one hand, the post-growth discourse looks at institutional norms and 
structures that often follow an unquestioned growth logic (e. g. Rydin 2013; 
Stein 2019). On the other hand, it also looks at the possible ways in which 
individuals can effect change (e.  g. Ekardt 2017; Welzer 2013). The interac-
tion of the macro- and micro-levels of decision making and of global and 
local processes calls for a response by all of us. Investigations and discussion 
about post-growth are still relatively new and research gaps remain (Schmel-
zer/Vetter 2019: 232–235). These include the global ecological question of 
post-growth in relation to social justice and the relationship between post-
growth, geopolitics and security policies. However, in the search for arenas 
of responsibility and transformative roles, urban and spatial planning can 
draw not only on its own initial post-growth impulses but also on funda-
mental critiques of existing social and economic models from neighbouring 
disciplines. 
With the work of Piketty (2016), a new basis for understanding the devel-
opment and meaning of growth has recently been developed in economics, 
and concludes that growth is leading to extreme national and global inequal-
ities. Growth is not normal. In human history, it rather represents an excep-
tional situation in the second half of the twentieth century. In addition to 
analytical approaches, there are alternative economic models such as the 
Christian Lamker, Viola Schulze Dieckhoff354
post-growth economy (Paech 2012; Jackson 2017), donut economics (Raworth 
2018), the common good economy (Felber 2018) and the degrowth movement 
(Latouche 2010; Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie e.V. / DFG-Kolleg Postwach-
stumsgesellschaften 2017; Kallis 2018). In response to planetary boundaries 
and the need to improve public welfare, such approaches call for immediate 
change to our economic practices and lifestyles (for example, with an eco-
nomic focus in Felber 2018). However, the spatial dimension is still under-
represented (Schmid 2019: 9).
In sociology, critical approaches describe the ‘racing standstill’ of a 
society that is in constant acceleration but still fails to achieve a good life 
(Rosa 2016; Rosa/Henning 2018). However, great change is often also the 
result of small adaptations in our own behaviour and actions. There are thus 
also hopeful messages to be found in sociology, focusing on the agency of 
everyone (Ekardt 2017). Psychology explores the question of why the urge for 
growth is so deeply anchored in our thought patterns (Fromm 2009; Welzer 
2013; Hunecke 2013), even though material possessions only lead to short-
term moments of happiness and never to a state of lasting satisfaction. Erich 
Fromm (2009: 274) accordingly criticises the ‘triad of unlimited production, 
absolute freedom and unrestricted happiness’ (translated from German). 
However, current findings in brain research are encouraging for individuals 
as well as for cities and regions and suggest that there are possibilities for 
change, learning and development until the end of life (Hüther 2013; 2018).
There are also links to political activism working within other economic 
and social models. In 2011, the German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(Wissenschaf tliche Beirat der Bundesregierung, WBGU) called for a great trans-
formation (WBGU 2011). In 2013, the Enquête Commission ‘Growth, Pros-
perity, Quality of Life’ (‘Wachstum, Wohlstand, Lebensqualität’) also discussed 
the search for alternatives in its final report (Deutscher Bundestag 2013). In 
2014, the first degrowth conference took place in Germany and has since been 
held annually in other European cities. In 2018, the European Post-Growth 
Conference, initiated in Brussels by ten MEPs, discussed future-proof policy 
and a sustainable combination of the environment, human rights and a via-
ble economy.
Finally, in 2018, the Fridays for Future movement was born, becoming a 
major political force in 2019, right up to the European elections. For the first 
time, young people around the world are collectively calling on politicians 
and society to take decisive action and change direction in the face of the 
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climate crisis and planetary boundaries. Since the end of the 2010s, this civ-
il-society ‘moral revolution’ or ‘art of the future’ (‘Zukunf tskunst’) (Schneide-
wind 2018: 476–479) has triggered ref lection in many professions about indi-
vidual political responsibility and possibilities and may be a starting point 
for political-institutional, technological and economic change. Nevertheless, 
in Germany it has not led to fundamental policy changes.
There is an increasing amount of work in urban and rural planning that 
is critical of the deeply rooted (economic) growth orientation of the profes-
sion (Janssen-Jansen et al. 2012; Rydin 2013; Hahne 2017; Schulz 2018; Sav-
ini 2019; Stein 2019). The growth paradigm pervades planning instruments, 
institutions and norms and prevents planning from focusing on the com-
mon good. A critical view from a post-growth perspective can be valuable 
here: first, it helps to identify this growth focus on various levels; second, it 
provides incentives, arguments and visions for a post-growth culture; and 
third, it offers motivation to productively use the critical pluralism of opin-
ion. In Germany, the Academy for Spatial Research and Planning (Akademie 
für Raumforschung und Landesplanung, ARL) sees potential for post-growth to 
develop into a ‘paradigm in the economy, society and planning’ (Akademie 
für Raumforschung und Landesplanung 2017: 4, translated from German). 
In 2019, the Association of German Architects (Bund Deutscher Architekten, 
BDA) heralded the end of growth as necessary for survival, elaborating on 
this in ten postulates (Bund Deutscher Architekten 2019). 
On the level of neighbourhoods, urban districts, towns and cities, sev-
eral examples of alternative practices and criteria have the potential to lead 
to new ways of thinking and modes of living. On the regional, federal-state, 
national and global levels, the debates largely remain niche topics (very 
markedly in Denmark, Galland 2012). Indeed, the post-growth discussion 
has been split into, on the one hand, concrete and often radical demands 
directed towards established institutions and, on the other hand, a focus on 
self-organised projects and niches (Schmelzer/Vetter 2019: 217). Throughout, 
calls are made for new (positive) social visions which can break down the 
supremacy of a growth orientation, or even the ‘growth fetish’ in economy, 
society and urban and spatial planning.
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Roles in an active transformation 
The post-growth debate does not lead to a single role suitable for planners in 
public administrations or in private planning agencies. This seems particu-
larly undesirable considering demands for diversity, pluralism and critical 
debate in large parts of the field. A set of roles can help daily planning prac-
tice to become more ref lexive and active in face of the challenges and limits 
that the post-growth discourse identifies. Bringing together social, cultural 
and ecological issues in a broad discourse (as in Schmelzer/Vetter 2019: 15) 
provides a good basis for an integrative planning perspective on space. It is 
therefore especially helpful to identify impulses that receive little attention 
in the classical definitions of urban and spatial planning. 
The six propositions of post-growth planning proposed by Lamker and 
Schulze Dieckhoff (2019) show the need for new roles from a post-growth 
perspective. New roles are intended to act as a bridge to bold action that sees 
current developments as being changeable, right down to their fundamen-
tals. It is essential to use various types of communication including playful 
approaches for taking people with their personal and emotional dimensions 
seriously in open processes (Innes/Booher 1999: 19; similarly also Schnei-
dewind 2018). Roles must provide a robust basis for communication, an 
immediate link to transformative action, and anchors that can be used in 
shared responsibility by every individual planning actor. Although social 
change has been occurring in many initiatives and micro-practices since the 
1990s, spatial planning seems increasingly challenged by these approaches. 
Demands for rapid construction and the rapid development of land come 
up against the clear limits to growth and the real-world housing situation, 
mobility opportunities and quality of life. Debates about services of general 
interest, equivalent living conditions and the social divide are accelerating 
at all spatial levels and require a new perspective (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, 
Stadt- und Raumforschung 2017; Hagelüken 2017; Terfrüchte 2019). Is it 
impossible to effect large-scale and even systemic changes through collec-
tive decision-making? 
Urban commons, cooperative kinds of urban development, civic neigh-
bourhood concepts and spatial associations are already changing neighbour-
hoods and urban districts (Schneidewind 2018: 301–475). Although these 
approaches can be described using planning vocabulary, they focus on direct 
action, on collective forms of organisation and on the concrete improvement 
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of the spatial environment. In addition, a new generational conf lict is emerg-
ing. On the one hand, degree programmes, conferences and initiatives reveal 
a great interest in urban and spatial planning among young people from many 
backgrounds. On the other hand, there are problems with the representation 
of younger generations in democratic bodies. In the public debate, awareness 
and appreciation of demands for change – made visible, for example, by the 
Fridays for Future movement – are met with uncertainty or even rejected by 
established planning actors in research and practice. The long-term goals are 
well accepted, as seen, for example, in the transfer of the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals to all policy levels (Bundesregierung 2018). However, it is dif-
ficult to take the necessary courageous steps and to create a breakthrough 
with innovative solutions and new institutionalisations (Schneidewind 2018: 
30). Part of the post-growth discourse fundamentally questions the way in 
which our modern society is organised, while other strands of the discourse 
actively direct their appeal to existing institutions (like, for instance, Fridays 
for Future). Post-growth calls for the stronger politicisation of social and thus 
also spatial issues (Schmelzer/Vetter 2019: 226).
In the context of a broader ‘turn to action’ in spatial and planning sci-
ences (Lamker/Levin-Keitel 2019: 112), roles should be developed that provide 
inspiration and motivation for change. The established roles as a facilitator 
and coordinator of spatial processes have not so far opened up the necessary 
opportunities for a broader and more political process of change. They seem 
too passive and conservative to introduce and motivate a new perspective. 
Integrating post-growth into urban and spatial planning requires action-
based roles that can inspire a positive vision of a growth-independent world 
(Lamker/Schulze Dieckhoff 2019: 8). As a discipline, urban and spatial plan-
ning is, however, characterised by the ability to use changing roles to repeat-
edly establish connections between people and spatial development and to 
envisage alternative futures (Lamker 2016: 323).
An open process is important to connect the integrative and long-term 
perspective with bold and immediate action. Planners should trust them-
selves (and be given the necessary scope by others) to develop ideas and 
even radical alternatives, offering them for public discussion. As inspir-
ers, motivators and leaders, it is possible to help develop a link between 
concrete proposals within established institutions and the hope connected 
with self-organised forces in civil society, thus supporting a dual (or shared) 
transformation strategy. It should not be forgotten that the long tradition of 
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urban and spatial planning in Germany and Central Europe has produced 
many valuable ideas and instruments that can also be used for changed goals 
and new success criteria. 
Outlook
The greatest challenge is to collectively organise spatial development and at 
the same time to release it from its growth orientation. With their overview 
of modes of action and interrelations in space, planners can help by question-
ing apparently unquestioned assumptions. They can consider the long-term 
effects of individual decisions in the context of the diverse impacts of our 
uses of space. And, with the help of a broadened repertoire of roles, they can 
take an active and leading part in developing growth-independent spatial 
change. They should not enter into a cycle of avoiding critical discussion, but 
actively take responsibility within their own field, translating this responsi-
bility into collective action with other stakeholders. The post-growth debate 
underscores that structural social changes are necessary if dependence on 
growth is to be overcome (Schmelzer/Vetter 2019: 26). It is not a question 
of whether the conditions or individual actions have to change first. Both 
are intricately linked and can only be fundamentally transformed if differ-
ent groups of players simultaneously act together in new understandings of 
their roles (as in the transformation model in Schneidewind 2018: 477; also 
see Kristof 2017: 169–171).
Leading processes of sustainable transformation also means that plan-
ners must engage responsibly and actively. Combining post-growth with 
urban and spatial planning involves focusing more closely on shared and 
bold engagement. Ecological boundaries and social movements especially 
demand fast and dynamic action. In the future, planners should also adopt 
the roles of inspirers and motivators. An important step in this context is to 
combine existing approaches, to enter into creative discourse and to jointly 
embark on even those steps that initially appear almost impossible. 
Spatial organisation is a collective matter where planners can take a key 
position precisely because of the level of complexity and dynamism. They 
thereby become leaders in developing the spatial conditions for a growth-in-
dependent society. At the same time, suitable social and political conditions 
must be created for collective action to have a lasting effect. This can provide 
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fertile ground for the emergence, growth and activation of new roles in a 
growth-independent post-growth planning.
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The Bauhaus as a designer of transition 
Post-growth approaches in East Germany after 
reunification – between false growth and unwanted 
non-growth 
Heike Brückner
In the upheaval following the German reunification, spaces and initiatives 
emerged that launched alternative approaches to sustainable and indepen-
dent regional development: post-growth initiatives, although they were not 
yet known as such. Much of what was trialled and tested is today discussed 
as part of post-growth approaches. Since the 1990s, the Bauhaus in Dessau 
has proved itself an institution that provides important creative and cultural 
impulses for this transformation process. This thinktank and creative insti-
tution has accumulated knowledge on issues related to a ‘different moder-
nity’, produced images and narratives of change and instigated concrete 
interventions for real change. With what is, in retrospect, amazing continu-
ity, processes of change have been designed in keeping with a post-growth 
approach, setting an example for other cities, landscapes and regions. This 
chapter ref lects on this experience, venturing to draw conclusions about the 
framework conditions, (planning) instruments and infrastructures that can 
support the development of a post-growth economy, using the example of an 
East German region, the Dessau-Wittenberg-Bitterfeld area.
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Bauhaus and post-growth 
In the midst of the weeks marking the fall of Berlin Wall in autumn 1989, 
the Bauhaus in Dessau launched a project named ‘Industrial Garden Realm’ 
(Industrielles Gartenreich), pursuing approaches towards a post-growth econ-
omy. Only nobody described it in this way, indeed the term did not yet exist. 
At that time, the concept targeted regional renewal, aiming to improve and 
utilise the endogenous potentials of the region and adhere to the ideal of sus-
tainability. The goal was to initiate an ‘Ecological Model Region’ directly on 
the doorstep of the Bauhaus, in the triangle formed by the towns of Dessau, 
Wittenberg and Bitterfeld. 
This idea was born in the ‘Walter-Gropius-Seminar’ that began on 4 
November 1989, the day of the ground-breaking demonstration on Alexan-
derplatz in Berlin, and ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 
1989. The rapid transformations kindled hope for a renewal of the region, one 
that would change the catastrophic ecological conditions, take care of the 
cultural heritage, prevent further decline of the inner cities and use architec-
ture, landscape design and urban planning to create an environment worth 
living in.
The term ‘Industrial Garden Realm’ spatially and conceptually combined 
two historical reforms that had affected the region: the Garden Realm of 
the Enlightenment, and the Bauhaus and industrial culture of Modernity. 
Thinking about this reform heritage created a conceptual space in which 
approaches appropriate for the social challenges of the closing Industrial Age 
could be developed. The ‘Limits to Growth’ by the Club of Rome (1972) and the 
Brundtland report ‘Our Common Future’ (1987) were also read in East Ger-
many (published by the state publishing house of the GDR as a book in 1988) 
and provided a backdrop for the model approach with its goals of sustain-
ability and ecological improvement. The analogy to the reforms initiated by 
the historical Bauhaus, which had emerged in the upheaval following World 
War One, was quickly established: the end of the GDR represented another 
‘historical upheaval’ that demanded and enabled reform.
That’s right: the concept for this programme of independent – sustain-
able – regional development was conceptualised in the Bauhaus Dessau. 
Since the mid-1980s, the Bauhaus had once again existed as an institute of 
design, a ‘Centre of Design’ (Zentrum für Gestaltung) as it was officially called. 
In the early days, people were searching for spaces in which they could use 
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planning and design to work towards change – despite political restrictions 
like the GDR’s housing programme and in the face of dilemmas such as the 
decay of the inner cities, the catastrophic environmental problems and an 
inefficient economy. Concrete design issues of relevance to GDR society were 
negotiated, including design workshops, architectural projects intended to 
improve industrial housing, and urban planning issues. It should also be 
mentioned that from 1987 the Bauhaus again hosted students, who were 
‘delegated’ to the foundation by universities with design disciplines (Weimar, 
Berlin, Halle, Dresden) and who became involved in the new Bauhaus design 
projects.
The self-image of the ‘new’ Bauhaus as a thinktank dealing with ques-
tions about the future found its way into the legal act that established the 
foundation in 1994. The goals recorded included not only conservation of cul-
tural heritage and educational tasks but also ‘contributions towards design-
ing today’s living environment’ (translated from German). In line with the 
three objectives of the foundation, it has three departments: the Collection, 
the Academy and the Workshop. The Academy and the Workshop took an 
interdisciplinary approach from the very beginning and brought people 
from architecture, urban planning, landscape planning, regional planning 
and sociology together with cultural scientists, art historians and artists. 
A popular rhetorical question intended to trigger discussion about cur-
rent design tasks was: What would Gropius do today, what would the mem-
bers of the Bauhaus do? While in the 1920s the Bauhaus found itself in a grow-
ing, up-and-coming industrial city with new tasks in housing development, 
serial design and urban development, in the present day it is confronted with 
the challenges of post-industrial change. Just like the historical Bauhaus 
helped to change society at the height of industrialisation, today it is called 
upon to help deal with problems at the end of industrialisation. Since 1989, 
highly politicised ‘long-term projects’, each planned to continue for about ten 
years, have been established to tackle urgent tasks and discourses: 
• ‘Industrial Garden Realm’ (‘Industrielles Gartenreich’) (1989-1999) 
Projects for sustainable and independent - sufficient - regional develop-
ment in the Dessau-Wittenberg-Bitterfeld region
• The 2010 International Building Exhibition on Urban Redevelopment – 
(Internationale Bauausstellung (IBA), Stadtumbau) (2002–2010) 
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Research, expertise and experience from practice for planning without 
growth 
• Post-fossil Spatial Design (Postfossile Raumgestaltung) (2010–2014) 
Scenarios and experiments with the model projects on the city, climate 
and landscape: Energy Landscapes 3.0 (Energielandschaf ten 3.0) / Active 
Mobility (Aktive Mobilität) / Productive UrbanLandscapes (Produktive 
StadtLandschaf ten) 
In retrospect – and from the perspective of the post-growth discourse – it 
can be said that in all three project phases, growth-critical positions were 
adopted and strategies developed for alternative spatial development paths 
leading beyond growth. The projects opened perspectives for spatial devel-
opment that focused on sustainability, regionality and a new concept of work 
that regarded individual fulfilment, creating and making as just as import-
ant as productivity and securing a livelihood. 
From the very beginning, it was important not only to think in terms of 
concepts and scenarios, but also to use concrete projects to visualise how 
change could be possible – to try things out, to initiate a joint search for solu-
tions. Such concrete project experience allows the process to become com-
prehensible for individuals, it then leaves the abstract canon and touches 
their own lifeworlds. People who are involved in this way become actors 
themselves. 
Another important aspect was the creation of institutions, i.e. the insti-
tutionalisation of new spatial actors. Who negotiates which goals and how? 
The old institutions cannot successfully negotiate future goals. A whole 
spectrum of ‘negotiating bodies’ has thus been developed and implemented 
including planning workshops, charters, a contract for the area surrounding 
the waterbody known as ‘die Goitzsche’, (regional) forums, a ‘watershed mas-
ter’ and temporary advisory councils (for further reading see Scurrell 2002). 
Interim conclusion
While the transformation of the old industrial REGION of Dessau-Witten-
berg-Bitterfeld provided the spatial framework for the ‘Industrial Garden 
Realm’, the focus of the ‘International Exhibition on Urban Redevelopment’ 
was on the transformation of URBAN AREAS against a backdrop of demo-
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graphic change. Finally, the scenarios of post-fossil spatial development 
were inspired by the idea of new URBAN-RURAL structures in which new 
spatial relationships are established, with more decentralisation, regionality 
and the self-empowerment of actors.
Post-growth approaches in the individual project phases 
The Bauhaus project ‘Industrial Garden Realm’
For sustainable urban and regional development 
‘Industrial Garden Realm’ and ‘Environment-Expo 2000’ (Umwelt-Expo 
2000) → Planning sustainable regional development, developing and testing 
methods and instruments for independent - sufficient - regional develop-
ment 
Growth vs. deindustrialisation 
If you were a planner in the 1990s and started to talk about non-growth, inde-
pendent regional development and sustainability then you were quickly side-
lined. Everywhere was booming, growth was demanded (and promoted!) 
everywhere, fast growth moreover. Although much emerged in this time 
that we can be glad about (e. g. urban conservation, inner-city renewal), the 
‘Upswing East’ programme also bore strange fruits: huge commercial areas 
and shopping centres in the suburbs and peripheries of the cities, a gigantic 
wave of suburbanisation accompanied by the construction of new residen-
tial estates on the outskirts of the city, the exorbitant expansion of transport 
infrastructure as an economic development measure, the designation of 
peripheral areas for – tax-incentivised – single-family homes, the construc-
tion of new swimming pools, leisure facilities and hospitals regardless of 
demand. This false growth has come at a high cost in some places, as is seen 
just a few years later. One extreme example concerns the suspension of plan-
ning laws, e. g. when construction was allowed in f loodplains, developments 
that are now having to be demolished.
This false growth occurred at the same time as widespread deindustriali-
sation, which was accompanied by new ecological maldevelopments. Instead 
of investing in existing structures – and thus protecting them – the nature 
conservation provisions and regulations protecting historic buildings were 
often circumvented. Many of the new investments led to the sealing of new 
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surfaces, interventions in the natural water regime and new environmental 
damage. Such measures were politically f lanked by, for instance, ‘invest-
ment facilitation laws’.
In everyday professional life, ‘planning’ then primarily involved forming 
alliances to fight against the destruction of the landscape or built heritage, to 
organise resistance and to avoid negative developments. It quickly became 
clear that the classical planning instruments like land-use plans or landscape 
master plans were not able to withstand the pressure of ‘wrong’ investments.
In face of the massive job losses and recognition that labour-intensive 
industries would no longer exist in the future, it was important, and indeed 
necessary, that an institution like the Bauhaus focused on ‘new work’ and 
new jobs in a deindustrialised society. This included all the issues associated 
with such a change and the development of new perspectives and concepts. 
Developmental and educational workshops focused on new professional 
prospects and new job profiles for an ‘economy of sustainability’ in which 
gainful employment and personal and community work were to be of equal 
status. 





01.11.1993  1.300 
01.01.1994 964
01.09.1994 799
Source: Stein 1996: 190
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Figure 1: Protestors demonstrating against the closure of the Dessau rail-car 
construction works
Source: Jänicke, K.-D., Lokalanzeige Dessau on 24.12.1994, in: Stein, M. (1996): 193
Figure 2: Discarded excavator
Source: Stif tung Bauhaus Dessau, Archiv Industrielles Gartenreich, 1992
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Figure 3: Wounds in the landscape, open-cast lignite mine Goitzsche
Source:  Brückner, Stif tung Bauhaus Dessau, 1995 
How can new developments be set in motion on the remains and traces of 
former industrial use? The following topics formed the programmatic cor-
nerstones of the ‘Industrial Garden Realm’ project:
• ‘New work’
• The ecological repair of wounds left by the industrial society
• The re-establishment of ecological cycles
• Dealing with industrial heritage 
• A different economy focused on sufficiency
What emerged and how it continued
In the period between 1989 and 1999, 16 projects emerged, all of which were 
designed as experimental fields for sustainable regional development: large 
and small, investment and culture, constructional and conceptual, spectac-
ular and common projects. While a great deal became clear and developed its 
own momentum, certain things had to be put on hold and are still waiting to 
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be picked up again. Much has been successful and is now celebrated as pos-
itive transformation, e. g. FERROPOLIS, an open-air museum of industrial 
machines also used as an event location, and the renovation and revegeta-
tion of the open-cast mine Goitzsche. 
There are also less well-known examples. For instance, the conservation 
and restoration of the factory housing estate in Wittenberg-Piesteritz, which 
was linked to a ‘car-free’ concept very early on (a concept that continues to 
be successfully applied today). Or the far-reaching plans that viewed the 
Dessau-Wörlitzer Garten Realm not only as a tourist attraction but also as a 
source of inspiration and impetus for ecological agricultural reform. Or the 
priority zones for wind energy that were designated at a very early stage in 
Saxony-Anhalt, so as to open up the prospect of a renewable energy supply 
after the closure of coal-fired power plants. The first wind farm was built in 
1999 in sight of the Zschornewitz lignite-fired power plant and owes much to 
the commitment of the Bauhaus to new economic fields for the time after coal. 
Other goals could not be realised due to a lack of political support but remain 
at the top of the agenda of post-growth regional development. These include the 
recultivation of an open-cast mine without artificial f looding with river water, 
and an ecological f lood protection system for the Elbe and Mulde rivers. 
In 1995, the ‘Industrial Garden Realm’ was accepted as an additional 
location for the Environment-Expo 2000 in Hannover. This gave the project 
a significant boost – and recognition beyond the region. With the resources 
provided by EXPO, many plans could be realised professionally and access 
to funding was made possible. It should be noted that in the process some 
developments or projects that aimed at slow and cautious recultivation were 
very quickly transformed into event locations, which was actually rather 
contrary to the idea of ecological sustainability. 
The 2010 International Building Exhibition Urban Redevelopment 
Less is More – Less is Future
The 2010 International Building Exhibition Urban Redevelopment Sax-
ony-Anhalt: Planning non-growth. Research, expertise and experience 
from practice for planning without growth (including the research project 
‘Shrinking Cities’ and the international exhibition ‘Less is Future’).
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After the collapse of the old industries led to whole swaths of land falling 
into visible disuse in the 1990s, the problem of vacancies and decline spilled 
over into the cities in the early 2000s. Planners had pointed out that there was 
no long-term demand to justify the construction of a surplus of new offices, 
housing and commercial buildings, estates of single-family homes and shop-
ping centres – all developed with (tax) subsidies. However, these warnings 
of the new problems being created were ignored. A change in approach was 
only seen once the housing industry itself came under pressure and in turn 
brought pressure to bear on politicians. An expert commission known as the 
‘Lehmann-Grube Commission’ was established to consider structural change 
in the housing industry in the new federal states. They predicted a surplus of 
over a million vacant dwellings in East Germany. Politicians reacted and set 
up the ‘Federal Programme for Urban Redevelopment in the East’ (‘Bundes-
programm Stadtumbau Ost ’).
Reacting to an initiative by the Bauhaus Dessau, the state government of 
Saxony-Anhalt decided to hold an International Building Exhibition on the 
topic of urban redevelopment. The exhibition was based on investigations 
and studies by the Bauhaus workshop, which approached the topic of shrink-
age not only in terms of demolition programmes to ensure housing market 
adjustment but aimed to change the urban planning and development par-
adigm to focus on greater sustainability and less consumption of resources. 
How do we conduct planning without growth? Which instruments and 
methods must planning use and which spatial models result from this? 
The contrast between a ‘motorboat’ and ‘sailing boat’ provides a powerful 
image here. The ‘motorboat’ symbolises the old system of unrestrained, con-
stant growth. With the outboard motor – i.e. with external investment – I 
can reach any destination and determine my course very independently and 
precisely. If there is no external investment then development – moving for-
wards – must be organised very differently, by using existing resources. This 
is what the image of the ‘sailing boat’ symbolises. The course is not straight 
but needs to be repeatedly adjusted and adapted to the concrete situation. 
The passengers in the boat are part of the system. With their actions they 
rebalance the boat again and again – and they have to be very agile, react 
very f lexibly and adapt to the circumstances (Oswalt/Overmeyer 2001).
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Small and medium-sized towns as a focus of the International 
Building Exhibition 
The federal state of Saxony-Anhalt is deep blue on the map of demographic 
change in Germany. Blue stands for a declining population – and thus for 
negative development, shrinkage. Apart from the two cities of Magdeburg 
and Halle, there are no areas that are not characterised by a shrinking pop-
ulation. However, if we look more closely at the settlement distribution it 
becomes clear that this is not an abandoned or empty space. On the contrary, 
it is an area that is characterised by many small settlement structures, creat-
ing a lively populated network of villages and small and medium-sized towns. 
And it was precisely these small and medium-sized towns that formed the 
focus of the International Building Exhibition Urban Redevelopment. Such 
settlements are often important anchors and support points for rural areas. 
With between 20,000 and 70,000 inhabitants, they house over half of the 
population of Saxony-Anhalt. In Germany as a whole, about two-thirds of 
the population live in small and medium-sized towns (BBSR 2007), a fact 
that receives insufficient attention both qualitatively and quantitatively in 
current political and strategic debates on social cohesion, and is not given 
the space it deserves in considerations of the future of urban areas.
Ultimately, seeing these shrinking small and medium-sized towns as pio-
neers of sustainable and post-fossil urban development was one of the core 
ideas of the International Building Exhibition, and resulted in three spatial 
scenarios. These scenarios for the future focused on the topics of urban areas, 
(agricultural) landscapes, and climate and energy. They aimed to create new 
urban-rural structures with ‘cluster-cities’ and ‘rural republics’ (MLV 2010).
Gaining new actors for sustainable spatial development
The traditional actors, however, tended to take a wait-and-see approach to 
these changes and tried to preserve their vested interests. New actors had 
to be found who saw an opportunity in the redevelopment processes and 
wanted to participate with openness, creativity and new ideas. This required 
a different kind of planning. Planning that targets invitation, activation and 
enabling. Planning that helps to initiate and shape processes, even ones with 
unclear outcomes. Planning that no longer prescribes something that just 
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needs to be implemented but aims at the gradual cultivation of urban or 
rural spaces that have fallen into disuse. 
This is well-illustrated in the example of Dessau, where one of the most 
advanced city-wide redevelopment projects was realised as part of the Inter-
national Building Exhibition. As this is where the Bauhaus is located, it 
seemed obvious that the city and the foundation should together try out new 
paths. In addition to a long-term urban strategy based on the island theory, 
the focus was on new ways of mobilising the public to open up opportuni-
ties for direct participation. An ‘Urban Redevelopment Planning Workshop’ 
was launched, inviting new – different – stakeholders to become involved in 
the redevelopment process, such as the sponsors of cultural institutions or 
initiatives, the providers of supply and disposal systems, associations and 
private citizens.
Figure 4: Citizen claims ‘400 m² of Dessau’
Source: Reckmann, Stif tung Bauhaus Dessau 2006
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Figure 5: Pixels & Claims: for a culture of interaction and exchange
Source: Brückner (graphics: Faber), Stif tung Bauhaus Dessau 2004
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Correspondingly, the spatial scale was ‘broken down’. The city was sym-
bolically pixelated. Using grids of 20 x 20 m, areas of 400 m² were created, 
which approximately corresponds to the smallest average plot size. The areas 
were given to private citizens, associations or firms to cultivate, no matter 
whether as a garden, as a three-dimensional business card or for sport and 
leisure etc. Analogous to the goldrush atmosphere that once characterised 
North America, these areas were named ‘claims’.
Claims are important elements in the transformation of the city. Wher-
ever an actor is willing to undertake something concrete then site ownership, 
usage contracts and design considerations must be clarified. This always 
accelerates the redevelopment process. 
The grid used here is a method that can also be widely transferred – to 
other cities and other spaces. It gives structure and order to the emerging 
diversity and the spatio-temporal uncertainty. The structure of the pixel grid 
also creates an aesthetic but nonetheless systematic way of juxtaposing the 
planned and the unplanned, the small and the large, the conventional and 
the unconventional, etc. The uses and functions of the space are not pro-
grammed ‘from above’, rather its character is determined by the process of 
cultivation by the actors involved.
The claims were originally intended for temporary use, in the meanwhile 
a number of them have become long-term garden projects, educational sites 
or leisure areas, and some have been extended. The ‘Urban Farm Dessau’, 
which is in the process of establishing a ‘neighbourhood farm’ on brownfield 
sites, also sees itself as a further development of the claims, providing nec-
essary infrastructure. With grow-your-own strategies and local supplies of 
renewable energy, water and food in the middle of the city, it aims to estab-
lish productive land uses in urban neighbourhoods. 
Post-fossil spatial design
Urban areas, the climate, (agricultural) landscape
At the end of the 2010 International Building Exhibition Urban Redevel-
opment, three spatial scenarios were developed that outlined visions for a 
post-fossil society. They formed the starting point for further work by the 
Bauhaus Dessau on urban areas, the climate and (agricultural) landscape. 
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The Bauhaus Master Plan of 2011 states that ‘the present is character-
ised by manifold crisis phenomena: the financial crisis, climate change and 
demography are indicative of the serious global structural problems of con-
temporary societies. They are at the centre of the upcoming design tasks...’ 
And it continues: ‘In order to strengthen the ability to shape the future, sce-
narios are being developed that reach far into the future and from there 
reveal possible paths for solutions to the present problems’ (Stiftung Bau-
haus Dessau 2010, translated from German). 
The spatial scenarios are dedicated to the relationship between urban 
and rural, landscape and agriculture, climate and energy. Under the heading 
‘Less is Future’, they demonstrate strategies for alternative spatial develop-
ment paths beyond growth. 
The focus is on the region, specifically the region with its interplay of 
urban and rural structures. One core idea is that the disintegration of society 
is ref lected in space. We are dealing with the juxtaposition of growing urban 
areas and shrinking rural regions, with cleared agricultural landscapes and 
scattered villages whose inhabitants cannot find work locally and therefore 
have to commute to the nearest town or even really long distances. We are 
dealing with areas where the economy is booming and with leftover areas 
where nobody can earn a living and which are being abandoned as people 
move away. Linked to this is a spatial ‘decoupling’: the decoupling of produc-
tion and consumption, of work and housing, of the cultivation of the land 
and the settlement of the land. ‘Although 54 percent of the population in Sax-
ony-Anhalt live in rural regions, agriculture provides employment for only 
about one percent of the people’ (Veihelmann/Overmeyer 2010, translated 
from German).
Re-regionalisation
How can processes of reintegration be designed that include perspectives for 
sustainable transport, a renewable energy landscape and productive urban 
landscapes, as well as promoting strategies of renewal from within? 
The old instruments are no longer sufficient: ‘... already in the past too 
much emphasis was placed on infrastructure and equipping structurally 
weak areas with transport infrastructure did not help to stabilise them. On 
the contrary, the reduction of spatial resistance actually accelerated the 
abandonment of the area. ... It sounds paradoxical, but it seems to make 
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more sense to increase spatial resistance again and to look for endogenous 
development potential’ (Rettich/Dolata 2010, translated from German).
The keyword in all three scenarios is ‘re-regionalisation’: a regionalisa-
tion which relies on each locality’s unique qualities and makes them produc-
tive in the most diverse ways. This is linked to an image of space organised 
in a decentralised manner, with structures for local supplies and self-suffi-
ciency, where nature, resources and the landscape are protected, and where 
people negotiate with one another about what is done when, where and how 
in regionally anchored networks and forms of organisation. 
Spatial models for the post-fossil society
These scenarios have managed to find strong images and terminology for 
spatial models that enrich the discourses on services of general interest, 
future sustainable energy supplies, a changed farming culture and the reor-
ganisation of transport and mobility. They make existing knowledge acces-
sible, also for non-planners and laypersons. The scenarios can be understood 
as a kind of ‘visual thinking’ intended to bring together technicians, design-
ers and other experts, such as those specialising in climate and energy. 
Working on new ‘spatial images’ for a post-fossil society helps to focus 
the discourse, while the scenarios demonstrate different options for action. 
They can open up spaces for models and experiments. Ultimately, they can 
strengthen relevant approaches, increasing their inf luence on society. They 
are not ‘exclusive’ truths based on research findings, nor are they ‘target 
photos’. They are rather primarily ‘images for communication’. If we assume 
that in a post-fossil society, prosumers (see Kurzja/Thiele/Klagge, Bürkner/
Lange and Lamker/Schulze Dieckhoff in this volume), who design their own 
life processes, will be the most significant actors for many areas of life and 
the economy, then this ‘learning to design’ will be an important educational 
challenge for the Bauhaus (Stiftung Bauhaus Dessau 2011).
The spatial scenarios serve to demonstrate what the status-quo is, what is 
going wrong and how things can be done differently: 
• The status-quo: Energy Avantgarde Anhalt
• What is going wrong: Energy Landscapes 3.0
• How things can be changed: Productive UrbanLandscapes
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The status-quo: Energy Avantgarde Anhalt
Saxony-Anhalt is a pioneering state in renewable energies. The first wind 
farm was established on a spoil heap of a former open-cast mine as early as 
1999. In the same year, solar cell production was initiated in Thalheim near 
Bitterfeld. In July 2001, the first solar cells rolled off the production line at 
Q-Cells and continued until the slump in 2012. 
However, not only large investments were made. The initiatives were pri-
marily small ventures, organised privately or collectively, which – it should 
be emphasised – still exist today. They are remarkable in their continuity. 
Such initiatives include the revitalisation of a historical (protected) water-
mill, which today provides about 400 households with electricity. In Dessau 
there is also the first citizen-led solar power plant in Saxony-Anhalt, which 
has been supplying electricity to the grid as a 10 kWp system for over 15 years. 
Youth education projects have also been set up to encourage learning about 
the principles of self-sufficient energy supplies, as have a number of architec-
tural projects involving showcase energy efficient buildings and solar mod-
ules integrated into buildings. One example is the Federal Environmental 
Agency in Dessau, a new build designed by the architects Sauerbruch Hutton. 
There is little public awareness of these projects, so the initial task was to 
map and make visible what is there. Re-evaluating what exists is often the 
first step towards initiating transformation processes. 
Bringing together this wide variety of actors led to founding of the net-
work Energy Avantgarde Anhalt. This network of artists, sociologists, pri-
vate citizens, technicians and companies from the region was founded at the 
Bauhaus and has since established itself as an independent association. It 
focuses on working on a regional electricity system that makes it possible 
to turn private, public and civil society institutions and private citizens into 
producers and consumers of regionally generated energy. This provides an 
alternative to dicussion about major power transmission lines. 
What is going wrong: Energy Landscapes 3.0
Revealing what is going wrong is also part of ‘visible thinking’. Around 
2010, the project DESERTEC hit the headlines. An international consortium 
planned to build enormous solar farms in North Africa and southern Spain 
and to transport the ‘desert electricity’ produced there via major transmis-
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sion lines to Europe and elsewhere. Even at the time, Herman Scheer (2010) 
criticised the plan for creating a structure for renewable energies ‘that would 
be even more centralistic than the conventional energy system, at least in 
part’ (translated from German). A Bauhaus summer school took up the topic, 
focusing on the cultural, social and socio-economic dimensions because 
until then the issue had been viewed mainly from a purely technical perspec-
tive. 
The opinion of the students at the summer school was unanimous: pro-
ducing energy sustainably requires alternative economic approaches and 
lifestyles. ‘Production with the goal of continuous capital accumulation 
cannot be social, sustainable and re-productive’ (translated from German). 
They drew up concepts for decentralised supplies of renewable energies that 
involved as many actors as possible in a cycle of energy production, storage 
and use. They advocated the development of a prosumer culture in which 
reconnecting to social spaces, self-sufficiency, frugality and moderation 
would become the objectives of social action. The current energy supply 
model with its split between production and consumption is to be replaced 
by the model of prosuming, in which diverse actors enter into exchange with 
one another and practice new models of negotiation (Brückner 2011).
In contrast, projects like DESERTEC ‘are conceived purely in terms of 
the energy business and not in terms of the overall economy, certainly not in 
terms of the regional economy. They reduce the number of actors producing 
renewable energy instead of increasing them’ (Scheer 2010, translated from 
German).
Immediately after the summer school, the findings were communicated 
at a festival entitled ‘On the art of living / Survival art’ (‘Über Lebenskunst)’. 
Visitors to the festival could not get enough of the wonderful graphics, dia-
grams and maps. There was a great deal of animated discussion in front of 
the displays. This indicates the importance of visualisations of this kind that 
open up a space for discourse about the right and wrong approaches and 
allow joint learning.
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How things can be changed: Productive UrbanLandscapes and Urban 
Farm Dessau 
The Urban Farm Dessau project aims to produce healthy food and renewable 
energies where they are needed, in the cities and the urban neighbourhoods. 
The transition to non-fossil energy sources means that local supply strategies 
and self-sufficiency approaches are gaining significance. In the context of 
the 2010 International Building Exhibition Urban Redevelopment, unused 
spaces in Dessau were made available, initially temporarily, for new produc-
tive forms of land use, such as an energy crop plantation and ‘claims’ that 
could be used as gardens. This success of these claims and the increasing 
number of brownfields led to the vision of Productive UrbanLandscapes. 
The aim of Productive UrbanLandscapes is to cultivate more and more 
green spaces in urban areas as gardens, making them productive for local 
economic cycles (for further reading see Brückner 2016). The Dessau urban 
development concept provides a good basis for this: in line with the island 
model the city was divided into a number of neighbourhoods (see Stadt Des-
sau-Roßlau 2013). Between these ‘urban islands’, a landscape runs through 
the city that can be used in a variety of ways: as a climate-productive space, 
for food production, as retention areas to provide protection against f lood-
ing, for energy bands, for community activities by urban actors. The prod-
ucts are processed and used in the neighbouring districts. Neighbourhoods 
become ‘urban factories’ where value is created. 
In order for these goals to be realised and f lourish, institutional support 
and structural opportunities are needed. ‘Neighbourhood farms’ provide 
the infrastructure for cultivating the surrounding land. They are the control 
centres that coordinate the economic activities, provide social exchange and 
organise negotiations about what should be done where and how. 
The idea of initiating a ‘neighbourhood farm’ of this sort in a Dessau 
neighbourhood was born in the Bauhaus Dessau. With the support of the 
Robert Bosch Foundation and their Land Reclaimers programme, it was pos-
sible for the project to f lourish and a network to develop with people from the 
neighbourhood. Since 2016, the project has been running independently and 
has been gradually extended both spatially and in terms of focus.
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What comes next: Post-growth and spatial planning
Here we come full circle: initiatives like the ‘Urban Farm Dessau’ are infra-
structural projects that can develop and test post-growth economies in prac-
tice. What conclusions can be drawn from them for the spatial implementa-
tion of post-growth scenarios? What contribution can spatial development 
and the planning disciplines make to the emergence of a post-growth econ-
omy?1
1  Also see here Brückner 2020.
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Civil society actors are the drivers of a post-growth economy. Associa-
tions, co-operatives and private citizens are looking for alternative modes 
of living and alternative economic approaches in order to promote more 
sustainable development focused on the common good – in urban and rural 
areas alike. Actors and projects no longer want to wait for someone ‘from 
above’ (see Lange/Bürkner in this volume) to change course in order to tackle 
societal challenges such as climate change, the energy and food issue and 
social cohesion. Instead, they are taking action themselves, with their own 
resources, their own networks and their own alliances, in a very concrete and 
local way. 
With their networks, these actors create real alternatives to the domi-
nant economic system. The networks of eco-villages and transition towns, of 
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) and permaculture, of repair cul-
ture and citizen-led energy co-operatives, social housing projects, etc. – all 
show ways of operating in a different economic mode, beyond the classic 
logic of exploitation and growth convictions. They abstain from consump-
tion, operate in small cycles, develop step-by-step investments. They work in 
solidarity, collectively, ecologically. They act according to the principles of a 
post-growth economy – today.
The aim should therefore be to develop (management) instruments for 
spatial planning that support growth-critical approaches and open up spaces 
in which post-growth economies can f lourish. 
Projects led by private actors, initiatives and associations tend to be ‘fine-
grained’. They are imaginative and creative. Rather than following a grand 
plan, they trigger creative chain reactions. Instead of big, spatially domi-
nant investments, there are a multitude of small steps that focus on what is 
available and what can be made productive locally – so instead of the one big 
solution, there are a multitude of small solutions. 
Citizen-led, civil society initiatives thereby develop a momentum that 
cannot be planned for or managed using conventional planning instruments. 
The classical plans are too sluggish, too formal, too functionally specific and 
divisive. ‘Open planning processes’ and ‘informal plans’ are needed instead, 
ones that are f lexible in time and space and which allow the repeated rene-
gotiation of goals, tasks and wishes so that interaction between actors is 
encouraged. Instead of a finished plan that describes a final vision, we need 
planning tools that are understood as part of the processes being managed 
and designed. 
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What I have learnt in the long-term projects at the Bauhaus is that devel-
opments of this kind can be stimulated, encouraged, guided and qualified 
with a structural impulse ‘from above’. 
What could that be? A federal ministry for the promotion of post-growth 
economies? Why not? Let us imagine that the federal government takes up 
our suggestion and creates a POST-GROWTH Ministry. What would it have 
to do, what tasks would we give it?
Planning shrinkage and growth together
Shrinkage in one place always produces growth in another place. Rural 
regions characterised by infrastructural weakness, outwards migration and 
a declining population stand in contrast to growing metropolises. People go 
where they can find work. This leads to a shortage of housing and land in the 
large cities. Life grows increasingly expensive there and new social inequali-
ties emerge. As a result, more surfaces in urban areas are being sealed, which 
is not good for the climate or for human health. What is needed is to put both 
developments in the same context – the shrinking in peripheral regions and 
the enormous growth in the metropolises. Urban and rural then move closer 
together, become neighbours. And that occurs in smaller spatial units that 
are manageable and negotiable.
Keeping land available for reproductive economic activity
Local supplies and self-sufficiency in terms of water, energy and food are 
essential to post-growth. The prerequisite for this is that land is available 
that can be cultivated sustainably. However, current land speculation is an 
absolute obstacle to this – just like the sealing of urban land. While a great 
deal of public money continues to be used to demolish buildings in declining 
regions, the conditions in the cities are less and less suitable for reproduc-
tion. Here, active soil protection should be implemented, so that land can be 
deliberately and structurally kept free for climate protection, urban agricul-
ture, water management and social interaction, especially in metropolitan 
neighbourhoods. These areas of a new urban commons could be cultivated, 
managed and negotiated by a communally run ‘neighbourhood farm’. 
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Planning ‘free spaces’ for self-empowerment
My third thought relates to the many initiatives that are committed to the 
post-growth idea and, indeed, are already living it. They still receive too little 
attention in the guiding principles of spatial planning. The classic discourse 
on the provision of services of general interest focuses on the state ensuring 
equivalent living conditions. In parts of the post-growth discourse the focus 
is completely different: it is about strengthening structures for self-empow-
erment and creating conditions within which these structures can f lourish. 
One possibility is to use the coal phase-out programme here. Former 
mining areas can be recultivated so that the land and water is used for small-
scale ecological agriculture and forestry and made productive again. In 
between, climate productive potential can be created with evaporation areas, 
a small-cell water regime and measures to build up humus in the soil. This 
also involves correcting mistakes made when recultivating the open-cast 
mining areas in the past and introducing measures that help to repair the 
entire water regime and allow it to recover.
Local initiatives and actors would gain access to resources like land but 
also to empty buildings. They should receive support if they pursue goals 
aligned with sustainable economic activity and focus on sufficiency and 
public welfare. Citizen support structures can help strengthen the projects 
initiated by local actors. This approach promotes people’s ability to self-orga-
nise and cooperate and creates incentives for collective action – thus shaping 
a post-growth society from within.
The character of the area changes in such a process. It is not programmed 
by designations and uses assigned ‘from above’ but by what people actually 
do locally. This active appropriation grows out of the concrete behaviour of 
those involved and gains its value from the real actions of many. The area 
loses its static quality. It becomes more and more of a living structure in 
which different things happen simultaneously and design options emerge 
again and again. 
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Conclusion
There is no one master plan for post-growth. As it becomes clear that post-
growth develops in small spatial units then the role of spatial planning also 
changes. It is no longer about an authority that prescribes (or regulates) and 
thus triggers reactions; planning rather becomes part of the processes. Pro-
cess-oriented planning focuses on creating structures, occasions and oppor-
tunities in which creative spaces and creative forces can emerge. It is not 
about setting a linear course towards a final plan, but about continuously 
configuring and reconfiguring knowledge, forms and alliances. The planner 
then has the role of facilitating these processes, of providing focuses, aes-
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Post-growth perspectives for the Lausitz lignite 
mining region? – Opportunities and challenges
An interview with Carel Carlowitz Mohn, conducted by Mai Anh Ha, Meret Batke and 
Bastian Lange
The civil society group ‘Lausitz Perspectives’ (‘Lausitzer Perspektiven’) is commit-
ted to positively shaping structural change in the Lausitz region and actively 
influencing the transition to a post-fossil economy. It views itself as a platform 
for exchange and understanding of what the future of the region could look 




became involved in the founding and work of ‘Lausitz Perspectives’ because he 
is convinced that it is possible to combine decent employment opportunities, 
industry and environmentally sustainable economic activity. 
How long has the initiative been active?
Carel Mohn: It was in 2011/2012 that we began to look at the future prospects 
of the Lausitz. Over time this work led to the establishment of our organisa-
tion as a registered NGO, which works very closely with a group of initiatives 
called ‘Lausitz Citizen Region’ (‘Bürgerregion Lausitz’). 
What was the idea behind the initiative?
Carel Mohn: In the early days, there was no sign of the coal phase-out but it 
was clear that sooner or later the Lausitz and the other lignite-mining regions 
would have to get out of coal because of the huge greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with lignite. The aim was to start a conversation in society and 
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the region about what development opportunities there are beyond coal. This 
conversation was then actually set in motion.
Is this aim still relevant?
Carel Mohn: In the recent past, political developments have accelerated 
enormously. There’s no longer a need to talk about the future in order to 
allay people’s fears about the coal phase-out, because the decision about the 
coal phase-out has been made. Nevertheless, the development of the region 
should still be monitored. There are two points in particular that are cen-
tral: first, the extent to which truly far-reaching decarbonisation is a guiding 
principle for this structural development and, second, how citizens and civil 
society organisations can participate and contribute to this process. 
What are the processes that develop in a coal-mining region and what has changed 
since the coal phase-out was decided?
Carel Mohn: Coal regions have traditionally had one very dominant economic 
sector. This shapes the region, so that other industries, economic sectors 
and social spheres can hardly get past this giant – although the perceived 
importance of coal has actually always been much greater than its real eco-
nomic weight. You could quickly get the impression that these regions define 
themselves only through coal. In the Lausitz, this led to the emergence of a 
kind of ‘establishment’ based on coal. This establishment included the min-
ing operators themselves but also regional politicians, trade unions, cham-
bers of commerce and business associations. For a long time, they protected 
coal and used scenarios of fear, even while the coal phase-out was still being 
negotiated. However, once there was the prospect of government funds to 
buffer the phase-out process, there was a very quick U-turn and a great deal 
of thought about what could be done with all that money. That’s basically 
understandable and quite legitimate. However, you have to ask whether the 
people who for years and decades vehemently fought for a policy of carrying 
on and on with coal are or should be the best people to develop new perspec-
tives. 
The term ‘establishment’ implies that there are others who were lef t out… 
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Carel Mohn: The problem is that the people who proposed development alter-
natives for the region very early on aren’t yet part of the circle of full-time, 
mostly paid officials involved in implementing new development perspec-
tives today. This means that they also don’t have access to the funding. But 
these are the people who years and years ago developed ideas about what 
could happen in the Lausitz, ideas that also involve civil society commitment. 
The question is whether these people should have a chance to be heard. What 
resources can they use to be able to play a role?
What other challenges have emerged in the region?
Carel Mohn: This is a region that has been traumatised by the experience of 
the post-reunification period and the collapse of 90  % of the coal industry 
and the heavy industry associated with it. Quite understandably, there’s 
therefore been a lot of clinging to the remnants of this industrial complex. 
This includes all the sectors associated with coal as well as the energy-inten-
sive industries grouped around it. However even 15 or 20 years ago, it was 
clear that this industry couldn’t f lourish forever, because there was the cli-
mate problem even then. My impression is that this saga of coal as the only 
anchor of stability has really blocked the region from developing alternatives 
for too long.
What are the impacts of these challenges for the local residents? 
Carel Mohn: On the one hand, the traumatisation of the collapse of GDR 
structures hasn’t been dealt with sufficiently; on the other hand, in the 
run-up to the national coal phase-out consensus adopted in early 2019, the 
state governments in Saxony and Brandenburg failed to show political lead-
ership by preparing the population in the region for the phasing-out of coal 
at an early stage. Instead, they competed with one another in pledges of 
allegiance and commitment to Lausitz lignite. This combination continues 
to create a tense atmosphere to this day. In addition, many people from the 
Lausitz felt that the urbanites and climate protectors were badmouthing the 
Lausitz and jobs in coal – which actually offered very good working condi-
tions. In conversation you can often hear the frustration about this. These 
negative experiences first have to be overcome, and of course many from 
the Lausitz struggle with the fact that the coal industry is coming to an end, 
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because at least mentally this is also associated with a certain devaluation of 
the region.
What are alternative perspectives in the future? 
Carel Mohn: At the political level, it’s now clearer that something new needs 
to be developed in the Lausitz. The question is, however, whether attracting 
companies like Tesla (which is planning its largest European factory in Grün-
heide, some 50 kilometres to the north of the Lausitz), to use a current exam-
ple, is really a good option in the long term. Or whether this isn’t just people 
being intoxicated by the apparent success of an industrialisation model. It 
may work again to a certain extent, this attracting of large external investors, 
which creates many thousands of jobs in one go. What gets forgotten, how-
ever, is that this approach to economic and regional development is actually 
a course that hasn’t really worked in the last 20 years. 
How does this manifest itself?
Carel Mohn: The weakness of eastern Germany also has to do with the fact 
that there are too few small and medium-sized enterprises, too few research-
based companies and too few corporate headquarters in the region. As a 
result, in the private sector generally there’s a lack of research and innova-
tion. Of course, building up this commercial landscape is extremely arduous 
and takes a long time but there are no real alternatives. Attracting a huge 
external corporation like Tesla fatally confirms the position of actors who 
have always hoped for large structures. 
Are there examples of small-scale structures with small and medium-sized enter-
prises in the Lausitz?
Carel Mohn: Saxony and Brandenburg take different approaches here. In 
contrast to Brandenburg, the state of Saxony has focused more on promot-
ing small and medium-sized enterprises in recent years. Of course, there are 
many examples of companies that are not active in the field of the coal indus-
try. Some of these companies absolutely epitomise a pioneering spirit and 
entrepreneurship and also stand for very innovative approaches and con-
cepts for the future. But you need many such enterprises and, importantly, 
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state investment in science and research in order to create a small-scale, vital 
economic structure.
Is the term ‘post-growth’ one that comes up in this debate about a future perspective? 
Carel Mohn: I don’t think that this is a very helpful category in the Lausitz. 
My suspicion is that the model that’s associated with it creates more fear 
than inspiration among most of the people affected by the phase-out of coal. 
The term ‘post-growth’ communicates too little about what could concretely 
change and improve in people’s everyday lives. The region has very concrete 
problems, like keeping well-educated young people in the region and unfa-
vourable demographics, and problems in offering and maintaining adequate 
local infrastructure, for example health care in rural areas, public transport 
or public amenities as banal as local grocery stores. These are the issues that 
concern and interest people. It’s not really helpful to use buzzwords like 
‘post-growth’ because it divides rather than unites society. Post-growth is a 
view that’s strongly associated with left-wing values. It is important that we 
have value-based debates over the future of the region. However, if you want 
to convey new confidence in the Lausitz as a region strongly characterised by 
engineering and industry, then I don’t think that the term is tremendously 
helpful.
Is there an exchange between dif ferent political camps in the debate on regional 
development in the Lausitz, especially with regard to the AfD [Alternative für 
Deutschland – Alternative for Germany] and its definition of the terminology 
related to post-growth? 
Carel Mohn: The AfD relies on picking up on people’s moods and playing 
on their fears. This can be clearly seen in the Lausitz region at the moment. 
However, it shouldn’t be forgotten that the ground was prepared for the AfD 
over decades – by actors who didn’t exercise political leadership responsibly 
but rather spread fear among the public. 
Where have political leaders specifically failed to take responsibility? 
Carel Mohn: The state premiers and numerous other state politicians in 
Brandenburg and Saxony didn’t see the need to change, but rather spread 
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fear about the coal phase-out. Instead of explaining to people that although 
there are well-paid jobs in the coal industry they unfortunately can’t last for-
ever. Instead of involving the public in ideas for the time after coal, thinking 
about how a soft exit could be made possible. Overall, there was an exorbi-
tant lack of political leadership. This is what drove voters to the AfD. This is 
the historic failure of the SPD and CDU in this region.
What potential does the region have?
Carel Mohn: The region has immense potential because it’s very centrally 
located between various metropolises in Europe and is also at the intersec-
tion of the three most dynamic economies in the EU, i.e. the Czech Republic, 
Germany and Poland. There are large areas of land, large open spaces avail-
able, and a population that can be described as open-minded. For example, 
there is a natural proximity to engineering and technology. The region also 
has a special cultural and industrial heritage, for example experience in 
textiles, glass and ceramics. These are valuable qualities and opportunities 
that other regions don’t have. Agriculture has been completely marginalised 
by the coal industry to date, but it can also play an important role – Berlin, 
but also Leipzig and Dresden are huge markets right on the doorstep where 
regional, organic products are increasingly in demand. And when it comes to 
renewable raw materials, the bioeconomy and the circular economy, there’s 
a natural link here to the technical expertise that has previously been in 
demand in the Lausitz region.
What suggestions or wishes do you have for the transformation to post-fossil 
regional development?
Carel Mohn: Above all, it’s important to develop a concept about how the 
municipalities can be given more scope and greater autonomy. They would 
clearly have more options if they had more financial freedom. In addition, 
municipalities need the financial and political scope to promote initiatives, 
projects and local individuals who take on local responsibility. They also 
need to be able to apply for funding or to use their own resources. The whole 
issue of what municipalities could do if they had better resources and juris-
dictions is neglected in the debate. The second point is that there are really 
many pioneers in the region who are involved in cultural projects, in asso-
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ciations, in village renewal. We need to think about how to make it possible 
for these actors to actually implement their ideas. It’s extremely difficult to 
get funding and support to implement this non-profit work or even to par-
ticipate at all – not because there is no money but because it’s so time-con-
suming, bureaucratic and arduous to apply for just transition funds. It’s not 
just about the paid officials in the chamber of commerce and the union, there 
are also others involved. It is neither fair nor economically sensible if these 
pioneers have to privately develop their projects in their spare time. A small 
proportion of the billions should be directed towards foundations and NGOs 
to find ways to improve the involvement of civic engagement.

Hacking Ulm 
Open data, digital literacy and coding as practices 
creating space in the city 
An interview with Stefan Kaufmann, conducted by Meret Batke, Mai Anh Ha and 
Bastian Lange
The ‘Verschwörhaus’ describes itself as an ‘experimentation platform for the 
world of tomorrow’ intended to accompany the city of Ulm into the future. 
Ideas are developed in labs and at events. Equipped with 3-D printers, open 
workshops, lecture rooms and ‘cyber, chaos and public disorder’, this is a place 
where interested (young) people come together to experiment and to learn 
from one another.
www.verschwoerhaus.de
[Editorial comments and translations in square brackets]
What is the ‘Verschwörhaus’ and what does it do?
Stefan Kaufmann: My name is Stefan Kaufmann, I’m originally from the 
field of open-data activism, that’s an environment where people use par-
ticular means and technical abilities to try to tackle things and problems in 
the city. Not necessarily directly to solve things but at least to indicate ways 
that they could be dealt with. The ‘Verschwörhaus’ was founded out of this 
movement. It’s actually divided into two – one part is a project run by the 
city of Ulm, the ‘Stadtlabor’ [‘Urban Laboratory’], which provides an admin-
istrative and organisational framework. The city rents the rooms and makes 
them available, but the content is provided by people involved in ‘digital vol-
unteering’ – where people give their time because of intrinsic motivation, 
i. e. not because they want to earn money with this but because they want to 
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exchange ideas and do things and make a difference and are strongly inf lu-
enced by a creative idea. 
How can the project context for the city of Ulm be explained?
Stefan Kaufmann: The context was that there had been an open-data work-
ing group in Ulm for a very long time, one that was predominantly made up 
of students. The group dealt with mobility and public transport issues, for 
example, partly because that was a major problem that affected them per-
sonally. And relatively early on this voluntary work made it clear that if you 
want to make something like this permanent, you need a youth section so 
that the issue is also taken up and continued. In 2015, after we implemented 
various organisational formats to create exchanges between the administra-
tion and the public and to work on these issues, the group got to know the 
‘Jugend hackt ’ [‘youth hacks’] format from the ‘Open Knowledge Foundation’ 
and ‘mediale pfade’ [‘media paths’]. 
We made an effort to bring this format to Ulm as a youth development 
programme. We wanted to bring young people together for a weekend, 
young people who don’t have much chance of meeting people like themselves 
as they come from the rural areas of southern Germany. We used the motto 
‘Improving the World with Code’, and the young people could exchange ideas 
and work on problems about how to improve people’s everyday working lives. 
And this led to us saying that it would be good to have such formats not only 
once a year at the university, where everything has to be set up, but with a 
permanent space for them in the city. The model of hacker and makerspaces, 
which is really nothing new, also exists in other places and has already 
existed for twenty years.
How did you implement the project in Ulm?
Stefan Kaufmann: There was only a problem in Ulm if we wanted to do this 
under our own steam. Ulm is too small a city, there’s not much space and few 
vacancies and also not the physical mass of people who can support some-
thing like this and also pay for it and finance it. So there’s something like the 
‘Freiraum’ [‘Free Room’], a very small space with two rooms, where something 
like this was set up with relatively close links to CCC [Chaos Computer Club 
– Europe-wide decentralised groups and associations of hackers], but getting 
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a really large space, one with exciting machines and devices too, is hardly 
possible to finance on our own. And then came the idea of approaching the 
city to create space, also against the background that it’s a positive location 
factor if young people who like to tackle the topics have a contact person and 
a contact point where they can spend time. This led to a municipal council 
resolution in 2016, and now we will soon be in our fourth year.
Where did the name ‘Verschwörhaus’ [‘Conspiracy House’] come from?
Stefan Kaufmann: The house had a range of names first, ones that changed 
again and again, partly because a lot of different actors wanted to join in 
who were primarily business-oriented and worked in the areas of design 
and entrepreneurship. But we as a group specifically wanted to implement a 
citizen-centred approach, one that comes from civil society and is also a bit 
rebellious and non-conformist and sometimes makes itself heard if it doesn’t 
like something.
The name was a relatively obvious choice as the historical Schwörhaus 
(Oath House] is next door and is linked to the medieval tradition of the 
Schwörbrief [a historical document of the city of Ulm from 1397], which is 
(among other things) about staying true to yourself and following through. 
The name ‘Verschwörhaus’ was also google-distinct, in contrast to ‘Stadtlabor’ 
[‘Urban Lab’] – which was the municipal title for the project and is a generic 
name like ‘chemist’ – and this meant that the name continued to be used.
What is the relationship between hardware infrastructure and sof tware?
Stefan Kaufmann: We have about 500 m2 of space that we can use. This 
includes a large lecture room, where large projections and lectures are pos-
sible. We can also record and livestream lectures. We have an electronics lab 
with quite extensive equipment – hardware can be developed there and wire-
less measurements for sensor networks, for example, can also be recorded. 
There are multi-purpose rooms that can be used in different ways, and two 
workshops, one with classic fab lab equipment, i. e. laser cutter and several 
3D printers etc., and a large metal workshop with several circular saws, tools 
and a permanent project − a CNC metal milling machine [Computerised 
Numerical Control for the automatic production of parts].
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Who uses the ‘Verschwörhaus’? What do you provide?
Stefan Kaufmann: We’re open mainly in the evening hours, because people 
do this mainly on a voluntary basis and not full-time. And there are differ-
ent groups, there is an association that you can become a member of, but 
you don’t have to, and in this association there are different specialist areas, 
e. g. the sensor network group, which meets every fortnight and then some-
times gives public lectures or simply works on things together, and almost 
everyone is organised in groups like this. Among other things, there’s also a 
sporadic sewing cafe, which is organised by a sustainability group from the 
university, and Generationentref f [Generations Meeting] organises events on 
digital literacy with elderly people. And in addition, there is a programme 
aimed at young people, such as the ‘Jugend hackt ’ [‘youth hacks’] lab, where 
young people come together under supervision, and individual events such 
as weekend Jugend hackt events or events with ‘Wikimedia Germany’ and the 
‘Open Knowledge Foundation’. 
What backgrounds do the users have?
Stefan Kaufmann: We’re well aware that this is predominantly used by white 
people with academic backgrounds, who are mostly male and not necessarily 
poor. We know that and this is always a problem with such places. We try to 
set up specific formats that counteract this, for example, together with Car-
itas we have a job application cafe for refugees, so that we also reach other 
target groups. But I think the majority of those active here are mainly people 
with an academic background between 16 and 36, although the bell curve 
continues to shift and the person who is mainly in charge of the workshop in 
the basement is a retired 63-year-old electrician. 
How do you deal with material and data f lows?
Stefan Kaufmann: We work with a lot of electrical and IT equipment and, 
self-critically, we have to say that we also order and install things from China 
via ‘Ali Express’. We reuse a lot of IT equipment that has been taken out of 
service elsewhere and is then used here instead of being scrapped directly.
We see ourselves very strongly as being less on the material level and with 
more of a user-centred focus as opposed to profit-making. Mobility is still 
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one of the core issues that many people are tackling, and we always try to 
focus on reusability with free software, free licences, free concepts, in order 
to set a contrast, to show that it’s possible to do something that could help the 
public but that thinking of everything too much in terms of profit-making 
puts obstacles in the way. Here the approach is one of generating maximum 
profit for society as a whole.
Can you describe an example of the transport project? 
Stefan Kaufmann: One topic that has preoccupied people for a decade is 
open data in the area of networked mobility. The approach here is to say that 
transport providers should provide the data needed for the use of services as 
barrier-free as possible, so that any third party can use them to build infor-
mation and so develop intermodal mobility that is no longer dependent on 
the car. There’s been a lot of resistance to this in Germany, especially from 
the transport associations, which believe in the nonsensical comparison that 
data is like oil and can be monopolised. In the meantime, more transport 
companies and transport associations are providing data, also thanks to 
EU regulations. What we can do in the ‘Verschwörhaus’ is prototyping, in a 
larger context we’re trying to find ways of moving beyond the pure concept 
stage. A concrete example is the free software ‘digitransit’ in Helsinki [an 
open-source trip-planning solution that combines several open-source com-
ponents in a route-planning service]. From public transport to rented bikes, 
the software integrates mobility options from different sources to provide 
information. Because it was free software, several people here were able to 
port it to show how it works. At the time the city had an EU project which it 
fitted in with, so it was possible to appoint people as fellows who normally 
would not have ended up in the administration. The aim was to show what it 
could be like to think not of viability, but of maximising benefits. 
Where is the link to a scaling perspective? 
Stefan Kaufmann: What is important to me about people’s personalities, 
especially if they have an IT background, is that [when it comes to the prod-
ucts] they are not open to economic exploitation, because this would destroy 
the basic principle of the common good. With a good annual salary in an IT 
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company, I tend to be more focused on overtly doing something good in my 
free time. 
Another example is ‘Open Source Bike Sharing’, which could be under-
taken by municipalities themselves. This looks at how something can be 
implemented as an operating model instead of as a business model. Profit 
maximisation is not the priority here, but the focus is rather a model with 
minimal losses, which can perhaps be made self-sustainable and shows how 
this could function if organised cooperatively.
What are the interests behind such solutions, does it have something to do with the 
common good?
Stefan Kaufmann: Because of the networking of voluntary actors who want 
to further develop the networks and find new people to continue working 
on them, you have to be careful about how you understand your role. What 
is already run by the city? Where is the space occupied by the volunteers in 
complete freedom, where they themselves say where we are heading? My role 
at the interface is rather one where I tell the stories as well as possible, so that 
afterwards the political decision-makers want to pursue things like this. But 
of course I can’t make the targets, can’t say what the guidelines are, I don’t 
have that leverage. 
What are your hopes and vision for the future of the ‘Verschwörhaus’ in ten years 
time?
Stefan Kaufmann: I hope that in ten years I no longer have to sit here. I’ve 
been working to do away with my role since day one, and that has to be the 
target. This is a space that’s by the people for the people, it’s a basic principle 
to distribute the keys of the kingdom and to share them with many people. I 
hope that those who are active get funds from various sources so that they’re 
not dependent on any one place, for example on the city, something that must 
be seen critically. And that good cooperative ways and means can be found 
for the city to adopt and integrate and transfer the ideas that emerge here.
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Glossary 
CCC: Chaos Computer Club e.V., the largest European association of hack-
ers, consisting of different decentralised local associations and groups; 
annual event: Chaos Computer Congress (CCC)
CNC machines: Machines that use modern electronic control technology 
(Computerised Numerical Control), which enables the automatic pro-
duction of parts
Digitransit: Open-source trip planning solution that combines several open-
source components to create a route planning service. 
‘mediale pfade’: Agency for media education with a focus on political educa-
tion 
‘Jugend hackt ’: Educational programme promoted by ‘mediale pfade’ and 
(‘Youth hacks’) the NGO Open Knowledge Foundation. Very different 
to ‘Jugend debattiert ’ (Youth debates) and ‘Jugend musiziert ’ (Young musi-
cians) competitions etc., as the format is deliberately non-competitive 
and creates networking opportunities. 
‘Schwörbrief ’: Historical document of the City of Ulm from 1397 (‘großer 
Schwörbrief ’ [large Oath Letter]), which extended the rights of the guilds 
and regulated legal relationships. 

Designing living spaces together in open-ended 
approaches 
Participation in spatial development for a good life
An interview with Torsten Klafft, conducted by Martina Hülz
Torsten Klaf f t is an architect and sociologist-in-training. He works in the archi-
tecture agency ‘nonconform’, which states that it is ‘technically an architectural 
firm. But only technically’. 
https://www.nonconform.at/
How are post-growth or ecological, sustainable aspects of designing space – i.e. 
growth-critical planning in the broadest sense – ref lected in your work? 
Torsten Klafft: They’re ref lected in our core themes. In principle, the cur-
rent ‘nonconform’ came about in reaction to the sudden resistance from the 
public that we encountered in projects – resistance to planning by us and 
by those responsible. That puzzled us because we actually thought we were 
doing something good: using land frugally, focusing on local and urban cen-
tres or open-use building for communal utilisation to conserve resources. 
Why is there opposition to such approaches when they should be in every-
one’s interest? Then we had the idea of involving the residents from the outset 
and letting them discuss what should actually be planned. The ‘nonconform 
ideenwerkstatt ’ [‘nonconform ideas workshop’] was then developed and has 
since been implemented dozens of times. Participation in combination with 
sustainable planning principles has become a self-sustaining field of work.
We often deal with development in rural areas. For us, this primarily 
involves the development of village or town centres. Communities regret 
that their town centres are wasting away, the small shops are closing, the 
main street is more and more deserted, and the church is seldom able to 
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bring life into the surrounding square. And then we’re asked to contribute 
our expertise. Our initial recipe is quite simple: we invite the locals to talk 
to us about these developments and to develop solutions. The ‘nonconform 
ideenwerkstatt ’ is a form of participation that’s kept very concise. It has a sort 
of event character: we arrive, are on site for three days and invite everyone 
to our open ‘ideas office’. Anyone can come and join in the discussion and 
develop strategies in various formats that we facilitate. The goal is to find a 
solution path that’s individually tailored to the village or small town. 
Is it reasonable to assume that, with the focus on the development of local town cen-
tres, there’s already a certain awareness of sustainable spatial development among 
your clients and the local residents? 
Torsten Klafft: Many of the municipalities involved do already know about 
town-centre development, and we’re brought in to accompany them on this 
path. We can add the experiences of other municipalities to the process and 
there is much that can be learned here. Improving what exists is often not 
as ‘sexy’ as creating something new on a greenfield site. We provide answers 
about how it is possible to take the public along the path to sustainable 
town-centre development.
But the starting point is never the same twice – in terms of what moti-
vation and ideas are available locally, what projects have already been imple-
mented. Sometimes people are aware that the town centre has a problem, but 
this hasn’t been linked to the new retail park on the outskirts that’s attract-
ing people out of the town centre. Or not everyone accepts these conclusions 
yet. Often there are local protagonists who’ve already initiated a few good 
projects and now want to take the next step with us, together with the local 
residents. Then it’s our task, depending on the situation, to adapt the process 
appropriately. We have to accept what we find at the time. After all, the idea 
is to engage and convince people, we want it to happen with them. There’s no 
universal recipe for this.
What exactly do you want to achieve in these places, what motivates you? Partic-
ipation is actually the instrument or the method that you use, which has proved 
successful. 
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Torsten Klafft: I think that, on the one hand, it’s the instrument we use to 
get necessary transformative processes going. But, on the other hand, it is 
in itself precisely what we think is important: it’s about what people have in 
common in the village or town – around it and within it – because they live 
together in one place. That’s always the central idea behind it. How can local 
people improve their lives and shape them together? 
So your philosophy is the joint search for a good life with local people? What message 
do you bring with you?
Torsten Klafft: We bring our experiences from other places with us: that in 
fact there are always many local people who get involved very constructively. 
Even if one person says: ‘I don’t need the village, I just want a bit of peace in 
my own home’, there is always someone else who thinks the village or town 
centre is important because it connects people. You can trust in the power of 
shared stories if everyone’s involved in the process. Then many more ideas 
come together about what can be done for the town centre. There’s simply 
a lot of potential that we can filter and process. To do this, we look for good 
examples that have worked elsewhere and put these approaches together 
with the images that exist locally. Together, we then create a local story, one 
that emerges from that place. 
There’s a general feeling that rural areas are once again being perceived 
as living spaces for very many people and are seen as important. That’s why 
more funding is being created to encourage participation. There’s often still 
a strong idea of community in rural areas. This makes it possible to tell a 
different story. If this is then linked to committed, open-ended participatory 
work, it also makes it possible to hold more difficult discussions. Too often, 
the critics don’t get their message through when plans are being made for 
the next development of single-family homes. With the ‘nonconform ideen-
werkstatt ’ we create a space where people can openly discuss the future of 
the village, encourage each other and develop new energy locally so they can 
then move on together. This doesn’t always work, but often. At first, it’s ‘only’ 
about the town centre, but active communities can grow out of this, ones 
who continue to discuss their plans together and perhaps also convince oth-
ers with their ref lections on spatial development.
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Are people always willing and open? Or do you sometimes encounter resistance and 
scepticism? Or do you meet a certain type of person who’s open to topics related to 
sustainability? 
Torsten Klafft: It’s more a case of having individual proponents in the towns, 
people who support the process and say: ‘I’ve understood this for myself and 
I believe in it and think it’s good’. If that’s the mayor or members of the local 
council, then it’s very helpful of course because they’re the ones in charge. 
And even if some people are sceptical at first, most of the participants quite 
quickly say: ‘Ah yes, that’s right, it’s kind of fun to discuss this together with 
everyone else, and I hadn’t seen it like that before’. Spaces of possibility are 
opened up and often a spirit arises that overcomes any initial doubts or inhi-
bitions. And then comes the real challenge, because people have to stay on 
the ball and those responsible locally have to implement the ideas – even if 
there are then discussions because the car park next to the church is moved 
out of the very centre. It’s then important that the focus continues to be on 
the jointly developed vision of a lively church square as a meeting place and 
that this motivates people and gives them the courage to implement even 
unpleasant decisions because they believe in the goal. Especially at such 
moments, it helps a lot if the vision was not only passed by the local council 
but was worked out by many people together.
Do you follow up on further development or what happens af terwards?
Torsten Klafft: First we document our work, write a concept and hand it over 
to the municipality for further follow-up. In the best cases, there’s an imme-
diate opportunity for further cooperation, perhaps because small workshops 
have been arranged or because a competition is planned that we can help 
with as process designers and facilitators. Or we support the work of a local 
individual who has taken on responsibility for the process, like in Trofaiach 
in the Steiermark region. There we agreed to communicate closely with them, 
and if there were any problems, we worked together to find a solution. If this 
spirit f lows into continued joint work, then of course we’re closely involved 
in the process, but that’s not decided or fixed from the outset – it may just 
develop. It’s up to the people on the ground whether they want us involved.
All of the projects are potentially exciting, and we could spend ten years 
working on each of them because town-centre development requires contin-
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ued work, even if you usually don’t see the results for a few years. In an ideal 
scenario, we’re invited for the awarding of a prize for rural building culture. 
But many communities continue on their path without us, although even 
then we always keep an eye on them, following developments and staying 
in touch. 
The topic of ‘participation’ has become increasingly important in recent years and 
has been legally anchored in planning processes, so that public participation has 
become a necessity. Would you say that this is basically the right way to approach 
more sustainable spatial development? Or what are your experiences? What else is 
needed? 
Torsten Klafft: We are very much in favour of participation being more 
strongly anchored, especially in spatial development processes – but not only 
anchored, it must be practised! Because, on the one hand, these are the top-
ics that can encourage people and arouse their interest. On the other hand, 
we still too often see that it’s only half-hearted and descends into a kind of 
‘alibi participation’. That can be counterproductive. I’m always amazed when 
people talk about the ‘spectre of participation’ or about the negative effects 
that can emerge. There are events where the visitors, the participants, are 
asked almost fearfully: ‘What do you say to this?’ Is the storm about to break? 
There’s a risk that inviting the public is only seen as a duty and that the dom-
inant emotion is one of fear that the work of recent months is going to be 
destroyed. This shouldn’t become the defining experience, because good 
participation is important, even if it involves really demanding challenges. 
The language of planning must be translated in a way that everyone can 
understand. But the needs and statements of citizens must also be properly 
understood and translated into possible planning interventions for those 
responsible. In other words, in both directions. Many citizen participation 
processes are still affected by an attitude of getting them done because 
they’re prescribed by law. If planners try to push through the plans or only 
half-heartedly involve the public, then this tends to lead to more doubts 
about the plans. If the procedure is only intended to let people get to know 
the planning process and the arguments, then this must be clearly commu-
nicated. If people are lured to an event with false promises so that as many of 
them as possible take part in an elaborate public participation process, then 
this tends to be counterproductive. 
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So, are you now taking away our hope for post-growth, sustainable spatial develop-
ment through citizen participation?
Torsten Klafft: No! For the highest political level to say: ‘Participation in such 
procedures is important’ is a significant political statement. There’s space, 
time and funding available to try out many things. But we have to ask our-
selves how we go into such processes with our planning language. Do we 
really want to engage people because that makes the processes better? There 
are processes that are just understood as fulfilling requirements, but there’s 
increasingly a belief that projects are really improved by participation. Some 
people enjoy using walks or cooking dialogues as formats. We have to try 
out new things and tackle them wholeheartedly, but also have the courage to 
accept there may be failures. We already have a few good recipes, and we’re 
not the only ones who have repeatedly used them successfully. For example, 
people don’t always have to be seated like an audience facing the organiser. 
Sometimes you need to liven things up a bit so that everyone moves around 
and comes together in different constellations. Some people might like to 
stand in the middle and talk in front of everyone, but many others say: ‘Well, 
if there are a hundred people sitting here, I don’t need to add my two cents’. 
In smaller groups of six or seven, discussing around a table, everyone gets a 
chance to contribute. It’s important to find these ways of reaching partici-
pants. Our ‘ideas office’ is one access point, where anyone can drop by during 
the day and look at what was discussed the evening before on the f lipchart. 
In a personal conversation, these people then also say what they think and 
what they want for their hometown. 
You’re so convinced that you’re convincing me! Where does that come from? Did your 
training as a planner and architect equip you to do precisely this job with such moti-
vation? 
Torsten Klafft: After studying architecture, I worked as a traditional archi-
tect for two years and found that I didn’t know anything at all about what 
constitutes social space. That’s why I started to do a master’s degree in sociol-
ogy, to understand how society actually functions, the society that uses the 
spaces that we blithely design. Architects actually always design society, 
but it often looks different from the utopian image of society in magazines, 
where everyone happily walks around with a pram and a parasol. In real-
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ity, questions are rarely asked about how people are supposed to get there 
or why they should go to the glitzy magazine places designed in the isolated 
offices. I’ve become very critical of planning and planners’ discourse. Many 
discourses about the people who use the spaces – who live in them – take 
place among planners’ circles. I think it takes a lot of courage to say: ‘Alright, 
let’s find out how to find out if people want this or if people agree with the 
needs we’re designing for or what spaces they want to use or maybe what 
spaces they need to design their own living space’. 
In retrospect I find it rather shocking to think how little attention my 
training gave to such questions, because there’s a lot of knowledge about this 
available. I think a great deal can come from broader exchanges between 
architecture and the humanities. As well as considering the functionality of 
spaces, it should from the outset be more important to ask how the newly 
planned space will be used, whether it will work well and how it fits into a 
holistic sustainability debate – the appropriation, repurposing and diversity 
of spaces for different user groups who create the place for themselves and 
make it their place. Urban planning is already a bit ahead in this area.
This is a fundamental problem of science and practice and of linking the two and 
also of the old debate about universities doing science and not training. 
Torsten Klafft: Yes, but I studied architecture at a technical college. There 
we were trained to deal with the practical demands of an architect’s job, i.e. 
the requirements encountered in an architect’s office. But the professional 
image of an architect in practice that was reproduced at my architecture 
school was one that was limited to architects carrying out planning for the 
clients. Of course, it’s difficult to implement social ideals in everyday life or 
to negotiate them with clients, but I think it’s important to develop a position 
on this and to include it in the planning processes. In retrospect, for example, 
I would have liked to have had critical discussions at university about estab-
lished housing standards. Does a f lat that you can get with a housing enti-
tlement certificate have to comply only with the minimum standards, when 
findings in social research show that these minimum construction standards 
are rather arbitrary definitions that actually contradict how people deal with 
spaces? If you want to develop ‘good’ social housing as a young architect, you 
don’t just need courage and conviction, but you also need access to critical 
discourses – and these are still not heard enough at many architectural col-
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leges. It often seems to me that architecture is a little slow to discuss scien-
tific findings that contradict its self-image. Often, architecture training is 
characterised by a very generalist habitus of modernism, which also means 
that many of our most exciting colleagues initially had to deal very critically 
with their own training. There is still a lot of potential here, which could lead 
to more young planners being able to identify with their work and to many 
innovative approaches emerging. 
With this society-centred view that you’ve just highlighted, I would like to make the 
connection to post-growth, sustainable spatial development and sustainable spa-
tial design: How can geographers, planners and architects implement these ideas? 
Torsten Klafft: First, we need courageous planners who believe that collab-
orative approaches are a good way of designing coexistence. Then we need 
courageous people in positions of responsibility who support this and who 
provide the instruments – such as funding – that make it possible. We need 
open processes and experiments. Each place needs its own experiment, but 
it has to be possible to put these experiments into the necessary funding 
forms. And of course, the best thing would be if the regulars in the pub held 
active, differentiated and heartfelt discussions about post-growth ideas – 
in language that doesn’t exclude anyone from the discussion – and talked 
about how we would like to live together. 
At ‘nonconform’ we like to talk about the ‘best common denominator’ 
between local citizens, those responsible, the administration and everyone 
with an interest, basically all the stakeholders. When people don’t just talk 
about what they’re against but try to understand the needs of the other party, 
you get more than the lowest common denominator. If it’s possible to bring 
everyone together and develop a solution together, then there’s added value 
for everyone. The ‘best common denominator’ is greater than a grudging 
compromise. 
That fits in with post-growth, which is not fundamentally about less growth but 
about growing the right things, like in your case with finding not just a common 
denominator but actually the best common denominator for a good life. This atti-
tude fits into this debate very well. 
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Torsten Klafft: Exactly. What can we all gain if we all focus on our common-
alities?
That’s a nice conclusion. Let’s keep experimenting to find out and then spread the 
message. Thank you very much, Torsten. 

Opening up spaces of possibility    
with artistic experiments
An interview with Viola Schulze Dieckhoff and Hendryk von Busse, conducted by 
Christian Schulz
As graduates of urban and spatial planning, they both took an artistic approach to 
questions of urban design and urban policy at a very early stage. Schulze Dieckhoff 
works at the TU Dortmund and is also active in ‘die Urbanisten’ [The Urbanists] e. V., 





In your six theses on ‘post-growth planning’ you, Viola, write together with Chris-
tian Lamker: ‘Post-growth planning needs experimental and artistic action!’ What 
exactly do you mean?
Viola Schulze Dieckhoff: Christian Lamker and I have always tried to bring 
together post-growth and planning and have noticed that it is not always 
socially acceptable to talk about post-growth. And so, through what can be 
said and what cannot be said, through ‘do-able’ and ‘not do-able’ things, we 
came to realise how important experiments and art are. It is actually clear 
that the growth mantra of economic activity doesn’t work and must be aban-
doned. There’s enough scientific evidence that shows that life satisfaction 
doesn’t increase with more money and more consumption, there’s also no 
direct link to social justice, and GDP also grows through climate disasters 
and through diseases. Those are the facts but it’s not always easy to talk 
about them and to link things up with them because you can then quickly 
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find yourself socially ‘offside’. And let’s just say that through ‘experiments’ 
it’s possible to open up a kind of protected space – many people also say: 
to open up windows of opportunity or to create spaces of possibility – in 
order to consider what we actually want, how we want to live, how we want 
to work. And this space is not dependent on private economic interests or 
political calculations (e.  g. thinking about the electorate) and is thus with-
out any social path dependencies. Art also takes this up, firstly as an exper-
iment or laboratory. However, art is also anchored in the Basic Law, and 
artistic freedom is protected. This goes beyond the fact that individuals can 
think about art to include the notion that people can also do what they have 
thought about, and that they can exchange ideas about it and also empower 
new discourses. Art is therefore centrally important because it also ends in a 
product and materialises, perhaps in a way beyond what has been previously 
thought of and worked out as a socially accepted norm. But artistic creation 
also changes things, through performances such as theatre or even when you 
design facades. Just looking at others triggers something in the viewer and 
changes something in the viewer’s relationship to his or her environment – 
and can thereby create something new. Art and experimentation are there-
fore a possible way to ‘fuel’ the socio-ecological transformation, perhaps we 
can find transformative practice through the transformative actions of art 
and experimentation. The point is to show that changing, wanting to change 
and being able to change are also part of what we do, not just maintaining, 
preserving and preventing.
Where do you, Hendryk, see references to the topic of ‘post-growth’ in your recent 
projects? What role does art play in the imagination of post-growth living worlds?
Hendryk von Busse: I would simply use the example of the mural. The mural 
itself, as an urban design tool, has no direct relation to post-growth. But 
by investing resources, time and empathy, urban surfaces are enhanced or 
given life and identity, and thus become more than purely functional design. 
Otherwise, it depends very much on how you do this urban art, what you 
do with it. Where I see a connection is, for example, with our work on the 
‘civic neighbourhood concept’. In Halle-Freiimfelde, we used murals to revit-
alise vacant buildings and to provide a better identity and image for the 
neighbourhood, which also had an impact on quality of life. Thanks to the 
increased attention, it became clear that a plan was needed for this forgotten 
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district. It was then courageous of the city to say: ‘OK, we didn’t do anything 
about this upgrading, the public did that, so the public should also design the 
neighbourhood concept, i.e. the future of this neighbourhood’. So this neigh-
bourhood concept came about as a result of art, and it has many components 
that have to do with post-growth planning, for example, planning not from 
the outside through investors or redevelopment programmes but from the 
inside with the ideas, input, wishes and needs of residents. In this neigh-
bourhood concept – based on the wishes of residents – there are many areas 
for artistic and experimental activities. So there’s a citizens’ park where peo-
ple can garden, but which is also available for other projects. Besides classic 
post-growth activities like urban gardening and street art, there are also just 
open spaces and workshops where no one has defined what has to take place, 
and which are intended to remain f lexible – even in the long run. 
This civic neighbourhood concept also includes some guidelines for prop-
erty development, e. g. how owners can come together to design cooperative 
property projects. In the process of developing the neighbourhood concept, a 
close network of residents and property owners was created; this neighbour-
liness was an important basis for further discussion. 
So art is also a vehicle to promote social participation and democratic participation 
in the design of urban districts. Can you elaborate on that?
Viola Schulze Dieckhoff: I remember we did our first Street Art Festival in 
2012, and afterwards Benjamin Davy wrote: ‘Ms Schulze Dieckhoff, you 
have created such a great ‘Gemeinsamhaben’ [‘having together’]!’ And that 
was exactly what we created back then. There were no economic interests, 
we were fresh graduates, financing ourselves with small jobs, and we had a 
big network. So we could put a lot of voluntary work into a vision, by saying 
that we would like to paint in the neighbourhood, also together with the local 
residents. We financed that festival with far less than 30,000 euros and cre-
ated over 5000 m2 of wall designs. That was a process of exchange. We didn’t 
have much, but we were able to give something artistically – the design of 
the facades, the use of urban space. We traded this with local companies 
(e. g. providers of lifting platforms), with the economic actors in the neigh-
bourhood, and everyone gave what they could. We were then able to create 
a little world in its own right. It was precisely this democratic aspect that 
made it clear to me again that art can be used in different ways. Art is used 
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or even instrumentalised in representative democracy in order to integrate 
and involve different parts of society, so rather to initiate somewhat con-
trolled creative processes that can also be useful for planning. But there is a 
more anarchistic form of art, like uninvited contributions to spatial design 
– e.  g. through graffiti or street art, which is often very critical of growth. 
The beginnings of the Street Art Festival had a lot to do with self-empower-
ment, this joint creation in the neighbourhood and the awareness that I can 
and want to help shape my city. Back then, we also used the facades to shake 
things up. A small civic initiative was quickly formed, and they didn’t like our 
pictures much and emphasised that the local problems had more to do with 
cleanliness and safety on the streets. And so there was a second group, and 
the pluralism of opinion in the city also became publicly visible.
So you managed to mobilise a lot of local people. How did the planning authorities 
react to this?
Hendryk von Busse: In the case of the ‘Freiraumgalerie’, it was indeed initially 
the case that the urban planning authorities tried to prevent it because the 
word ‘graffiti’ was used far too often rather than the term ‘murals in partic-
ipatory urban design’. Because of the negative association of ‘graffiti’, there 
was concern at the time that the image of the neighbourhood would deterio-
rate further – become even more stigmatised.
Viola Schulze Dieckhoff: In addition, at that time all activities were being 
directed towards Halle city centre, and the east of Halle was more or less 
written off. Efforts were supposed to be concentrated elsewhere.
Hendryk von Busse: Back then, the city had no development concept for the 
district. Accordingly, there were no plans that our plans maybe didn’t fit in 
with, which is often a way of legitimising the prohibition of other plans. The 
city’s failure to tackle the neighbourhood therefore left it basically unable to 
act. 
So when we arrived with our approach, there was at first a certain amount 
of tolerance. The neighbourhood developed very well and also grew strongly. 
Many houses were renovated, many people moved in, more citizens became 
actively involved in the area. The city also noticed this and came under pres-
sure because things quickly became embarrassing – as the neighbourhood 
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became more visible so too did the city’s failure to act and this was also dis-
cussed by the media. I think this is why attitudes changed in Halle’s urban 
planning, so there was a willingness to say that we’re now going to do some-
thing special, not simply designate a redevelopment area and not simply hire 
a classic urban planning office to produce a development concept. Now we’ll 
take the step of trying a civic neighbourhood concept in order to test public 
participation as a maxim and also to learn from it. This laboratory, which we 
had initiated, could then be continued in this way.
What would you like to see in the planning from the point of view of the creatives 
and artists?
Viola Schulze Dieckhoff: What planners from the administration keep tell-
ing me behind closed doors is that if they wanted to do something different, 
it would be overturned by the city council, if not before. They’re always at the 
mercy of the political process and the city council decisions. I believe that 
planning could or should act differently and contribute more to the political 
opinion-forming process. In my opinion, the professional field of planning 
should not only include consensus building, but should also communicate 
more facts, bringing out what actually needs to be done in the city and thus 
fuelling the discourse. With a vigilant urban society, there would then be 
more opportunities for progressive city council decisions to be made. And 
art and artistic creation are also good starting points so planners can see that 
it’s necessary to promote places of creation more, because art is an essential 
building block of democracy, important for democratic negotiation.
We’ve often discussed the idea of the ‘Bannwald’ [protected area of wood-
land], that is, an area where you leave things so that something new can nat-
urally develop. Transferring something like this to the city could mean cre-
ating a kind of ‘cultural conservation area’ and introducing a corresponding 
land-use category into formal planning, at the regional and municipal levels. 
Land could also be set aside as commons and for the community economy. 
Planners could become opinion leaders in a negotiation process.
If you were awarded an unconditional grant for an art project related to post-growth 
and space, funding you for a year and providing all the resources you needed, what 
kind of project would you be most excited about?
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Viola Schulze Dieckhoff: I’d be particularly interested in a project on the very 
current issue of ‘climate adaptation and mobility’. I’d find it very interest-
ing to make the analyses and plans we’ve discussed visible in urban space. 
Which areas will particularly heat up, where there’s a danger of f looding, etc. 
– and to present this artistically, perhaps with street markings, but also to 
use formats of exchange with the public to inform and ref lect on the issues 
and to collect people’s impressions. And this is linked to the question of how 
a change in mobility can be promoted. My creative place, the one that I’d then 
like to have, would be a mobile container unit in a car park, symbolising that 
every parking space we provide free of charge could alternatively be a place 
of productive creation that generates value for society. From my office in this 
car park, numerous artistic projects should then emerge that serve to pass on 
knowledge and trigger discussion.
Do you see a general tendency for art to be increasingly recognised by planning, pol-
itics and science as an important element in the social debate about space?
Hendryk von Busse: Initially, I’m inclined to say yes, people are interested 
and the role of art is recognised. By the way, I also think that all forms of 
growth criticism have become socially acceptable and can be found in jour-
nalistic opinion pieces of all political persuasions. But actually, I think that 
overall the answer is rather no, because only ‘good’ art is recognised and pro-
moted. Street art, unwanted graffiti and tags, on the other hand, are con-
sidered defacements. There are standardisations and designations for them 
that are really below the belt. We need to ask which art is wanted and rec-
ognised as engaging with space. My feeling is: the current discussions fur-
ther emphasise the value of beauty and thus narrow understandings of art.
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